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ABSTRACT 
 
INTEGRATION: 
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND NATION IN THE NEW 
GERMAN PUBLIC 
Kate Zambon 
Marwan Kraidy 
This dissertation examines public discourse on culture and integration and asks how do 
mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of national culture and 
identity that operate to represent and manage “Other” (immigrant, minority, etc.) 
populations in the German context? Through a case study approach, this dissertation uses 
critical discourse theory to analyze public campaigns, media events, and mediated 
controversies since the mid-2000s that sought to define the qualifications for cultural 
citizenship. Although in recent years an increasing number of publications have 
addressed Germany’s diverse and transnational population, examinations of processes 
and policies of integration have tended to focus either on the level of the government or 
on the level of everyday life. Although ideas about integration and multiculturalism are 
predominantly forged through events and the surrounding representations in the media, 
the mid-level processes of the media sphere have been neglected in scholarship. Using 
Foucault’s theories on biopolitics, I argue that integration discourse divides the 
population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, consisting of 
individuals with apparent immigrant heritage. This division sets up a neoliberal 
framework of perpetual evaluation that separates the productive from the threatening 
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integration candidates while reinforcing normative foundations of Germanness. This 
dissertation includes three sections. The first outlines two major foundations of German 
national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of Heimat and the rational, 
Enlightenment notion of Germany as a bastion of Western values. This section examines 
the historical and theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity and the place of 
“new Germans” within them. The second section examines the construction of “the new 
Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the media’s celebration of 
immigrant patriots and the emergence of “soccer patriotism.” The three chapters in this 
section examine three different cases in the media that illuminate the relationship 
between patriotism and productivity and the role of diversity in this new national 
formation. The third section analyzes media events that construct boundaries separating 
integration successes from failures. These cases expose the continuities linking 
celebrations and condemnations of immigrants and new Germans. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the turn of the millennium, “integration” has become a dominant concept in 
discussions about culture, politics and demographic development in Germany. Following 
a trend throughout Europe, German politicians since the turn of the millennium have 
condemned multiculturalism, claiming that it leads to social disintegration and parallel 
societies. This backlash rejects the legalistic and difference-oriented approach of 
multiculturalism, blaming it for harming social cohesion and preventing minority groups 
from becoming normal and productive members of society. At the same time, critics of 
multiculturalism also reject the assimilationist approach that was critiqued for repressing 
difference during the rise of multiculturalism at the end of the 20th century. 
Multiculturalism is framed as the opposite of assimilationism, which is portrayed as the 
pursuit of equality through the stripping away of cultural difference. Integration is 
proposed as the humane middle ground between multiculturalist segregation and 
oppressive assimilationist forms of equality (Geissler & Pöttker, 2006). However, what 
this middle ground looks like is almost never explicitly defined. Across the political 
spectrum, integration is an extremely flexible signifier. As a result, integration is easily 
instrumentalized for diverse political, social, and economic projects.  
Integration is defined in the media using, on the one hand, “examples of 
successful integration” and, on the other, tales and statistics of masses of “integration-
refusers” and socially deficient parallel societies. Representations of immigrants and 
“new Germans” within integration discourse have also been crucial in creating the 
conception of a new cosmopolitan period in German history: one defined by unity, 
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tolerance, and a renewed sense of national pride. At the same time, the celebration of 
“beneficial” forms of difference co-exists easily with condemnations of threatening forms 
of difference, often within the same discussion. Although integration has emerged as an 
explicit political priority and as the leitmotiv of public discussions on citizenship and the 
national character of Germany as in many parts of Europe, the term has attracted little 
critical attention in scholarship.  
This dissertation critically examines patterns and themes of mediated public 
discourse on culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national 
core and managing difference. Discourse is the communicative space where meaning is 
produced, reproduced, and modified (see Stuart Hall, 1997a). In this regard, integration 
projects, campaigns, and debates have provided the framework for new constructions of 
German identity. The selective inclusion and celebration of minority Germans and 
immigrants has contributed to a new cosmopolitan version of Germanness, while at the 
same time obscuring structures that support the reproduction of disproportionate social 
and economic disadvantage among non-normative populations. Integration discourse is 
part of a new iteration of citizenship in Germany guided by rules of utility and 
productivity. This approach rejects the legalistic, rights-based approach of 
multiculturalism, with its focus on the right to difference. Instead, it follows biopolitical 
criteria that place the body and life at the center of politics (Lemke, 2011, p. 116). One 
becomes part of the German population by contributing to the well-being of society.  
From the beginning, citizenship was a mechanism of regulating populations 
(Hindess, 2000). In Germany, the stability of citizenship laws and norms has been a point 
of consistency in a nation-state that has undergone frequent, radical change. Through 
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Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and divided Germany, the 
citizenship laws established in 1913 remained largely the same.1 Recent changes break 
this stasis on two fronts: external pressure is introduced as freedom of movement for all 
European Union citizens opens the possibility of poorer populations seeking opportunity 
in the relatively wealthy Germany, and internal pressure results from the admission of 
new populations of “strangers” (Simmel, 1950) to the roles of German citizenry. The 
actual magnitude and empirical impact of these pressures is not as important as the 
perception that these changes raise fundamental questions about who “we” are. As a 
result of these changes, latent biopolitical underpinnings of citizenship have surfaced and 
been made explicit through public debates on migration, integration, and patriotism.  
What before was taken for granted in terms of citizenship is now explicitly 
considered. While the question of the correct relationship between the nation (Volk) and 
the German state was a perennial concern after the defeat of the fascist model of the 
Third Reich, the descent-based definition of German citizenship was not contentious. 
Whereas the primary question used to be if and how Germans can be proud to be German 
(as opposed to having regional pride), the question is now, “Who are we?” In the shift 
from the first question to the second, concern shifted from the limitation of state power 
over subjectivity by emphasizing the distinction between nation and state (with the final 
power in the hands of “the people”), to the character of the nation itself. In the space 
                                                          
 
 
 
1
 An exception was the revocation and subsequent reinstatement of citizenship from Jews and other “non-
Aryan” Germans during the Third Reich.  
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created by this shift, the State has stepped in with a new set of answers: “we” are those 
who act for the good of the population. “You are Germany” (see Chapter 4) when you are 
a productive, positive, and helpful citizen, regardless of race, religion, or ability. 
The dawn of the new millennium in Germany brought the culmination of historic 
changes related to several forms of integration. In the decade after the reunification of 
East and West Germany in 1990, the unified Federal Republic solidified an external shift 
toward supranational economic and political integration by adopting the new currency of 
the European Union and by accepting of member state citizens’ rights to move and work 
in Germany. At the same time, Germany addressed the internal integration of foreign-
nationals by providing, for the first time since 1913, territory-based jus soli citizenship 
for the children of long-term immigrants born in Germany. Despite the rapid growth of 
the foreign-national population in the post-war period, especially through guest worker 
programs, until 2000 a child could only acquire German citizenship by descent from a 
German parent. Naturalization was technically possible as of 1989, but was complicated 
and rare (Abraham, 2008, p. 148). Since, with the exception of voting, permanent non-
national residents had the same rights and access to the same public benefits as nationals, 
there was little motivation to pursue naturalization. With a few notable exceptions, the 
naturalization policies of authorities in state governments ranged from ambivalent to 
obstructionist.  
The citizenship law that went into effect in 2000 broke new ground by 
acknowledging that individuals born and raised in Germany were not, after all, 
foreigners. However, the late acknowledgement of immigrants and their children as a 
durable part of German society has also led to terminological awkwardness that persists 
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to the present. The terms guest worker, foreigner, migrant, and the oxymoronic foreign 
co-citizen (ausländische Mitbürger) have been joined by the technocratic term “person 
with a migration background” (Mensch mit Migrationshintergrund). More recently, the 
terms “new German” and “post-migrant” have emerged as emic alternatives among 
transnational Germans. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will generally use the term 
immigrants for foreign-born individuals who have settled in Germany and minority as a 
broad term for people of color or those with otherwise apparent non-German ancestry. 
These terms are also problematic and hopelessly insufficient for capturing the diverse 
histories and experiences of people who are not automatically identified as normative 
Germans. In the United States and Great Britain, the use of the term minority has been 
productively criticized as obscuring crucial differences between groups, as disempowing, 
and as supporting the normativity of whiteness (Aspinall, 2002; Cross, 2009; Okolosie, 
Harker, Green, & Dabiri, 2015). These debates over preferred terminology for non-
normative or minoritized groups are important opportunities to assess and critique current 
dynamics of language and power. At the same time, a definitive answer as to the “right” 
way to discuss white supremacy and racial categorizations is impossible, since discourses 
of normativity and difference are dynamic and must be constantly revisited in context. 
My preference for using the heuristic terms minority and normative is meant to draw 
attention to the process of distinction and fragmentation, rather than to describe actual 
groups of people. In this sense, they are meant as shorthand for the processual terms 
minoritized and normalized. The emphasis on the process of fragmentation makes space 
for considering commonalities across national and historical contexts without necessarily 
erasing the particularity of each case or the phenomenological experience of this process.  
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While the barriers to legal citizenship for long-term immigrants and German-born 
people of all backgrounds have fallen significantly, their representation in the public 
sphere reflects the precariousness of their position in the national social imaginary. 
Although access to citizenship brought this population into the legal framework of the 
nation, national discussions about immigrants and “new Germans” have produced a 
hierarchy of citizenship based on “efforts at integration” (Integrationsleistungen). In 
practice, integration is used as a metonym for economic success. At the same time, 
integration is framed as a choice, equally available to all. To refuse to integrate is to 
choose a life of economic insecurity at the margins of society. The predominance of 
Manichean models for the representation of minority Germans allows their co-optation 
for the promotion of a “new colorful Germany,” even while simultaneously mobilizing 
the image of the “bad migrant” to promote the normative legitimacy of the values of the 
German majority. As such, these discussions are as much about the definition and 
fortification of the German nation as they are about immigrants or new Germans 
themselves.  
This dissertation investigates the promotion and negotiation of the German nation 
in a new age of supra- and transnational integration. It addresses questions including: 
Under what conditions are new Germans—that is, those that have only been entitled to 
citizenship since the introduction of jus soli citizenship and naturalization law—
celebrated and placed at the center of the national public? How has the admission of new 
populations into the German social body, or demos, changed the categories of belonging? 
Why do sports play such a prominent role in integration policy and public discussion? 
What role do representations of new Germans play in processes of national narration? 
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How is integration implicated within projects to promote a “positive” and “healthy” 
relationship between the population and the idea of the German nation? Encompassing 
these concerns, the central research question for my dissertation is: 
How do mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of 
national culture and identity that operate to represent and manage Other 
(immigrant, minority, etc.) populations in the German context?  
Specifically, this dissertation analyzes public campaigns, events, and mediated 
controversies that define the meaning of Germanness and the qualifications for national 
belonging. In particular, it focuses on the function of mediated discourses of culture and 
integration for the management and regulation of populations within Europe and its most 
powerful member state: Germany.  
 The cases examined in this dissertation include the media campaigns that 
promulgated patriotism in preparation for hosting the FIFA 2006 World Cup and 
mediated discussions celebrating “soccer patriotism” during the tournament, the media 
coverage of a battle between anti-nationalist activists and German flag waving 
immigrants in Berlin, the dueling scandals following the release of an anti-Muslim book 
by politician Thilo Sarrazin, and the mobilization of minority celebrities in media 
industry programs in the name of integration. These cases, which I will outline in more 
detail at the end of this introduction, represent key moments in the definition of 
Germany’s approach to diversity and difference in the decade following the 
implementation of birthright citizenship. Through these cases, I argue that the recent 
development of integration policy and discourse can be best understood through 
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Foucault’s theories of biopolitics. Thomas Lemke consolidates the shifting notions of 
biopolitics developed by Michel Foucault into three major uses:  
First, biopolitics stands for a historical rupture in political thinking and practice 
that is characterized by a rearticulation of sovereign power. Second, Foucault 
assigns to biopolitical mechanisms a central role in the rise of modern racism. A 
third meaning of the concept refers to a distinctive art of government that 
historically emerges with liberal forms of social regulation and individual self-
governance (2011, p. 34). 
In relation to the first usage, integration provides an alternative to the politics of rights 
and contestation proposed in multicultural and deliberative democratic approaches. 
Instead of raising new political questions and proposing new political structures, 
integration eschews deliberative political engagement in favor of goals derived from 
social and natural scientific knowledge relating to the optimization of the life of the 
population (Lemke, 2011, p. 33). Consequently, integration policy focuses more on the 
self-governance and social regulation inherent in sports participation than on developing 
better forums for political contestation and complex cultural dialogue (Benhabib, 2002). 
Finally, the scientific and rationalist modes of evaluation used to determine a group’s 
level of integration contribute to a form of colorblind racism that fragments the 
population into the categories of the worthy and the unworthy.  
Building on Foucault’s work, Agamben argues that biopolitics implies an ongoing 
process of reassessment. “It is as if every valorization and every ‘politicization’ of 
life…necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life 
ceases to be politically relevant…and can be eliminated without punishment” (1998, p. 
139). Although Sarrazin is not calling explicitly for the death of Muslim Germans—in 
fact, his policy recommendations are quite moderate—he argues that their existence and 
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proliferation in Germany poses a fundamental threat to the nation. The implication is that 
for the health of the nation, Muslims who fail to “integrate” must not be encouraged to 
thrive. Whether the context is celebratory or condemnatory, integration involves constant 
reassessment. The praise of the multicultural elements of the national team in a successful 
tournament does not exempt differentially marked players from heightened scrutiny of 
their dedication in the wake of a poor performance (see Chapter 2). 
Sports in Germany have provided a forum for national self-construction since 
their mobilization in the effort to educate and mold patriotic national citizens in the 
Turner Movement beginning in the nineteenth century (Krüger, 1987). With the rise of 
international sporting spectacles in the twentieth centry, German soccer and Olympic 
sports became emblems of national power on the world stage—as in the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics—and of the recovery of national pride on the domestic level—as with the 
legendary upset victory of the West German national team in the 1954 FIFA World Cup. 
With the emergence of integration discourse, sports have once again emerged as a key 
forum for reconstructing German national identity in response to contemporary political 
and social developments. With the help of familiar narrative forms in the field of sports, 
integration has become a “nodal point” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) at the center of 
discourses of nationalism and Otherness. This includes a complex of different chains of 
association in which migration is not an action or experience, but the trace of foreignness 
that remains identifiable by normative society. As this cases in this dissertation show, 
sports and celebrity athletes emerge time and again within integration discourse. The 
chapters in this dissertation examine why sports provide such an effective forum for 
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explicating discourses of integration as part of the larger process of policing borders of 
national identity and managing difference. 
While sports provide a key forum, it is not enough to consider integration 
discourse only in the field of sports. Discourse around sports and integration reveals how 
particular forms of difference are rendered (temporarily) valuable and apolitical. At the 
same time, we also need to consider how articulations of integration made explicit in 
sports travel within a more dispersed field of public controversies and projects targeting 
integration. These complementary cases reveal hierarchies and contingencies within 
integration discourse. By viewing these cases together, we see that while integration 
discourse addresses all those with identifiable traces of foreignness, it also supports a 
distinction between minorities, with Muslims as the paradigmatic figure of difference. 
Islam functions here not as a religion but as a racial distinction couched in the discourse 
of cultural “differentialism” (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991).  
The dichotomy of good patriotic immigrants versus problem immigrants depends 
on an ongoing process of reassessment in the public sphere, one where the value of 
persons to the nation is constantly under evaluation, depending on how well these persons 
fit the ideals of integration. The key idea that sets the parameters for judgment, in both 
celebratory and condemnatory modes, are the metrics of productivity defined in 
integration discourse. As such it is possible to represent a segment of the population as a 
threat, while still holding up and celebrating those that break the mold of their cultural 
group to become fully integrated members of the healthy, productive national population. 
This dissertation examines these associations as they emerge and reproduce themselves in 
the context of media spectacles and controversies. These events, and related public 
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campaigns, have created new national narratives based on the renegotiation of German 
belonging to include civic nationalism and to take advantage of internal diversity. This 
introduction outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks for this dissertation, 
concluding with an outline of the chapters. 
Theoretical Framework 
Across Europe, the past two decades have seen a concerted backlash against 
multiculturalism. At the same time, integration has arisen as the new leitmotif of 
discourse about immigration and religious and cultural diversity both in individual 
countries and at the level of the European Union. To understand this convergence in 
European discourse, I review the ideas about universalism and particularism to identify 
continuities in European thought with ideas developed at the dawn of the modern age. I 
also consider how these discourses contribute to an apparently paradoxical double notion 
of culture that explains away the contradictions of capitalism as an economic system, 
legitimating the disproportionate cultural and political influence of European and Euro-
American states. But while discussions of the negotiation of universalism and 
particularism dominate debates about how to manage internal diversity, a subtler form of 
biopolitical rationality operates in parallel to justify the acceptance of some groups and 
the exclusion of others according to notions of fitness. This flexible process of 
categorization includes multiple forms of difference, but converges with, and is 
ultimately inseparable from, racist projects.  
Against Multiculturalism 
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In October 2010, in a statement that echoed through the German media-sphere 
and beyond, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared multiculturalism to be a complete 
failure. Although this statement was widely discussed and repeated, it is hardly original—
neither in Germany nor in Europe’s other increasingly diverse countries. On the contrary, 
one blogger outlined “the eternal death of multiculturalism,” linking to over a dozen such 
proclamations by German politicians since 2001 (American Viewer, 2011). As Vertovec 
and Wessendorf observe, “since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise, ubiquity, 
simultaneity and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism have been 
striking” (2010, p. 1). In these critiques, multiculturalism has been constructed as a 
cohesive and dogmatic concept that fosters segregation and social disintegration by 
catering to immigrants and allowing them to maintain their illiberal tendencies. The 
frequency and strength of the multiculturalism backlash has made the word itself into a 
political taboo.2  
At the same time, despite the excision of the term from political and policymaking 
discourse, throughout Europe the backlash against multiculturalism has not appreciably 
changed the content of policies themselves (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010, p. 27). In 
most cases, policy changes have been moderate, even as public debates have grown 
increasingly hot. Although, as recent European Parliament elections and the UK vote to 
                                                          
 
 
 
2 For example, whereas the German government’s inaugural “National Integration Plan” from 2006 used 
the word “integration” 1,215 times, “multicultural” appears only 3 times, and only in adjective form 
(“Bundesregierung | Nationaler Integrationsplan,” n.d.). 
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leave the European Union suggest, heated debates and rhetoric against immigrants and, in 
particular, Muslims may be eroding this moderation in policy. In these debates, 
multiculturalism is typically rejected in favor of “integration.” As integration has become 
a keyword in public discussions about internal difference throughout Europe (Joppke, 
2007), it has remained a concept without a definition. Integration is a signifier that does 
not have or need a signified to function. It is a floating signifier that “absorbs rather than 
emits meaning” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 173), a vehicle onto which multiple, and even 
contradictory, meanings are projected. Thus, the meaning it carries from case to case is 
reflective of the social systems that created it rather than of any essential or real 
phenomenon. Accordingly, within the process of national reproduction in Europe, 
integration discourse provides a space for national self-reflection through and against 
differentially marked internal populations.  
Because of its fundamentally amorphous nature, integration must be examined 
through its mobilization: through what it does as opposed to what it is (Lentin, 2014). 
The fluidity of integration as a signifier is one of its strongest rhetorical characteristics. 
Since the concrete impact of the public discourse against multiculturalism can be 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine, an examination of discourses around integration 
or against multiculturalism may be more productively considered in terms of their 
contribution to the construction of public logics. By analyzing how integration is 
deployed in German public discourse, this dissertation provides fresh insight into how 
differentially marked populations are defined and discursively managed in Germany. 
As the formal barriers to citizenship have become more permeable, integration 
discourse has contributed to new forms of “exclusive inclusion” (Ong, 2003; Partridge, 
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2012). Here I am not interested in integration as a process per se. Nor am I concerned 
with determining whether it is failing or succeeding. Rather than judging the success or 
failure of nation-states to integrate differentially marked populations, my concern is to 
unravel the political and economic rationalities supported by integration discourse. In 
short, this dissertation explores how integration talk functions to constantly reevaluate the 
worthiness and value of a group or individual member, as well as to reinstate and 
legitimatize the normative values of the nation. 
Universalism and the Politics of Difference  
From a theoretical perspective, questions around equality and difference have 
traditionally revolved around the relative importance of universal human capacities and 
needs versus the importance of the particular identity of the individual, and by extension, 
the cultural group (Taylor, 2005). Both positions focus on the development of individual 
capacity through the realization of a coherent subjectivity, but they differ in their 
conceptions of the source of this true subjectivity. The cosmopolitan, universalist position 
emphasizes a form of unifying inner rationality that can overcome differences between 
individuals and groups. The particularist position emphasizes the differences between 
peoples as the source of the unique abilities and capacities of group members. For the 
former, group-based pressure to conform threatens to overwhelm the internal voice of 
truth that is the source of subjectivity. For the latter, unique group-based modes of 
thought and action enrich the soil in which the authentic self grows.  
Charles Taylor outlines how this arises from a tension in the relationship between 
two shifts in self-conception under modernity. The first change emerged from the 
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collapse of honor-based social hierarchies. Against honor, the modern notion of universal 
and egalitarian “dignity,” or eventually “citizen dignity” took hold (2005, p. 466). The 
honor-based system depended on exclusivity. For honor to hold meaning, it must be 
accorded only to the deserving few. Dignity, on the other hand, derived its meaning from 
its universality. Dignity arises from the belief in the innate capacities of all people. At the 
same time, the subjective turn of the 18th century bound the idea of “the good” to the 
idea of being true to oneself. Taylor identifies Rousseau as the most influential articulator 
of this shift. “Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our following a 
voice of nature within us. This voice is often drowned out by the passions that are 
induced by our dependence on others... Salvation comes from recovering authentic moral 
contact with ourselves” (Taylor, 2005, p. 467). As God and divine right lost their place as 
the source of moral and social orders, the self became the source of the good. Morality 
became a matter of heeding the voice of nature within us.  
In this line of thought, it is a person's calling to live in an original way, not in 
imitation of anyone else's life. “It accords moral importance to a kind of contact with 
myself, with my own inner nature" (Taylor, 2005, p. 468). However, there is a 
fundamental conflict within the ideal of inwardly generated selves, since the very 
frameworks on which they depend are externally generated and dialogically maintained. 
Since the identity of the individual is necessarily dialogical, this identity also involves 
group identities. The languages of self-determination are acquired through interaction 
with others and, I would add, in conversation with discourses circulating in the mediated 
public sphere. Taylor argues that "we define our identity always in dialogue with, 
sometimes in struggle against the things our significant others want to see in us" (Taylor, 
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2005, p. 469). This mimetic mode of self formation (Taussig, 1992) also involves the 
reification of the categories of difference that are organized under the banner of culture.  
Building on Rousseau’s liberal Enlightenment ideals of internal morality, Herder 
and other German Romantic thinkers reoriented ideals of individuality to apply to 
differences between groups, introducing a hermeneutic circle between the cultural group 
and the self as the source of morality and truth. The Romantics took over Rousseau’s 
concept of popular sovereignty, but added to it the conviction that the source of the 
authentic self springs from the distinct organic nation to which the individual belongs. As 
William Wilson summarizes, “Herder believed that humanity was something man could 
achieve only as a member of a nation and that nations could arrive at humanity only if 
they remained true to their national characters, or souls” (1973, p. 823). This notion of 
progress through national self-actualization requires each nation to develop its unique 
abilities to contribute to the larger progress of humanity. Thus, the ideal of authenticity 
framed the differences between human beings as a matter of moral significance since the 
failure to live an authentic, fully realized life is to betray one’s duty to the nation, and by 
extension, humankind. However, as Robert Young (1995) shows, this conceptualization 
of progress through the contributions of unique national cultures also produces a 
fundamental paradox.  
While on the one hand colonization and racial mixture are regarded by Herder as 
introducing a fatal heterogeneity, on the other the very progress of mankind 
comes as a result of diffusionism, or cultural mixing and communication, 
whereby cultural achievements of one society are grafted onto another. (R. 
Young, 1995, p. 38) 
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In other words, for each culture’s unique talents to contribute to progress at the level of 
humanity, those contributions must be picked up and incorporated into other cultures. 
This diffusion and the necessary hybridization that results are both necessary and 
dangerous to the mission of humanity as Herder conceptualizes it. Young uses Herder's 
work to show how the idea of culture has always been fraught, ambivalent, and divided 
against itself. Moreover, hybridization has always been desired and feared, characterized 
both as the great hope and the potential downfall of Western “civilization.”  
 Whereas Rousseau’s universalistic and cosmopolitan conception of culture 
dominated in France, as German intellectuals sought to construct the historical and social 
legitimacy for the unification of German speaking states, they relied on Herder’s 
universal national particularism as a normative foundation. These two approaches to 
constructing modern nationalism involve divergent positions regarding questions of 
difference. The liberal French position, which was famously elaborated by Ernest Renan 
in the late 19th century, focused on the primacy of voluntaristic association. For Renan, 
linguistic, historical, religious or geographic difference was not essential for the 
foundation of the nation (1990). In this view, the difference is irrelevant for public issues; 
the cultural neutrality of the public sphere ensures the freedom and equality of all 
citizens. The nation necessarily includes difference within its borders. However, that 
difference is not a threat to the nation since it is subordinated to the “daily plebiscite” 
through which the people identify with national memory and grant their consent to be 
governed.  
For the German Romantic approach, however, difference posed a more 
complicated challenge. As Young observes, Herder considers contact—the exchange of 
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ideas between distinct groups—as necessary for human progress. However, difference 
that was deemed “out of place” or improperly consolidated posed a threat to the full 
realization of a people’s potential. Individuals and groups who were separated from their 
nation geographically, and who acquired the languages and customs of other nations were 
a sign of the failure of their true nation to develop its own authentic virtues. “The stability 
of a nation,” said Herder,   
which does not forsake itself, but builds and continues to all build upon itself, 
gives a definite direction to the endeavors of its members. But other peoples, 
because they have not found themselves, must seek their salvation in foreign 
nations, serving them, thinking their thoughts; they forget even the times of their 
glory, of their own proven feats, always desiring, never succeeding, always 
lingering on the threshold." (quoted in Wilson, 1973, p. 823)  
It follows that the immigrant or national minority group is doomed to permanently 
inhabit a liminal space, separated from their authentic selves and prevented from reaching 
their full potential. Instead they must languish, longing for their true selves and 
subordinate to the more fully actualized members of the autochthonous nation. German 
speaking Romantic intellectuals saw this as defining the fractured, dispersed and state-
less German nation in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Although the dangerous and even 
genocidal possibilities of this type of national ideology became clear during the age of 
European fascism, Romantic conceptions of authentic, organic nations remain influential. 
For example, while the essentialist and eugenicist implications of this type of nationalism 
were harshly critiqued in the aftermath of the defeat of National Socialism, the idea of the 
homeland as the source of the fully actualized, authentic self persist in the idea of 
Heimat, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
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While the development of French and German approaches to nationalism 
emphasize different aspects, nationalist frameworks necessarily contain both voluntaristic 
and primordialist elements. Attempts to draw a hard distinction between them often end 
up reinforcing the familiar normative distinction between bad nationalism and good 
patriotism (Yack, 1996). However, the tensions between and within these two lines of 
thought still characterizes debates over how to conceptualize and respond to diversity 
within the nation-state. In states where national projects have been most successful, these 
debates emerge most frequently in relation to debates about how to respond to national 
minorities and newcomers or, in Georg Simmel’s terms, “strangers” (1950). In these 
cases, the existence of the nation as a meaningful category is taken for granted. What is 
up for discussion is if, and under what conditions, strangers should be allowed to 
participate in and even possibly alter the national project.  
Multiculturalism and the “Universalist Masquerade” 
Among both proponents and critics of multiculturalism, the emphasis on culture 
as a source of authenticity and social solidarity is burdened by a moralism and an 
essentialism that is difficult to escape. As important as it is to maintain the “right to be 
different” while still confirming the right to belong (Rosaldo, 1997), public talk about 
cultural politics must inevitably overdetermine the outlines of culture in order to make 
claims. Furthermore, the “right to be different” can just as easily be mobilized from the 
hegemonic position to argue for the right to exclude those whose difference threatens to 
enter and change its authentic national culture.  
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As Immanuel Wallerstein argued in his influential essay, Culture as the 
Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System  (1990), the apparent paradox of 
the universalist and particularist conceptions of culture is actually a symbiosis. Although 
in different conceptions one definition may predominate over the other, both uses of 
culture are at work wherever cultural politics are in play. The particularist usage (usage I) 
defines culture as "the set of characteristics which distinguish one group from another" 
(1990, p. 33). This usage, which Herder emphasizes, sees culture as based on the history 
of each group. Each group has its own equally legitimate and historically grounded 
culture. The second usage (usage II) is the evaluative and hierarchical type. This is the 
universalist, transcendental notion of culture, the Arnoldian “sweetness and light,” which 
holds that the products and values of cultures (in the particularist sense) can be compared 
by universal measures.  
Across these definitions, echoes of both Rousseau and Herder reverberate, of 
Enlightenment and Romanticism. While different political philosophies prioritize 
different uses of “culture”, Wallerstein shows how the presence of both elements is 
necessary for the logics of the modern political, social and economic system. Here 
“culture” is the idea-system that has resulted from our “collective historical attempts to 
come to terms with the contradictions, the ambiguities, the complexities of the socio-
political system” (1990, p. 38). Wallerstein writes that 
we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage I) as the 
assertion of unchanging realities amidst a world that is in fact ceaselessly 
changing. And we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage 
II) as the justification of the inequities of the system, as the attempt to keep them 
unchanging in a world which is ceaselessly threatened by change. (1990, p. 39) 
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Cultural politics set the parameters for how social problems are assessed and sustain the 
logical framework for solving problems and assessing individual agency and 
responsibility. This symbiotic but contradictory use of culture smooths over the 
contradictions within the system, occluding the fact that inequality is not simply an 
unfortunate byproduct of progress that will be ameliorated as the system expands, but is 
rather at the very heart of the system.  
Thus, a belief in universalism suggests that all people are equally able to achieve 
success according to transcendent measures, while culture in the evaluative sense is 
mobilized to explain the disproportionate success of some groups over others. But as 
Taylor points out and Wallerstein elaborates, the universalism of modern liberal 
democracy has thus far been a European Universalism.  “It is not that there may not be 
global universal values. It is rather that we are far from yet knowing what these values 
are. Global universal values are not given to us; they are created by us. The human 
enterprise of creating such values is the great moral enterprise of humanity” (Wallerstein, 
2006, p. 28). Cultural politics form the foundation upon which the contemporary world 
economic and political system is constructed as well as the tools for its maintenance and 
reproduction. The move towards a more universal form of universalism requires a critical 
approach toward claims made about culture and difference in the public sphere.  
Moving Away from Culturalism in Public Discourse 
From conflicts over the permissibility of certain forms of religious dress to the 
right of parents to deny potentially life-saving care for children, liberal democracies face 
increasing challenges in navigating the terrain between recognizing the claims of 
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individuals or groups to maintain cultural traditions and protecting the rights of 
individuals whose autonomy these practices threaten. To address these cross-cultural 
challenges, Seyla Benhabib (2002) proposes a deliberative democratic model based on 
contestation and justification in the public sphere. Benhabib’s conception of publics 
resists automatically assigning cultural definitions to individuals over other forms of 
identification that they may prefer. She also resists the idea of privileging a priori the 
claims of ethno-cultural groups over those of other publics. For Benhabib, all groups 
should have an equal right to contestation. This is particularly important since the 
recognition of cultural claims often conflicts with the rights of disempowered groups like 
women and children. 
In this regard, I would propose that in thinking about deliberative democracy it 
might be helpful to move away from “cultures” in political discussions in favor of the 
term publics. This would help address Benhabib’s concern about the prioritization of one 
group’s cultural claims over the claims of other groups. Also inherent in the idea of 
publics is constituency not through birth but through action. To be a member of a public 
is to actively engage. This is also conducive to the principles Benhabib outlines to guide 
multicultural pluralist arrangements: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and 
freedom of exit and association (2002, p. 131). As Fraser (1990) argues, multiple publics 
are not only possible, but essential to deliberative democracy. Benhabib’s framework 
promotes the kinds of communications across lines of cultural difference that Fraser sees 
as both problematic and highly desirable, and it does so without requiring the “bracketing 
of differences” that Fraser rightly criticizes in the Habermasian model. Benhabib does not 
advocate ignoring or suppressing differences, but instead sees the struggle to understand 
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difference through complex cultural dialogue as holding the answers to multicultural 
dilemmas.  
One area of concern that Benhabib does not sufficiently address, however, is the 
informal impediments to equal access to the public sphere posed by social inequality. 
This is another aspect of the Habermasian deliberative democratic approach most 
frequently highlighted by critics (Fraser, 1990). Even in the absence of formal exclusions, 
and in a system designed to encourage the participation of multiple publics, factors 
related to social status impact the likelihood of less powerful groups to participate. 
Margaret Kohn addresses this in her critique of deliberative democracy. Kohn asks whose 
voice predominates in public discourse, and answers with statistics showing that the more 
intensive the form of participation,3 the greater the tendency to over represent high-status 
members of society. Holding speech as the predominant medium of deliberative 
democracy privileges parties with the greatest command of linguistic resources. Kohn 
asserts that a whole repertoire of tactics must be included to achieve a more egalitarian 
public sphere. To bring together and expand on Benhabib and Kohn’s theories, I would 
argue that the key aspect of deliberation is reflective communication. There is no reason 
the definition of deliberation must be limited to dialogic discussion. Deliberation can take 
the form of political satire, grassroots mobilization, protest, or political art. It can be 
                                                          
 
 
 
3
 By “intensive” Kohn and those she cites are referring to the level of active, original participation involved 
in a political activity. Voting, which follows strict, uniform procedures, is one of the least intensive forms. 
Forms that require face-to-face speech and public debate are considered the most intensive. 
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enacted in films or on television, in the style of tragedy, comedy, or tragicomedy. The 
essential characteristic that allows it to serve the cause of deliberative democracy is 
reflective communication. Since many of these forms are broadly accessible, they are 
more likely to engage a variety of affected parties. Meeting around a table or in a town 
hall for verbal deliberation is no less important; however, to neglect to consider other 
modes of deliberative communication is to see only part of the picture.  
This brings me to the limitations of the present investigation. By focusing on 
discourse in the mediated public sphere, this dissertation analyzes only part of the picture. 
For the most part, the sorts of flexible and creative spaces for contestation hinted at above 
will not be analyzed here. The justification for this critical omission is that my interest 
and focus here are the strategic logics of normative, or hegemonic, publics. The 
contribution of this type of analysis is to help clarify the evolution of predominant forms 
of common sense and to highlight the strategic, rather than natural, logics that support 
them. It is an attempt to follow Wallerstein’s call to historicize our intellectual analysis, 
and  
To place the reality we are immediately studying within the larger context: the 
historical structure within which it fits and operates. We can never understand the 
detail if we do not understand the pertinent whole, since we can never otherwise 
appreciate exactly what is changing, how it is changing, and why it is changing. 
(2006, pp. 82–83) 
While in the present project I will not pretend to capture the totality of “the pertinent 
whole,” I will attempt to follow the lines of thought and knowledge from their 
articulation in the immediate context of public events back to the historical and 
systematic discourses that make them make sense. At the same time, it is important to 
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remember what this focus omits. The spaces of contestation outside of hegemonic 
discourse are myriad. Counterpublics and alternative discursive logics exist alongside and 
make frequent incursions into the discursive space of the normative public sphere (Fraser, 
1990; Michael Warner, 2002). The focus here on the flexibility of hegemony in 
incorporating and taming contestations is not meant to deny the possibility of resistance 
and even of fundamental systemic change. As Wallerstein reminds us, the current 
capitalist world system is historical (2006, p. 28). Like all such systems it has a life cycle 
and, thus, at some point must also come to an end.  
Difference as a Matter of Productivity  
 As Taylor (1999) and Wallerstein (1990) argue, the strategic logics of 
universalism and particularism work in tandem to smooth out the contradictions of global 
capitalism and to justify the hegemony of certain systems of value and knowledge. 
Benhabib and Kohn provide two approaches to tackling the challenges of creating space 
for difference in the face of the hegemony of the public sphere in the singular. They 
move away from questions of cultural values to assert the need to support counter-
hegemonic public spheres and complex cultural dialogue. However, there is a third, and 
perhaps more powerful perspective at work in the discourse of integration: the 
biopolitical approach to governing that subverts dialogue and contestation in favor of a 
rational and utilitarian approach to integration.  
 For the biopolitical approach, the question of difference itself is not the most 
important issue up for discussion in debates about integration and difference. 
Multiculturalism holds that the right juridical framework balancing the demands of 
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universal equality with the right to difference can solve the problems of tensions between 
groups. The rejection of multiculturalism is not necessarily the rejection of difference, 
per se, but rather the rejection of the agonistic framework for managing difference. In 
focusing on the negotiation of rights and exceptions, multicultural and deliberative 
democratic approaches center on juridico-legal frameworks, focusing on particular cases 
of right and wrong, of permitted and prohibited, rather than on the larger and, from the 
biopolitical perspective, more crucial questions of the health and happiness of the 
population. Integration discourse is not about particular conflicts or claims, but rather 
about ideas of the health and vitality of society as a whole. The issues of particularism 
and universalism outlined above still circulate within discussions of difference. However, 
those who reject multiculturalism in favor of integration seek to replace practices of 
contestation valued by proponents of deliberative democracy with a biopolitical 
framework that values harmony, homeostasis, and productivity. This section outlines the 
development of the biopolitical techniques and forms of knowledge most fundamental for 
understanding integration as opposed to multiculturalism and deliberative democratic 
approaches to negotiating difference.  
Integration discourse has developed in Germany since the turn of the millennium 
in reaction to the inclusion of German-born Others into the citizenry at the legal level. 
However, the idea of integration as an issue does not appear for the first time in this 
period. In fact, the first call in the magazine Der Spiegel for Germany to develop an 
“integration policy” to address guest workers who were becoming “permanent guests” 
appeared in a special report on social inequality in 1970 (“KOMM, KOMM, KOMM - 
GEH, GEH, GEH,” 1970). Nevertheless, the imagined impermanence of the migrant 
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population persisted well into the 1990s, enabling a politics of denial in regards to 
Germany’s status as an immigrant country (see Süssmuth, 2001). It was only after 
citizenship law was changed in 2000 that questions of integration became a persistent 
public topic. Despite never having instituted a national policy regarding immigrant 
membership in society—multicultural, deliberative or otherwise—Germany took up the 
politics of integration just in time to join the wave of multiculturalism backlash crossing 
Europe.  
Despite its almost obsessive scrutiny of differentially marked groups, integration 
is not primarily a way to think about difference. Multiculturalism is myopically 
concerned with difference: the protection thereof, its representation and recognition, and 
the moderation of harms that can result from making exceptions to universal norms for 
this purpose. In contrast, integration is concerned with difference insofar as it relates to 
productivity and the welfare of national society. Above all, integration is a framework for 
thinking about the population, about the nation delimited by the territory of the state. 
Integration purports to be a route towards the construction of a better, more productive 
population. It is also a means of conceptualizing and managing threats to the population. 
Both tasks use difference as their axis, but the first treats difference as a source of life 
while the second revolves around difference as a threat to life that must managed or 
neutralized. In both cases, the subject of concern is the normative population, the nation.  
In contrast to multiculturalism and deliberative democracy, integration politics do 
not stem from the legal discourse of public rights, but instead relate to a concept of right 
based on productivity and a biopolitical notion of social value. Foucault (2003) correlates 
the development of this concept of public right with the emergence of two new forms of 
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power, disciplinary and biopolitical, which complement and partially displace sovereign 
power. Sovereignty, which traditionally belonged to the king, was the right of life and 
death. More precisely, it was the right to kill or let live since “sovereign power’s effect on 
life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill” (Foucault, 2003, p. 240). In Europe 
during late 18th and 19th centuries, industrialization and demographic explosion meant 
that sovereign power was no longer sufficient to govern the economic and political body 
of society. Such was the extent and rate of change that too many things were escaping the 
old mechanisms of sovereign power, both at the level of detail and at the mass level 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 249). Disciplinary mechanisms were introduced to take care of the 
details, to surveil and train the population. Biopolitical mechanisms were introduced to 
manage populations. Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, mechanisms of 
regulatory and disciplinary power extended across the domain of life, aided by the 
circulation of related norms. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I outline Foucault’s (2008) 
work showing how biopolitics became even more central in Germany in the postwar 
period as leaders in the West German Federal Republic sought a source of legitimacy for 
the new state. I then argue that integration is an extension of these biopolitical and 
neoliberal ideals through policies evaluating and managing difference.  
Race as Discursive Fragmentation: Death in a Politics of Life 
Since antagonism, war, and death can never be eliminated from the field of life, 
Foucault poses the question, “How can the power of death, the function of death, be 
exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?” (2003, p. 254). It is here that 
Foucault argues that racism intervenes. Foucault defines racism as “a way of introducing 
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a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what 
must live and what must die” (2003, p. 254). Although racism existed long before the 
modern state, under biopolitics it becomes a technology of power. Foucault defines race 
not by what it is, but by its function. He defines two major functions. As an analytic of 
history, in the approach to history as race war, race is the means of articulating 
antagonisms, historical injustices perpetrated by the sovereign against the nobility, 
understood as a race or nation. The second function arises when the discourse of race 
struggle is incorporated within the state rather than oriented against it (Foucault, 2003, p. 
81). Within state discourse race provides a means of fragmenting the population, of 
determining which populations must be made to live while others are left to die.  
It also transforms the older calculation of the relationship of war that “in order to 
live, you must take lives.” Racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between 
the life of the normative population and the death of the Other that is purely civil in 
nature. It is not the military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but rather the 
rational and civic calculation of the greater good (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It eliminates 
antagonism from this relationship by substituting a biological-type rationality that 
converts the us-them conflict into a calculation whereby as the inferior species die out, 
the stronger I—as a species rather than an individual—will be and the better I can live 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It is here, according to Foucault, that state racism appears: “a 
racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own 
products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of 
30 
 
the basic dimensions of social normalization” (2003, p. 62). In this way, racism is a 
requirement for the state to exercise sovereignty, which is to say, its right to kill.4  
Following this biopolitical version of race struggle, which is internal to state 
function, integration discourse eliminates conflict, since it denies the deliberative, 
agonistic rights and representation approach. Instead, it builds its approach around 
supposedly objective measures of population welfare. Integration itself becomes the 
marker of race, the means of fragmenting the population. The population is divided into 
two categories in relation to integration. First, there is the category of the nation, which 
stands in for the population. The integration status of the national does not need to be 
assessed. The national, the individual representative of the population, is the normative 
subject whose life is an indicator of the health and well-being of the population. The 
national is not evaluated in relation to integration since the national is the population. 
However, nationals may lose their unqualified status if they betray the 
evolutionary project of increasing national well-being. Although this form is rare in the 
cases at issue in this dissertation, this category of the failed German national emerged in 
the Sarrazin debate as a way to defuse the critique that Sarrazin’s book unfairly targets 
Muslims (see Chapter 6). To show that Sarrazin’s work is not racist, reviewers on 
Amazon point out that Sarrazin is just as critical of unproductive, low-intelligence 
                                                          
 
 
 
4 Here Foucault clarifies that with “killing,” he is not talking only about murder, but also indirect forms of 
death, such as “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, 
quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256).  
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Germans. However, this practice of separating the unproductive members from the 
valuable nationals is consistent with the population fragmentation Foucault outlines as 
part of state racism. The place of these unproductive nationals is illustrated by the trope 
of the Asozialen. The Duden dictionary defines asozial as 1) incapable of life in society, 
not fitting into society; living on the margins of society; 2) damaging to community, 
society; or 3) possessing a low intellectual, cultural level; uneducated and ill-bred 
(“asozial,” n.d.).i Asozial, or the slang version, assi, indicates a type of person who is 
harmful to society. Currently, it is primarily used in slang form as an insult.  
This term emerged in politics and jurisprudence in the early 20th century. The 
category of the asozial emerged as inseparable from hereditary and eugenicist thought. 
Under National Socialism, it was used to describe and then deport to concentration camps 
a category of social undesirables that included the heterogeneous groups of vagrants, 
beggars, mentally ill, alcoholics, addicts, work-averse (Arbeitsscheuen), nutritionally 
deficient, and prostitutes. Sinti and Roma were also grouped within the category of 
“Asozialen” (Willing, 2003, p. 1). The term continues to be used today in relation to the 
same referents. The Asozialer is not only outside the norms of society, but actually 
threatens the well-being of society or the population at large. In addition, they are often 
blamed for other social ills, such as racism and xenophobia (see Conclusion), relieving 
normative society of the burden of answering for the violence of the fragmentation of 
integration discourse. This term shares much with the American derogatory term “white 
trash,” both in terms of its present day usage and its emergence in 20th century eugenicist 
thought (see Newitz & Wray, 2013). The tropes of the asozial and of white trash 
disqualify individuals or classes from belonging to the category of society or the national. 
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As such, their life is no longer an indicator of the health of the population, but rather 
exists as a threat to the health of the population.  
Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics helps to explain not only these 
continuities between contemporary liberal democratic social categories and those of early 
20th century totalitarianism, but also the fundamental stakes involved in rights, political 
membership, and the construction and evaluation of social groups. Agamben argues that 
liberal democracy, using the juridical framework of rights, includes from its outset the 
possibility for totalitarianism. In the creation of the rights and protections of citizenship, 
the modern state created a new form of exception: the condition of statelessness. Through 
citizenship rights based in national membership, the nation-state separates bios—political 
life—from zoe—natural life. This separation creates a “zone of indistinction” and a form 
of life that lies beyond the protections of the political, but which, under conditions of 
modernity, cannot return to a natural form of life.  This is what Agamben refers to as bare 
life—life that has been stripped of all other qualities except for life itself (1998, p. 171). 
Furthermore, Agamben argues that it is not the qualified life of the citizen that modern 
democracy has situated as its referent. Instead, it has affirmed bare life (the right to life, 
health, happiness, satisfaction of needs) as the fundamental subject of politics. Politics 
under biopolitics is concerned with the determination of the value or nonvalue of life 
itself. This process of determination involves an ongoing process of boundary definition 
beyond the formal legal distinctions established in citizenship norms.  
Citizenship is invested with the task of optimizing life. Citizenship, and the right 
to issue, withhold, or revoke it, “names the new status of life as origin and ground of 
sovereignty" (Agamben, 1998, p. 129). The importance of citizenship relates to what 
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Agamben sees as one of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics:  “its constant 
need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from 
what is outside” (1998, p. 131). The implications of this became clear when, after the 
start of WWI, many European states introduced juridical measures allowing for the mass 
denaturalization and denationalization of portions of their populations who were 
considered unworthy or as enemies of the nation. This reached its culmination with the 
Nuremberg laws of fascist Germany, which concretized “the principle according to which 
citizenship was something of which one had to prove oneself worthy and which could 
therefore always be called into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Here we can see that 
the fate of the racialized Other and the unworthy or asozial citizen converge as easily 
under democracy as within totalitarianism. In the process of ongoing evaluation, both can 
be reduced to bare life, that is, to life without political value. This process is so central, 
that Agamben situates the work of answering the question of what is national (German, 
French, American, etc.) as a critical political task of biopolitics. In fact, Agamben argues 
that under most radical manifestation of the biopolitical regime, the German Third Reich, 
the answer to the question “Who and what is German?” coincided directly with the 
highest political task (1998, p. 130). This illustrates starkly how the work of belonging, of 
defining and refining the essential nature of national life, cannot be separated from the 
definition of life without political value.  
Generations after the defeat of the Third Reich and the return of liberal 
democracy to Germany, the question of who and what defines Germanness has continued 
as a fundamental political preoccupation. Through the inclusion of immigrants and their 
descendants within the political body of the nation in 2000, the question of what 
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constitutes Germany and Germans arose again with new urgency. This dissertation 
analyzes attempts to answer this question in the public sphere. Agamben argues that "in 
modern biopolitics, the sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as 
such" (1998, p. 142). Consequently, it is essential to focus on the institutions and 
individuals positioned to assume the role of the sovereign and define who and what the 
nation is, and the relative value of different forms of life for the national body. This work 
is done above all within the mediated public sphere. Integration has emerged as one of 
the fundamental tools in process of defining new norms for these “new Germans.” Lemke 
has argued that “biopolitics is essentially a political economy of life” that goes beyond 
the state and the juridical order (2011, p. 60). It is this political economy of life that 
motivates the ongoing process of evaluation that divides integrants from nationals and 
separates the worthy from the asozial.  
Study Design and Data Corpus 
Examinations of processes and policies of integration have tended to focus either 
on the level of the government (Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009; Joppke, 2007; 
Penninx, 2005), or on the level of everyday life. Several ethnographic works on this topic 
move between the macro and interpersonal levels, analyzing not just integration but also 
the disjunctures between cultural policies aimed at managing difference and the lives and 
practices of the minority groups who are the focus of those policies (Hinze, 2013; 
Partridge, 2012).  However, the mid-level processes of the public sphere have largely 
been ignored, or only considered in passing. At the same time, as a number of scholars 
have observed, ideas about integration and multiculturalism are largely forged through 
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events and the surrounding discussions in the mediated public sphere (Lentin & Titley, 
2011; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). This dissertation examines major events focused 
on defining German identity and the place of diversity within it that took over the 
mediated public in Germany since the turn of the millennium.  It will also examine 
several smaller, splinter events connected to these larger instances of media attention.  
The primary source of empirical data for this dissertation is press coverage in the 
print media, in addition to the content and documentation of public service campaigns 
and projects, policy documents, and entertainment programs. Although industry experts 
have recently announced the arrival of the global newspaper crisis in Germany (Doctor, 
2013; Schnibben, 2013), print media remain at the center of the increasingly diverse 
German media sphere. Print holds a particularly influential place in the German mediated 
sphere based on two important indicators: First, journalists from across the field regularly 
consume print sources more frequently than other media; second, print sources are cited 
more frequently across the media sphere than other media.  
The main criteria for selecting which periodicals to analyze for the print media 
portions of this dissertation were the sources’ influence among journalists and their 
influence on other media as indicated by the number of citations they generate. 
According to the most recent large-scale study on the state of journalism in Germany, the 
largest proportion of journalists are employed by newspapers (Weischenberg, Malik, & 
Scholl, 2006). The same study showed that media professionals regularly consume print 
media more frequently than other media. Among the representative sample of media 
professionals surveyed, 35% and 34% of journalists regularly read the SZ and Der 
Spiegel respectively. This compares to 19% who regularly watch the news program the 
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Tagesschau on the public broadcaster ARD (Weischenberg et al., 2006, p. 359). The list 
of periodicals most regularly read by journalists that appears in this survey was used to 
determine the primary periodicals of interest for this dissertation. In descending order, the 
top 11 periodicals read by journalists were the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, the Bild, Die Tageszeitung, Stern, Focus, Die 
Welt, the Frankfurter Rundschau, and the Handelsblatt.5 The fact that media 
professionals who are producing content are consuming these print sources most 
frequently suggests that they are a critical site for analyzing public discourse in Germany.  
Furthermore, in terms of overall citations within the media sphere, from July 2009 
to December 2013 just two print sources, Bild and Der Spiegel, garnered over 40% of all 
citations in the media. The only non-print outlets to make the top ten cited sources were 
the public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF with 7% and 5% of citations (PMG Presse-
Monitor, 2014). Together, in descending order, the online and print versions of the 
periodicals the Bild, Der Spiegel, the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z), Die Welt, Focus, the Handelsblatt, and Stern garnered 87% 
of all media citations in 2013 (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). This suggests the strength of 
print’s influence as the medium of reference across the media sphere. Audience numbers 
                                                          
 
 
 
5 These periodicals have different rules for capitalization. I have decided to adopt the common German 
rules for capitalizing titles. Where articles (die, der, das) are included as official part of the periodical’s 
title, I have included the German article as part of the title. For newspapers that do not use an article in 
their titles, I have used the English article. For magazines that do not include the article in their title, no 
article is used.  
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also back up the importance of print. The most popular television news show, the 
Tagesschau regularly reached 5.34 million viewers in 2010 (Schröder, 2010), while Bild 
had 12.31 million readers in 2012, according to the media research group Media-Analyse. 
While television news is also very popular, print is still the primary medium in Germany 
both in terms of audiences and resonance. Print media are the center of public 
deliberation and the primary space for the development of major arguments of national 
significance. In addition to print media, I examine institutional structures, policy 
documents, audio-visual and print publicity materials as well as examples from 
entertainment media.  
Search Methodology 
Access to the archives of the most important German print media is difficult 
outside Germany. The only periodical that maintains a fully accessible, comprehensive 
online archive is Der Spiegel, which includes facsimile versions of all print articles 
beginning with their first issue in 1947. Articles from Spiegel Online, which has been 
producing original content since 1996, are also available in the archives. There is no 
single newspaper database available that maintains a comprehensive electronic archive of 
the most important sources of German print news. The best online archive of German 
periodicals is maintained by GBI-Genios, which provides a university-oriented 
subscription service called Wiso. Wiso includes access to 180 German print news 
sources, not including the Bild, the F.A.Z., or the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The only 
available option for access to an electronic archive of the Bild is to search the 
newspaper’s website, which includes a limited electronic archive. The Süddeutsche 
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Zeitung and the F.A.Z. each provide subscription-based access through university 
libraries. I accessed Wiso and the full archives of the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the F.A.Z. 
by visiting the library at the Free University in Berlin.   
Table 1: Top Periodicals Read by Journalists and Description of Available Access 
Title 
Percentage of Journalists 
Who Are Regular Readers6 
Type of Access 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 35 Full access (library) 
Der Spiegel  34 Full access (online) 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(F.A.Z.) 
15 Full access (library) 
Die Zeit 11 Full access (WISO) 
Bild 10 Partial access (online) 
Die Tageszeitung 7 Full access (online) 
Stern 6 Full access (WISO) 
Focus 5 Full access (WISO) 
Die Welt 4 Full access (WISO) 
Frankfurter Rundschau 4 Full access (WISO) 
Financial Times Deutschland 
(ceased publication 2012)  
4 Full access (WISO) 
Handelsblatt 3 Full access (WISO) 
   
                                                          
 
 
 
6 Source: Weischenberg, Malik, and Scholl (2006) 
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In order to capture a variety of content produced by periodicals with a cross-
section of political orientations, I focused on the top newspapers regularly read by 
German media professionals (Weischenberg et al., 2006). This list also contains the 
highest circulating news and information periodicals and the most frequently cited 
sources across the media sphere (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). These sources include a 
wide range of political orientations. Rather than claiming to be apolitical or completely 
impartial, news periodicals in Germany acknowledge their political orientation. The 
selected periodicals represent a mix of perspectives, from center-right (Bild, Focus) and 
neoliberal, center-right (F.A.Z., Handelsblatt, Die Welt), to center-left (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Stern, Frankfurter Rundschau). The Bild provides insight 
into the conservative, populist German public sphere, while the other sources form the 
backbone of Germany’s quality press. In addition, the cooperatively owned Tageszeitung, 
which has the smallest circulation of all the selected periodicals, represents one of the 
most critical and progressive perspectives among legacy media in Germany. The 
diversity of editorial orientations across these sources capture a broad range of 
mainstream perspectives on the issues under study. For cases that produced a corpus that 
was either too large to submit to detailed textual analysis or too small to get a full sense 
of the case, the list of periodicals searched was limited or expanded accordingly. The 
specific searches used and the rationale behind alterations of the periodical list are 
explained in each chapter.  
Methodology: Discourse Theory and Analysis 
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As Ernest Renan argued in his seminal theory of nationalism, "the essence of a 
nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have 
forgotten many things" (1990, p. 11). But who decides on the form those commonalities 
should take? How is it determined which are the things to be discarded in the 
construction of social and political solidarity? As the age of authoritarianism waned in 
the late 18th and 19th centuries and the democratic nation-state established itself as the 
most important level of political organization in the West, maintaining a minimal level of 
consent of the governed became the major problem of the national elite. As such, “the 
battle for nationhood” became “a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak 
for the whole nation and to represent the national essence” (Billig, 1995, p. 27). This 
process entails the construction of a national identity, through which representatives, by 
virtue of shared nationhood, are anointed with legitimate social authority. However, as 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have shown, identity can only be constructed negatively 
through emphasizing the construction of frontiers built upon the distinction from others. 
Since these constructions are permanently contingent and perpetually vulnerable to the 
challenge of competing rearticulations, normative groups must constantly reproduce the 
“chains of equivalence” that support their attempts to establish their versions of “truth” as 
normal. 
Consequently, the construction of Others, both within and beyond the boundaries 
of the nation-state, is intimately related to the construction and maintenance of the 
collective authority of a normative national group. What we are must regularly be 
defined by who we are not. Furthermore, the successful articulation of a hegemonic 
discourse leads to the naturalization, and therefore the disappearance, of the normalized 
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subject position. The analysis of these processes requires a theoretical and 
methodological approach that locates and unpacks operations of power at the level of 
their everyday reproduction. Discourse analysis, in its various forms, encompasses a 
variety of methods and analytical forms that relate a specific case or event to the larger 
structures that shape them. As Foucault pointed out, "in appearance, speech may well be 
of little account, but the prohibitions surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire and 
power" (1971, p. 9). In the next section, I outline some of these approaches to discourse 
analysis, from its origins in linguistics to its adaptation in service of macro-level social 
and political analysis.  
Development of Discourse Analysis 
Discourse Analysis, in its many forms, emerged from the union of 
poststructuralist literary theory with critical linguistics beginning in the 1970s. At the 
time, a divide had been growing between linguists interested in an increasingly abstract 
and mathematical notion of language and those primarily interested in how language 
shapes subjectivity and social reality. Debates on subjectivity in the analytic philosophy 
of language and in literary studies have continued to diverge, the former focusing on 
increasingly technical and abstract modeling and logical analyses of form which have 
little practical value for the hermeneutics of desire and difference that concerns the latter 
(Lee, 1997).  
While critical linguistics increased the attention toward social and metalinguistic 
forms, that is,  "linguistic forms used to talk about and represent discourse" (Lee, 1997, p. 
11) including reported speech, quotation, and indirect discourse, the founders of Critical 
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Discourse Analysis (CDA) were concerned that sociolinguistics still paid too little 
attention to issues of power and social hierarchy. Coming from diverse disciplines, these 
scholars, including Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk, sought to 
further open textual and discourse analysis to take advantage of the methods and insights 
of multiple disciplines. According to Wodak (2001), most approaches to CDA have at 
their foundation the social semiotic approach of Michael Halliday’s systemic functional 
grammar.  
Halliday distinguished three metafunctions of language that are continuously 
interconnected: Firstly, the ideational function through which language lends structure to 
experience (the ideational structure has a dialectical relationship with social structure, 
both reflecting and influencing it); secondly, the interpersonal function which constitutes 
relationships between the participants; and thirdly, the textual function which constitutes 
coherence and cohesion in texts (Wodak, 2001, p. 8). Halliday’s structural framework, 
while based in linguistics, leaves room to approach these problems from a number of 
perspectives. Developing these insights, Fairclough argues for a  
theoretical perspective on language and more generally semiosis (including 
‘visual language’, ‘body language’, and so on) as one element or ‘moment’ of the 
material social process, which gives rise to ways of analysing language or 
semiosis within broader analyses of the social process. (2001b, p. 121) 
CDA analyzes texts and interactions, but it does not start from texts and interactions. It 
starts, instead, from problems that people face in their social lives and social issues that 
are taken up within sociology, political science and/or cultural studies.  
While practitioners of CDA make social hierarchy and power their central 
concern, some scholars in cultural and media studies argue that CDA maintains a 
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linguistic bias towards micro-level discourse. Bloomaert and Bulcaen argue that "CDA is 
still burdened by a very “linguistic” outlook, which prevents productive ways of 
incorporating linguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of semiosis” (2000, p. 461). To 
move beyond narrow conceptions of textuality, they propose “a more ethnographically 
informed stance, in which linguistic practice is embedded in more general patterns of 
human meaningful action” (2000, p. 461). Furthermore, Threadgold (2003) holds that 
theory and method cannot be divorced, and thus, a sustained engagement with critical 
theory should be taken as fundamental for methods pertaining to critical discourse 
analysis. 
In order to more effectively illuminate structural levels of power as they operate 
in media texts, Carpentier and De Cleen (2007) propose an approach they call Discourse 
Theory and Analysis (DTA). DTA has much in common with Critical Discourse 
Analysis, including a fundamental commitment to understanding power relations in 
society and working towards emancipation. However, whereas CDA is more concerned 
with micro-level linguistic analysis, DTA uses Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse 
theory to focus on a broader definition of text considering also non-linguistic forms. DTA 
also utilizes a macro-contextual approach which refers “to the social as the realm where 
the processes of the generation of meaning are situated” (2007, p. 277). While 
practitioners of various forms of discourse analysis often make divergent claims about the 
relative importance of the textual at the micro-level, and the intertextual at the meso- and 
macro-levels, approaches to discourse analysis utilize a hermeneutic approach, which 
seeks to understand structural elements of the formation of the social subject by focusing 
on concrete events, embodied, mediated or both. As Fairclough writes, "the reason for 
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centring the concept of ‘social practice’ is that it allows an oscillation between the 
perspective of social structure and the perspective of social action and agency" (2001a, p. 
27). In this way, discourse analysis shares much with interpretive ethnographic 
approaches to culture and society, which conceive of culture as “webs of significance” 
(Geertz, 1977, p. 5).  
Although not traditionally situated within methodologies of discourse analysis, 
some of the most productive approaches to the oscillation between structure and action 
can be found in interpretive ethnography. Although Fairclough does not reference him in 
relation to the idea of “social practice,” Bourdieu’s early ethnographic work was 
foundational in outlining the structure-practice nexus. Contrary to objectivist and 
structuralist approaches popular in mid 20th century anthropology, Bourdieu (1977) 
argues that in homogeneous societies it is not explicitly understood rules that govern 
practice, but rather “practical knowledge, based on the continuous decoding of the 
perceived—but not consciously noticed—indices of the welcome given to actions already 
accomplished” (1977, p. 10). This perpetual mechanism of checks and corrections ensure 
the adjustment of practices to meet the expectations of other social agents.  
This mechanism functions implicitly, without the need for active reflection or 
theorization on the part of agents. It is a “discourse of familiarity that leaves unsaid all 
that goes without saying” (1977, p. 17). Bourdieu critiques anthropologists who, when 
asking informants to express what is implicit, take the explanations as reflective of the 
informant’s process. In actuality, by turning practical knowledge into semi-theoretical 
explanations in response to outsider questioning, informants reduce and unintentionally 
conceal the true depths of practical knowledge (1977, p. 19). Instead, Bourdieu proposes 
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that social analysts focus on the construction of “the principle which makes it possible to 
account for all the cases observed…This construction, and the generative operation of 
which it is the basis, are only the theoretical equivalent of the practical scheme which 
enables every correctly trained agent to produce all the practices and judgments of 
honour called for by the challenges of existence” (1977, p. 11). The implicit background 
principles guiding background practices, which are known to all and are reproduced and 
developed socially, provide both structure and space for strategic maneuvering. And yet, 
“the imposition and inculcation of the structures is never so perfect that all explicitness 
can be dispensed with” (1977, p. 19). In fact, inculcation through some form of 
objectification in discourse or through the symbolic support of emblems and rituals is 
“one of the privileged moments for formulating the practical schemes and constituting 
them as principles” (1977, p. 20). Thus, examining these instances of inculcation can 
reveal much about the otherwise largely implicit principles guiding practice. 
Discourse and the Social: Analyzing Fixity and Dispersion 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) provide a set of tools to help apply these insights about 
social practice and the invented nature of any articulation of culture to the analysis of 
advanced capitalist societies. The apparently more complex and fragmented nature of 
these societies as compared to their traditional counterparts is the result of the 
fundamental asymmetry “between a growing proliferation of differences—a surplus 
meaning of ‘the social’—and the difficulties encountered by any discourse attempting to 
fix those differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure” (2001, p. 98). While in 
more homogenous societies the knowledge of practice, or “the social,” remains largely 
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implicit, in heterogeneous societies the multiplicity of forms of the social raises difficulty 
for those attempting to maintain their definition of the normal. It becomes more difficult 
for the hegemonic group to “conceal from itself its own truth” and inscribe in objectivity 
its representation thereof (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 22). Thus, increasing polysemy in 
heterogeneous societies puts pressure on discursive structures that “the social” attempts 
use to create the identity of society.  
Laclau and Mouffe show that discourse is the ultimately futile attempt to tame 
and fix this surplus meaning of the social. Through the concept of overdetermination, 
they focus on every form of fixity as the object of critique. One possible conclusion from 
Althusser’s early mobilization of the idea of overdetermination—the one that Laclau and 
Mouffe aim to recover—is that every formulation of society is necessarily an 
overdetermination. Overdetermination is the means by which the social constitutes itself 
as a symbolic order. For Laclau and Mouffe, overdetermination is the process of creating 
symbolic order by fixing a privileged meaning from the manifold possible meanings. 
"Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the 
relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain 
order" (2001, p. 98). The attempts at fixation will always remain partial since “the 
presence of some objects in others prevents any of their identities from being fixed” 
(2001, p. 104). Discourse is a battle against the surplus of meaning that can only ever 
partially succeed. This “surplus” is the terrain of every social practice - the field of 
discursivity (2001, p. 111).  "Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the 
field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center” (2001, p. 
112). They call the “privileged discursive point of this partial fixation, nodal points" 
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(2001, p. 112). Thus, although Laclau and Mouffe argue for a critique of every form of 
fixity, they do not deny the existence of fixity absolutely. Fixity can succeed to greater or 
lesser extents, but can never succeed definitely. Thus, despite great efforts to hold onto a 
coherent idea of society,  
society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted 
within an intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, 
consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a 
result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude 
of the field of discursivity. (2001, p. 113) 
The partial successes of articulation provide an always incomplete, impermanent and 
imperfect, but still potent sense of society. Just as a complete form of fixity is impossible, 
it is also not possible to do away with fixity altogether. To do so would be to do away 
with the conditions of possibility of social practice and even the social altogether. 
This notion of the discursive field complements Foucault’s archeo-genealogical 
approach to discourse.  In The Archeology of Knowledge, which was originally published 
in 1969, Foucault instructs that the first step for analyzing discourse is to question 
familiar categories or groupings and other notions that provide continuity through ready-
made syntheses. "All these syntheses that are accepted without question must remain in 
suspense" (2002, p. 28). Foucault seeks to unsettle the tranquility with which familiar 
nodal points are accepted. Like Laclau and Mouffe’s exhortation to critique every form of 
fixity, Foucault is not arguing that they should be definitively rejected. However, the first 
step to understanding the operations of hegemony is to question the forms of knowledge, 
the common sense that it supports.  
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According to Foucault, we must show that these categories and continuities “do 
not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of 
which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized” (2002, p. 28). 
The kinds of rules Foucault is talking about are not the juridical form imagined by 
traditional structuralists that  sees practice as a form of obedience to the rules. It is “rule” 
in the polysemic sense, as Bourdieu also proposes (1977, p. 27). Beyond the explicitly 
stated and recognized form expressed in the idea of norms, Bourdieu reminds us to 
consider rules also in the form of theoretical models, or as a scheme immanent in 
practice. So, in summary, the first step in analyzing discourse is to unsettle and examine 
the foundations of its unity and continuity and ask under what conditions this unity is 
made legitimate. Once having taken it apart, we have to ask if it can be put back together 
again, or whether it could be reformed in another way.  
Given their privileged position in formulating narratives, in selecting from the 
universe of events fragments to portray, analyze and publically disperse, the media are a 
prime site of analysis for discourse theory. Yet, according to Carpentier and De Cleen, 
relatively few studies of the media have used discourse theoretical analysis. Instead, 
studies of media discourse have been primarily undertaken under the more linguistically 
oriented Critical Discourse Analysis. Despite the common ground between these 
approaches, Carpentier and De Cleen argue that discourse theory allows analysis of the 
media to move beyond “talk and text in context,” to use Van Dijk’s formulation, to 
consider non-linguistic aspects of discursive formations.  
Perhaps the most crucial allowance of discourse theory and analysis’s broader 
approach is the theoretical support it provides “for the in-depth analysis of the 
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construction of political identities, embedded in the sociology of conflict and 
antagonisms” (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 278). Although CDA offers better tools 
for the analysis of the specificities of language and form, in their comparison of 
discursive approaches for analyzing subject formation Jørgensen and Phillips conclude 
that “critical discourse analysis has the least developed understanding of self and identity 
(2002, p. 146).  Since my interest in this dissertation is focused more on how public 
representations create and reinforce ideas of society, a discourse theoretical approach 
provides the most focused framework for identifying points of fixity and pulling at their 
seams to examine their constituent parts and to ask how it might be otherwise. 
Chapter Outline 
Part I: German National Ideas 
The first section of this dissertation outlines two frameworks of identity formation 
that inform basic assumptions about selfhood and belonging at various scales: the 
affective Romantic and the rational Universalist. As was argued above, the particular and 
the universal are both necessary to conceptualize and reproduce the particular disjunctive 
hyphen of the nation-state. In the German case, the “twin concepts of power state and 
romantic nation are constitutive but not fused” (Wæver, 2005, p. 39). The first chapter 
analyzes the conception of the nation through the German idea of Heimat (homeland). 
The second chapter traces the emergence of integration projects, relating them to the 
development of forms of national identity and state sovereignty based on rationalistic 
economic imperatives after World War II.  Both sections consider the relationship 
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between normative and non-normative populations in each of these modes of collective 
subjectivity.  
Chapter 1 examines how the concept of Heimat (homeland) has helped to stabilize 
the German sense of nationhood and national subjectivity across periods of political 
rupture. While changes in German citizenship law have gradually extended formal 
citizenship to those outside the imagined autochthonous population, informal 
mechanisms of normative citizenship reproduce the category of the stranger, or the 
candidate for integration, across generations. This chapter analyzes how the notion of 
Heimat has functioned in post-war Germany in conservative and leftist narratives of the 
past to separate the personal from the political in memory of past atrocity. It also looks at 
the subtle ways that Heimat excludes non-normative citizens from participation in 
collective memory and, thus, from full membership in the national citizenry. 
Although Germany is traditionally seen as a paradigmatic example of 
particularistic forms of national identity, the implementation of birthright to citizenship in 
2000 has required the renegotiation of national belonging. Chapter 2 explores the 
development of integration discourse as a means of including and simultaneously 
managing diversity within the German population. Sports, and above all soccer, have 
played an important role in the conceptualization of integration. I analyze documents 
from the Federal Government, the German Olympic Sports Confederation, and the 
German Soccer Association to explain the symbolic and practical value of sports in 
integration discourse. This chapter argues that integration discourse is an extension of 
biopolitical and disciplinary technologies for constituting and governing the national 
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population, which have been a fundamental part of the national project since the 
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. 
Part II: Integrants and the New Germany 
This section examines the new forms of public relationships to the national that 
have emerged in Germany since 2000. Since the first German state was established in 
1971, there have been many “new Germanys.” In fact, since its foundation as a state 
every generation has lived through the foundation of at least one new iteration of 
Germany, from the rise of the Third Reich to Reunification. However, the newest 
Germany, based on the inclusion of immigrants and their children, is the first to include 
“new Germans” (Bota, Özlem, & Pham, 2012; Ezli, 2014).This section examines how 
hosting one of the world’s greatest sporting spectacles contributed to a renaissance of 
German symbolic nationalism and how the participation of “new Germans” has been 
invoked by the media to create a break from the traumatic past. In this process, the media 
frames integration and national pride as fundamental to the health and wellbeing of the 
national population.  
 Global sporting spectacles provide an ideal forum for the “repatriation of 
difference” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 307) and construction of the symbolic power of the 
nation brand. This is particularly salient for the host nation. In 2006, Germany hosted its 
first FIFA men’s World Cup since reunification. The desire for a renewed German pride 
has long been stymied by the specters of German nationalisms of the past. Where past 
efforts had failed, Chapter 3 examines how the 2006 World Cup finally succeeded in 
breaking the perceived taboo against the public expression of overt national pride. At the 
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same time, in the period leading up to the tournament, integration reached an 
unprecedented level of importance in public policy and in the media. In 2004 the first law 
governing immigration went into effect (Zuwanderungsgesetz). For the first time, in this 
law “integration” became a matter of law. In both national self-reflection and integration 
discourse, sports emerge repeatedly as a source of narrative and symbolism. Mentions of 
the 2006 World Cup are often accompanied by passionate declarations about its personal 
and national significance, evoking themes such as pride, freedom, national cohesion, and 
the feeling of joining the world of “normal” nations. During the 2006 World Cup, 
football was proposed as a model for national engagement. The first case study analyzes 
how the features and expectations of this event were mobilized to legitimate a change in 
German practices of symbolic nationalism. 
 In preparation for the tournament, several national media campaigns were rolled 
out in a coordinated effort to use the wave of enthusiasm for one of the world’s largest 
and most popular sporting events to usher in a new era of patriotism. The largest and 
most successful of these projects was the social marketing campaign under the slogan, Du 
bist Deutschland (“You Are Germany”), which is the focus of Chapter 4. The initial 
campaign was one of several campaigns focused on promoting Germany developed in the 
year running up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany. A related campaign, “Germany—
Land of Ideas” focused on promoting German innovation and industrial prowess to take 
advantage of the global attention that hosting the World Cup would attract. But unlike the 
international focus of the “Land of Ideas” campaign, Du bist Deutschland was focused 
entirely on creating a “positive mood” and stimulating national sentiments among the 
German population. This campaign illustrates the internal component of nation branding, 
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which follows from the imperative to secure the buy-in of citizens for the success of 
national projects of self-representation on a global stage. In the case of Germany, this 
required the neutralization or at least the suspension of complicated domestic politics of 
memory around national symbols and sentiments. By successfully executing this 
spectacle following the established script for global sporting events, Germany was 
fulfilling its duty as host. In this way, the global sporting spectacle of the World Cup 
provided both the means and the justification for remaking German national pride. Given 
the almost universal participation of German media companies in the campaign, as well 
as the indirect support of the government and industrialists through Partners for 
Innovation, Chapter 4 investigates the kind of idealized national construction imagined 
by leaders in German industry, media, and politics. 
After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the 
practice of public displays of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost 
obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World 
Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of 
the 2010 World Cup inspired transnational Germans and immigrants to join in the 
patriotic displays in greater numbers. Chapter 5 discusses a heavily mediated flag fight 
between immigrant patriots and anti-nationalist Germans during the 2010 World Cup, 
which exemplified the symbolic and pedagogical value of immigrant patriotism for the 
promotion of a civic form of nationalism. The story of the display and adamant defense 
of one of Germany’s largest flags by Lebanese immigrants in Berlin attracted national 
and international attention. The story was framed in the media as a surprising reversal of 
the expected: the flag’s attackers were ethnic Germans and its defenders were hyphenated 
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Germans. Yet, the story is framed not only as a surprising reversal, but also as a critique 
of many Germans’ distrust of symbolic patriotism. The fervor of the Lebanese-German 
patriots is projected as a lesson to normative Germans about patriotism as a healthy and 
natural form of social cohesion that is compatible with––and even necessary for––the 
functional development of diverse societies. 
This kind of instrumentalization of national sports teams and global sporting 
spectacles is by no means unique to Germany. As Laurent Dubois (2010) shows, the 1998 
World Cup victory in a tournament hosted in France was celebrated as the victory of the 
“black, blanc, beur” (black, white, and Arab) team. The team represented the colonial 
history and postcolonial present and future of France. The team’s diversity was subjected 
to intense scrutiny, and was held as a symbol of the transformation of French society. 
Like the French case, the German team was converted into a symbol of positive change in 
German society. Moreover, the change in the makeup of the national team was used to 
symbolize a break with the past. In both cases, international sporting events provide a 
forum and a symbolic focal point for reckoning with the past and constructing an 
idealized national trajectory. Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past, 
immigrant patriotism authorizes and invites normative citizens to participate in 
normalized forms of nationalist expression.  
Part III: “Failures” of Integration  
The two chapters in this final section analyze the construction and fortification of 
divisions between citizens and integrants, between integration failures and successes. 
They demonstrate how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so 
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that the power to make live can be optimized by confining social ills to particular 
segments of the population. While national pride and sporting integration define the 
optimal forms of life for Germans and worthy integrants, this section investigates various 
means for the assessment and condemnation of unfit populations. The precariousness of 
the support of the new cosmopolitan Germany that was touted during the flag fight was 
thrown into sharp relief just months after the national soccer team returned from South 
Africa. In August of 2010, one of the most intense recent debates in Germany broke out 
around the publication and runaway popularity of Thilo Sarrazin’s book titled Germany 
Does Away with Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), which is the focus of Chapter 6. The 
arguments of the book are built on nativist pseudoscience bolstered by statistics that 
supposedly prove that while intelligent German women are not procreating, less 
intelligent populations, particularly Muslims, are proliferating and dumbing down 
German society.  
Drawing on evidence from sources including Herrnstein and Murray (1996), Lynn 
and Vanhanen (2002), and Francis Galton (1869), Sarrazin’s book borrows from a long 
tradition of eugenicist social science. These authors combine pseudoscientific theories of 
the heritability of aptitude and intelligence with state-generated statistics describing the 
levels of education, criminality, and affluence to draw broad conclusions about the state 
of society and the culprits of social ills. In many ways, this debate echoed the American 
controversy around Herrnstein and Murray’s racially oriented book on the heritability of 
IQ, The Bell Curve in the 1990s. According to an analysis of press coverage, The Bell 
Curve, which “spent weeks at the top of the best-seller lists” (Schmidt, 2012), “was 
accorded attention totally disproportionate to the merits of the book or the novelty of its 
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thesis” (Naureckas, 1995). Like the media response to Sarrazin’s book, “media accounts 
showed a disturbing tendency to accept Murray and Herrnstein's premises and evidence 
even while debating their conclusions” (Naureckas, 1995). Similarly, although taking 
issue with his tone, Sarrazin was widely praised for bringing to light an important and 
“taboo” issue.  
Finally, Chapter 7 examines two media projects that emerged around the time of 
the Sarrazin debate, which illustrate the depth of entanglements between processes of 
celebration and condemnation in integration discourse. According to his critics, 
Sarrazin’s book was the antithesis of productive integration work. However, several 
positively oriented integration campaigns and programs developed in the wake of the 
debate bear a strong resemblance to many of the arguments and assumptions of Sarrazin 
and his supporters. Although the projects analyzed in this chapter celebrate integrants 
using celebrity examples, they also depend on a binary conception of integrants as either 
willful failures or successes.  
The first part of Chapter 7 examines the creation of a new prize category honoring 
“successful examples of integration” by Germany’s oldest media prize institution, the 
Bambi Awards. The Integration Bambi was first awarded in 2010, less than three months 
after the publication of Sarrazin’s book. The inaugural recipient was German national 
soccer player, Mesut Özil. The introduction of a prize category honoring integration was 
uncontroversial, particularly with the soft-spoken Turkish-German soccer star as the first 
recipient. However, the choice of successful Tunesian-German rap artist Bushido as the 
2011 recipient became a national controversy. Bushido’s work draws on gangsta rap 
conventions, including violent, misogynistic, and homophobic lyrics. He is also actively 
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involved in youth charity work. The first part of this chapter compares the framing and 
responses to these two award recipients, considering the logics of social prizes. These 
recipients served to define the ideals of integration and the threat posed by its failure. 
Controversy around the award only heightened the importance of the award and 
strengthened the normative assumptions behind the category. 
The second part of Chapter 7 examines another celebrity-oriented integration 
program, the Raus mit der Sprache––Rein ins Leben (Out with language––Into Life) 
campaign from Association of German Periodical Publishers with the support of the 
Federal Government. The campaign features photographs of well-known minority 
German athletes, artists, and politicians sticking out their tongues for the camera. Their 
tongues have been digitally altered to display the colors of the German flag, indicating 
their ability to speak German. In addition to the content of the campaign and its theme 
song, this section analyzes the statements of campaign creators and supporters to 
understand the goals and the logic of this campaign as it relates to integration, focusing 
on the conception of language within integration discourse. Judgments about what counts 
as valuable language reflect both the anxieties and the opportunism of broader 
approaches to social diversity in an increasingly diverse population. This campaign 
demonstrates how the frequent invocation of language within integration discourse and 
policy engages in the politics and political economy of life examined in previous 
chapters. Through the examples of the Integration Bambi and the Out with It campaign, 
this chapter examines how minority celebrities act as models of and threats to integration. 
The conclusion of this dissertation contemplates the future of integration 
discourse, using reactions to the ongoing global refugee crisis to extend the implications 
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of a politics oriented towards the cultivation of life. Public discourse and policy in the 
European Union reacting to the crisis highlight again how biopolitics involves perpetual 
decision-making about which lives are of value for the life of the population, which is 
conceived in terms of the normative national. At the same time, the racist logics of this 
process of decision making have been taken up by the growing populist right, threatening 
to destabilize the moral balance of European Universalism (Wallerstein, 2006). In 
response, mainstream politicians and public figures have scrambled to isolate racism as a 
marginal social phenomenon, rather than an inherent part of integration discourse. The 
conclusion turns to the critical voices writing from a minoritarian perspective to 
challenge this move to confine conceptions of racism to the margins. These writers 
propose a new way forward that insists on confronting racism as a structural and 
institutional problem and that engages the complexity of cultural dialog in diverse 
societies.  
 
                                                          
 
 
 
i 1) Unfähig zum Leben in der Gemeinschaft, sich nicht in die Gemeinschaft einfügend; am Rand der 
Gesellschaft lebend; 2) die Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft schädigend; 3) ein niedriges geistiges, kulturelles 
Niveau aufweisend; ungebildet und ungehobelt. 
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PART I: GERMAN NATIONAL IDEAS 
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CHAPTER 1 – HEIMAT AND GERMAN NOTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
 
 This chapter examines one of the foundations of German national subjectivity that 
has emerged from the critical analysis of German nationalism largely unscathed: the idea 
of Heimat, or homeland. Biopolitics, with its focus on “the population” as a biological 
corpus, imagines itself as operating above the social levels of national politics and law 
(Lemke, 2011). However, the idea of the population which is politically relevant 
continues to be cultivated through national discourses and norms. It is true that 
conceptions of the population can easily scale to encompass all of humanity, as in 
discussions of the geological impact of humanity through population growth and ensuing 
environmental degradation. However, the political and institutional mechanisms for 
implementing biopolitical policies and mechanisms still depend on nationally defined 
states and the uneven power of the international system of nation-states, such as the 
United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or NATO. Even in this global age, the 
hegemony of the nation-state persists in politics as it does in popular imaginations. What 
defines the nation as a social and political entity varies greatly, and that definition has 
implications for determining the legitimate place and expectations of denizens of a state. 
Recalling Foucault’s (2003) definition of biopolitical race war as a means of fragmenting 
the population into the normative and the potentially threatening, this chapter looks at the 
role of the affective concept of Heimat in defining German belonging through a shared 
conception of an imagined personal and familial past. Heimat defines those whose 
membership is assumed to be natural, emerging from a connection to an originary past 
that concords with the present. It is a foundational part of the distinction between the 
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grounded “national” and the dislocated “integrant,” who presumably suffers psychic 
fragmentation because of the separation from their own harmonious Heimat. 
In contemporary liberal democracy, tolerance is promoted as a public virtue and 
racism is almost universally condemned (Brown, 2009). In this schema, Heimat serves as 
a seemingly benign means of dividing the population at the apparently pre-political level. 
However, the fact that this form of intimate division may cut deeper than overt acts of 
racism was conveyed in two anecdotes shared with me outside one of Berlin’s popular 
watering holes in the neighborhood of Kreuzberg. Since the early 1990s, if not before, 
Kreuzberg has been the jewel in Berlin’s crown of cutting edge alterity.7 Germany’s most 
famous Turkish neighborhood, Kreuzberg is a national symbol of both multicultural cool 
and the threat of parallel (immigrant) societies (Parallelgesellschaften). Berem is a 
university student from Dortmund, whom I had met while doing research in Istanbul two 
summers earlier. She had been doing an exchange year there through the Erasmus 
program, and I had interviewed her about her experience of living in Turkey as a German 
of Turkish descent. To be specific, Berem is not Turkish, but Kurdish, although her 
family, as she put it, was twice assimilated: her parents to Turkey and her to Germany. 
As a result, while her family’s traditions varied significantly from many of her Turkish-
German compatriots, she shared with them both the Turkish language of her parents and 
                                                          
 
 
 
7
 See, for example, Berlin for Young People, 1992 (qtd. in Soysal, 2004, p. 67) 
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the German language of her birth nation. One thing that has never been ambiguous to 
Berem was her subjectivity as German.  
During our first conversation, Berem assumed that I planned to ask her about 
rupture and crisis, the modes of subjectivity that have long been assigned to first, second 
and third generation Germans or, as they are more commonly called, “migrants” or 
“people with a migration background” (Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund). Her 
assumptions, and the stories she told me when she realized that my conceptual frame did 
not fit the presumed mold, revealed how frequently Berem was faced with pushing back 
against narratives of deficiency, or fracturing and disintegration that others—primarily 
normative white Germans—projected onto her.  
Our second meeting was purely social, but we ended up talking again about 
experiences of mismatched interpellation. One story she told me was of being on the train 
in Frankfurt an der Oder, where Berem attends university. Pass checkers boarded the 
train, and she handed them her semester ticket. The checker looked at it and, claiming 
that it was invalid, took it away. Berem protested, and the conductor responded, “This is 
how it’s done in Germany.”i Berem was utterly confused, and only upon later reflection 
did she realize that it was a racist act: “I didn’t understand the comment. I see myself as a 
German, and it never crossed my mind at the time that others might not see it the same 
way.” The checker’s interpellation of Berem as a foreigner passed her by, and even when 
she put the pieces together, her anger was short-lived. This was just an individual whose 
racist aggression against Berem failed to hit its mark.  
The other anecdote Berem offered was from the time of her preparations for the 
Erasmus year in Istanbul. When she was getting the paperwork necessary for her student 
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visa, the German official who was helping her exclaimed, “How nice! You’re going back 
to your homeland.”ii Berem responded curtly that she was born in Germany and that this 
was her homeland. The woman responded with a flustered apology. Of the two incidents, 
this misguided friendliness was the one that most upset Berem.  
The most obvious explanation for the less disturbing nature of the direct form of 
exclusion is that the spontaneous malice of an individual is easily written off as a random 
act of aggression from the margins of society, despite the checker’s status as a public 
employee. The fare-checker’s act was so distant from Berem’s self-conception and her 
conception of her home nation of Germany that, in the end, it was almost risible. On the 
other hand, the sympathetic instantiation of exclusion came from the very center of 
German social and institutional space. The official had Berem’s German passport in hand 
as she simultaneously denied it as a signifier of true national affiliation. The fact that the 
comment was meant to be understanding and supportive galled Berem even more. Part of 
the depth of this affront also relates to the particular status of the Heimat in German 
notions of belonging. Berem’s contrasting anecdotes express the subtle corrosiveness of 
well-intentioned misapprehension and raise questions about how the local and personal 
notion of homeland reproduce the abstract political notion of the nation.  
This chapter investigates the forms of social cohesion and exclusion expressed in 
the German idea of Heimat. Understanding Heimat’s role in the construction of a German 
national subjectivity is essential for understanding the durable distinction between the 
national and the integrant. Lentin and Titley (2011) borrow and elaborate on the term 
“integrant” from an empirical study by Hvenegård-Lassen (2005) based on interviews 
with bureaucrats involved in integration programs in Denmark and Sweden. Hvenegård-
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Lassen defines the category of the integrant as the imagined recipient of integration 
programming, the “subject for integration.” Focusing on the category of the integrant 
allows for a division between conceptualizations of the subject of integration programs 
and discourse and the actual people they refer to. Thus, discourse constructing the 
integrant tells us more about the people and institutions who contribute to it than it does 
about its referent. This chapter focuses on the category of the national which, as this 
dissertation argues, only has meaning in relation to its Others.  
The rootedness and permanence of the imagined Heimat, as well as its 
conceptualization as the epitome of German harmony, reproduces the perception of 
citizens and residents without German descent as permanent foreigners. Furthermore, it 
does so within an affective framework that is difficult to criticize. The intimacy of 
Heimat resists analysis. As Peter Blickle observes, “the tacit assumption is that Heimat 
can only be understood from within. Therefore, true understanding can only come only 
out of a form of identification, not from a form of analysis” (2004, p. 12). Heimat is 
conceived as fundamentally constitutive of the self. It is the place of origin, the place of 
individual sovereignty. Through its association with the individual and particular, it also 
presents itself as apolitical and even anti-nationalist. At the same time, as we will see, 
Heimat constitutes the nexus between the individual world of the experiential and the 
abstract space of politics and, thus, forms the foundation of the German national 
imaginary.  
Heimat and Subjectivity: From the 19th Century to the Postwar Period 
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The term Heimat combines a particular conception of the temporal and the spatial 
in the definition of the affective and political German nation. Notoriously difficult to 
translate, “homeland” is an insufficient, but tolerable approximation of Heimat. From the 
Old High German term Heimoti, which signified the right to be present at a certain place 
or locality (Schütz, 1996, p. 57), Heimat implies a deep affective bond of a person to an 
original home. The possession of a Heimat is a key part of individuals’ possession of 
their own person, their own interiority. Intimately linked to the possession of legitimate 
claims to space, Heimat exists primarily, and perhaps exclusively, in retrospect. Heimat is 
the imagined origin that is remembered in the process of the human becoming the 
individual. Heimat encapsulates a place-world wherein portions of the past are brought 
into being. It is the foundation of the German conception of indigeneity, a mode that—
although itself formed through the defamiliarization induced by change over time—
emphasizes rootedness and constructs temporal continuity. The intimate and individual 
possession of Heimat is conceived of as an apolitical form of affiliation, as opposed to 
communitarian and exclusionary forms of affiliation associated with nationalism.  
Despite the wealth of popular and scholarly texts centered on the Heimat idea, 
very few authors have taken a critical approach to understanding the term and its social 
and political function. In her book, A Nation of Provincials (1990), historian Celia 
Applegate was the first to seriously investigate the genealogy of Heimat, which she traces 
to the foundation of the modern notion of Germany as nation-state. The primary 
distinguishing feature of the modern German notion of Heimat is its  
“mixture of practicality and sentimentality” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). The idea emerged in 
the first half of the 19th century, in conjunction with terms like Nation, Volk, Vaterland, 
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and Staat to create new political imaginaries in the diverse and unstable German states 
after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. As part of efforts to provide solid 
ground for a German nationalism, writers and civic leaders reinvented the term, which 
had long existed in the German language but was previously of little social or political 
importance. The term was at the heart of a new mode of language, one that was aware of 
its audience, which was imagined in national terms. As Applegate writes, Heimat “is a 
term that dwelt in one world, that of the self-conscious centralizers, modernizers, and 
nationalists of the General Estate, while evoking another” (1990, p. 8). Emerging from 
the new bourgeois public sphere, it evoked an imagined, mythologized version of the 
hometown—the secure society of childhood memory.  
While focusing on the private and local, this evocation was mobilized to establish 
the earliest membership policies of modern statehood in the German territories in the 19th 
century. In the 1820s in the independent kingdom of Bavaria, the Heimatrecht (law of 
domicile) was enacted as part of an administrative effort to unify the definition of 
citizenship and extend it to the borders of the state (Applegate, 1990, p. 8).  This law 
established the right of citizens to settle in any Bavarian town they chose, and imposed 
responsibilities such as self-sufficiency and adherence to laws. Heimatrecht represented a 
new principle of state citizenship which superseded the right of local communities to 
determine who belonged and who did not. “Heimat represented a thoroughly flexible 
concept by which the state could reproduce itself at the local level of civic experience 
characteristic of most people’s lives” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). As urbanization and 
industrialization overtook the real hometown, the deceptive antiquity of the word 
increasingly obscured the administrative fiction of this reinscription of Heimat.  
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The territorially grounded nature of this shared form of individual memory is 
essential for it to function as a constitutive part of the political-cultural union of the 
nation-state. As the example of early 19th century Bavaria shows, the foundation of 
modern political institutions requires particularity to establish a new universal form of 
liberal politics based on citizenship. Observing the growing hegemony of the modern 
nation-state, Marx recognized already in the mid-nineteenth century that the state requires 
particularity to justify its superiority,  
Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes them in order 
to exist, it only experiences itself as political state and asserts its universality in 
opposition to these elements… it is only in this way, above the particular 
elements that the state constitutes itself as universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 219).  
The person living within the political state thus lives in a double life of particularity and 
universality. As Marx observed in the case of the United States, the political 
emancipation of the individual through granting democratic sovereignty to the figure of 
the citizen does not require neutralizing difference. In order to construct the idea of the 
species-being in the form of the citizen, the living individual is divested of “his real 
individual life and filled with an unreal universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 220). The 
scalability of Heimat provides a sort of affective continuity within this double life.  
Although the concept of Heimat is built on deeply localized notions, these notions 
were primarily a means of transferring the emotional and social attachments of the lived 
world to a broader, more abstract level than ever before. As Applegate observes, “the 
utility of Heimat lay in its capacity to obscure any chasms between small local worlds 
and the larger ones to which the locality belonged” (1990, p. 10). At the same time, the 
idea of provincial diversity of the German territory was maintained as a constitutive part 
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of the new German state after unification in 1871. In this way, Heimat acted—and 
continues to act—as a wedge that props up the uneven parts of the German nation to 
produce an illusion of cohesion and continuity. The emptiness of the gap creates the 
imaginary space necessary to generate a conception of community in the abstract. Heimat 
is the power of the imagined but never experienced past: the original homeland. Public 
invocations of Heimat involve the subordination of phenomenal experiences to collective 
memory—or perhaps more precisely, to the collective individualized experience of 
idealized memory. Reference to Heimat invokes idealized forms of personal memories 
and associations to cultivate a collective affect in service of a shared political imaginary.  
During the Nazi period, Heimat was used by the regime as part of a raft of terms 
to express a highly-centralized form of Germanness, losing the provincial associations 
foundational to its meaning. For the Nazis, Heimat was just another way to talk about 
nation, race, and Volk. Thus, although it was a prominent part of nationalist discourses of 
the period, the term was easily rehabilitated after the war through the reintroduction of 
the local emphasis. “Pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi Reich as a victim, not a 
perpetrator” (Applegate, 1990, p. 229), Heimat was revived after the war and once again 
used to create a grounded and affective form of national cohesion. Since Nazism was 
seen as an excess of centralized national power, the provincialism of Heimat was seen as 
an antidote to “excessive Germanness” (Applegate, 1990, p. 18), while still providing a 
powerful form of national sentiment. This conception held even though, as discussed 
above, it was the very provincialism of Heimat that made it so crucial for creating the 
double life of particularity and universality necessary for establishing a centralized, 
modern German nationhood.  
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Faced with the unbearable trauma of accepting the broad participation of society 
necessary to commit National Socialist crimes, postwar Germans retreated to personal 
memories of the Nazi period (Confino, 1998). As part of this, the intimate, local, and 
experiential aspects of the Heimat concept were revived and its imperial deployment in 
building the abstract political community of the nation were forgotten or ignored. 
Heimat’s affective security and harmony became a refuge in postwar Germany, where the 
bucolic Heimat film genre took over the German cinema, peaking in the 1950s (Kaes, 
1992; Ludewig, 2014). Cinema quickly became one of the most popular leisure-time 
activities after cinemas were reopened in the summer of 1945. The German public had 
little appetite for films depicting harsh postwar realities, a genre that became known as 
“rubble films” (Trümmerfilme). Almost immediately after the German film industry 
began releasing original films again in 1947, there were appeals from the press and 
German audiences to stop depicting politics and ruins and produce more positive, 
unblemished representations of German life (Ludewig, 2014). Postwar Heimat films 
largely reproduced the settings, narratives, and emotional arcs that defined Heimat films 
during the Nazi period.  
Still, the escapist and apparently apolitical nature of Heimat films allowed this 
genre that had been an effective part of Nazi propaganda to succeed in West Germany’s 
economically-driven postwar culture industry (Ludewig, 2014). In a newly divided and 
occupied country, as Anton Kaes writes, “Heimat signified above all an experience of 
loss, a vacuum that Germans filled with nostalgic memories” (1992, p. 166). This was not 
only the personal loss of one’s original home and the imagined harmony it represents, it 
was also the loss of the uncontroversial, unthinking simplicity of banal nationalism 
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(Billig, 1995). This is not to suggest that nationalism disappeared in the German public 
after the defeat of National Socialism; nationalism continued, for example, in strict, 
descent-based citizenship laws and in policies of ethnic German “repatriation” discussed 
below. However, the idea that Germans denied themselves symbolic nationalism and 
self-confidence because of the Nazi past is essentially taken for granted in public 
discussions of German nationalism (see Chapter 3). In the postwar period, Heimat offered 
a simple and positive form of identification that public celebrations of symbolic 
nationalism could no longer provide.  
Coming Home? 
If the ideal Germany should be, as one writer in the postwar period put it, 
“outwardly as unified as necessary, inwardly as diversified as possible” (Schnath, 1958, 
p. 20), it would appear that the concept of Heimat should be well suited to provide a new 
pluralist form of identification in Germany as its population changes with immigration 
and demographic shifts. Yet, as Berem illustrated in our conversation, the forms of 
diversity compatible with claims to Germany as Heimat do not extend to those who are 
perceived as exogenous. A decisive boundary constructed by the German notion of 
Heimat is between those who live in the nation of their Heimat and those who are 
perceived to have been displaced from it. The counter-image of Heimat is embodied by 
the Ausländer (Räthzel, 1994, p. 89). Ausländer, which translates to foreigner, is 
composed of the preposition aus- meaning outside, and Land, meaning country. It means, 
consequently, a person who lives outside their country and, simultaneously, one who 
belongs outside the country where they reside. The disturbing associations of the 
71 
 
alienation from Heimat are also expressed in its antonym in adjective form unheimlich, 
generally translated as uncanny. The Heimat is where the subject makes sense, and the 
experience of the unheimlich is the suspension of that familiar regime of truth. Whereas 
Heimat represents the place where one unquestioningly belongs, the Ausländer is one 
who is deprived of that harmonious belonging in perpetuity.  
 The most dramatic illustration of the complex relationship between Heimat and 
ethnic or racial notions of belonging is evident in the case of ethnic German Aussiedler 
(resettler), whose ancestors had moved to parts of Eastern Europe and Russia from 
German territories decades or even centuries before. The definition of citizenship 
established in the 1949 Basic Law of the German Federal Republic included special 
consideration of Aussiedler, originally referred to as Heimatvertriebene (expellees from 
the homeland). To paraphrase the relevant statute, refugees or expellees of German 
descent who found refuge in the boundaries of the German Empire in 1937 were defined 
as German according to the Basic Law (Article 116, Paragraph 1).iii This designation was 
clarified in the Expellee and Refugee Law (BVFG) of 1953 to define ethnic German 
status through the verifiable self-designation as German as well as the ability to 
demonstrate characteristics such as descent and the maintenance of language or cultural 
norms. The inclusion of these ethnic German minorities in German citizenship was a 
reaction to the expulsion of these populations from the lands they had long occupied as a 
response to German invasions during the Second World War. In the first four years after 
the war, eight million expellees settled in West Germany (von Koppenfels, 2002). 
Numbers of Aussiedler entering Germany dropped to an average of 40,000 between 1950 
and 1986 and then spiked with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reaching nearly 
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400,000 in 1990. Aussiedler were provided significant resources to aid their resettlement, 
including housing aid, access to the pension system and free German language classes.  
The laws and processes establishing the privileges of German Aussiedler further 
codified the juridical meaning of Germanness through ethnic descent, although this may 
have been an unintended consequence of a reactive policy responding to the ethnic 
definitions used to expel minority Germans from Eastern Europe (von Koppenfels, 2002). 
In addition to strengthening norms of jus sanguinis citizenship, the process of accepting 
Aussiedler also depended on shared conceptions of the meaning of Heimat, which 
includes descent but also depends on the demonstration of an active imagination of 
territorially and culturally grounded origins. The injustices of expulsion and the pain of 
the loss of one’s Heimat became part of a strong conservative narrative of German 
victimization in the Federal Republic that continues in contemporary reunited Germany 
in mainstream as well as extreme right circles (Brinks, 2000); it allowed postwar 
Germans to position themselves as victims of the Nazi period due to the suffering of 
“good Germans” expelled from their rightful homelands (Confino, 2005). Although it 
was widely acknowledged that after generations living far from Germany there was very 
little that could be clearly distinguished as “German” about the Aussiedler, with proof of 
descent and a cursory demonstration of the maintenance of cultural ties “returnees” were 
welcomed into Germany with citizenship and social benefits.  But as Stefan Senders 
(2002) argues, this was not simply a policy affirming biological, blood-based belonging. 
More than that, the process of applying for Aussiedler status was an active mimetic 
construction of the nation. Senders writes that in the process of repatriation,  
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ethnic Germans are required to bring their life stories into conformation with 
prototypic plots; they must claim to have had the proper kinds of relationships, to 
have felt the appropriate pain, and to have experienced their own being in specific 
and predetermined forms. (2002, p. 90) 
Through “testing” Aussiedler to see if they qualify for repatriation, German jurisprudence 
made the norms regulating the reproduction of normative German citizens transparent. 
These norms affirm that to be German implies genealogical descent, but that genealogical 
descent is not necessarily sufficient to be German. The peak in applications for 
Aussiedler status in the 1990s established affinity across time and space at a historical 
moment when the children and grandchildren of the postwar Gastarbeiter (guest worker) 
generation were coming of age as foreigners in the territory of their birth.  
Updates to the Expellee and Refugee Law in 1992 added the expectation that 
Aussiedler demonstrate having suffered for being German as one key means of proving 
the authenticity of the claim to Germanness. In fact, current guidelines for applicants 
from outside the former Soviet Union must “demonstrate that they have experienced 
discrimination or the effects of earlier discrimination as a result of their German 
identification (Völkszugehörigkeit)”iv (Bundesverwaltungsamt, n.d.). Regardless of 
whether it was a reasonable reflection of their lived experience, Aussiedler are required to 
present documents and narratives demonstrating the endurance of their memory of their 
German Heimat abroad in their written petitions to German bureaucrats.  
More than a recovery of original belonging, however, the petition procedure 
entails a narrative performance that produces the German citizen “in Germany’s own 
image”, thereby excluding other forms of difference from the narrative of national 
reproduction (Senders, 2002, p. 88). This process of claiming citizenship acknowledges 
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the possibility of transformation. As Senders’ study of legal cases from the 1990s shows, 
the children of individuals who qualify as ethnic German Aussiedler might not 
themselves qualify if they are determined to lack the necessary experiences and traits, 
from a grasp of basic German to the maintenance of religious rituals, such as celebrating 
Christmas in the German way following the Gregorian calendar. But by rearticulating and 
recounting these requisite experiences in written petitions for citizenship, the Aussiedler 
can become German again through the process of repatriation. At the same time, by 
emphasizing the link between suffering endured to maintain Germanness outside the 
ancestral homeland, it confirms the perception of the incompleteness of the lives of 
Ausländer living in Germany and deprived of access to the place where they truly belong. 
This might explain the sympathetic enthusiasm of the German official as she imagined 
Berem’s experience of “returning” to the place where she can finally belong.  
The perception that those residents and citizens who do not qualify as ethnic 
Germans live suspended between their homelands and their host lands rearticulates the 
perpetual difference between the German self and the foreign other. For this reason, when 
writing about pervasive portrayals of immigrants and their descendants as internally torn 
or fragmented, Leslie Adelson argues that “the trope of ‘betweenness’ often functions 
literally like a reservation designed to contain, restrain, and impede new knowledge, not 
enable it” (2007, p. 266). The imaginary bridge “between two worlds” keeps apart that 
which it pretends to unify. Rather than a mode of transit to someplace new, the bridge 
keeps migrants suspended in a state of perpetual alterity. In this context, turning a critical 
eye to the deeply naturalized and also ambivalent notion of Heimat reveals how the 
emotional and affective requirements of modern citizenship cannot be separated from the 
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political. Left unexamined, the cultural and temporal assumptions that undergird the term 
uncritically reproduce the foreignness of those whose Heimat is presumed to be 
elsewhere.  
Heimat: The Making of German Nationals and Integrant “Strangers” 
As we have seen, the Heimat idea forms part of the daily reproduction of the 
modern nation by creating a link between the locality and the nation. However, the term’s 
flexibility does not necessarily encompass all forms of particularity. The term’s openness 
obscures its function in racializing groups who carry exogenous markers, from foreign 
names to physical features such as “schwarze Haare” (black hair). These traces of 
foreignness index individuals and groups as “strangers,” to use Georg Simmel’s term. 
Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Simmel defined strangers as members of 
society whose relations are defined by the synthesis of “nearness and distance” (2011). 
The paradigmatic stranger for Simmel was the European Jew, who often settled in one 
place, but who nevertheless maintained a kind of mobility through business as well as 
familial and social connections across space. 
Simmel emphasized that strangers are part of society, not truly outsiders. They 
share many commonalities with their indigenous neighbors, but those commonalities are 
universal and general in nature, as opposed to the particularities “organic members” share 
with each other that distinguish them from the universal. Strangers’ mobility and the 
general nature of their relations of commonality are the inverse of Heimat. Crucially, 
however, while the stranger and the Heimat are incongruous, their relation is not one of 
insiders as opposed to outsiders. Strangers are not the barbarians at the gates, but the 
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neighbors whose status lies in between, simultaneously near and distant. Their ambiguity, 
the complexity of their relations, opposes the simplicity, harmony, and clarity of the 
imagined Heimat.  
In our universal system of nation-states, strangers become particularly 
problematic. States operate by abstracting the concepts of friends (insiders) and enemies 
(outsiders) to the level of national collectives (Bauman, 1990; Schmitt, 2007). But, as 
Bauman (1990) observes, strangers are others within whose status of friend or enemy is 
unclear, and therefore unsettling. Whereas oppositions between friend and enemy “enable 
knowledge and action; undecidables paralyze” (Bauman, 1990, p. 146). Strangers must 
always be watched, their behavior scrutinized to determine whether they are friends or 
enemies. Bauman writes that assimilation is a “war against ambivalence”8 (1990, p. 155). 
It is the attempt to either turn a stranger into friend, or clarify their status as an enemy. 
However, when strangers are part of a distinguishable group, the actions of some reflect 
on, and raise questions about, the whole class. So long as they are recognized as 
strangers, the determination can never be settled. The process becomes an infinite loop 
until it is forgotten that they are strange. By using the term integrant to refer to this 
stranger status in Germany, I emphasize this infinite loop that maintains scrutiny on those 
whose Heimat is assumed to lie elsewhere. 
                                                          
 
 
 
8
Without discussing the arguments about the differences and similarities between integration and 
assimilation generally, in relation to the figure of the stranger, the two concepts play the same role.  
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So long as a person—a Migrant, Muslim, Ausländer, Mensch mit 
Migrationshintergrund (person with a migration background)—is caught up in the 
discourse of integration, their status as stranger remains active. Even in his pessimistic 
account, Bauman recognizes that a stranger’s status as strange may be forgotten. The 
definition of classes of strangers is socially grounded and subject to historical change. 
The Jewish stranger of Simmel’s time is no longer the paradigmatic stranger. Although 
there is significant discomfort among normative Germans around Jewishness in 
Germany, which manifests in part as Philosemitism, Ruth Mandel’s (2008) ethnographic 
work in Berlin during the 1980s and 1990s shows that Jews are no longer the primary 
internal Other. Mandel’s work draws parallels between the pre-war status of Germany’s 
Jews and the contemporary perception of Turkish-Germans as the primary example of 
“foreigners inside” (2008, p. 137). As new waves of refugees from Lebanon, Syria, 
Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran and other majority Muslim countries continue to arrive, the 
Turk as paradigmatic stranger has been joined by the designation as Muslim. As relations 
change and new strangers are identified, the formerly strange may recede from notice 
within normative society. However, some features identifying strangers are more durable 
than others, phenotypical difference chief among them.   
Heimat’s troubling continuity with the past lies not in the overt racism of the Nazi 
period, but rather in its status as a conventional discursive practice that continuously re-
inscribes difference, even when the intent is integrative. Even at the heart of the term 
‘integration,’ the assumption of the necessity of a social process to suture two or more 
distinct elements reifies the very existence of the difference it seeks to overcome. It 
denies the possibility that a person raised in Germany can become familiar with and take 
78 
 
ownership of the various cultural spheres they are immersed in, regardless of their 
heritage. This, I think, lies at the heart of Berem’s two stories of social exclusion. The 
government worker’s inadvertent friendly exclusion cut Berem more deeply than the 
overtly racist act of the ticket checker. This friendly exclusion marks her as a permanent 
stranger within.  
Indeed, the unimpeachability of Heimat is based in its perceived individuality. For 
each person, the meaning and imagining of Heimat is unique. Often it is associated with 
the distinguishing features of the landscape of one’s childhood. It is safety and 
domesticity evacuated of conflict—that is to say—of other people (Räthzel, 1994). It is 
the state of harmony that can only be achieved in the imaginary. This internal nature of 
Heimat is what Isaiah Berlin calls “collective individuality” (1976, p. 200). This refers us 
back again to the particularity of German national collectivity. It is a collectivity that 
bases itself on collective individuality and views collective social formations—such as 
those projected onto patriarchal Eastern societies—as threatening the harmony of the 
internally constituted but shared possession of Heimat. Modernity, through the nation-
state, has fused cultural and political subjectivities to the point that the betrayal of the 
nation is tantamount to the betrayal of self (Yack, 1996). Heimat, a thoroughly modern 
term dressed in primordial trappings, reveals that the tension between European 
universalism and romantic particularism is not a conflict at all, but rather a constitutive 
force of modern subjectivity.  
Different national imaginaries combine these two frameworks of universalism and 
particularism in distinct and historically specific ways. The generalization necessary to 
sustain the imaginary of a national population is built on different conceptions of 
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specificity. Everyone must answer the question of what it means to be a member and 
what defines a nation as opposed to its neighbors, although the answers must always 
remain internally contested. National imaginaries also interact with regional and global 
divisions, such as the distinction between modern and developing nations, between the 
East and the West. It is quite common in the literature on nationalism to divide nations 
into categories according to the weight given to particularistic as opposed to political or 
constitutional forms. In one classic example, Kohn characterized the development of 
European nationalisms according to the battle between nationalisms based on claims of 
historical community  as opposed to nations based on “the dream of brotherhood and 
equal peoples in a universal order of democratic justice” (1955, p. 51). German 
nationalism is often seen as a prototype of the particularist nation, defined by 
romanticism and Herderian notions of essential cultures and “communities of fate” 
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft). In contrast, French nationalism is defined as a civic community 
of consensus, where culture, religion, and other forms of individual or group-based 
differences are theoretically irrelevant in determining who belongs to the nation. While 
there is some truth in this characterization, it obscures as much as it illuminates. After all, 
what national ideology does not claim to pursue universalist aspirations of democratic 
justice and equality among its citizenry? What modern nation has been immune from 
nativist chauvinism that seeks to protect an essentialized notion of national culture from 
outside threat? Keeping these phenomena apart creates a normative distinction between 
good and bad forms of nationalism, creating the illusion that positive civic nationalism 
can fully displace the negative historical variety (Kuzio, 2002; Yack, 1996). The crucial 
point is to determine the relationship between these two tendencies as they emerge in 
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each context. As a concept, Heimat is one of the terms that facilitates the spatial and 
temporal movement between universalist national imaginaries and personal experience 
and affect. The shared conception of Heimat as a source of the self builds the national 
from the personal, while also maintaining the positive normative valence of universalism. 
After all, everyone can have their own version of what constitutes Heimat.  
Although the deceptive naturalism and intimacy of Heimat makes it difficult to 
analyze, in doing so we may understand and critique the assumptions that reproduce 
everyday forms of exclusion that can sometimes cut deeper than a particular act of 
explicit racism. In part, this would involve acknowledging that in Germany “cultural 
contact today is not an ‘intercultural encounter’ that takes place between German culture 
and something outside it but something happening within German culture between the 
German past and the German present” (Adelson, 2007, p. 268). Even as citizenship rights 
have finally been expanded to include the second and third generations born of the 
immigrant “Guest Workers” of the postwar period, locating the source of subjectivity 
within the Heimat marks those who carry traces of other homelands as strangers or, 
borrowing from Partridge (2012), as “noncitizens.”  
The Desire for “Healthy Normality”  
Heimat is bound up with a discourse of longing for “normality” that establishes 
confident and unequivocal national self-identification as a prerequisite for the psychic 
health of the population. In this view, people and historical events that introduce 
complexity and unruly plurality or that evoke ambivalence pose a threat to the well-being 
of the national population. Along with the discourses examined in other chapters of this 
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dissertation, Heimat is one means of reducing this social complexity, assigning it to the 
individual level and managing the trauma of associations with the perpetrators of 
historical atrocities. This chapter concludes with examples that elucidate this relationship 
between the trauma of the perpetrators and notions of normality and national “self-
confidence.” Also circulating within these discourses is the crucial question of who has 
the right to speak about the National Socialist past. My intention here is not to enter 
discussions about the relative validity of different representations of the past per se. What 
is important for this dissertation are the uses of these debates about the past as part of the 
construction of the national present and its legitimate citizenry. The first two examples 
come from discussions surrounding two of the most popular creative works of the 1980s 
and 90s: Edgar Reitz’s epic film series Heimat (1981-1984) and Martin Walser’s award-
winning auto-biographical novel, A Leaping Spring (1998) (Ein springender Brunnen). 
From distinct political perspectives, these works model a collective national reclaiming of 
narratives of the Third Reich from outsiders as well as a move to privatize the past in a 
way that isolates personal experience from practices of state genocide.  
The 1990s were defined both by Germany’s reunification and by a fresh outbreak 
of racist violence against immigrants and refugees. Even as reunification raised the 
possibility that Germany could once again be a “normal” nation in Europe, fatal fire 
bombings and riots broke out in the early 1990s, raising the specter of the racisms of 
Germany’s past. The 1990s also brought new revelations about the involvement of 
Wehrmacht soldiers and everyday Germans in the Holocaust (Caplan, Frei, Geyer, Nolan, 
& Stargardt, 2006). At the same time, frustration was building with the growing 
memorial culture and official efforts at “coming to terms with the past” 
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(Vergangenheitsbewältigung) (Assmann, 2003). However, despite complaints that the 
past casts a consistent and oppressive shadow over Germany, the breadth and depth of 
discussions and efforts at self-reflection and coming to terms with the past have been 
highly contested (Kansteiner, 2006b). To be clear, not only have the meaning of the past 
and the relevance of the past for the present been contested, the meaning and extent of 
that process of public self-reflection is itself a complex and contested issue. While the 
specter of the question of guilt and responsibility (the Schuldfrage) never fully left the 
collective consciousness, Dan Diner writes that over time the question has been 
“paradoxically most present in terms of denial” (2000, p. 221). While the crimes of the 
Nazi past would periodically break onto the scene, in the form of high-profile trials such 
as the Eichmann trial, as well as in controversial commemorations and debates, 
discussions of the Holocaust only gained broad traction in the 1980s9 (Caplan et al., 
2006; Confino, 2004; Giesen, 2004; Maier, 1997). The myth of the good and chivalrous 
German Wehrmacht soldier, as opposed to the vicious Nazi, had been undermined in 
scholarship as early as the 1970s, but survived among the general public until the late 
1990s (Kansteiner, 2006b). The history of public debate about the meaning of the Nazi 
past, its relevance for the present, and the role of everyday Germans in enabling and 
perpetrating atrocities, is complex and uneven. Regardless of the inconsistent and often 
limited nature of these discussions during much of postwar history, the claim that the past 
                                                          
 
 
 
9 See Wulf Kansteiner (2006b) for a detailed discussion of the various phases and protagonists of the 
struggles over memory culture from 1945 through the 1990s.  
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has been constantly used to create a “guilt complex” (Schuldkomplex) among Germans is 
widely accepted as valid. As this section will show, this guilt complex has been situated 
as a major stumbling block inhibiting the “normal” development of Germany as a strong, 
proud, and effective nation today.   
As was discussed above, Heimat provided a refuge from the most troubled parts 
of the collective memory of Nazi crimes, starting with the escapism of the popular 
postwar Heimat films. With a few very powerful exceptions, in the first decades after the 
war, “West Germans emphasized their own suffering and largely ignored the suffering 
they had inflicted on others” (Kansteiner, 2006b, p. 111). Even when representations of 
the Nazi genocide began to appear with more frequency on television in the 1970s, 
stories were focused on a particular subset of victims—usually successful survivors—and 
good Germans who aided them, erasing perpetrators and bystanders or reducing them to 
elite leaders or to caricature (Kansteiner, 2006a). One turning point in media 
representation and public discussion was the 1979 telecast of the American television 
mini-series Holocaust (1978) in West Germany. The series, which attracted 20 million 
West German viewers or roughly half of the population, followed two families during the 
Third Reich, a family of German Jews and an ambitious couple that ascended the ranks of 
the SS. The entertaining and emotionally powerful series included both victims and 
perpetrators as complex subjects and brought the Nazi genocide into the center of the 
public sphere with unprecedented success. However, the success of Holocaust frustrated 
some on the German left, who saw the production as a hypocritical capitalist project, 
meant to profit from the pain of Nazi crimes (Herf, 1980). 
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Edgar Reitz explicitly framed his popular television series, Heimat (1984), as a 
German answer to the successful American mini-series, Holocaust (Confino, 1998). The 
epic, fifteen-hour film tells the story of a family in a small town near the Rhine from 
1919 to 1982. As Alon Confino explains, beginning in the 1970s, the New Left embraced 
the Heimat idea as a symbol of "local roots and authentic German ways of life", and, 
thus, as the antithesis to nationalism, Americanization, and consumerism (1998, p. 193). 
This was at the heart of a new movement among German historians promoting oral 
history and the history of everyday life. Taking up this approach in television fiction, 
with Heimat Reitz aimed to portray genuine German relationships and experiences, as 
opposed to the supposedly kitschy and stereotypical Hollywood representations of 
Holocaust. Reitz unequivocally supported the commonly held view that Heimat cannot 
be scaled up to the nation or state, claiming in a 1984 article in Die Zeit, that "Heimat and 
nation... are contradictory terms" (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 190). The nation is 
associated with conflict, abstraction, and diversity; Heimat is personal, embodied, 
harmonious and close-knit. As Confino summarizes, “the local meaning of the Heimat 
idea enables Reitz to disavow the notion of national history, and to fragment the larger 
processes of German history into numerous histories of local Heimats" (1998, p. 190). 
Reitz’s statements about Heimat reveal a slippage between the intimate personal 
experiences he foregrounds in the film, on the one hand, and on the other, a national 
consciousness constructed on collective but private ownership over the past.  
This foregrounding of the legitimacy of local experiences also has implications 
for determining who has the right to narrate the past. In reaction to Holocaust, Reitz 
wrote that “the most profound expropriation that exists is the expropriation of people 
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from their own history” (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 194). Reitz’s film is a reaction 
against expropriation both by foreign storytellers and by historians who attempt to, in his 
words, “generalize, to order events, to disclose cause and effect” (E. Reitz, 1988, p. 137). 
Although he positions himself against national history, Reitz proposes a nationalist 
version of history that equates embodied “German experience” with authenticity, 
excluding both those who do not have a personal connection to the German past and 
those who undertake a broader analysis of the past and situate the personal in relation to 
political events. This view gives authority to speak based only on the personal, assuming, 
of course, one is also a member of the nation.   
 This argument was taken even further by Martin Walser in his 1998 speech 
accepting the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchandels (Peace Prize of the German 
Books Trade) for his autobiographical novel, Ein springender Brunnen (1998). The 
award is one of Germany’s most prestigious, and the annual award ceremony is 
nationally televised and attended by the cultural, political, and intellectual elite. Walser’s 
novel depicts an idyllic childhood in southern Germany during the Nazi period, and of 
the loss of a father and brother during the war. As in Reitz’s film, National Socialism is 
presented unreflectively and its crimes are not presented at all. In Walser’s acceptance 
speech, which will be examined in more detail below, he spoke out against the 
"instrumentalization of Auschwitz" and the making of remembrance into a ritual (1998). 
He framed his critiques to provide plausible deniability against possible claims that he 
was promoting the forgetting of the past in that he purported to only be speaking for 
himself and his own experience. However, the language of the speech constantly slipped 
seamlessly between the personal “I” and the German “we”, belying this claim.  
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The speech received a near unanimous standing ovation from the exalted 
audience. Two days later Ignaz Bubis, the chair of the Zentralrats der Juden in 
Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany) criticized the speech as intellectual 
arson (geistige Brandstiftung). Bubis repeated and elaborated his criticism a month later 
on the 60th anniversary of Kristallnacht, which unleashed a heated debate. Opinions 
expressed in the media generally sided with Walser, and cast Bubis’s concerns as a 
“failure to understand” Walser’s literary and artistic style in the speech (Assmann, 2003; 
Eshel, 2000). The debate ended up reinforcing Walser’s position and casting doubt on 
both the ability and the motives of “Others” who would speak out against closing off the 
past.  
Walser shares a suspicion of abstraction and symbolism with the early architects 
of the notion of Heimat. He also shares their blind acceptance of the nation as a natural 
community. “Germany” as a collective of German individuals is utterly natural, to the 
extent that it supersedes the political—and therefore abstract—state. Walser demonstrates 
this by reiterating his long-standing opposition to the division of Germany. Contrary to 
the typical West German stance, Walser denied not only the legitimacy of the GDR, but 
also of the Federal Republic in its divided form. Walser compares the stance he took in 
1977 to his current project. “Trembling as [he was] then" Walser insists that "Auschwitz 
is not suited to becoming a routine threat, a means of intimidation or a moral cudgel to be 
mobilized at any time, or simply a required practice. What comes to pass through 
ritualization has the character of lip service”v (Walser, 1998). Here, the threat Auschwitz 
poses is not that it reveals humanity’s latent capacity for unspeakable brutality but rather, 
that it can be used for the “permanent presentation of our shame.” Walser’s deep 
87 
 
identification as a German above all means that he interprets any presentation of German 
crimes as a process of external shaming imposed by self-hating Germans and various 
outsiders.  
Walser’s rejection of the representation of German crimes is not limited to the 
crimes of the National Socialist past, however. He feels the same suspicion in response to 
discussions of contemporary hate crimes. He presents a quotation from an unnamed 
“intellectual” (Habermas) about the festive atmosphere during the racist riots of the early 
1990s. Framing his question as self-critical, Walser asks why he is “not galvanized by the 
same outrage” as this intellectual who writes of the “sympathetic population [that] sets up 
sausage stands in front of burning refugee hostels.” Here, Walser references an article 
that Habermas wrote for Die Zeit in 1992 criticizing the public reaction to the xenophobic 
violence. Habermas argues against the single-minded concern with the political 
implications of the violence for Germany’s international image. After quoting a number 
of top politicians who identified “the actual crime” as the harm to Germany’s 
international image, Habermas writes, “Neither the victims or the barbarization of our 
society rate as the first worries, rather it is the image of seat-of-industry Germany”vi 
(1992). Walser goes even further, by categorically refusing to believe the worst details of 
the riots themselves.  
Walser sees the injustice of the supposed guilt complex (Schuldkomplex) as 
singular: in the past quarter century, there is “no other people (Volk), population, society” 
that could be so addressed. Although the unnamed intellectual refers to a specific and 
contemporary event, Walser rejects the presentation of racist violence that recalls 
Germany's “eternal shame.” He blames the media’s “routine of accusation” for pushing 
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him to look away when faced with German “shame:” “when I am presented every day 
with this past in the media, I notice that something in me defends itself against the 
permanent presentation of our shame….I start to look away.”vii But lest the audience 
think that Walser is concerned about the ethics of this tendency, he reveals that in 
analyzing it he is “almost happy” to realize his reaction is not against remembrance itself, 
but against the “instrumentalization of our shame for present purposes.”viii Walser 
suspects that the media and self-hating German intellectuals have ulterior motives for 
representing the past in public. He suspects that it makes German critics feel closer to 
victims, relieving themselves of their burden by heaping it higher onto their compatriots. 
Walser, however, claims that he cannot shake the feeling of always standing on the side 
of the “accused.”  
This section of Walser's speech raises several important issues. First, it shows 
how the over-identification with the national (German) converts all representations of 
crimes committed by group members into an accusation against the nation, and thus 
against all members. This identification is so strong that it holds together crimes past and 
present under the same agenda of shaming. Any use of the past as a tool for analysis is 
tantamount to “instrumentalization,” which, regardless of its purpose, is suspect and is a 
misuse of Auschwitz. Second, it reflects once again the structure of 19th century Heimat 
discourse, which defends the sovereignty of the individual and expresses suspicion of 
politics, abstraction, and symbolism. Under cover of this disavowal of politics, it 
reaffirms the unquestioned natural community of the people (Volk). This is a politics of 
the private nation, which holds the personal experience as primary and truly authentic. 
This nation is unaffected by the historical unfolding of the politics and actions of the 
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state. Finally, it draws a strong line between “we” Germans who are the target of hurtful 
representations and those who marshal those representations. Walser’s binary divides the 
world into victims and perpetrators, accusers and accused. The strength of Walser’s 
national identification makes a shared practice of remembrance impossible. Those who 
publically discuss German crimes are thus outsiders. The common experience of being 
constantly accused, threatened with the constant mobilization of Auschwitz as "a means 
of intimidation or moral cudgel" (Walser, 1998) unites Germans. The positive reception 
reflected in the standing ovation Walser received was carried over into the mediated 
debate that followed from Bubis’s critique. While a number of other prominent figures—
most of them also Jews—shared Bubis’s reading of Walser’s speech, the responses 
published in the media largely supported Walser and dismissed the critique as an inability 
to understand Walser’s literary style (Eshel, 2001). The lightly veiled anti-Semitism 
underlying the claim that German Jewish critics were incapable of understanding literary 
German was expressed in a more extreme form when, at the height of the debate, a pig 
painted with a Star of David and labeled BUBIS was driven onto Berlin’s Alexanderplatz 
(Roll, 1998). The mostly positive reaction to Walser’s and against Bubis’s criticism of it 
shows that speaking out against the continued public analysis of Germany’s past to 
establish the “normality” of reunified Germany serves to unify and consolidate the idea 
of the German nation against domestic and international outsiders. 
New Germans and the German Past 
This national consolidation around the past has consequences for immigrants and 
new Germans, whose familial past does not include a connection to the perpetrator 
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generations of the Third Reich. This is not only a problem of the right, as represented by 
Walser. While many have called for an inclusive practice of memory since early in the 
postwar period, many of the critical leftist proponents of Vergangenheitsbewältigung 
(coming to terms with the past) have relied heavily on a genealogical connection to 
National Socialism to justify the depth of German responsibility to be critically self-
reflective. For example, Habermas’s idea of “constitutional patriotism” is based on 
political attachment and the commitment to the norms, values and procedures of a liberal 
democratic constitution, relying also on “supplements of particularity” to become an 
effective form of political attachment (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 11); in the German case this 
meant the self-critical memory of the Nazi past.  
Habermas and other leftist intellectuals proposed constitutional patriotism in 
reaction to the move by conservative historians to relativize the National Socialist past 
during the 1980s (see Chapter 3). However, in seeking to reaffirm the singularity of Nazi 
crimes, the national emphasis of early concepts of constitutional patriotism effectively 
excluded immigrants and new Germans from a key site of national community formation 
(J.-W. Müller, 2008, pp. 37–39; Rothberg & Yildiz, 2011, p. 38). Nevertheless, as Jan-
Werner Müller argues, this ethnic-national emphasis is not critical to—or even 
sustainable within—the practice of constitutional patriotism (2008, p. 42). Although it 
may have been an expedient way to counter conservative drives for normalization, the 
construction of an exclusive form of memory culture is not necessary to preserve active 
engagement with the past. In fact, it is counterproductive. As Rothberg and Yildiz (2011) 
show in their excellent ethnographic work with immigrants and their descendants who 
engage with and explore Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across 
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time and space, there is no a priori reason that immigrants cannot access the collective 
memory of the receiving country. Taking on the question of whether the immigrating to 
Germany doesn't also mean immigrating into Germany's recent past (Senocak & Tulay, 
2000), Rothberg and Yildiz discuss the example of a group of immigrant “activist 
citizens” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). This group of Turkish immigrant women are engaging 
with and exploring Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across time and 
space, using the example of Nazi genocide to think through the Turkish history of 
Armenian genocide. Rothberg and Yildiz counter the assumption that immigrants are 
necessarily cut off from the collective memory of the receiving country. They expose the 
ways that the leftist politics of contrition, in the ways outlined above, have led to 
cordoning off immigrant citizens and minorities, supporting ethnicist notions of 
Germanness.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, both sides of the polarized debate between conservative 
and critical leftist approaches to defining the place of the National Socialist past in the 
country’s contemporary self-conception depended on a descent-based definition of the 
national community. For conservatives like Walser, only Germans could understand the 
emotional and psychological toll of being faced with a ceaseless “routine of accusation” 
domestically and internationally. In contrast, pushing back against conservative attempts 
to relativize the past led many critical intellectuals to overemphasize the particularly 
German responsibility for remembering National Socialist crimes (Rothberg & Yildiz, 
2011). However, after reunification, the self-reflexive critical form of identification 
called for by “constitutional patriotism” fell out of favor. Reunification ushered in a new 
wave of nationalist enthusiasm. With the “anomaly” of the national division gone, many 
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intellectuals from across the political spectrum thought that Germans could now form a 
“normal” national consciousness (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 44). In addition, after fiercely 
but vainly resisting citizenship law changes introducing limited birth right to citizenship 
around the turn of the millennium, conservative politicians gradually discovered the 
pedagogical power of immigrant patriots in the cause of establishing a “normalized” 
national consciousness (see Chapter 5). The enthusiasm of immigrant patriots for their 
new homeland serves as an example to Germans whose relationship to the nation is 
portrayed as neurotic and tense (verkrampft). In contrast, critical intellectuals from 
Adorno to Habermas see this tension as part of a productive community-building process 
of reflection on uncomfortable pasts (Jürgen Habermas, 1997, p. 17). From this 
perspective, engaging with this tension that conservatives view as pathological serves as 
a tool of empowerment and as the key to the formation of an ethical and active national 
community (Assmann, 2003; J.-W. Müller, 2008).  
However, this rational and complex discursive version of national affiliation runs 
precisely contrary to the pre-political, affective, and harmonious notion of Heimat. 
Heimat discourse accepts the contributions that immigrants and transnational citizens can 
make in freeing German national sentiment from the friction and complexity of the past. 
Their participation is also rhetorically useful as evidence of the inclusiveness of new 
nationalism. However, since Heimat thinking is also incompatible with the complexity 
and rationality of plural and transnational affiliations, it also maintains a boundary 
between immigrant patriots and normative nationals. German “memory culture” (Esmer, 
2014) thus stands as both a challenge and an opportunity for new Germans seeking to 
claim their place within national culture.  
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While those with identifiable immigrant heritage may continue to be frustrated in 
their attempts to claim their Heimat in Germany, their presumed lack of a German past 
gives them a privileged position in defining a new Germany free from the burdens of the 
National Socialist past. This is evident in minority cultural production from hip-hop to 
journalism (see for example Harris, 2010a; Samy Deluxe, 2009). In their 2012 book Wir 
neuen Deutschen (We New Germans), Polish-born Alice Bota, Turkish-German Topçu 
Özlem, and Vietnamese-German Khue Pham intertwine narratives from their personal 
lives as first and second generation immigrants from three distinct cultural and socio-
economic backgrounds with broader analysis and critique of identity and exclusion in 
contemporary Germany. They use their biographies and their experience as journalists on 
the editorial staff of the prestigious weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, to analyze the logics and 
functions of limited notions of Germanness and to argue for the benefits of inclusiveness 
to the whole population of Germany. Throughout their work they criticize the 
hierarchical differentiation of “Germans” from “foreigners.” Germanness is defined first 
by the lack of foreign traces in language, religion, appearance, and name. However, they 
observe that Germanness may be attained (at least provisionally) despite these foreign 
traces based on a person’s level of achievement in society.  
Although Bota et al. provide a nuanced and comprehensive critique of the 
differential valuation of the “foreign” and the “German,” they also uncritically accept 
several common assumptions relating to Heimat and the German past. The third chapter 
of their book, Meine Heimat, keine Heimat (My Heimat, No Heimat), addresses the 
question of where one comes from, delving into the affect of belonging. Bota et al. 
observe that those who ask this question of others can usually answer it easily for 
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themselves, but are not satisfied with a simple answer. For those whose origins are 
multiple this question is a trap, forcing them to declare loyalties to one at the expense of 
others. They write that Heimat is an extremely emotional and complicated concept, one 
that evokes the sacrifices their parents made by emigrating, and the desire for the security 
their German friends seem to derive from it. “Heimat,” they write, “is the origin of body 
and soul; it is the middle point of one’s own world”ix (2012, p. 50). The authors’ 
internalized conception of Heimat underscores their assimilation of German notions of 
self, even as it marks them as permanently alienated from it.  
Even as they perceive that Germans enjoy security and harmony from inhabiting 
their own homeland, echoing Walser’s position, they see Germans as tormented by shame 
for the Nazi past. They write that, “being German still means: having to bear Nazi jokes 
abroad, keeping your head bowed, and only bringing out the flag during the World Cup”x 
(2012, p. 53). They argue that the burden of the past has prevented Germans from having 
a robust national identity. Somehow, the authors do not interpret long persistence of 
exclusively descent-based citizenship, the primacy of singular notions of Heimat, and the 
resistance to accepting people of color as German as indications of a strong national 
identity. Despite the abundant evidence Bota et al. present of the resilient positive 
associations with Germanness, the authors still accept the Walserian notion that a 
persistent “guilt complex” makes positive German identity impossible. Bota et al. go so 
far as to borrow the axiom that “to love others, one must first love themselves” (2012, p. 
53) to argue that German self-loathing is actually the root of xenophobia. They offer little 
justification for this claim, which appears to be based on the commonsensical idea that 
bullies—here xenophobes—only lash out at others out of a lack of self-confidence, 
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caused in this case by shame about the Nazi past. The authors consider themselves as 
absolved from this shame, since others do not see the German past as belonging to them. 
In this, they find an opportunity: by encouraging Germans to accept their immigrant and 
minority compatriots as part of the nation, they can build a new identity free from the 
fetters of past nationalist atrocities. In their acceptance of the view that the past has a 
pathological impact on the German national psyche, they view the incorporation of the 
transnational in Germany as a route to freedom from the past.  
Bota et al.’s book musters a powerful critique of the cultural politics of 
contemporary social inequality, but it also demonstrates the taboo surrounding the 
concept of racism in Germany. The authors repeatedly address issues of appearance, 
religious stigma, and religious and cultural othering, but the words “race” and “racism” 
only appear on two pages in the book. Beyond that, it shows the even stronger taboo 
around examining continuities with National Socialist past. The only role the German 
past plays in the book is as a source of shame that prevents a relaxed and healthy 
contemporary German identity. Taking a different approach, Turkish-German journalist 
Mustafa Esmer (2014) rejects the ways the past is used by normative Germans in a 
commentary written for the online magazine, Migazin, which covers issues related to 
migration in Germany. Esmer uses stories from his life to demonstrate how the burden of 
the past functions to delegitimize criticism of racism by minorities in contemporary 
Germany. Esmer points to a pattern evident in episodes ranging from memories of his 
parents' attempts to criticize discriminatory treatment in the search for housing to 
contemporary discussions about his experiences of everyday racism with "bio-German" 
friends. Whenever his parents or Esmer spoke up against racialized inequality, they were 
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met with the defensive dismissal, “Yeah, yeah, we are all Nazis” (Esmer, 2014). He then 
asks,  
Why, even though I have lived in Germany since my birth, I grew up here and I 
actively follow politics, am I not allowed to criticize the injustices that govern my 
life? Very simple: I am missing a crucial marker of bio-German identity, namely, 
the German original sin—the Holocaust. The exclusivity of the German original 
sin is the problem that leads to the lack of recognition of new Germans by the 
majority society.xi (Esmer, 2014)  
Esmer sympathetically observes the same “guilt complex” that Bota et al. blame for 
German self-hatred and, paradoxically, xenophobia, but comes to a different conclusion. 
Instead of seeing the inclusion of minorities as a means of breaking the curse of guilt, 
Esmer calls for an initiative involving representatives of the German population in all its 
diversity to devise a new, active, and inclusive approach to German memory culture. 
Esmer’s account shows that, even among his liberal German friends, the past is not 
functioning as a tool to understand the logics and the significance of everyday forms of 
racism. On the contrary, it has been used to create an environment of what Robin 
DiAngelo (2011) in the United States has called “white fragility,” or the expectation 
among majority populations of being insulated from racial stress, leading to the inability 
to tolerate challenges to the hegemonic racial equilibrium. 
This resistance among majority German society to a national “guilt complex” and 
its prevention of “normal” national sentiments reaches back to the early postwar years. 
Already in 1959, Adorno criticized pervasive complaints of a “guilt complex,” suggesting 
that this term portrays burdening of oneself with the past as pathological, “whereas the 
healthy and realistic person is fully absorbed in the present and its practical goals” (2012, 
p. 91). This quote reflects the extent to which biopolitical concepts of health and the 
productive, future-oriented population were already well-established and functioning to 
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construct national ideals less than 15 years after the war ended. Indeed, Adorno saw 
much behavior that is neurotic in relation to the past, including “defensive postures where 
one is not attacked, intense affects where they are hardly warranted by the situation, an 
absence of affect in the face of the gravest matters, not seldom simply a repression of 
what is known or half-known” (2012, p. 90), examples of all of which are readily 
apparent in Walser’s 1998 speech. Adorno was skeptical that this neurosis was the result 
of a collectively felt guilt, but rather suggests it was a defensive reaction against it. A key 
part of this defense is the denial of continuities from the Third Reich to postwar 
Germany—in particular as regards national identity and racism. Establishing a new 
national normality after the Third Reich has depended heavily on the intimate features of 
Heimat thinking, while denying its political functions in establishing the abstract nation-
state and maintaining the notion of internal strangers.  
Conclusion 
By privileging an imaginary stability, simplicity, and harmony, Heimat excludes 
populations whose experiences of moving across cultures and switching cultural codes 
makes them acutely aware of the ambiguities and complexities of national cultures. 
Because new Germans must learn diverse sets of cultural codes, they can never forget 
that cultural assumptions are not simply natural, but are socially constructed. Heimat 
crystallizes this desire for continuity between the personal and the social, between local 
experience and the political abstraction. Although visible minorities are excluded from 
this German norm of Heimat, their perceived lack of a German past positions them to 
support another desired form of normality: a present- and future-oriented German nation 
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that is free from the burdens of the past. Whereas this chapter has focused on an affective 
concept that distinguishes indigenous Germans from integrant strangers, the next chapter 
examines rational, biopolitical conceptions of the social body that mobilize immigrants 
and minorities in integration projects that aim to build a new Germany suited to the 
challenges of a global economy.  
                                                          
 
 
 
i So wird es en Deutschland gemacht 
ii Wie schön! Sie fahren zurück in die Heimat. 
iii Deutscher im Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die 
deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder als Flüchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volkszugehörigkeit 
oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abkömmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen Reiches nach dem Stande vom 
31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat. (GG Art. 116 (1)) 
iv Aufnahmebewerber aus anderen Staaten (einschließlich Estland, Lettland oder Litauen) als der ehemali-
gen Sowjetunion müssen zusätzlich nachweisen, dass sie auf Grund ihrer deutschen Volkszugehörigkeit 
Benachteiligungen oder Nachwirkungen früherer Benachteiligungen unterlagen. 
v Das fällt mir ein, weil ich jetzt wieder vor Kühnheit zittere, wenn ich sage: Auschwitz eignet sich nicht, 
dafür Drohroutine zu werden, jederzeit einsetzbares Einschüchterungsmittel oder Moralkeule oder auch 
nur Pflichtübung 
vi Nicht den Opfern und der Entzivilisierung unserer Gesellschaft gilt die erste Sorge, sondern dem 
Ansehen des Industriestandortes Deutschland. 
vii Wenn mir aber jeden Tag in den Medien diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten wird, merke ich, daß sich in 
mir etwas gegen diese Dauerpräsentation unserer Schande wehrt. Anstatt dankbar zu sein für die 
unaufhörliche Präsentation unserer Schande, fange ich an wegzuschauen. 
viii Wenn ich merke, daß sich in mir etwas dagegen wehrt, versuche ich, die Vorhaltung unserer Schande 
auf Motive hin abzuhören und bin fast froh, wenn ich glaube, entdecken zu können, daß öfter nicht mehr 
das Gedenken, das Nichtvergessendürfen das Motiv ist, sondern die Instrumentalisierung unserer 
Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken. 
ix Heimat ist der Ursprung von Körper und Seele, es ist der Mittelpunkt der eigenen Welt. 
x Deutschsein heißt immer noch: im Ausland Naziwitze ertragen, den Kopf gesenkt halten, die Fahne nur 
zur WM rausholen. 
xi Warum darf ich trotz der Tatsache, dass ich seit Geburt in Deutschland lebe, hier aufgewachsen bin und 
die Politik aktiv verfolge, die Missstände, die meinen Alltag bestimmen, nicht kritisieren? Ganz einfach: 
Mir fehlt ein wesentliches Merkmal biodeutscher Identität, nämlich die deutsche Erbsünde—der 
Holocaust. Die Exklusivität der deutschen Erbschuld ist das Problem, das zu der fehlenden Anerkennung 
Neudeutscher vonseiten der Mehrheitsgesellschaft führt. 
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CHAPTER 2 – SPORTS INTEGRATION IN THE NEW GERMANY 
 
In the early 2000s, after the introduction of territorial birthright to citizenship (jus 
solis), Germany quickly transformed itself from a paradigm of “segregationist” 
approaches to immigration into a strong supporter of new “integrationist” approaches 
(see Süssmuth 2001). German migration policy shifted from exclusion and repatriation to 
focus on management and socialization. Chapter 1 discussed the German notion of 
Heimat, or homeland, which is generally conceived as a paradigmatic example of 
particularism. Heimat evokes a personal, private and individual imagination of the place 
of true belonging outside the realm of politics. However, as Chapter 1 argued, it is 
precisely this sense of intimacy that made Heimat such an effective tool for the 
generalization of identity to formulate Germany as a national community in the modern 
sense. Heimat maintains its particularist and primordial underpinnings but, by conceiving 
of itself as an individualist concept, resists political analysis. However, as this chapter 
will argue, contemporary notions of national belonging and citizenship in Germany have 
also evolved to include universalizing imperatives under the paradigm of civic 
integration. As a complement to the past temporal orientation of Heimat, contemporary 
integration projects work to cultivate collective forms of subjectivity that aim to improve 
the future life of the population. Sports have emerged as one of the most prominent forms 
taken by these projects. This chapter looks at the prominent place of sports, and 
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particularly soccer, in integration policy to parse the logics underpinning the development 
of new techniques for managing diversity in German society.  
Several of the earliest national institutions to initiate integration projects were the 
German Olympic Sports Confederation and the German Football Association (DFB, 
Deutscher Fußball Bund), which fields the national soccer team. Despite the long 
relationship of sports to war (Mangan, 2004; Pritchard, 2009), today sports are 
conceptualized as the ideal model for transcultural social cohesion and international 
cooperation. This chapter opens with an analysis of a 2014 cover story from Der Spiegel, 
which shows the extent to which sports facilitate discourses of national self-construction. 
To further investigate the conceptualization of the relationship between sports and 
integration, this chapter examines the place of sports in the National Integration Plan of 
2006 and in the integration programs of the German Football Association and the 
German Olympic Sports Confederation. The corpus for this chapter is as follows:  
• German Football Association (DFB) and Mercedes Benz 
o Integration Prize  
• Brochures (2008-2015) 
• German Football Association (DFB) 
• Integration Starts with Me! Practical Handbook (2011) 
• German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) 
o Integration through Sports Program  
• 20 Years of Integration Brochure (2009) 
• Integration through Sport: An Introduction (2012) 
• Basic Framework Document (2014) 
• The Federal Government (Die Bundesregierung) 
o National Integration Plan 
• Plan Introduction and Sections Related to Sports (2007) 
• National Integration Plan Brochure (2007) 
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I analyze the social policies and rhetoric around the participation of minority Germans in 
elite and amateur soccer, and in particular, the claim of DFB leaders—echoed by 
politicians—that “sport is the primary engine of integration in Germany,” and that elite 
athletes of color represent “lived integration” (gelebte Integration). As this chapter 
shows, discourses of sporting integration follow a biopolitical mode of governance aimed 
at managing diversity and cultivating it into a form that is beneficial for the German 
population. In doing so, those discourses strengthen the normative foundations of 
majority German society and justify the socio-economic inequality of those who choose 
not to or fail to meet those normative standards. 
The chapter ends with an analysis of the seams of this sporting integration, the 
disjunctures where the easy transition from celebration to skepticism and condemnation 
reveal the dual nature of biopolitics: the power to “make live” involves deciding which 
life should be encouraged to thrive and which should not. The logics dictating that 
resources and energies be poured into disciplining non-normative bodies to transform 
them into valuable members of the population also dictate that those provisional members 
be surveilled for evidence of errancy. In particular, I examine a debate about requiring 
players to sing the national anthem that cropped up after the national team performed 
below expectations at the Euro Cup in 2012. This chapter asks, what connection do 
discourses of sports integration illustrate between life and integration? How does 
promoting “integration” through sports discipline unruly bodies and turn them into 
productive citizens? How are the minority affiliations of these athletes conceptualized as 
contributing to their ability and to the ability of the German national team, or in the case 
of amateur sports, to the German population at large? The central role of sports in 
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German policy on the socialization and management of those newly entitled to 
citizenship has emerged in concordance with economic theories of national life 
developed in Germany after World War II and, more recently, as part of the spread of a 
new form of integration discourse across Europe around the turn of the millennium. In 
both cases, economic logics have gained ascendance in the definition of deserving 
citizens.  
Although it is still common to distinguish European policies on immigrant 
reception into national typologies defining them on a range between multiculturalist and 
assimilationist, as Christian Joppke (2007) has shown, policy across European states is 
converging around the ideal of “civic integration.” Typologies of nationalism often 
categorize nationalisms according to their relative reliance on ethnic or civic traits in 
defining the population (Canovan 2000, Yack 1996). “Mature,” “modern” and “Western” 
forms of nationalism—with all of the problematic superiority implied in these terms—are 
typically associated with civic nationalist conceptions that accommodate and incorporate 
diversity in the very idea of the nation (Canovan, 2000).  This form contrasts with 
“exclusive” forms that depend on primordial and particularistic conceptions of the 
national population. The latter, “segregationist” form is often associated with Germany 
(Koopmans 2005), most dramatically expressed in the period of National Socialist rule. 
Even after National Socialism, Germany’s maintenance of a decent-based form of 
citizenship (jus sanguinis, or “blood right”) made it, until recently, “the pariah among 
immigrant-receiving states in the West” (Joppke, 2007, p. 2). In contrast, the Netherlands 
and France are held up as exemplars of two different forms of civic nationalism (Joppke, 
2007). The Dutch version is characterized as a strong pluralist model of multiculturalism 
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built on the traditional Dutch model of pillarization, which affirmed the right to self-
organization in the interests of maintaining religious communities (Prins & Saharso, 
2010). On the other hand, the French model of civic nationalism is often referenced as a 
paradigm of universalist or assimilationist models of incorporating cultural difference 
(Simon & Sala Pala, 2010). However, closer examination of the policy and discourse of 
these paradigmatic examples shows that they have actually converged in recent decades, 
moving towards new discourses of “integration,” while condemning the supposed 
“balkanization” of multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). At the same time, 
assimilation is no longer considered a realistic or ethical approach. Even France 
condemned the idea of assimilation as early as the 1980s, calling for the utilization of 
“differences within a common project and not, like assimilation, their abolition” 
(quotation from the French High Council for Integration cited in Simon & Sala Pala, 
2010, p. 93). Despite their many differences, recent scholarship has shown that clean 
typological distinctions among models of citizenship and belonging in Western 
immigrant-receiving countries are untenable.  
Instead, Europe has broadly turned to “integration” as a supposed alternative to 
assimilation and multiculturalism, outlined in a policy document released by the Council 
of the European Union in 2004. This document reflected and advanced a convergence of 
policy on immigrant reception and incorporation. The Council outlined goals for the 
monitoring and evaluation of integration processes, as well as factors such as education, 
employment, language skills and majority society contact that they argued contribute to 
successful integration (Council of the European Union, 2004). While also including a 
point clarifying the need to pursue anti-discrimination policy, the document primarily 
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outlines immigrant obligations to become productive and autonomous. State and civil 
society measures are aimed at creating the conditions for immigrant self-reliance. 
Christian Joppke (2007) traces the development of the EU policy to the Netherlands, 
which took a strong turn away from multicultural policy over the course of the 1990s. 
The Dutch went from being pioneers of multiculturalism to become leaders in what Prins 
and Saharso (2010) call “new realism,” a social conservative discourse condemning the 
supposed hegemony of the “liberal elite” and its oppressive norms of “political 
correctness.” While the language of the 2004 policy document maintains broad language 
of inclusivity, Joppke shows that the implementation of “civic integration” policy across 
Europe demonstrates an increasingly obligatory tendency and has become a new tool for 
immigration restriction, particularly for the family members of low-skilled immigrants 
seeking reunification.  
European states have moved to adopt a dualistic policy of immigration, which 
rolls out “a red carpet of relaxed entry and residence requirements” for highly skilled 
immigrants while “fending off” low-skilled immigrants with pre-entry integration 
requirements and other restrictions (Joppke, 2007, p. 8). After long denying the 
permanence of postwar labor migration and the settlement of asylum seekers, Germany 
followed the implementation of changes to citizenship law in 2000 with the enactment of 
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its first explicit policy on immigrant inclusion with the Immigration Act in 2004.10 This 
law introduced, in highly contradictory terms, the “entitlement” and the “obligation” of 
immigrants to attend integration courses. Without defining it, the law includes the term 
“integration” 61 times. The law requires integration education for long-term permanent 
residents who are deemed to have “special integration needs” and those who receive 
public benefits. This law grants broad discretion to authorities to determine the level and 
meaning of integration. The meaning of integration, however, has remained flexible, 
defined informally in public discourse and indirectly through the specific government 
measures to pursue it. While later chapters, and particularly Chapter 6, analyze the 
repressive side of integration discourse, this chapter analyzes the attractive and 
productive aspects of biopolitical mechanisms embodied in sporting integration. 
Being Somebody Again: National Self-Reflection and Optimization Through Sports  
After Germany’s 2014 victory during the men’s FIFA World Cup, Der Spiegel 
published an issue with a cover that asked Wir sind wieder… wer? (We are who… 
again?). This title used punctuation to convert the famous idiom Wir sind wieder wer (We 
are somebody again), which emerged from the jubilant collective response to West 
Germany’s 1954 World Cup victory, commonly known as the Miracle of Bern (“„Wir 
sind wieder wer“,” 1996). That event has taken on mythological proportions in national 
                                                          
 
 
 
10 Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens 
and Foreigners (Immigration Act) of 30 June, 2004.  
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narration, with prominent politicians and historians referring to it as “the true birthday of 
the Federal Republic” (Joel & Schütt, 2008, p. 8). In a spontaneous display of national 
exuberance—one that provoked anxiety among many international observers—the 
audience in Bern broke into the original national anthem, complete with the excised 
section proclaiming “Deutschland über alles” (Germany above all). By referencing the 
return of collective public pride in 1954, Spiegel ties the current victory back to that 
postwar moment of “becoming someone.” At the same time, the ellipses and interrogative 
transform the statement into its opposite: a statement of doubt and anxiety about the 
makeup of the population and its meaning for national collectivity.  
The issue was released with six different cover images of people draped in the 
German flag, who, according to the editor’s introduction, represent six German 
Archetypes, including a man in sandals and white socks with a German shepherd, a 
woman in business attire with a child on her hip, and a man pushing a shopping cart filled 
with reclaimed bottles and cans. These people represent six possible answers to the 
question of who represents the national “we”. The figures, the top halves of their bodies 
covered by the flag, are identifiable by their stances and clothing. On the cover for the 
digital edition (figure 1), Angela Merkel is suggested by her typical dress (black slacks 
and pink blazer) and her characteristic stance: straight-backed with feet placed close 
together, arms bent with her hands meeting in front of her torso, fingers lightly touching. 
To each side, you can see part of two other figures, suggesting that the series of covers 
forms a circle. These two figures are identifiable as a national soccer team member and a 
Muslim woman, fully veiled in black. Ironically, in order to show that the woman is 
veiled, she is the only figure whose face is not completely covered by the German flag. 
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The cover image suggests that the nation, embodied by its top politician, stands between 
two possibilities competing to define its future. The soccer player represents national 
unity and the glory of success on a global stage.  
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Figure 1: The cover of Der Spiegel for the first issue published after Germany’s 2014 World Cup win. The 
figures represent various archetypes in German society. Here, the central figure evokes Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. She is flanked on the one side by a national hero in the form of a German soccer team member and 
on the other by a figure of national anxiety: a presumably Muslim woman in modest dress.   
This is the Germany of lightness and positive national sentiment. The figure of the 
woman, on the other hand, represents the threat of a “parallel society” within Germany, 
defined by “traditional” Muslim values and gender norms. The veiled woman is both a 
figure of both pity and anxiety, symbolizing the supposed repression of women among a 
segment of the “we” in Germany that does not wish to adopt “Western” norms. As Joan 
Scott (2007) observed, in Western Europe the veil or the headscarf has taken on a 
disproportionate meaning, standing in for the threat posed to liberal democracy by 
Muslim minorities and symbolizing a “clash of cultures” between the West and the 
Muslim world. This cover image is Orientalist in Said’s (1979) most basic sense: it poses 
Western Europe’s quintessential image of Oriental difference beside the figure 
representing the liberal democratic state and asks whether these things are reconcilable. 
Although there are many other visible cues that could signify Muslim difference, the 
headscarf or veil is the primary focus of attention in European cultural politics (J. W. 
Scott, 2007). By choosing a fully covered figure meant to represent the maximum 
possible difference, the cover’s designers set up an irreconcilable tension between Islam 
and key German institutions.  
This symbol of illiberal traditionalism stands in contrast to, and as such defines, 
the liberal democratic values embodied by Chancellor Merkel. But this image also 
includes a third figure: the national soccer team player. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, 
the unprecedented diversity of the German national team beginning in the 2000s 
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contributed to a new national imaginary that uses minority players and patriotic fans to 
authorize and “teach” the German public to be proud of their country. In public 
discussions about the changing German population, sports and sporting celebrity 
repeatedly emerge as a means of managing cultural difference and reasserting normative 
German values under the banner of integration. Sports not only provide a forum for 
national self-reflection, they have been mobilized as a technology for transforming 
immigrants and their descendants into valuable citizens.  
The quintessential German values identified in these discussions are imbued with 
the kind of universalism that Wallerstein (1990) identifies in his analysis of the key 
relationship between universalism and racism-sexism. This symbiotic pair contains the 
contradictions of the world system under capitalism, explaining persistent inequalities in 
the face of capitalist promises of rising prosperity for all. Wallerstein’s idea of the 
universal and the racist-sexist tracks closely with the rationalities behind Foucault’s 
theories of biopolitics. Both identify a political economy of life that seeks to optimize the 
life of the population, while always also reproducing the division between life that is 
worthy and life that is unworthy, and thus a threat to the population. The population must 
be optimized for better life, which means that it must also be fragmented—a hierarchical 
mechanism that Foucault uses to define racism (2003, p. 255). This involves a constant 
process of self-definition, and identification of traits of universal value with the 
hegemonic or normative population. Wallerstein defines this form of universalism as 
“European universalism,” which holds that Western civilizations are superior because 
they are the only ones that have come to be based on universal values and truths. 
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The title article in the 2014 Der Spiegel issue is a wide-ranging rumination on 
who “we” are, defining the components of a national population and touching on pieces 
of the German past and present, from the Nazi past to Germany’s emergence and bright 
future as a global economic powerhouse and moral authority. The theme of the article is 
the trajectory away from “self-imposed gloominess” (Selbstverdüsterung) and shame 
over the past towards attaining “lightness” interpreted as the primary component of a new 
“Germany feeling” (Deutschlandgefühl). The article claims that “it is also German virtues 
that have led to the German lightness. Since prosperity makes life light and elevates the 
mood. As a consequence of diligence, discipline, and obedience this prosperity is 
currently growing”i (Kurbjuweit et al., 2014, p. 61). These culturally defined traits are 
used to explain the prosperity of Germany, which, as the authors note, was enjoying 
something like a “small economic miracle” amidst the European economic crisis. They 
attribute this prosperity both to “German virtues” and to the economic reforms made in 
the early 2000s to “bring society and the economy into conformity.” This statement 
legitimates Germany’s economic gains at a time when its Southern European neighbors 
were mired in economic turmoil. The virtues claimed as culturally German serve to 
explain Germany’s success on the playing field as well as in the global economy. 
Returning to the cover image of the three figures described above, German liberal 
democracy stands between its projection of illiberal traditionalism on the one side and on 
the other a national soccer team that has come to signify the possible benefits of a 
transnational and multiethnic society. This forked pathway of “benefits” and “challenges” 
has driven the underlying narrative in the battle for Germany’s future, encapsulated in 
integration discourse and its projects. It should not be surprising, then, that sports 
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emerged as a major focus of the earliest national projects for integration. One of the first 
institutions to take up the project of integration was the German Olympic Sports 
Confederation (DOSB). The DOSB conceptualized a program called “Sport for 
everyone—Sports with Aussiedlern” in 1989 that allocated federal funding to provide 
recreational sports activities to newly arrived ethnic German immigrants from the Soviet 
Union and Eastern bloc countries (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of Aussiedler). In its 
first iteration, only immigrants with German citizenship were included. The decision not 
to include refugees was harshly critiqued by some politicians, but it was justified by 
arguments that ethnic German Aussiedler were permanent immigrants and that they had a 
“greater willingness for integration” than other groups (Giebenhain, 1995, p. 172). In 
2002, as part of a national shift sparked by the liberalization of German citizenship law, 
“Sports with Aussiedler” was renamed “Integration through Sports,” reflecting a new 
recognition of immigrants and their children as part of German society. However, this 
move towards new inclusiveness was accompanied by increasing majority anxieties about 
some groups’ “cultural compatibility” and “willingness to integrate,” or lack thereof.  
The National Integration Plan of 2006 and the integration programs of Germany’s 
two most important sporting organizations reflect attempts by the State, in Gramsci’s 
generous sense of the term (1971, p. 244), to manage cultural and social difference by 
cultivating “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1978) at the individual level. At the level of the 
population, these programs contribute to discourses that normalize values that are 
portrayed as both inherent in German culture and universal in their utility for cultivating 
an economically independent and rational citizenry under global capitalism.  
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Germany’s Economic Rebirth: Foundations of Sovereignty in Economic Liberty and 
Enterprise 
The concepts of neoliberal citizenship at the heart of integration discourse are not 
unique to Germany, but they have played a particularly important role in the Federal 
Republic since its establishment in 1949. Foucault uses the example of Germany’s 
reconstruction in his lectures from 1978-1979, collectively titled The Birth of Biopolitics 
(2008), to trace the emergence of one of the most influential strains of the neoliberal 
politics in globalized political economy. In the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in World 
War II and its subsequent occupation by Allied powers, German politicians faced an 
existential crisis of national legitimacy and national sovereignty. Under the guidance of 
prominent neoliberal economist, Ludwig Erhard, the state’s role was framed as the 
establishment of “economic freedom” and “responsibility” of its citizens (Foucault, 2008, 
p. 81). The purpose of this framing was not simply to establish good economic 
management for the purposes of universal prosperity; more importantly, “the economy 
produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor... this economic institution… 
produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within these 
economic processes” (2008, p. 84). As Foucault puts it, “history had said no to the 
German state, but now the economy will allow it to assert itself” (2008, p. 86). This 
allowed Germany to establish “a new dimension of temporality” based not on the 
memory of a “malfunctioning history,” but rather on continuous economic growth. While 
this form of political economy subsequently spread across the globe, it played a 
foundational role in mitigating the memory of the past to reestablish a self-confident 
West German state.  
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In establishing the tenants of this new political-economic regime, German 
politicians drew on the tenants of the German and Austrian ordoliberal school of 
economics, which had been active since the 1930s. Their theories would also become the 
basis of American neoliberalism. Against the tenants of welfare economic theories, 
according to the ordoliberals, social policy should not aim to equalize economic 
differences restricting the access of consumer goods. Instead, inequality plays a vital role 
in maintaining the “price mechanism,” which is the basis of economic rationality: it can 
only produce regulatory effects if the fluctuations that are part of mechanisms of 
competition are allowed to function (Foucault, 2008, p. 142). The mechanism of this 
“social policy” must be privatization. Finally, economic growth is the only true and 
acceptable form of social policy; growth should not be followed by increased 
redistribution, which, according to neoliberal theory, would hinder further growth. As a 
liberal regime, the neoliberal government cannot intervene in the effects of the market, or 
correct its harmful effects on society. Instead, it is left to intervene on society itself.  
The architects of the social and economic policy in the first decades of the Federal 
Republic called for a politics of society (Gesellschaftspolitik) that sees “society as the 
target and objective of governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 148), or what one key 
policymaker called “a politics of life” (Vitalpolitik). This involved generalizing economic 
rationality and the ideal of the citizen as entrepreneur and producer throughout the social 
body. At the same time, German neoliberals in the postwar period recognized that the 
economization of the entire social field, which prioritized competition as a principle order 
of life, would put stress on the social fabric of society. Vitalpolitik and what was also 
called the “social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), maintained strong welfare 
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provisions and other measures to protect the population from the harshest impacts of a 
generalized economistic approach to politics and life. To compensate for the “cold” 
features of competition in society, the state must maintain a political and moral 
framework that would ensure “a community which is not fragmented,” and foster 
cooperation amongst people who are "naturally rooted and socially integrated" (Foucault, 
2008, p. 243). Thus, the German form of neoliberalism also included social protections to 
compensate for the ethical problems of neoliberalism, while also depending on a 
homogeneous conception of society to justify this protection. This framing also 
foreshadows a response to migration and cultural diversity as a threat to the viability of 
the protections offered by the social market economy approach. However, this provision 
of protection for a “naturally rooted” population divided German neoliberal policy 
against itself by maintaining protections that worked against the conditions it held as 
necessary for the full functioning of the regulatory mechanisms of the market.  
While Germany was liberalizing its citizenship policy around the turn of the 
millennium, German government and the business sector were also implementing 
fundamental changes to liberalize Germany’s economy and eventually to severely reduce 
its social safety net (see Chapter 4). As the Spiegel article cited above proudly stated, 
Germans made changes aiming to “bring society and the economy into conformity,” 
including massive cuts to its welfare provisions. These changes moved to do away with 
the ambiguities of German neoliberalism as it had been implemented, bringing it closer to 
the pure form imagined by the ordoliberals in the 1930s, a form which had been more 
fully implemented in the United States. The liberalization of citizenship law at this time 
also created the imperative to include immigrants and minority Germans in this political 
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and economic regime. This was an opportunity fully in line with many of the economic 
imperatives of neoliberalism. Critical Marxist theorists have long critiqued the logic of 
global capitalism as one of standardization, from Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944) work 
on cultural industries through Herb Schiller’s (1976) theory of cultural imperialism and 
critics of globalization in the 1990s. However, Foucault argues that these theories have 
little to do with neoliberal governmental policy. On the contrary, the current art of 
government involves “obtaining a society that is not oriented towards the commodity and 
the uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of 
enterprises” (2008, p. 149). This explains why integration discourse so easily to praises 
social and cultural difference as enriching, as sources of potential growth for the 
population at large.  
On the other hand, when candidates for integration reject this order, it stands as a 
threat to the population. In his lectures from 1977-1978, titled Security, Territory, and 
Population, Foucault clarifies the distinction between the politically relevant population 
and its Others: “The people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the 
system” (2009, p. 44). Agamben also observes this division in Western politics, arguing 
that  
It is as if what we call “people” were in reality not a unitary subject but a 
dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the set of the 
People as a whole political body, and on the other, the subset of the people as a 
fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies. (1998, p. 178) 
For both Agamben and Foucault, this fracturing is only possible within a group that can 
be conceived in some way as a people or a population. Thus, when foreigners become a 
part of the citizenry in Germany, when they are finally included within the population, 
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they also become subject in a new way to processes of biopolitical fracture. It must 
always remain to be seen whether they will join the population as entrepreneurial 
members whose young bodies and “cultural difference” might even benefit the economic 
growth of the social body, or whether they will refuse the terms of engagement and 
become a threat to the system. This permanent ambiguity is heightened around 
immigrants and apparent minorities, representing in the starkest terms the biopolitical 
fracture that is an always active potential in the population: “it is what cannot be included 
in the whole of which it is a part and what cannot belong to the set in which it is always 
already included” (Agamben, 1998, p. 179). It is only when they became a potential part 
of the politically relevant population that immigrants and their children became the 
targets of integration.   
To Support and Demand: The 2007 National Integration Plan 
In 2007, the German Government released a National Integration Plan, in 
cooperation with representatives from the sectors of research, business, civil society, and 
the media. Before going into more depth on the parts of the plan dealing with sports, this 
section examines the broader conception of integration outlined in the introduction to the 
plan. In the introduction, then secretary of the Federal Ministry for Migration, Refugees, 
and Integration Maria Böhmer sketches Germany’s postwar migration history in a few 
short paragraphs. Starting in the 1950s, foreign guest workers were invited to work in 
Germany. “They wanted to stay—and should have only stayed—temporarily; then many 
of them chose a life in Germany”ii (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 9). Then “people came for 
other reasons to Germany, and were often also allowed to stay,”iii she writes, referring 
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obliquely to the rise in asylum seekers in Germany in the late 1970s and 1980s. Finally, 
with the fall of the Iron Curtain, “many Germans returned to the land of their ancestors.”iv 
The legitimacy gap between the refugees and guest workers who overstayed their 
welcome and the “Germans returning to the fatherland” is hardly veiled in Böhmer’s 
statement. The statement goes on to propose a new historiography of Germany, saying 
that although the postwar immigration has changed Germany, migration and cultural 
exchange has traditionally characterized Germany as a European “Kulturnation” (cultural 
nation). Böhmer addresses the long-delayed acceptance of “foreign” migration (as 
opposed to the “returned German” Aussiedler) as: “A reality, that opens up many 
opportunities but also contains the danger of social tension.”v Thus, only an active and 
comprehensive policy to pursue integration of “people with a migration background” can 
contain the risk they pose and convert them into a benefit for the Population.  
In the following sections, I used descriptive coding (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to 
identify the themes and discursive patterns that emerged in the documents from national 
sporting integration programs. I began with the introduction to the Federal Government’s 
2007 National Integration Plan and the section of the plan dedicated to sports. I examined 
the brochures celebrating the winners of the annual “Integration Prize” awarded since 
2007 by the German Football Association (DFB) and its corporate sponsor, Mercedes 
Benz. As of the time of writing, it is the most highly remunerated social prize in 
Germany. Winners earn money as well as vehicles from Mercedes Benz. The prize 
honors amateur sports programs in a variety of different institutions, including soccer 
teams, schools, and sports clubs. Soccer is their primary focus, although they also honor 
other sports programs. From the DFB, I also examined the 2013 “Practical Handbook” 
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for developing integration programs in amateur sports. In addition, I analyzed the 
German Olympic Sports Confederation’s (DOSB) 2014 “basic paper” 
(Grundlagenpapier) on the program “Integration through Sports.” The DOSB is the 
umbrella organization for local German sports clubs (Sportvereine) and claims to be the 
largest “citizens’ movement in Germany,” with over 27 million members in about 90,000 
sports clubs across the country (Der Deutsche Olympische Sportbund, n.d.). Sports clubs 
in Germany are primarily financed through membership fees and depend heavily on 
volunteers for management and programming (Hovemann, Horch, & Schubert, 2006). In 
terms of membership numbers and cultural influence, the DFB and DOSB are two of the 
most important civic institutions in Germany. The materials examined here depict 
approaches to integration as a concept and a social agenda by key organizations from 
government, business, and civic sectors.  
The first of the two most important guidelines proposed to optimize this risk-to-
benefit ratio is that “Integration must be lived. It cannot be prescribed.” Secondly, it 
requires the practical and concrete engagement of institutions and individuals at all levels 
of the state and society. It is a universal social project within the nation that reinforces 
and protects national norms by managing potential dangers posed by immigrant 
difference. In setting the foundations for integration, the National Integration Plan 
emphasizes the importance of a strong conception of the particularity of German culture 
and normative values as well European universalist norms that form the basis of German 
constitutional law: 
Integration is a task with national significance. The foundation is, besides our 
values and our cultural self-conception, the free and democratic order, as it has 
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developed from German and European history and which has its legal expression 
in the basic law.vi (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007) 
This statement sets the terms for the discussion on integration: it is a discussion that will 
be framed in terms of national interests. It also binds together, in no uncertain terms, the 
establishment of the German constitution with the presumably monolithic values and 
cultural self-conception of the hegemonic German “we.” To further emphasize the 
primordial underpinnings of the community claiming to set the foundations, the statement 
emphasizes the organic and historical development of the community and its norms. 
Throughout the National Integration Plan, the possessive language of the first-person 
plural underscores the stability of the normative German national category into which 
immigrants are to be integrated. 
The Integration Plan and its accompanying brochures and press releases 
frequently reiterate that integration is a project and requires “effort” (Anstrengung) from 
everyone: state, society, and immigrants. It is generally listed in this order, in an apparent 
attempt to dispel the concern that demands are being made on the immigrant alone. The 
directionality of these efforts, however, is not equal. As the statement above confirms, the 
process is built on the normative foundations of a historically defined culture and nation. 
The state and society has the responsibility to make efforts to educate and employ 
immigrants, while immigrants must make themselves employable, culturally acceptable, 
and intelligible by majority society through the German language. Change may be 
demanded of all, but the immigrant is required to change themselves whereas the 
majority society is only required to make changes to enable the immigrants’ 
transformation. Under the rubric of “support and demand” (fördern und fordern), the plan 
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sets out the obligations to be placed on those I call integrants or candidates for 
integration:  
Integration cannot be prescribed. It requires effort from everyone, from the state 
and society. Crucial, for a start, is the willingness of the immigrant to be open to a 
life within our society, to accept unconditionally our basic law and our whole 
legal system and, especially, to make a visible sign of their belonging to Germany 
by learning the German language. On the side of the receiving society, 
acceptance, tolerance, civil society engagement and the willingness to honestly 
welcome people who legitimately live with us are indispensable: Integration—an 
opportunity for our country!vii (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007) 
The receiving society here, once again hailed in the flyer through the first-person plural, 
is required to be tolerant and accepting, at least of those whose residence is deemed 
legitimate. However, the since the flyer stipulates from the outset that “Germany is an 
open-minded country,”viii this does not require those in the majority society to make any 
fundamental changes. They need only act according to their tolerant and open nature.  
On the other hand, very concrete demands are made of immigrants. The 
immigrant is asked to be open to a life within German society and to follow its rules. 
They are expected to accept these laws and the whole legal order “unconditionally,” 
which is to say, they have no right to challenge or question existing laws and norms. It is 
difficult to understand how a democratic system can also proscribe its people from 
challenging existing legal norms, unless those people are considered non-citizens. 
Finally, immigrants are assigned the burden of proving their affiliation and dedication to 
Germany by learning the standardized form of the German language. As this is something 
that immigrants must prove, normative German society does not have to presume 
belonging until it is visibly signified. The use of the modifier “visible” (sichtbar), which 
figuratively translates here to obvious or apparent, is curious for a capacity or trait that is 
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auditory, not visible. However, the first mode of determining whether immigrants must 
demonstrate their belonging as candidates for integration, or whether they are presumed 
already to belong to “society,” is inevitably somatic difference.  
The expectations placed on German institutions and normative society generally 
focus on encouraging them to more effectively include, educate, and build the capacity of 
immigrants and their descendants. They are encouraged to see “diversity as an 
occupational resource” (Beschäftigungsressource). In terms of fighting discrimination 
against immigrants and minorities, the report does not go into detail. An analysis of the 
terms hate, racism, prejudice, xenophobia, stereotypes, and discrimination11 as they are 
used in the report shows that these issues arise only rarely. Where they do appear, it is 
often in the context of concerns about interethnic tension between immigrants. Concerns 
with discrimination are often related back to their harmful effect on creating a productive 
workspace or on Germany’s image, and thus its international competitiveness. For 
example, in a section dedicated to increasing Germany’s attractiveness to highly qualified 
researchers and workers, the plan states that “the prejudice of ‘xenophobia’ in Germany 
can give international researchers the impression that they will not be welcome”ix 
(“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 190). To be clear, the “prejudice” that is of 
concern in this statement is not bias against foreigners, but rather the preconception held 
by outsiders that xenophobia is a problem in Germany. It then goes on to affirm that 
                                                          
 
 
 
11 Hass, Rassismus, Vorurteile, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Stereotypen, 
Diskriminierung 
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studies have shown that only a tiny number of foreign researchers experience xenophobia 
in Germany during their stay, dismissing it as a real concern. Only the “prejudices” or 
preconceptions of xenophobia are a concern, not its actual existence. Throughout the 
report, racism and discrimination among the majority society is addressed only in the 
vaguest of terms, and is often paired with a renewed declaration of the responsibilities of 
immigrants to be open to normative Germans. For example, “among the native (German) 
population prejudices and xenophobia must be dismantled. At the same time immigrants 
must also be willing to be open to society” (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 140). Although 
the plan claims that integration is “a two-way process,” normative society’s role is to 
educate and train immigrants in majority norms while the immigrant’s role is to accept 
established norms and to contribute to optimizing the life of the social body.   
Sports as “Lived Integration”: Cultivating Responsible Citizens and Managing Risk 
In the 2007 Integration Plan, sports are institutional arenas that receive special 
attention. The plan points out that as a “motor of integration,” sports provide a wide 
range of possibilities for integration, from cultural and social exchange to involving 
immigrants in the “everyday politics” of running and supporting sporting clubs and 
teams. The “positive effects of sports involvement” are accepted as common knowledge:  
Sports provide very diverse offerings and stand open to all people, regardless of 
their personalities or their cultural or financial situations. Fair play and equal 
opportunity are supported in every form of sports through worldwide standards of 
rules. Sports satisfy the human need for comparison and serves development of a 
movement- and body-oriented personality. In particular, the practice of team 
sports leads to a team spirit that does not emerge on its own in daily life.x 
(Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 139) 
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Despite these common-sense claims of the open, egalitarian, and socially constructive 
nature of sports, scholars have contested the basic claim that amateur sports inevitably 
lead to the kind of cooperative, intercultural solidarities described above (Giebenhain, 
1995) as well as the claim that sports participation is equally available to all (Breuer, 
Hallmann, & Wicker, 2011). Halm (2006) even provides evidence indicating that, in 
general, amateur sports in Germany have contributed to social division between majority 
society and Turkish-German youth. However, this chapter is not concerned with the 
effectiveness of sporting integration in achieving its stated goals, but rather what sports 
integration reveals about the biopolitical foundations of cultural politics around 
nationalism and migration in Germany. My critical analysis here focuses on how major 
sporting institutions, the government, and business sponsors discuss and frame the 
integration projects they support.  
The National Integration Plan, along with the integration programs of the DOSB 
and the DFB, represent an ambitious project to use the symbolism of elite national sports 
and the practical framework of amateur sports to discipline young “integrant” bodies and 
to normalize values that are portrayed both as universal and as already typically German. 
These values mirror ideals of economic citizenship and the imperative to cultivate human 
capital. While the programs all play lip service to the ideal of integration as a two-way 
process, the targets of integration programs show this process to be highly uneven. The 
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role of sports in communication and language learning is a clear example of the 
enforcement of German norms within a practice that is lauded as universal and egalitarian 
(presuming, of course, that one has the physical capacity to participate). Language is one 
of the most salient themes in the corpus.12 Sports are seen as ideally suited to bridge 
communication gaps because of their universal rules and the prioritization of physical 
communication over verbal forms. At the same time, sports are taken as an opportunity to 
enforce norms of monolingual communication in the national language.  
Among their six fundamental rules, the DFB’s Handbook for sports integration 
lists the need to establish German as the sole “field language” (Platzsprache). The rule of 
monolingualism is justified in terms of the need for fairness and equality. They write that 
“communication only functions in the language that all participants understand. It is a 
fault of respect and unfair to speak to someone in a language that he does not obviously 
understand. This leads to rejection and aggression” (Hink, 2011, p. 28). This statement 
contradicts the many statements lauding the value of sports in its transcendence of 
language. This statement goes so far as to legitimate German speakers who reject and 
react aggressively towards those who speak anything but the universal language. It shows 
that despite celebrations of diversity in the universalist framework of sports, sports are a 
means of entry to organize diversity and subordinate it to hegemonic norms. The unequal 
                                                          
 
 
 
12 See Chapter 7 for further discussion of language norms within integration discourse.  
125 
 
flow of these expectations of norm acquisition is even clearer in this statement 
advocating sports in the National Integration Plan:  
Cultural integration is accomplished by the transmission of cultural techniques 
like, for example, language acquisition as well as the acquisition of culturally 
coded social “normative models” like behavioral models for everyday situations. 
Sports clubs offer not only places to play sports; they are also spaces of everyday 
communication that open access to two-way intercultural learning.xi (“Nationaler 
Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 140) 
The final nod to two-way processes of learning is belied by the fact that the norms and 
techniques to be acquired in the first part of the statement are German, starting with 
language. Encouraging bilingualism or the majority acquisition of minority languages is 
not promoted anywhere in the corpus. Programs are oriented towards attracting, 
accommodating and/or reforming people “with a migration background.” Majority 
Germans are involved as planners or, incidentally, as teammates and peers, but are not 
framed as targets. Majority norms are the foundation of the process tying together the 
social body. As the National Integration Plan puts it, the goal is “to tie more people with 
a migration background into established structures, and thereby improve understanding 
between people of different cultures” (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 142). The 
guidelines and narratives presented in the corpus call for changes at the institutional level 
to more effectively reach and reform minorities at the individual level. 
If sports are—as is repeatedly claimed in the corpus—the ideal tool for 
integration, it is because sports serve the dual purposes underlying biopolitics: discipline 
and regulation. As I argue throughout this dissertation, biopolitics are the logical and 
technical modus operandi of integration. As Foucault shows, the modern era has been 
characterized by a turn away from negative, repressive forms of constraint and towards a 
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generalized system of discipline and surveillance that operates through desire (Foucault, 
1977, 1978, 2009). Sports integration depends on the broad appeal of sports to attract 
young minorities and, once physically and affectively engaged, to recruit them into a 
system of liberal political and economic values. As I will demonstrate, the stories of 
successful integration selected for the DFB and Mercedes Benz Integration Prize 
characterize soccer as a technology for transforming dysfunctional multi-ethnic 
communities and spaces into optimized cosmopolitan communities. They do so by 
affirming the legitimacy of values and norms that are framed as German, and more 
broadly Western, as optimal for collective life while simultaneously celebrating 
beneficial and consumable forms of difference.  
The Integration Prize highlights two kinds of contexts for this community 
transformation. One type of transformation exemplifies the disciplinary side of sports 
integration through the conversion of dangerous multiethnic neighborhoods into safe 
spaces by attracting and educating unruly young men. The other commonly featured 
narrative illustrates the regulatory side of sports integration, celebrating clubs that have 
managed to turn demographic shifts that could have posed existential threats into new 
sources of growth. The award honors clubs that lost membership due to the strong 
localized growth of immigrant communities, but which managed to turn this threat of 
demise into a productive new opportunity by attracting new immigrant members. They 
also promote the accommodation of a selection of divergent norms around consumption 
and modesty, by promoting respect for alcohol and food restrictions and affirming 
different practices around showering and nudity.  
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The disciplinary side of sports integration projects focuses on using the affective 
and playful character of sport to attract and teach minority youth values and norms such 
as punctuality, discipline, responsibility, and hard work. Coaches, educators, and program 
coordinators explain that soccer motivates young people, spurring them to discipline 
themselves: 
That soccer plays a primary role in integration, is obvious to Heinz Bunzer: “We 
have it so much easier, since we are a playful community.”xii (2010 
Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 9) 
In our opinion, endless prohibitions and reprimands don't go anywhere. We set 
ourselves the goal to do things from the inside out in a positive way and through 
that to reach different cultures.xiii (Hink, 2011, p. 8)  
I think that the boys and girls on a team notice quite quickly how much fun it is to 
pursue goals and to celebrate victories together—and everyone happily pitches in 
for that.xiv (Hink, 2011, p. 48) 
Once engaged in sport, young people are primed to incorporate other forms of behavior 
that elevate their human capital. Their performance in sport is secondary to other 
pedagogical goals. The body is a medium, a conduit for socialization:  
Social capacity, a self-confident performance, team spirit—that is more important 
than lactic acid values and shooting techniques. “With soccer young people are 
intrinsically motivated, so they learn with greater motivation and in a playful way, 
to stick to the rules,” says Konermann. “The goal is to get as many of them to get 
a foothold in the job market as quickly as possible.”xv  (2013 Integrationspreis, 
2014, p. 19) 
"Soccer is a good means to realize positive developments, both for individual 
students, as a class and, also, for our entire school," says Jürgen Kuhlmann. 
Because the ball can do a lot—playing soccer teaches the Gelsenkirchen youth 
important values and strengthens their character. "Not to give up so easily when 
facing difficulties, to address conflicts but not to allow them to escalate, soccer 
facilitates this," reports the physical education teacher from his experiences in 
past years.xvi (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 10)  
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In this schema, sports provide a point of entry to engage the individual in self-
improvement for the good of the class, school, and beyond to the population at large. The 
logic of sports integration tracks closely with the techniques and aims of discipline, 
turning “confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of 
individual elements” (Foucault, 1977, p. 170) whose forces are coordinated and made 
productive. The chaos of untrained bodies emerges particularly clearly in one prize 
narrative. Businessman Thomas Stoll decided to start a soccer program after had 
attending “a seminar on the transmission of values in Austria.” 
Then I came home and picked up my son from school. The children were out of 
control; they were simply running across the street and were hurling around the 
wildest profanity. That was my key moment. It was clear that I had to do 
something.xvii (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 14)  
The ethnic background of the children is not specified in the narrative of the program, but 
its status as an “integration” program communicates the minority status of its targets. 
Soccer, with its requirements of order, cellular dispersion and control of bodies also 
includes processes of “hierarchical observation” and “normalizing judgment” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 170). Integration as a system of managing difference aims to normalize 
immigrants and their descendants and render them useful. At the same time, as it operates 
in service of liberalism, it must avoid the appearance of illiberal coercion. Sports are 
hailed as a “motor of integration” because they attract young, able-bodied people, 
enlisting them in their own normalization.   
Targets of Discipline and Normalization: Unruly Boys and Oppressed Girls 
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Sports integration programs overwhelmingly focus on young people and their 
families. Since sports integration is heavily invested in sports as a pedagogical tool, 
families are targeted as the first locus of social reproduction. The targets of these 
programs are approached within a highly-gendered framework. While the pedagogy 
applied to girls and boys share some of the same goals—foremost among them, the 
cultivation of individual empowerment, confidence, and “good values”—they diverge on 
key points. Remedies proposed by sports integration programs point to perceived deficits 
in immigrant communities. In the corpus, young minority males are singled out for 
reform of deviant behaviors like violence and criminality, whereas women and girls are 
targeted to remedy gender inequality that is presumed to be a generalized problem in 
“traditional” minority communities. In both cases, integration projects are largely 
oriented towards problems located within immigrant communities. This deficit-
orientation is particularly prominent in the narratives of the DFB and Mercedes Benz 
Integration Prize.  
In the stories publicized by the Integration Prize, young men are often normalized 
by neglecting to mention gender as a focus when discussing boys’ teams, or stigmatized 
by making them the focus of programs targeting social deviance and neighborhoods 
classified as “social combustion points.” The celebrated Midnight Sports program in 
Berlin is a paradigmatic example of this type of gendering, targeting people characterized 
as potential delinquents and normalized as male. As the 2013 Integration Prize brochure 
avers, Midnight Sports organizers were invited to confer with Chancellor Merkel on the 
topic of integration and were awarded with the Bambi—Germany’s oldest and most 
important media prize (see Chapter 7)—for the category Integration. The project 
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mobilized the celebrity and symbolic power of its sponsor, the Ghanaian-German 
national soccer team member Jérôme Boateng, in a narrative of reforming urban minority 
youth through sports to “defend a Berlin neighborhood teetering on the brink.” The 
program’s founder Ismail Öner, a trained social pedagogue of Turkish heritage, described 
his motivation for starting the project, 
The police designated the Heer Street in North Spandau a "criminally burdened 
place." A group of about 30 young people, mostly with a migration background, 
had practically crippled the neighborhood. For me it was clear: something had to 
change now. Midnight Sports was the result of a discussion I organized between 
the police and the young people. On December 8, 2007, we opened the gym for 
the first time. The effect was stupendous. The categorization of "criminally 
burdened place" place could soon be lifted.xviii (2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 
22) 
 This story epitomizes transformative narrative of sports, which by transforming 
dangerous young people, defends and restores the social body to health. The category of a 
“criminally burdened place” is a local legal classification of space that the police may 
assign, which lowers the requirement of reasonable suspicion to justify police 
intervention. Cities and states across Germany have similar policies classifying 
“dangerous zones” to justify increased surveillance and police intervention. Local police 
have broad authority to designate of these spaces of exception, and the limited research 
available on these policies suggests that designation is based as much or more on 
demographic features of a space than on actual risk of violence (Belina & Wehrheim, 
2011; Ullrich & Tullney, 2012). Öner draws on this category to justify the claim that 
these mostly minority youths represented a serious threat to life in the neighborhood and 
to link his intervention to the neutralization of that threat.  
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 Midnight Sports uses the attraction of organized sports to transform threatening 
young men into useful individuals through a variety of disciplinary techniques that 
coincide with the requirements of sport. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) 
outlines a modern technology aimed at increasing the usefulness of individuals in the 
most efficient possible manner. Discipline seeks to produce “subjected and practiced” 
bodies, increasing the forces of the body in terms of utility while decreasing the political 
force of the body through obedience (1977, p. 138). This involves processes of enclosure 
and partitioning, which in this case is the removal of young men from the public spaces 
of the streets to the controlled space of the gym and the indoor soccer field where each 
player knows his place and his function within that space. By its very definition as a 
practice, sport produces “docile bodies,” which is Foucault’s term for the disciplined 
body that represents maximal utility and minimal cost. Beyond the direct practices of the 
game, however, sports open the possibility for further interventions, as the leader of 
Midnight Sports explains.   
DFB Interviewer: And the baseball bats had to be left outside the gym? 
Ismail Öner: Let's not exaggerate, it wasn't so bad. We created encounters. At our 
first tournament, the police played against the kids. They had previously only 
encountered each other during incidents. The young people come to the gym and 
they bring all their works and needs along. Then the social pedagogy work begins. 
We create networks with schools, families, soccer clubs, child welfare offices, 
and other people and institutions around the kids. There is often trouble. They are 
in danger of failing, they are under threat of expulsion, a young man can't find an 
internship, another has a court order. Sometimes it's just lovesickness.xix (2013 
Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 22) 
Here, the DFB interviewer picks up on the description of delinquency that Öner 
introduced in his previous statement by suggesting, half in jest, that these young men 
needed to be disarmed before participating. Öner initially pushes back against what he 
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classifies as an overstatement of their deviance. He then continues to outline the depth 
and breadth of interventions necessary to reform these young men and make them 
productive. Foucault writes that disciplinary space aims to “establish presences and 
absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, 
to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, 
to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits” (2009, p. 143). The practice of 
soccer in itself fulfills these aims, but Öner’s statement shows that, above all, it generates 
the enticement to enter a disciplinary space that to acts as the nexus in a network of other 
disciplinary spaces. The statement above concludes with an inventory of transgressions 
against the standards and norms of schools, the job market, and the legal system. Öner 
mitigates this description of deviance by adding an example of the “normal” travails of 
youth learning to navigate amorous relationships.  
There is a tension in the DFB literature between the masculine normativity of 
soccer and the special gendered imperatives of integration discourse demanding the 
inclusion and empowerment of women. While the above interview emphasizes that 
Midnight Sports welcomes all national backgrounds, “including Germans,” Öner 
expresses discomfort with female participants, explaining that he is unable to relate to the 
problems of girls:  
If they come into the gym they are permitted to play. But I know what I can do 
and what I can’t. Pedagogy plays a major role. I don’t have the ability to 
empathize in order to understand the problems of 14-year-old girls. Other female 
colleagues (Kolleginnen) will have to take that on.xx (2013 Integrationspreis, 
2014, p. 23) 
Before this question, the last of the interview, the neutral term “young people” 
(Jugendliche) is generally used for the participants. Once Öner refers to “our boys” 
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(unsere Jungs), but until the last question gender otherwise unspecified, and 
consequently, presumed to be male.  
Soccer in Germany and in most of Europe is deeply associated with masculinity 
(Pfister, 2003; Pfister, Fasting, Scraton, & Vázquez, 2002). While the men’s soccer was 
becoming a keystone of postwar national mythology, German women were barred from 
organized soccer by the German Football Association until 1970. In the development of 
recreational and professional soccer across most of Europe during the 20th century, soccer 
was coded as fundamentally masculine and women were long barred or discouraged from 
playing organized soccer.13 Although women’s soccer programs in Europe have become 
increasingly competitive at the elite level, amateur participation rates are heavily skewed 
in favor of men. In 2016, women’s teams made up only 7.7% of soccer teams in 
Germany (Deutscher Fussball-Bund, 2016). The drastic gender disparity in soccer 
participation nationwide does not rate as a central concern on the DFB website. It 
receives only passing mention and the lack of female players is described as a technical 
problem to be negotiated with, for example, an online team exchange where female teams 
can post openings for players or with “test training” sessions (Schnuppertraining) where 
girls can check out the game. In contrast, in the context of sports integration, girls’ 
participation is framed as a central problem with broader social implications, both as a 
                                                          
 
 
 
13 In contrast, in the U.S. participation rates across genders are approximately equal, and soccer has 
traditionally been considered a sport that is equally appropriate for  males and females (Knoppers & 
Anthonissen, 2003; Markovits & Hellerman, 2003). 
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reflection of and as a means to change the presumed patriarchal norms of minority 
communities.  
Girls and women receive special attention in the DFB Integration Prize, although 
their interest in soccer is sometimes observed with considerable surprise. As one prize 
winner stated, “we noticed—with total astonishment—that the girls also liked to play 
soccer during recess, and were good at it”xxi (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 8). This 
statement underscores the strength of the male coding of soccer in majority German 
society. However, this realization of girls’ interest in soccer in the context of integration 
programs does not lead to reflection on the problematic gendered assumptions about 
soccer held by majority society. Instead, participation is viewed within the framework of 
assumptions about gender inequalities in minority communities. As program organizer 
Hans-Jürgen Daum stated,  
I was very skeptical at the beginning. Girls from Moroccan or Turkish families 
playing soccer? I couldn’t really imagine that. Today I see the enthusiasm of 
fathers cheering on their daughters. Soccer has contributed to a convergence of 
cultures.xxii (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 19) 
The failure of imagination described in this statement relates to the intersection of 
gendered and religiously coded national categories. While there is much left unsaid in 
this statement, it only makes sense in relation to an underlying presumption of, on the one 
hand, a patriarchal traditionalism among Muslim minority families and, on the other, a 
normative culture that supports gender equality in sports participation. This statement is 
best understood by beginning at the end. Daum’s inability to imagine Muslim girls 
playing soccer was tied to the assumption that their fathers—who turned out to be 
enthusiastic fans—would prohibit their daughters’ participation in soccer. When he was 
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proven wrong, however, he does not question his initial assumptions about these 
(Muslim) families, but instead credits soccer with causing a change in their culture, 
causing them to converge with implicitly German norms. This proposed effect of soccer 
in transforming patriarchal norms is even clearer in another statement by the founder of 
the project, Social Integration of Girls through Soccer, which has been replicated 
nationwide. Founder, Dr. Ulf Gebken claimed that, “soccer can be a lever of 
emancipation. The older brother or father see the sister or daughter in a completely 
different milieu. It changes the role behavior”xxiii (2011 Integrationspreis, 2012, p. 18). In 
hegemonic sports culture, soccer is seen as a fundamentally masculine pastime, while in 
the context of sports integration it is as a means of empowering minority girls and 
combatting the particular gender inequalities in minority families. The concern with 
gender in integration discourse separates the actual and perceived gender inequalities in 
immigrant communities from those of the majority society.  
Along with sports’ ability to teach rules and norms, targeting women and girls is 
one of the most frequently appearing themes across the corpus. Following the gendered 
focus of the National Integration Plan, minority women in sports integration programs are 
defined as a special target for integration. Using the female body as a symbolic site, these 
programs strongly target immigrant and minority girls and women to contest the gender 
inequalities presumed to be endemic in minority communities and to encourage women 
to transmit the values and norms of integration in their role as mothers. As the National 
Integration Plan states, 
In their role as mothers, female migrants have a key place in the integration of the 
next generation. Many girls with migration backgrounds achieve good results in 
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school and dominate the German language. Nevertheless, they often lack the 
opportunity to put their potential to profitable use. (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 18) 
The Integration Plan and in the sports integration programs portray women as a crucial 
source of unutilized human capital. This focus on women as mothers also reflects the 
drive of biopolitics to push into every domain of human life. Integration programs focus 
heavily on empowering girls, in part to recover female productivity lost to traditional 
family structures and in part to prepare them to pass integrated values down to their 
future children. The reason for this loss of female human capital, implicit in the statement 
above, is sketched out in more detail through the examples of the problems to be solved, 
including need to protect immigrant women from domestic violence, forced marriage, 
and the impingement of their human rights. By framing these problems as particular to 
immigrant communities, this discourse characterizes immigrant communities as illiberal. 
Their illiberalism poses a threat to the ability of immigrant women to contribute to 
Germany’s future prosperity. In this way, the presumption of patriarchal dominance calls 
for disciplinary solutions to change the behavior of men and boys and regulatory 
solutions to change the norms that prevent women and girls from reaching their full 
economic capacity.  
Regulation: Immigrants and the Nation’s Future  
There is considerable overlap in the discourses driving sports integration 
programs examined in this chapter. They all include the goal of improving the inclusion 
and socialization of immigrants and minorities for the benefit of society at large. They 
also proclaim the ability of sport to reform or socialize the individual and impart the 
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idealized Western/universal values of equality, liberty, and individualism. The programs 
in this chapter operate at the micro-level of practice, but also draw on the national level 
symbolism of elite athletics, quoting national team members who explain how soccer or 
their Olympic careers have allowed them to integrate into normative society and 
convinced them of the equality of opportunity for immigrants and minorities in 
Germany.xxiv One quote that encapsulates the sports integration-meritocracy narrative is 
from women’s national soccer team member Cecilia Okoyino da Mbabi, who states, 
“Soccer helped me to easily integrate myself into German society, so that today I can 
study and play for the national soccer team. I learned through sports that there are 
opportunities in Germany, even for children with a migration background” (Hink, 2011, 
p. 12). Programs proclaim sports’ ability to create community through the shared 
experience of self-actualization around a common task with universal rules. These values 
and behaviors are framed as a stepping stone to success on the job market. These sports 
integration programs also share a lack of concern with structural inequality, racism, and 
social exclusion. Although sports can just as easily exacerbate stereotypes and racism 
(see Stuart Hall, 1997b; Hoberman, 1997), the idea of sports—both at the level of 
individual practice and the level of mediated representation—as a natural mechanism for 
positive transcultural exchange is persistent throughout the discourse on sports 
integration.  
Although they share key foundations, the discourses of the DFB and DOSB can 
be distinguished in terms of emphasis and tone. The DFB literature has a more 
disciplinary and remedial emphasis, whereas the DOSB places a greater emphasis on 
creating interventions to achieve equal participation. In their 2014 paper, the DOSB 
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writes that “whereas before remedial integration was consistently the focus, today it is 
primarily about the equal participation of people with and without a migration 
background in all areas of life”xxv (DOSB, 2014, p. 4). Subtle forms of othering persist in 
the DOSB’s integration discourse. However, recent publications by the DOSB also 
critically interrogate the classification of “having a migration background” and insist on 
the category’s fluid meaning. Furthermore, they define those with a migration 
background as an inextricable part of the German population. While both the DFB-
Mercedes Benz and the DOSB programs use disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms, the 
DOSB discourse emphasizes the regulatory elements by conceptualizing integration 
primarily in terms of the population. The regulatory elements of sports integration center 
on the “social body,” which is to say, on the population as an aggregate. As opposed to 
the deficit-orientation of disciplinary discourse, regulatory discourse is oriented towards 
the potential benefits of immigration and cultural diversity for the future. This involves 
the quantification and projection of changing demographics that underscore the need to 
recruit immigrants and their children into the national project. In this mode, politicians, 
industrial elites, and sporting functionaries speak enthusiastically about the opportunities 
offered by candidates for integration.  
Regulatory aspects of projects identify key target populations and optimize 
interventions for the greatest possible benefit to the broader population. This targeting 
focuses on families, the young, and the able-bodied based on their importance for 
sustaining national growth in the future. Integration projects all begin with the division of 
the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, defined by the 
possession of a “migration background.” The DOSB project is no exception, but while it 
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accepts this basic premise of division, it seeks to mitigate the harm caused by this 
division by promoting an anti-essentialist definition of the category of “people with 
migration background” and challenging those who equate it with “foreigners.” Instead, 
they argue that this diverse category is an increasingly important part of the nation’s 
future:  
The total number of new immigrants grew last year by 43,000 or 0.1%. According 
to projections, this tendency will continue at least until 2030, but not because that 
many new people will immigrate, but primarily because people of non-German 
heritage are younger on average than the majority population, and are therefore 
more often at an age to establish families.xxvi (German Olympic Sports 
Confederation, 2012, p. 6) 
Using statistical projections, the DOSB justifies the importance of interventions to 
increase the productivity of those with a migration background, who, they note in the 
following paragraph, are twice as likely to be unemployed as their normative German 
peers. This comment opens the door to discussions about structural inequality, but the 
solutions offered by sports integration programs invariably return to interventions 
targeting individual behavior and interpersonal contact.  
Although the framing and top-level conceptualization of the DOSB program 
emphasizes the benefits of diverse populations, the programs featured often involve the 
same pedagogical and disciplinary approaches as those honored by the DFB and 
Mercedes Benz Integration Prize. Like the DFB, the DOSB uses sport as a gateway other 
pedagogical interventions, including language programs, social counseling, and school or 
job search assistance, an approach they call “Sports plus x” (German Olympic Sports 
Confederation, 2012, p. 30). The DOSB shares the commitment of the National 
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Integration Plan and the DFB framework to mobilizing sport as part of a comprehensive 
and interventionist program aimed at imparting idealized normative values and behaviors.  
While the disciplinary mode includes more-or-less implicit threats posed by 
individual immigrants and immigrant communities, the regulatory mode focuses entirely 
on the potential benefits of managing the present population for future gains. The 
emphasis on the benefits represented by diversity fits into an economic system of value 
that sees difference as a potential source of innovation. In the words of Mercedes Benz’s 
Director of Global Diversity, 
Diversity, whether in sports or in business, always broadens one's own 
perspective.…diversity enriches our culture and thereby our lives. It is, therefore, 
the foundation for the future of enterprise and for the future of society.xxvii (2013 
Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 3)  
To achieve this benefit, however, integration must be carefully managed and “rehearsed” 
(geübt) through coordinated interventions from top level policies down to individual 
communities. In the 2009 Integration Prize brochure, the same Mercedes Benz 
representative underscores the importance of active interventions in order to make 
diversity beneficial, emphasizing that “integration must be fostered and supported in 
order to be really effective and lasting, and so that diversity of people and cultures will be 
an enrichment for everyone”xxviii (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, programs 
should form a network. As the DOSB puts it, “integration work can start on islands. But 
sooner or later these islands must be connected, so that each one can reach its full 
effectiveness”xxix (German Olympic Sports Confederation, 2012, p. 32). To illustrate 
effective networking, they present the example of a “colorful Berlin network” that 
organizes “prevention weeks” for school children. This program involves schools, police, 
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the judiciary, and sports clubs to teach children the difference between “fighting and 
competition” (Kampf und Wettkampf). After lessons on drug abuse and weapon laws 
from German authorities, students can try a variety of new sports. In this combination of 
fun activities and stern lessons, sports are not simply a reward for disciplined attention; it 
demonstrates the continuity of these projects. This program perfectly blends the 
disciplinary imperatives to impart bodily control and knowledge of certain punishment 
for potential transgressions. It does so according to a biopolitical philosophy promoting 
preventative measures to manage the risk and increase the stability, health, and economic 
viability of the population. Even with the attempts at progressive reframing by the 
DOSB, their highlighted integration projects target immigrant and minority children as 
risks in need of management.  
Although the regulatory mode enthusiastically proclaims the benefits of diversity, 
the implicit threat does not disappear, but rather shifts up to a higher scale: to the level of 
the population. The potential benefits are contingent on the successful management of 
difference through “integration work.” In a typical articulation of the task, Maria Böhmer 
states, 
The integration of people from immigrant families is an enormous challenge. 
Let's make it into an opportunity for our country! Because here we are deciding, 
above all, the question of the future viability of our society—both on the national 
and the European level. (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007) 
Here, “our society” is both national and European, implicating all European nations in the 
project of integrating non-European populations. This quote emphasizes the integration 
of minorities as a path to a better national and European future. However, by framing the 
stakes of integration projects as nothing less than “the future viability of our society,” the 
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threat posed by the supposed refusal to integrate operates at a greater order of magnitude. 
The threat of failure is framed as existential, making each unruly body symbolize the 
death of German and European society. 
Cracks in the Veneer of Sports Integration  
Integration as a conceptual framework guides interventions attempting to bring 
immigrants and their children into the biopolitical order that Foucault calls the 
“normalizing society.” These interventions reflect their transition to being recognized as a 
permanent part of the population, a change which began with the implementation of a 
limited form of jus soli citizenship rights in 2000. This increased inclusion has been 
accompanied by new interventions from the state level reaching down to local 
communities and even into the family sphere, seeking to discipline and regulate new 
Germans through their status as permanent candidates for integration. Power under a 
regime of biopolitics operates through the cultivation of life. Yet, biopolitics also 
involves a constant process of distinguishing between life that must be cultivated, and life 
that poses a threat to the People and must be weeded out. The discourses and programs of 
integration do not categorize all immigrant and minority people as unworthy life. Instead, 
they categorize these groups as carriers of both risks and benefits. The extraction of 
benefits calls for coordinated and comprehensive interventions and surveillance to assess 
progress. This process includes celebration, care, and attention with the goal of 
developing candidates for integration into enthusiastic supporters of the German national 
project. In this regard, sports are seen as an ideal and natural nexus connecting individual 
bodies to the life of the normative population.  
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This process of assessment and distinction of integration successes from failures 
is open-ended. Candidates for integration may be celebrated as exemplars of success one 
day, only to have their integration status questioned at the next opportunity. Elite athletes 
are repeatedly caught up in this process. As embodiments of the nation, the minority 
athletes of the men’s German national soccer team are a key focal point of this process of 
assessment, celebration, and criticism. This process is by no means confined to Germany. 
When the French men’s soccer team won its first World Cup title in 1998, the ethnic 
composition of its team reflected France’s history of empire. The diversity of the French 
team was hailed as a source of its success and as a sign of a new post-colonial era of 
racial equality and harmony (Dubois, 2010). Despite the team’s successes, any lackluster 
performance has consistently raised complaints from the right that the team might be “too 
black.” In the Netherlands, there has been a similar development as the number of 
national team players of color increased in the 1990s. While a number of minority players 
have achieved the status of national heroes, audience studies and studies of media 
coverage of the national team have shown familiar racialized patterns that distinguish 
(autochthonous) white players from their (foreign) teammates of color (Hermes, 2005; 
Floris Müller, Zoonen, & Roode, 2007; Sterkenburg, 2013). Historical legacies of 
colonialism and increasingly mobile transnational populations are reflected in the 
demographics of national sports teams, and media coverage frequently draws on 
difference as an explanatory tool for the successes and failures of national teams.  
International competition turns athletes into embodied national symbols, and the 
carefully choreographed cameras and running commentary of mediated international 
sports reproduce common tropes and narratives of differentiation (Wenner, 2002). In the 
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German case, the vaunted “multikulti” team of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa came 
to symbolize the strength of a new inclusive Germany (see Chapters 5 and 7). The 
Turkish-German midfielder Mesut Özil became a breakout national star. Özil, along with 
his German-born national teammates Jerome Boateng, Sami Khedira, have been widely 
lauded as “examples of successful integration.” The Polish-born Miroslav Klose and 
Lukas Podolski are sometimes also added to the list of the “successfully integrated.” But 
while the national team was being celebrated for its unprecedented diversity in 2010, a 
new debate emerged reflecting the surveillance and assessment that has accompanied 
minorities’ entrance into the symbolic national core. Before the 2010 tournament, former 
national team member, trainer and DFB vice president, Franz Beckenbauer criticized the 
national players who chose not to sing along with the national anthem before games. 
Beckenbauer faced a temporary ban from FIFA in 2014 and is currently under 
investigation for corruption related to the successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup, but 
remains one of the most popular figures in German soccer. The popular tabloid, the Bild, 
stoked the debate by publishing Beckenbauer’s statement that all players should be 
required to sing along (Stevens, 2010). After the team exited the 2012 European 
Championship, the debate was kicked up again with new enthusiasm. Politicians and 
leaders in the DFB proposed a “singing requirement” (Singpflicht) for all national team 
players, while the team’s coach defended the free choices of this players (“Diskussion 
ums Halbfinal-Aus bei der EM,” 2012). These discussions were renewed again in 
anticipation of the World Cup in 2014 and the European Championship in 2016. 
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Figure 1: The caption for this photograph reads, “The silent and the singers: The German players with a 
migration background listen to the national anthem with closed lips, the rest sing along ardently.”xxx 
(Spoerr, 2014) 
Winning “Integration Prizes” and even the World Cup in 2014 has not protected 
minority athletes from perpetual policing. In a country where nationalist celebrations 
around sports have, until recently, been relatively restrained (see Chapter 3), the scrutiny 
and critique of athletes who choose not to sing has been highly charged. Karen Spoerr, a 
commentator in the national newspaper Die Welt, addressed the players in an open letter. 
It is worth quoting substantial excerpts from the letter, since it provides a striking 
example of racialized and gendered discourses in soccer and narrates how the mediated 
experience of sports feeds expectations for affective satisfaction. 
Dear Mesut Özil, Sami Khedira, Jerome Boateng, 
I don’t understand much about soccer, but I understand a little…. I must say, the 
business of playing together works well on the German team. Something else 
does not work so well. You already know what I am talking about, right, about the 
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national anthem. All the players sing the national anthem—only you three don’t. 
You stay silent…. I have to ask myself: What are you telling us with your silence? 
… I really like you three, because you look so good, because you can run so fast, 
and because you want to shoot goals so that the Germany can become the best 
soccer team in the world.  
But then I see you standing there silently. The camera films the singing mouths. 
The singing players, the singing trainer, the singing reserve bench. Only you three 
pinch your lips together14 like teenagers who want to punish their parents for not 
being cool enough. You stand there and shun the millions of enthusiastic 
countrymen in front of their televisions, who are yearning nothing more deeply in 
that moment than to get goosebumps. Who wish to be allowed to melt into a 
singing German community of destiny, even people like me, who can’t tell the 
difference between a penalty and a free kick. 
[…] You three stand there speechless and destroy the beautiful idea that by 
singing the national anthem we can become a whole. Or could it be that this is just 
a misunderstanding? 
Dear Mesut, Sami, Jerome, every time that I see you stay silent, I ask myself what 
you must be thinking while Germany sings. I think I know: You aren’t thinking 
about Turkey, Tunisia and Ghana. You aren’t thinking about your national 
identity. You think: Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit für das deutsche Vaterland 
(unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland). Right? How about 
next time you think it you just open your mouths?15 (Spoerr, 2014) 
This commentary arguing that all national players should be expected to sing is followed 
by a counterpoint by a (male) colleague arguing that performance on the field matters 
most and that not singing does not mean that the players are not patriotic. He also points 
out that during the 1974 final no one, not even Beckenbauer, sang along. In contrast to 
the female author of the first position who proclaims three times her ignorance of the 
                                                          
 
 
 
14 The originally used term kneifen means “to pinch,” but is also used in phrases indicating the shirking of 
duties or fleeing in cowardice.   
15 For the original text, visit http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article129454350/Sollten-alle-
deutschen-Spieler-die-Hymne-singen.html  
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sport and disinterest in anything but national team soccer, the second author is concerned 
with results, with substance over symbolism. This reinforces the expectation that women 
have little understanding of soccer and are only interested in the pageantry and emotion 
of international games, whereas men have a deeper, more technical interest. The World 
Cup is framed as an exceptional event, where “even women” become soccer fans and 
patriotic displays are increasingly not only safe and normal, they are almost obligatory. 
Spoerr drives this point home, writing, “The national anthem is just as interesting to me 
as soccer, which is to say normally not at all. But during the World Cup I am interested in 
both, soccer and the anthem.”xxxi Chapter 3 will examine the beginnings of this new 
national sports orthodoxy in 2006. By 2014, Spoerr expresses her entitlement to demand 
that players satisfy her desire for the affective satisfaction of uncomplicated “collective 
effervescence,” to reference Durkheim’s (1995) classic theory.  
Spoerr is angry that these three players of color have “destroyed the beautiful 
idea” of perfect national unity. Possibly recognizing a problem with explicitly singling 
out three minority players for rebuke, she attempts to show that she is not prejudiced 
against them personally, by complimenting their physical appearance, speed, and 
effectiveness in raising Germany to the top of the global (sports) hierarchy. This 
comment falls squarely in the terrain of positively framed racism that flourishes in sports, 
where minority athletes are valued for their almost preternatural physical prowess, and 
appreciated for their physicality rather than their tactical or intellectual abilities (see 
Hoberman, 1997). After sexually objectifying these players, the author further demeans 
Özil, Boateng, and Khedira by infantilizing them and accusing them of petulance and 
spite against their “uncool parents,” presumably here embodied by white German society. 
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To avoid accusing them of secret disloyalty by thinking instead of their fathers’ 
homelands (Boateng and Khedira have white German mothers) she presumes to fill their 
silence with her own wishful interpretation that they must be mentally singing along. 
Spoerr concludes with the demand that they should “just open their mouths” next time.  
Özil, Boateng and Khedira had already been scrutinized and critiqued for their 
failure to properly perform patriotism in 2010 and 2012, and had already publicly 
accounted for and defended their actions during the anthem, explaining that they use that 
moment to focus and/or pray. In defense of his legitimate place as a national player, 
Khedira argued  
It is a good sign when one sings the national anthem, but that doesn’t make you a 
good German. You become a good German when you speak the language well 
and you live the values. And that is the case with all of us.xxxii (“Debatte um 
Nationalhymne „überflüssig“,” 2012)  
Khedira accepts not only the positive value of performing patriotism, but also the basic 
notion that belonging as German is defined by speaking “good German” and adopting 
normative values (see Chapter 7 for and examination of the role of language in defining 
legitimate citizenship). Spoerr not only erases minority players’ speech on this specific 
topic, she takes the liberty of defining their thoughts and demanding they act according to 
her expectations. Spoerr’s commentary perfectly blends sexist and racist frameworks 
around soccer. Although her column is an extreme example in that it illustrates so many 
tropes in such an unvarnished manner, the assumptions and expectations underlying it run 
throughout the cases analyzed in this dissertation.   
Conclusion 
149 
 
Elite sports, particularly at the national level, reflect and reconstruct national 
politics of culture, race, and citizenship. They symbolize the optimism of national 
communities and also reveal the fragility of support for celebrated figures of integration. 
This chapter examined the politics of sports integration as it has been conceptualized by 
stakeholders in the government, business, and civic sectors and implemented at the level 
of communities. These programs demonstrate how the idea of integration operates 
through intertwined processes of discipline and biopolitical reason, seeking to improve 
the life of the population by disciplining bodies that represent a particular risk to that 
population. The celebratory and optimistic tone of sports integration discourse and 
practice, which emphasizes the benefits of properly disciplined diversity for the national 
future, implies the existential threat represented by the “failure” of integration. 
Immigrants and their children will either be the source of Germany’s future growth or the 
cause of its demise.  
The rise of integration discourse cannot be separated from the rise of renewed 
forms of symbolic nationalism. This is the case not only in Germany but throughout 
Europe as the unity of the European Union has faltered in the face of nationalist 
commitments to regulating the population through controls on migration. Germany 
provides a particularly valuable case, however, because its history of atrocities committed 
in the name of the nation makes symbolic nationalism a contentious topic, which is 
subject to considerable public debate. The following chapters in this dissertation analyze 
a number of these public debates and “critical incidents” (Zelizer, 1992). These mediated 
incidents mobilize celebrity athletes and entertainers as examples for celebration or 
scrutiny for their roles in the project of constructing the new “colorful” German nation. 
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The next three chapters analyze and contextualize press discourses legitimating 
patriotism beginning with the 2006 World Cup. Chapter 3 analyzes media coverage to 
trace the emergence of the idea of “soccer patriotism.” Chapter 4 examines the political 
economy and representational politics of a media campaign that paved the way for the 
successful normalization of soccer patriotism in 2006. Chapter 5 investigates the 
mobilization of immigrants as pedagogical figures in the case of a dispute between 
immigrant patriots and German anti-nationalists.  
                                                          
 
 
 
i Es sind auch deutsche Tugenden, die zur deutschen Leichtigkeit beitragen. Denn Wohlstand macht das 
Leben leicht und hebt die Laune. Als Folge von Fleiß, Disziplin und Folgsamkeit wächst dieser Wohlstand 
gerade.  
ii Sie wollten und sollten auf Zeit bleiben, dann entschieden sich viele von ihnen für ein Leben in 
Deutschland.  
iii In den späteren Jahrzehnten veränderte sich die Zuwanderung. Nun kamen Menschen aus anderen 
Gründen nach Deutschland – und konnten häufig auch bleiben. 
iv Mit den politischen Veränderungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa kamen viele Deutsche in das Land ihrer 
Vorfahren zurück. 
v Dennoch hat es lange gedauert, bis diese Entwicklung als das verstanden wurde, was sie ist: Eine 
Wirklichkeit, die viele Chancen eröffnet, aber auch die Gefahr gesellschaftlicher Spannungen birgt. 
vi Integration ist eine Aufgabe von nationaler Bedeutung. Grundlage ist neben unseren Wertvorstellungen 
und unserem kulturellen Selbstverständnis die freiheitliche und demokratische Ordnung, wie sie sich aus 
der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte entwickelt hat und im Grundgesetz ihre verfassungsrechtliche 
Ausprägung findet. 
vii Integration kann nicht verordnet werden. Sie erfordert Anstrengungen von allen, vom Staat und der 
Gesellschaft. Maßgebend ist zum einen die Bereitschaft der Zuwande-rer, sich auf ein Leben in unserer 
Gesellschaft einzulassen, unser Grundgesetz und unsere gesamte Rechtsordnung vorbehaltlos zu 
akzeptieren und insbesondere durch das Erlernen der deutschen Sprache ein sichtbares Zeichen der 
Zugehörigkeit zu Deutschland zu setzen. Auf Seiten der Aufnahmegesellschaft sind Akzeptanz, Toleranz, 
zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement und die Bereitschaft unverzichtbar, Menschen, die rechtmäßig bei uns 
leben, ehrlich willkommen zu heißen: Integration—eine Chance für unser Land! 
viii Deutschland ist ein weltoffenes Land.  
ix Das Vorurteil der „Ausländerfeindlichkeit“ in Deutschland kann dazu führen, dass Forscher aus dem 
Ausland den Eindruck gewinnen, nicht immer willkommen zu sein. 
x Der Sport bietet sehr vielseitige Angebote und steht allen Menschen—unabhängig von ihrer persönlichen, 
kulturellen oder finanziellen Situation—offen. Fairplay und Chancengleichheit werden in jeder Sportart 
durch weltweit einheitliche Regeln gefördert. Sport befriedigt das menschliche Bedürfnis nach Vergleich 
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und dient der bewegungs- und körperorientierten Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit. Insbesondere die 
Ausübung von Mannschaftssport führt zu Teamgeist, der im Alltag nicht von selbst entsteht. 
xi Kulturelle Integration erfolgt durch die Vermittlung von Kulturtechniken wie z. B. den Spracherwerb 
sowie den Erwerb kulturell eingefärbter sozialer „Normalitätsmuster“ wie Verhaltensmuster in 
Alltagssituationen. Sportvereine bieten nicht nur Orte des Sporttreibens, sondern sind auch Orte der 
Alltagskommunikation, die Anlass zu wechselseitigem interkulturellem Lernen bieten. 
xii Dass der Fußball eine Vorreiterrolle bei der Integration spielt, liegt für Heinz Bunzer auf der Hand „Wir 
haben es soviel leichter, denn wir sind eine spielerische Gemeinschaft.“ 
xiii Unserer Auffassung nach führen ewige Verbote und Maßregelungen zu nichts. Wir haben uns zum Ziel 
gesetzt, solche Dinge von innen heraus positiv zu gestalten und damit die unterschiedlichen Kulturen zu 
erreichen.  
xiv Ich denke die Jungs und Mädels in einer Mannschaft merken selbst ziemlich schnell, wie viel Spaß es 
macht, gemeinsam Ziele zu verfolgen und Siege zu feiern – und dafür packt auch jeder gerne mit an. 
xv Soziale Fähigkeiten, ein selbstbewusster Auftritt, Teamfähigkeit das ist wichtiger als Laktatwert und 
Torschusstechnik. „Jugendliche beim Fußball sind intrinsisch motiviert, sie lernen also mit hoher 
Motivation und auf spielerische Weise, sich an Regeln zu halten“, sagt Konermann, „Das Ziel ist es, dass 
möglichst viele, möglichst rasch auf dem Arbeitsmarkt Fuß fassen.“ 
xvi „Der Fußball ist einfach ein sehr gutes Mittel, um sowohl beim einzelnen Schüler, im Klassenverband 
aber auch für unsere gesamte Schule positive Entwicklungen auf den Weg zu bringen“, sagt Jürgen 
Kuhlmann. Denn der Ball kann viel - Fußball spielen lehrt den Gelsenkirchener Jugendlichen wichtige 
Werte und stärkt den Charakter. „Bei Schwierigkeiten nicht so schnell aufzustecken, Konflikte 
anzusprechen aber nicht eskalieren zu lassen, das leistet der Fußball“, berichtet der Sportlehrer aus den 
Erfahrungen der vergangenen Jahre. 
xvii Ein Seminar über Wertevermittlung in Österreich. Dann kam ich nachhause und holte meinen Sohn von 
der Schule ab. Die Kinder waren außer Rand und Band, rannten einfach über die Straße, hatten die 
wüstesten Beschimpfungen drauf. Das war mein Schlüsselerlebnis. Mir war klar, dass ich etwas 
unternehmen muss. 
xviii Die Polizei deklarierte die Heerstraße Nord in Spandau 2007 als kriminalitätsbelasteten Ort. Eine 
Gruppe von etwa 30 Jugendlichen, die meisten mit einem Migrationshintergrund, legten praktisch den 
Stadtteil lahm. Für mich stand fest: Jetzt muss etwas passieren. Der Mitternachtssport war das Ergebnis 
eines von mir organisierten Gesprächs zwischen Polizei und Jugendlichen. Am 8. Dezember 2007 haben 
wir dann die Halle das erste Mal aufgeschlossen. Der Effekt war umwerfend. Die Kategorisierung als 
kriminalitätsbelasteter Ort konnte bald aufgehoben werden. 
xix DFB: Und die Baseballschläger mussten vor der Halle abgegeben werden? Ismail Öner: Man sollte nicht 
übertreiben, so schlimm war es auch nicht. Wir haben Begegnung geschaffen. Beim ersten Turnier 
spielten Polizisten gegen Jugendliche, die sich sonst nur bei Einsätzen begegnet sind. Die Jugendlichen 
kommen zu uns in die Halle und bringen alle ihre Sorgen und Nöte mit. Dann beginnt die 
sozialpädagogische Arbeit. Wir schaffen Netzwerke aus Schule, Elternhaus, Fußballverein, Jugendamt 
und anderen Personen und Institutionen rund um den Jugendlichen. Oft sind es Schieflagen. Die 
Versetzung ist gefährdet, es droht ein Schulverweis, ein Junge findet keinen Praktikumsplatz, der andere 
hat eine richterliche Weisung. Manchmal ist’s auch einfach Liebeskummer. 
xx Wenn Mädchen in die Halle kommen, dürfen sie mitspielen. Aber ich weiß auch, was ich kann und was 
nicht. Pädagogik spielt eine große Rolle. Und mir fehlt die Fähigkeit und das Einfühlungsvermögen, die 
Probleme von 14-jährigen Mädchen zu verstehen. Da müssen andere Kolleginnen ran. 
xxi „Wir haben—durchaus mit Erstaunen—bemerkt, dass in den Pausenhöfen auch die Mädchen gern und 
gut Fußball spielen“, berichtet Städtler. 
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xxii Ich war sehr skeptisch am Anfang. Mädchen aus marokkanischen oder türkischen Familien und Fußball 
spielen? Das konnte ich mir nicht so richtig vorstellen. Heute erlebe ich bei Turnieren den Enthusiasmus, 
mit dem die Väter ihre Töchter anfeuern. Der Fußball hat dazu beigetragen, dass sich die Kulturen 
annähern. 
xxiii Fußball kann ein Hebel der Emanzipation sein. Der ältere Bruder oder der Vater sehen die Schwester 
oder Tochter in einem ganz anderen Umfeld. Das Rollenverhalten verändert sich.  
xxiv Der Fußball hat mir sehr dabei geholfen, mich problemlos in die deutsche Gesellschaft zu integrieren, 
so dass ich heute studieren und für die deutsche Nationalmannschaft spielen kann. Ich habe durch den 
Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland Chancengleichheit gibt. 
xxv Wo vorher stets eine nachholende Integration im Blickpunkt stand, geht es heute um die 
gleichberechtigte Teilhabe und Teilnahme von Menschen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund in allen 
Lebensbereichen im Sinne einer interkulturellen Öffnung.  
xxvi Die Gesamtzahl der Zugewanderten ist im Vorjahr gewachsen, um 43.000 Menschen beziehungsweise 
0,1 Prozentpunkte. Prognosen zufolge wird sich die steigende Tendenz bis mindestens 2030 fortsetzen. 
Aber nicht weil so viele Personen immigrieren würden, sondern vor allem weil Menschen nichtdeutschen 
Ursprungs im Durchschnitt viel jünger sind als die Mehrheitsbevölkerung. Und damit häufiger in einem 
Alter, in dem Familien gegründet werden. 
xxvii Vielfalt, ganz egal ob im Sport oder im Unternehmen, ist immer eine Erweiterung der eigenen 
Perspektive und will geübt sein. Vielfalt bereichert unsere Kultur und damit unser Leben. Dadurch ist sie 
das Fundament für unternehmerische Zukunft und für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft. 
xxviii Aber Integration muss gefördert und unterstützt werden, um wirklich erfolgreich und nachhaltig zu 
sein, und damit die Vielfalt der Menschen und Kulturen eine Bereicherung für alle wird. 
xxix Integrationsarbeit kann auf Inseln beginnen. Früher oder später aber müssen diese Inseln verbunden 
werden, damit jede einzelne voll zur Wirkung kommt. 
xxx Schweiger und Sänger: Die deutschen Spieler mit Migrationshintergrund lauschen der Nationalhymne 
mit geschlossenen Lippen, der Rest singt inbrünstig mit 
xxxi Die Nationalhymne interessiert mich ungefähr genauso wie der Fußball, nämlich normalerweise gar 
nicht. Aber wenn Fußballweltmeisterschaft ist, dann interessiert mich beides, der Fußball und die Hymne. 
xxxii Es ist ein gutes Zeichen, wenn man die Nationalhymne singt. Aber man wird dadurch kein guter 
Deutscher. Ein guter Deutscher wird man, wenn man die Sprache gut spricht und die Werte lebt. Und das 
ist bei uns allen der Fall. 
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PART II: INTEGRANTS AND THE NEW GERMANY 
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CHAPTER 3 – CONSTRUCTING PATRIOTISM ABOVE REPROACH: THE 
REHABILITATION OF GERMAN NATIONAL PRIDE IN THE 2006 WORLD 
CUP 
 
Integration discourse is an exercise in national self-construction, focusing as 
much on defining and propping up the normativity and the positive value of the national 
category as on defining those whose candidature for belonging must be assessed. As the 
case studies in this dissertation show, discussions about integration are deeply interwoven 
with reflections on German identity—in relation both to the troubled national past and to 
its possible futures. However, in their construction of the categories of integrant and 
national, these discussions not only define through opposition, more importantly they 
depoliticize and naturalize these categories. This requires the minimization of conflicts 
and controversy around them, requiring both categorizations to appear necessary, benign, 
and even positive. In the German case, however, the positive value of the national 
category has been contested since Germany’s defeat in the World War II was followed on 
the global stage by the atrocities that may follow from nationalism being taken to its 
logical conclusion. Germany’s defeat and the demand for a public reckoning for atrocities 
committed in the name of the nation complicated public nationalism, even though the 
defeat had little impact on the continuity of banal forms of nationalism, in that, borrowing 
Billig’s framing (1995), Germans never forgot or doubted that they were German. 
Although postwar nationalism continued to thrive in the collective intimacy of Heimat 
(see Chapter 1), the spectacular and celebratory practices of nationalism favored by 
National Socialists became points of contention. The media prescribed immersion in 
national colors during the 2006 World Cup to alleviate this contentiousness,  proclaiming 
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the tournament as “the best group therapy for Germans, who are tormented by identity 
complexes, even though they are the world leaders in exports and have a generous social 
welfare system” (“Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006). In this Spiegel article, this 
quote from a Portuguese newspaper commentary was gathered along with quotes from 
five other international periodicals to affirm the value of uncontested national identity.  
This chapter analyzes the process by which the media in Germany constructed 
new narratives of national identity and patriotism around the 2006 World Cup. While 
Chapter 2 outlines the function of sport in the biopolitical system of values that defines 
the conditions for the substantive citizenship of minorities, this chapter returns to the 
category of the normative national and its narrative association with a harmonious and 
happy population. To understand the discursive field in which the press coverage of the 
tournament operates, I first outline the history of debates over nationalism in Germany. In 
2006, the return of symbolic nationalism was celebrated by the German media and 
approved by international observers. Discourses of soccer patriotism construct the 
positive value of the national category, affirming the necessity of national affiliation for 
the health and wellbeing of the population and removing it from the realm of political 
contention.  
During the 2006 World Cup, soccer was proposed as an ideal model for national 
engagement. This case study analyzes how the features and expectations of this event 
were marshalled to legitimate a change in German practices of symbolic nationalism. The 
first section examines the history of the debates over remembering National Socialism, 
which was introduced in Chapter 1, to explain the tension that the coverage of celebration 
of “soccer patriotism” in 2006 sought to defuse. The second discusses the nature of 
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sporting nationalism to clarify the role of sport spectacles in the formation and 
legitimation of the category of the national. Finally, I look at the media coverage of the 
2006 World Cup to examine how the German media constructed new narratives of 
salutary national identity and patriotism by using the event to create a break from the 
past.   
Articles were gathered using the search terms Fußball (soccer) AND Patriotismus 
(patriotism) in two different newspaper archives. Because of the volume of coverage 
related to soccer patriotism is so large, I limited my search to one influential national 
periodical and one regional periodical. For the national periodical I chose Der Spiegel 
including its online sibling Spiegel Online, which are by far the most frequently cited 
quality periodicals in Germany (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). A Spiegel search for the 
above terms yielded 46 articles (14 in print and 33 online) written in 2006. To understand 
the circulation of discourses of soccer patriotism in regional public spheres, I examined 
the archive of the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (MZ), which holds a near monopoly on regional 
coverage in the south of Saxony-Anhalt. The MZ archives returned 26 results for the 
above search terms in 2006. The regional daily newspaper is not known for holding a 
strong ideological position. Of these results, I selected and examined articles that focused 
primarily on patriotism and national sentiments in the context of the World Cup. This 
yielded a total of 49 articles across the three sources (see table 2). 
Table 2: Search Results for Fußball AND Patriotismus, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2006 
Source All Results 
Selected 
(Commentary) 
Der Spiegel 14 6 
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Spiegel Online (SPON) 33 19 
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (MZ) 26 24 
Total 73 49 
 Using discourse theory and analysis, I examined the themes and narratives used in 
the German press to construct the event and define its meaning for the nation. In the 
process, media coverage created a break from the past by simultaneously omitting or 
dismissing critical discourse about the role of nationalism in Germany’s fascist past and 
creating collective narratives of a new, unimpeachable “soccer patriotism.” As one astute 
commentator observed regarding the difficulty in taking a logical or critical stance 
towards the flag issue, “the secret of the little flags is: any resistance immediately comes 
off as uptight, whereas now we are in such a super laid-back mood”i (K. Schmidt, 2006). 
The return of celebratory nationalism hinges on a binary between tension and 
relaxation—any discussion or reflection on it uncovers or raises tension. The object under 
scrutiny (the flag and national colors) is defined as fun itself, establishing a “chain of 
equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) between national symbolism, the popular “parsed 
flag” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 216), and happiness, unity, and the alleviation of identity-
based tension. Politics and critique are situated as the opposite of this, and, thus, quickly 
become unsustainable. National symbols are situated in a narrative of transformation in 
which the nation, previously alienated from itself, celebrates a glorious reconciliation.   
Current narratives framing national soccer as the foremost site of national 
symbolism focus on the World Cup tournament hosted by Germany in 2006. Merely 
mentioning “the summer fairytale” (Sommermärchen), as it came to be called, is enough 
to evoke images of exuberant, flag-waving crowds of Germans “finally” taking their 
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place among the “normal” nations. The strength of this association continues unabated, as 
was evident in media reports in late 2015, which revealed that Germany’s successful bid 
to host the 2006 World Cup was not won on its own merit, but was bought away from the 
front-runner, South Africa. Spiegel’s title story revealing the results of their investigation 
declares that,  
The soccer World Cup in summer 2006 was a turning point in German history. 
The country of the Holocaust had already made other steps towards rehabilitation; 
it had matured into a stable democracy; it had peacefully reunited. But then 
German also became likeable. (Feldenkirchen, 2015)  
The author then outlines Germany’s concurrent rise to become one of the world’s most 
admired countries, as global leaders acting against climate change and for a capitalist 
economy that is both robust and socially responsible. The 2006 World Cup, according to 
this article, was the point that marked Germany’s change in global position from 
repentant perpetrator to moral role model.  
However, as the article points out, the possibility of high-level corruption behind 
the symbolically crucial 2006 tournament in Germany threatens to tarnish Germany’s 
reputation and self-conception as a moral beacon. Nevertheless, the Spiegel journalist 
concludes that this has led to a more realistic image of a nation that is no better and no 
worse than any other: “There is no cause for German arrogance, no reason for feelings of 
superiority, which in these days are again showing themselves in their most primitive 
form: hatred of foreigners” (Feldenkirchen, 2015). This quote reflects a recognition of the 
link between identitarian forms of self-love and suspicion and hatred of those perceived 
as exogenous. As this chapter shows, this kind of reflection had no place within press 
narratives that asserted the unmitigated social and psychological benefits of the flag-
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draped sporting spectacle of 2006. Although the World Cup, and in particular the 2006 
tournament hosted by Germany, has emerged as possibly the most visible platform for 
national self-reflection and nation branding, it has received remarkably little scholarly 
attention. This chapter examines the process by which hosting this sporting spectacle 
transformed the nation’s relationship to its national symbols, freeing them from their 
long-troubled relationship to the atrocities of National Socialism while cultivating new 
collective memories to define German national identity. The contentiousness of the 
German case, as well as the efforts to neutralize that contention, provide a particularly 
stark example of the often-unnoticed processes of national narration that are part of all 
global sporting spectacles.  
The History of Remembering: Conflicting Postwar Narratives 
German memory of National Socialist atrocities followed a tortuous path, 
bifurcating in divided Germany with each nation following its own pattern of 
remembrance and amnesia. In her piece Between Memory and Oblivion, Claudia Koonz 
traced these paths, arguing that beginning with the post-war “Zero Hour” (Stunde Null), 
“Germans constructed a new identity based on a fresh start or a clean break from the 
past” (1996, p. 262). East and West Germans differed, however, in their strategies for 
creating the break. East Germans railed against Nazi crimes, using them as an 
opportunity to celebrate Communist resistance to fascism and to proclaim that “German 
monopoly capital—they gave orders for murder… while in the West, memory was sealed 
off in post-traumatic oblivion” (Koonz, 1996, p. 265). What was forgotten on both sides, 
however, was the racial genocide and the complicity of everyday Germans in Nazism. 
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Not until the late 1960s did memory of the genocide return to public consciousness, albeit 
in very different ways in the East and West. In this period, East Germany began 
preserving and memorializing the concentration camps, continuing the state-organized 
project of focusing on the heroism of “anti-fascist resisters”, minimizing or omitting the 
central racial element of the genocide. In the West, the flood of commemoration begun 
by the student movements in the late 1960s—including the push to recognize the Jewish 
victims of genocide—was less uniform, and more loudly contested.  This contestation 
reached a climax in the bitter 1985-86 “historians’ dispute” (Historikerstreit) between 
historians, philosophers, and intellectuals over the appropriate historical interpretation of 
the genocide. 
This debate arose from a quest by conservative intellectuals to distance Germany 
from the fascist past and establish “a new, proud, ‘normal’ national identity” (Nolan, 
1988, p. 62). The public battle began with an article by Ernst Nolte published in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung entitled, “The past that won’t go away” (Nolte, 1986). In 
arguing that many aspects of the Third Reich and the Holocaust were not unique, Nolte 
and other conservative historians sought to normalize National Socialism. As Mary Nolan 
(1988) argued, the Historikerstreit was one of a series of controversies sparked by actions 
from Germany’s political right throughout the 1980s that reflected the growing desire of 
conservatives for a “usable past.” In order to accomplish this, the political right needed to 
“emancipate nationalism from its discrediting by fascism. A reinterpretation of 
history…above all of the Third Reich, is integral to this construction of a conservative 
national identity” (Nolan, 1988, p. 62). Leftist intellectuals, led by Jürgen Habermas, 
fought back against this attempt to whitewash the German past and, in particular, the 
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Holocaust. Nolan argued that “whereas the right wants a uniform and emotionally felt 
national identity, [the left strives] for a calm and reasoned acceptance of constitutional 
democracy, built on a critical understanding of Germany's recent past” (1988, p. 65). 
Although they did begin to chip away at the “mourning work” (Trauerarbeit) that was 
gaining momentum in the 1980s, the right was not entirely successful in overcoming the 
pervasive hold of the past on German identity in West Germany at the time of 
reunification in 1990.  
 The gap in Eastern and Western conceptions of the past were a significant 
stumbling block to the establishment of a shared national identity after unification. As 
Koonz observes,  
Like a common currency and culture, the public memory of historical events 
structures a sense of civil society across generations, classes, and regions… While 
tensions and out-right hostility repolarized East and West Germans, the public 
memory of their shared Nazi past also became a site of dispute. (1996, p. 269)  
While East Germans had constructed narratives around the continuity of German fascism 
in the capitalist West, West Germany had nurtured an opposing position, likening the 
authoritarian GDR to the totalitarian Nazi state. Not surprisingly, East Germans balked at 
accepting the West German brand of mourning work, which included both implicit and 
explicit disparagement of the GDR and did not properly reflect East German experiences. 
In particular, residents of the towns near the concentration camps in the former East 
resisted the re-branding of the camps from heroic anti-fascist memorials into monuments 
of admonishment.  
 In fact, even in the West where they had originated, the official chastisements of 
mourning work, which inspired respect abroad and among liberal Germans, had not 
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caught on among the public at large. Koonz writes that “even before unification, the 
depiction of Nazism in West German television specials, best-sellers, and films 
contradicted political leaders’ rhetoric of mourning (1996, p. 274).” Many of them 
focused on the lives of average Germans during the Nazi time, omitting or sanitizing the 
unpleasant or morally challenging aspects (see also Chapter 1). Beginning with the 
Historikerstreit, conservative intellectuals sought to exploit the gap between popular 
memory and official invocations of the genocide. After unification, their message also 
found an attentive audience among East Germans irritated by Wessie forms of memory.  
 Indeed, the desire to cast off the fetters of the past complicating the public 
expression of national pride was one of the few sentiments that had popular appeal across 
the newly reunited nation. The process of reunification facilitated this goal on two fronts. 
First, reunification provided a functional justification for patriotism and the cultivation of 
a united German identity. And second, it marked the end of a historical period. 
“Sometime between November 9, 1989, and October 3, 1990, twentieth-century Germany 
became history” (Confino 2004, 389). The dissolution of the post-war divide created a 
new distance from the World War II—a “symbolic rupture” (Nora, 1998, p. 503) —
paving the way for a new German generation even further removed from the troubling 
past.  
 Although the symbolic potential of the break with the past offered by 
reunification held great potential for the foundation of a new national narrative, this 
potential was mired in the conflicting Eastern and Western conceptions of that past. As 
Michael Geisler (2005) argues in his work on German national symbols and public 
memory after 1989, the process of forming a consensus around the meaning of past 
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events is a necessary—and in the German case, extraordinarily difficult—part of 
establishing the symbols of national identity. The significance of this failed consensus is 
illustrated by Ernest Renan’s famous claim that a nation is defined by its collective 
memory, by the fact that it shares, “in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets.”  It is thus 
A large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made 
in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a 
past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, 
the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if 
you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite.  (Renan, 1990, p. 19) 
Although Germany’s national symbols are arguably effective at accomplishing the 
official tasks of representing and identifying the state, Geisler argues that they have failed 
at their ideological tasks of “sustaining the collective identity of the nation, bookmarking 
public memory, and integrating diverse subgroups” (2005, p. 64). This results from that 
fact that large segments of the population—mostly among liberal Germans—feel 
discomforted by the symbols that are meant to inspire feeling of affiliation.  However, it 
is important to note that while national symbols remained a point of contention, official 
forms of nationalism remained deeply rooted, for example, in German citizenship laws 
and immigration and asylum policies of the 1980s and 1990s (see Göktürk, Gramling, & 
Kaes, 2007). Despite the focus among both public observers and scholars of nationalism 
on public celebrations of nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) rightly points out that a more 
profound accomplishment of nationalism is its pervasiveness and durability in everyday 
life, even—and especially—as it disappears from notice.  
Sporting Nationalism 
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 Global sports spectacles are uniquely positioned to facilitate the renewal of 
nationalism under the pretext of a cooperative international event. Since their foundation, 
the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup were steeped in the idealist rhetoric of global 
peace and harmony. Tomlinson and Young (2006) traced these origins in the statements 
of the founding fathers of these events, Baron Pierre de Coubertin and FIFA president 
Jules Rimet. For de Coubertin, “the Olympic project had philosophical, historical, and 
educational dimensions and goals,” and he insisted that “internationalism was a bulwark 
against ignorance, chauvinism, and war” (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p. 4). Rimet’s 
goals for the World Cup were no less lofty.   
Seeing in sport a means of building good character, Christian and patriotic, his 
love of God and France was combined in his passion for football. He believed in 
the universality of the church and saw in football the chance to create a worldwide 
‘football family’ welded to Christian principles (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p. 
5).  
This conception of international sporting events as a source of healthy pleasure and fun 
and as promoting global friendship across social, racial, and cultural difference has 
endured as the justification for these events, even as particularistic elements of religion 
and nation thrive under the surface.  
 As this case study shows, the idealist rationale for the World Cup inoculated it 
against concerns about the nationalistic displays it encourages. After all, the logic goes, 
how can celebrations associated with an event explicitly designed to encourage universal 
peace be conduits of national chauvinism? But this is not so contradictory after all. As 
Gellner demonstrated, 
The nationalist principle can be asserted in an ethical, ‘universalistic’ spirit. There 
could be, and on occasion there have been, nationalists-in-the-abstract, unbiased 
in favour of any special nationality of their own, and generously preaching the 
165 
 
doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let 
all of them also refrain from including non-nationals under it (2006, p. 2). 
In this way, nationalism and universalism need not be mutually exclusive. The World 
Cup celebrates a universalized form of particularism regulated by nation-states. Even as 
international sports spectacles unite the people of the world under the banner of universal 
peace, they provide the opportunity to cement more “united” and fixed conceptions of 
national identity. And at the same time, the pervasive acceptance of these events as 
fundamentally benign makes any critique of the activities associated with them very 
difficult to sustain publicly.  
 The connections between global sports events and nationalism have been well 
documented (Bairner, 2001; A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006). One of the key tools of this 
connection is the ability to abolish the divisions between the national and the private 
through sports and the media. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, for the standardization, 
homogenization and transfer of popular ideologies, “deliberate propaganda was almost 
certainly less significant than the ability of the mass media to make what were in effect 
national symbols part of the life of every individual” (1992, p. 142). Sports as a mass 
media spectacle are a potent force for bridging the gap between private and public 
worlds. Hobsbawm continues to argue that  
What has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating national 
feelings, is the ease with which even the least political or public individuals can 
identify with the nation as symbolized by young persons excelling at what 
practically every man wants, or at one time in life has wanted, to be good at. The 
imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named 
people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his 
nation himself. (1992, p. 143) 
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Thus, sports are a key locus for transference of national identity to the individual through 
the shared pleasure of admiring the physical abilities of the nation’s most talented 
athletes. The process of the individual becoming the symbol of the nation is so seamless 
that it is easily naturalized, and therefore tends to remain unquestioned and difficult to 
interrogate.  
 For the nation hosting the event this process is intensified, since, as the nation 
becomes the host, the burden of hosting must be met by all those identified as belonging 
to the nation. This is an opportunity for national leaders to mobilize citizens for a united 
and idealistic cause. Acting as good hosts through enthusiastic support “is presented as a 
patriotic duty, whereby internal differences need to be set aside, if only for the duration, 
in the greater national interest. In this sense, host Olympic discourse resembles the 
galvanizing rhetoric of war” (Rowe & Stevenson, 2006, p. 199). With the enormous 
international media attention focused on the event, global sporting spectacles provide 
unparalleled opportunities for accruing symbolic capital if the event is well executed. The 
success or failure of the event is seen as a direct reflection of the capabilities of the host 
nation.  
This is true even when unforeseeable events intervene, as was the case in the 1972 
Munich Olympics, when the Black September terrorist group kidnapped and murdered 
eleven Israeli athletes from the Olympic Village. Like the 2006 World Cup, the Munich 
Olympics were seen as an opportunity for (West) Germany to “showcase its rehabilitation 
as a peace-loving, democratic state where the past was a foreign country” (C. Young, 
2006, p. 118). Referring to the massacre in his memoirs, then Chancellor Willy Brandt 
wrote:  
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My disappointment at the time was intense, first because the Olympics on which 
we had expended so much loving care would not go down in history as a happy 
occasion—indeed, I was afraid that our international reputation would be blighted 
for many years—and secondly because our counter-measures had proved so 
abortive. (C. Young, 2006, p. 118)  
As Young notes, this statement is striking due both to the order in which Brandt’s lists his 
regrets—the self is placed before others and the harm to the nation is prioritized over the 
suffering of the individual—and to the list of key words he employs: history, 
international reputation, loving care, and happiness. This emphasis on positive emotions, 
affective connections, and historical and international significance endures in the 
conception of the role of hosting that Germany brought to the 2006 World Cup. 
Reclaiming a Collective Identity: Establishing and Redressing the Lack 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, since reunification and even before, there has 
been a strong popular and conservative intellectual desire to reclaim German national 
pride from the clutches of the past. Despite the enduring “wall of the mind” (Mauer im 
Kopf) separating former citizens of East and West Germany, citizens of the newly united 
Germany shared a longing for a “normal” national identity. In the context of the modern 
nation-state, John Gillis writes that  
Individuals, subgroups, and nations all demand identity as if it were a necessity of 
life itself. Identity has taken on the status of the sacred object, an “ultimate 
concern,” worth fighting and even dying for. To those who believe they do not 
have it, identity appears even more scarce and precious” (1994, p. 4).  
Popular German sentiment after unification arose from this sense of identity lost through 
occupation and national division. At the same time, it is important to note that Gillis 
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discusses not the empirical existence of identity, but rather the collective belief in the 
possession of identity and the ability to ritually celebrate it.  
This also raises the question, with the contemporary proliferation of forms of 
identity, whether the national form still matters, and if so, why. Even as globalization 
makes borders increasingly porous, the nation-state still stands as the primary arbiter of 
legitimacy holding the power to determine what Hannah Arendt calls, “the right to have 
rights” (1973, p. 296). The physical capacity to cross borders may be more generalized 
than ever, but one’s ability to be fully human is still tied to the accident of birth that 
determines belonging to a nation-(state). This belonging to a political community is 
legally established by rules of citizenship, but it also requires social and affective 
scaffolding to perpetuate its legitimacy. Addressing the affective realm, Carolyn Marvin 
and David Ingle (1999) argue that the ability to govern is built on the willingness of 
citizens to sacrifice themselves and their children. One area that Marvin and Ingle do not 
address is the determination of whose death may act as a group-constituting sacrifice, an 
ability that Giorgio Agamben (1998) has recognized as a key function in modern politics. 
This distinction between life that has political value and can thus be sacrificed and life 
that may be killed but not sacrificed is the biopolitical basis of both modern democracy 
and modern totalitarianism. It is the foundation of integration discourse and reveals the 
continuities between past and present forms of exclusion.  In modern democracies, the 
civic religion of nationalism is the only domain of identity that inspires this scale of 
collective devotion. This willingness to sacrifice is not only necessary in a straight-
forward military sense of national security and conquest. It is the sacrifice of group 
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members that creates the group, creating a form of unity that trumps—though never 
completely or without contestation—other affiliative domains. 
Marvin and Ingle argue that only the process of the willing sacrifice of group 
members is powerful enough to forge the affective bonds holding a group together. For 
this reason, they define the nation as “the memory of the last sacrifice” (1999, p. 5). 
However, the idea that sacrificial violence is the source of national cohesion is contrary 
to the values of modern nation-states, which hold violence to be immoral or barbaric, a 
failure of politics rather than its necessary precursor. “To protect themselves from 
recognizing the source of group unity, citizens render totem violence and its symbols 
sacred” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 12) which is to say taboo, unknowable and 
unspeakable.  
But what happens when the last great sacrifice revealed the totem secret before 
the whole world? Germans felt unable to construct their identity out of shared past not 
tainted by shameful revelation of the bloodthirsty foundations of nationalism. The 
revelation of the bloodthirsty nationalism of the Third Reich before the international 
community inhibited the proper function of the taboo against acknowledging that violent 
sacrifice generates the sentimental power of national cohesion. This broken taboo 
manifested in discomfort with the totemic symbols of national identity (flags, colors, 
anthems, etc.). In the late 1980s, the Historikerstreit began the movement to revive 
explicit symbolic nationalism, and reunification provided the sense of a legitimate need 
for active displays of patriotism, but official ambivalence around direct appeals to 
national pride still endured. To chip away at this lingering ambivalence, an event was 
needed that would strengthen national affect and symbolism while offering an illusion of 
170 
 
separation from explicit national pride. To create distance between the violence of past 
nationalism and current forms, nationalism had to be retrieved from the realm of 
contention and restored as a neutral given. Hosting the World Cup provided the perfect 
opportunity to create a uniform and emotionally felt national identity, while also 
dismissing the pursuit of a critical discourse on Germany's past.  
Mediatized Plebiscite: Fan Fests and Renewed National Narratives   
 The soccer patriotism narratives of 2006 typically begin with descriptions of cities 
being taken over by a “sea of flags” (Fahnenmeer). These accounts revolve around a key 
new feature of the sporting spectacle; organizers introduced public viewings, or Fan 
Fests, throughout the country in the 2006 tournament. This element has become standard 
practice for World Cups ever since, taking place not only in the host country but also 
internationally. These viewings provided places for people to gather together and 
celebrate, and consequently they also provided an excellent opportunity to capture the 
revelry in the media and broadcast it to the world. This offered unprecedented 
opportunities for multiplying the impact of the celebrations. Not only could Germans 
across the nation participate in the experience of watching the event as a group regardless 
of whether they had tickets to the matches or even lived near the stadiums, but their 
celebration became the object of media attention, conferring an even greater status on 
their participation.  
The most famous of these viewings was the Berlin “Fan Mile,” which stretched 
between the between two significant memorials of German identity and history: the 
nearly 70-meter-high Victory Column (Siegessäule) and the Brandenburg Gate. An 
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official city website publicizing the revival of the Fan Fast for the 2010 World Cup 
proclaimed that  
With the Fan Fest during the 2006 FIFA World Cup Berlin created a worldwide 
acknowledged wave of enthusiasm, furor and friendliness for the German capital 
and for Germany. The incomparable pictures taken of the Fan Fest 2006 stood and 
stand for enthusiasm for sport, hospitality and the new found confidence of the 
Berliners and Germans. (“International FIFA Fan Fest Berlin,” 2010)  
The website celebrates the “breathtaking atmosphere” created by the over one million 
people that came every day during the 2006 tournament. This shows the value of the 
public viewings both for the mass sharing of positive sentiments and for simultaneously 
memorializing the unique experience by capturing and circulating it in images. It is also 
significant that this website, written in English and targeted towards visitors of Berlin, 
emphasized the newfound confidence of Berliners and Germans. This event allowed 
Germans to reclaim their nationalism from its shameful past not only for themselves, but 
to proudly affirm this fact in front of the whole world. With the 2006 World Cup 
Germans declared to the world their national pride, and through the success of the event 
they were validated by nearly universal international praise. 
 The German organizers of the World Cup recognized the value of the lived 
experience of the event. Although the media are a key component of constructing 
“imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006), there is still a power implicit in an embodied 
experience that gets lost in the mediated experience of an event. Paul Connerton explains 
that 
There is a world of difference between typography as a rhetoric that is known 
about, and topography as a rhetoric that is known… For there is a type of 
experience recognizable only to those who have walked through a particular 
building or street or district. Only they have lived it. To ‘live’ an artifact is to 
appropriate it, to make it one’s own. (2009, p. 32) 
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Experiencing the World Cup on television from the comfort of one’s home is thus 
qualitatively different from the experience of the public viewing, which mimics more 
closely the scale and sensations of the experience of viewing the game from the stadium. 
In their literature publicizing the benefits of hosting a “Fan Fest”, FIFA wrote that in 
2006, the official Fan Fests in twelve cities attracted approximately 18 million viewers, 
allowing six times as many people as were accommodated in the stadiums to experience 
the “unique FIFA World Cup feeling” (FIFA, 2010). Although the mediated experience 
of the events provides a sense of simultaneity to viewers, the experience pales in 
comparison to the power of physically experiencing the events in the same time and 
space. Together with the media, the public viewings created a feedback loop in which 
audiences enjoyed the embodied experience of collective emotions of fandom and the 
media wrote about those experiences, legitimating them and making them meaningful.  
 Indeed, the World Cup offers this experience of simultaneity on a level unlike any 
other event, even the Olympics, in which the simultaneity of different events divides the 
attention of spectators. In contrast, the World Cup offers only one event at a time, 
concentrating spectator attention at the global scale. There are reminders of the 
simultaneous spectator experience everywhere soccer is appreciated, from the quiet 
streets to the outbursts of sound that unite a city in celebration (or mourning). The public 
viewing experience heightens this experience even further, allowing spectators to 
participate bodily in a multi-sensory experience orchestrated by the action of the sporting 
event. The media captures and disseminates this experience, creating a virtuous circle 
further multiplying the impact, through photos and allusions to jubilant flag bedecked 
crowds. 
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Figure 2 The caption to this photo reads, “Flag sea: Celebrating a goal at North Germany’s biggest fan 
party in Hamburg.ii (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006) 
 
Figure 3 The caption reads, “Black-Red-Gold: Fan party at the “Field of the Holy Spirit” in Hamburgiii 
(“Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006) 
As the FIFA literature affirmed, the public viewings were “very important platforms,” 
providing “80 percent of the non-action related stories” in the media about the World Cup 
(FIFA, 2010). The 2006 World Cup combined the nationally-oriented, mediated 
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experience of watching on television with the massive embodied experience of the public 
viewings, all of which resonated and was amplified by the media coverage of the 
spectatorship.  
Rescuing the Flag from the Past: Young, Safe, Healthy 
 Scholarship on journalism has challenged the common assumption that 
journalism’s role in presenting the news means that in terms of memory work it is only 
involved in writing “the first draft of history” and not the last (Edy, 1999; Lang & Lang, 
1989; Zelizer, 2008). In fact, a great deal of journalism’s work consists of looking back, 
even—and perhaps especially—when reporting on the newest breaking stories. As is 
shown below, in covering the 2006 World Cup, the German media worked on making the 
new soccer patriotism the definitive end of Germany’s long struggle with its identity. 
Subsequent public reflections, particularly around the World Cup tournaments in 2010 
and 2014, demonstrate the success of this narrative. To achieve this, media coverage 
employed a combination of memory and amnesia, of the present and the past. Stories 
emphasized the bounded and idealistic features of sports spectacles, creating a safe space 
for patriotism. Within this safe space, the media rehabilitated national symbols by 
portraying them in association with the positive and universal experience of the sporting 
event, reaffirming their interpretations through the expert opinion of German cultural 
elites. These narratives—thus established and remaining uncontested—were then used as 
symbols to recall and create nostalgia for the event over the following months and years, 
establishing in collective memory a basis for “soccer patriotism” as a new normal mode 
of German national identity.  
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One of the methods they used to accomplish this was to focus on the bounded 
nature of “soccer patriotism,” which, the argument goes, is bound to sports and not to 
politics and more dangerous forms of nationalism. The fact that people are swathing 
themselves in the national colors is ascribed solely to the desire to support the national 
team, which happens to be represented by those colors.  
There’s no need to worry about soccer enthusiasm playing into the hands of right-
wing extremists. On the contrary: carnival costumed soccer fans send the message 
to the world: “Look here, we invite you to the international soccer festival.” 
Tricolored wigs instead of Nazi skinheads” (Biallas, 2006). 
“Not every flag-waver is directly made into a patriot or nationalist,” says Klaus 
Boehnke, Sociologist at the International University of Bremen. The masses do 
not reflect at all on the historical meaning of national symbols. Above all, they are 
carried by momentary euphoria.iv (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006) 
We remember: It was the soccer World Cup and Germany transformed itself for a 
few weeks into a euphoric nation.v (Hoch & Main, 2006) 
Journalists and the experts they cite also assure readers that there is no need to be 
concerned about the long-term effects of soccer patriotism since it is tied to this singular 
event in which Germans are the hosts. Germany will not be able to host again for at least 
25 years. This perspective ignores, however, the fact that these temporary experiences of 
what Durkheim (1995) calls “collective effervescence” serve to transfer these 
transformative emotions to the symbols around which the event evolves. While the event 
is temporary, its impact continues in the revitalization of the normalized significance of 
national membership. In this way, the World Cup provides the aura of neutrality even 
while exercising distinctly partisan behavior.  
The central tool of this quasi-religious connection between the individual and 
national identity is the ubiquitous reference to national symbols, above all “black-red-
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gold,” which achieves the status of fixed phrase. As Geisler writes, “a symbol reduces the 
enormous complexity of communication by using a concrete sign as a kind of shorthand 
for—in our case—a complex of interrelated concepts, ideals, and value systems” 
(Geisler, 2005, p. xxvii). As shown above, the media invoked national symbols in 
conjunction with hyperbolic, quasi-religious ecstasy. In Durkheim’s words, “it is, in fact, 
a well-known law that the feelings a thing arouses in us are spontaneously transmitted to 
the symbol that represents it” (2003, p. 112). Through the experience of participating as a 
spectator in the World Cup—particularly at mass public viewings—the intense positive 
emotions of the experience are fused to the symbols representing the national team being 
supported. The experience of Germans soccer fans temporarily losing their individual 
selves in the totality of the nation through interaction with national symbols was 
described in the German media in hyperbolic terms like “euphoria”, “exultation” or 
“jubilance.”  
Although black-red-gold was never sullied in history, Germans have had a hard 
time with national symbols in the past decades. Now the whole country has been 
baptized in German colors. (“WM-Euphorie,” 2006) 
In a civic religious experience, the German people were said to have been restored, made 
whole again through their embrace of the national colors. The whole nation is portrayed 
as participating in the ritual of renewal and rebirth into a shared national identity, all-the-
while being reassured that these symbols have nothing to do with the shameful past. After 
the fact, the media provided Germans with the shared experience of imagining reliving 
the event, solidifying these symbolic associations and erasing any troubling links to the 
past they might have previously evoked.  
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The World Cup is delimited in time and space, and its patriotic displays are 
characterized as temporary. Journalists affirm that, “like a holiday”, after its passing the 
decorations will disappear back into the closet (Bock, 2006b). This characterization 
resonates with the idea that, in established nations, when nationalism “does irrupt in fever 
pitch, it is often seen as being confined to special occasions, the irruption soon dies 
down; the temperature passes; the flags are rolled up; and, then, it is business as usual" 
(Billig, 1995, p. 5) This language is repeatedly mirrored in World Cup coverage to prove 
that this display of nationalism is contained and is, therefore, safe.  
For the Bielefeld historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the newly discovered self-
awareness of the German fans is no sign of burgeoning nationalism. Rather, sports 
call forth an “Ersatz nationalism… since it operates with national colors and a 
national team.” For Wehler, the rediscovery of the German flag is an 
“extraordinarily ephemeral phenomenon,” a dangerous nationalism will not be 
called forth by it.vi (Todt, 2006). 
Using expert voices, journalists draw stark boundaries around “soccer patriotism,” 
protecting it from the critique it might attract if taken seriously as an issue of cultural and 
social politics. However, the same articles that emphasize the temporary nature of soccer 
patriotism, often characterize it as a fundamental social transformation. Just before 
providing reassurances of its ephemerality, the above article states that “on the streets and 
in the stadiums, the inhibiting shame in dealing with national symbols has apparently 
given way to a relaxed relationship.”vii The reassurances of boundedness are belied by 
articles praising and exhorting the spread of the new national sentiments to other areas of 
life. This spread is repeatedly characterized as evidence of a normal and relaxed 
relationship to national symbols.  
178 
 
This event is made particularly exceptional by the duty of Germans as hosts, 
which implies the expectation of creating an appropriate atmosphere through shows of 
enthusiasm. To begin with, citizens are called upon to participate as a matter of their 
patriotic duty to represent the hospitality and enthusiasm of the nation (see also Chapter 
4). Participating in the act of supporting one’s national team provides a site of large-scale 
solidarity, accentuated by the extra expectations of the role of host country. This 
expectation—evident in the association of flagged celebration with the liveliness and fun 
expected of a party’s host—was emphasized repeatedly in the German media to justify 
and legitimate nationalistic displays, seeking to eliminate the contentiousness of public 
symbolic nationalism in Germany. 
“All of Germany rejoices black-red-gold—and friends from the whole world 
celebrate cheerfully along,” writes [Green Party Faction leader Renate] Künast in 
a guest column for the Bild am Sonntag. The soccer World Cup is a “festival of 
colors, of nations, of people, and black-red-gold is our ID card as guests: come 
here, we’ll show you, how beautiful Germany can be.”viii (“Deutschland in 
Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006) 
The World Cup hysteria is undiminished. And patriotism appears just as strongly 
pronounced in these weeks. Above all, the Germans as hosts of the soccer 
spectacle are showing their flags.ix (Pfeifer, 2006) 
[Young Germans] are already globalized party-goers, and now they are the hosts. 
In this role, they don’t want to be grumpy. During a World Cup, globalization 
also means: the battle of merriment cultures. The Germans are participating in 
force.x (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 76) 
Many journalists enthusiastically declared that the 2006 World Cup finally broke the 
taboo on nationalist celebration. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that, borrowing 
from Marvin and Ingle (1999), hosts used the simulated violence of global sporting 
spectacle to finally restore the taboo obscuring the real violence that constitutes the totem 
secret. 
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The national narrative that developed around the 2006 World Cup began from the 
premise that Germans have long been suffering under the burdens of the national past. 
This burden, the narrative goes, has led to collective self-doubt and a tense relationship 
between citizens and their national identity.  
In Germany, there is always a big “but” when it has to do with Germany. Isn’t 
there too much black-red-gold in the seats and on the screens? Is one allowed to 
sing the German national anthem from the heart?xi (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 70)  
Citizens of the Federal Republic have always had a hard time with flag waving, 
with painted faces, with singing.xii (Schnibben, 2006, p. 84) 
In the discussions of “soccer patriotism” in 2006, journalists frequently hint at a 
generalized feeling of disconnectedness and discontent that was alleviated by the 
tournament, suggesting that Germans had been denied something essential to their 
existence. Most often, the previous lack is indicated by claiming the newness of the 
“relaxed” mobilization of national symbols. Other examples are more explicit: 
International studies confirm that in comparison to other countries, Germans still 
have a poor sense of self-esteem…. A big event like the World Cup, however, 
stokes up community sentiments and is a chance, particularly for young people, to 
identify with the country.xiii  (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006)  
I find the ease new and highly pleasant… you notice how tensely you’ve been 
seeing things for such a long time.xiv (Reif & Drecker, 2006) 
Patriotism is not a luxury, but rather a necessity for survival.xv (Matussek, 2006)  
German identity and German pride are described as being laden with contention and 
discontinuity. At the same time, strength of national identification is equated with good 
self-esteem, and—echoing Arendt’s and Agamben’s observations about the equivalence 
between affiliation with a political community and one’s right to life—is even construed 
as vital for existence.  
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Discussions of the German nation in the corpus are frequently ambivalent, 
oscillating between concrete description of national characteristics or patriotic displays 
and the denial of their coherence or significance. One article, in particular, demonstrates 
the simultaneous claim and denial of national coherence. Describing one of the many 
museum exhibits examining the meaning of German nationhood that appeared around the 
time of the World Cup, this Spiegel feature article lists several national exemplars 
featured in one exhibit: 
There are the German thinkers and poets, the German forest, the German 
Gemütlichkeit (atmosphere of comfort, good cheer), German efficiency, the 
German longing for Italy, and there is Winnetou.xvi (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24) 
Referencing a beloved German character from Karl May’s eighteenth century Western 
novels, the “Apache” Winnetou is a perfect example of the Noble Savage trope—a 
product of the distant European imagination of a prelapsarian human uncorrupted by 
civilization. The figure of Winnetou usurps an idea of Nativeness as a canvas on which to 
project German ideals. 
Winnetou is hands-down the Federal German hero, a paragon of virtue, a nature 
freak, a Romantic, a pacifist in his heart but in a bellicose world, the best warrior, 
agile, trenchantly accurate. Eleven Winnetous, and we would be world champions 
on July 9th.xvii (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24) 
Appropriating the figure of the Noble Savage as a vessel, the author delivers notions of 
self-evident and unimpeachable German ideals. If each member of the team could live up 
to the German ideals embodied in the figure of Winnetou, no nation could defeat them. 
Yet, after declaring these identity concepts, he denies the possibility of a coherent 
German identity. Citing an irresolvable tension, endemic to Germanness, the author 
asserts the necessity of continuous efforts of self-construction:  
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Identity and Germany are contradictory terms. After all, what Germanness meant 
was too long flush with unclear or constantly changing borders and populations. 
After all, the Holocaust is too unwieldy. With [the Holocaust] one cannot 
construct an identity, and without it even less…. in truth, the search is the goal. 
To search for the self, without being able to find oneself—that is German, that is 
also a German form of amusement.xviii (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24) 
The uncertainty about the nature of German national affiliation is an invitation to 
perpetual reflection on the meaning of the nation—a practice that occurs throughout the 
soccer patriotism archive. These examples show how national redefinition discourse 
proceeds by 1) claiming that there is (and perhaps always has been) a crisis of 
identification, 2) defining the national/citizen, and 3) denying the boundaries created by 
the previous redefinition and, thus, defending against critiques of exclusion. Definition 
must take place, just as that definition must be denied to impede the introduction of 
agonistic politics. Its ambiguity maintains the nation at the center of attention. Departing 
from the claim of Germany’s particularly tense relationship to national identity, 
journalists affirm that the soccer patriotism of the World Cup nullifies these tensions—at 
least temporarily. At the same time, they argue that the exceptional nature of the event 
ensures that this release of tension will not turn into a politically dangerous form of 
national excess.  
Stigmatizing Critique 
 Although the coherence, unity, and true patriotism of the soccer revelry were 
often questioned, the normative value of the World Cup and its nationally oriented 
performativity was framed as irreproachable. After all, commentators argued, gloomy 
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and serious deliberations have no obvious place in a sporting event, and thus critical 
discussions were rejected outright as knee-jerk, pessimistic, and generally absurd: 
To reframe the dance in black-red-gold as an expression of the return of 
strengthened national feeling is absurd.xix (Biallas, 2006) 
Professionals consider the critique to be knee-jerk and typical German defeatism. 
“I don’t take it seriously” says Heinz Grüne, executive at Reingold (Cologne), an 
institute for market and media analysis.xx (Bock, 2006a) 
There will not be threatening national pride in Germany anymore, said 
[Bundestag President] Lammert. As such, he rejected criticism of the World Cup 
Euphoria: “The attempt, to declare such healthy patriotism as objectionable 
encourages the activities of deranged rightwing extremists.”xxi (“WM-Euphorie,” 
2006) 
One has long asked himself: “Are we allowed to do this?” Of course, we are 
allowed. We have asked ourselves questions that should not be asked, since this is 
all without question normal. It is really good. Furthermore, the external perception 
is much more relaxed than our own. This all doesn’t mean that now Germany is 
marching again. Whoever interprets what is happening that way is crazy.xxii (Reif 
& Drecker, 2006) 
These last two comments, in particular, reveal the strength of associations of nationalism 
with normality and critique with political extremism of the right and left. The logic of this 
argument claims that by complicating symbolic nationalism, critics alienate “normal” 
citizens and drive them into the arms of the extreme right. Instead, it holds that positive 
feelings of uncomplicated national belonging should be generated at the center of society. 
Nearly half of the selected articles refer to the existence of a “debate” around 
national identity and soccer patriotism, although few of them present actual criticsisms of 
soccer patriotism. After alluding to debates, journalists and their sources condemn “bad” 
forms of nationalism sometimes alluding to the need to remember the Nazi past, while 
building up arguments of the positive value of soccer patriotism. Some commentators 
accept the inevitable presence of the national past, without engaging with the historical 
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connections between sporting spectacle and the symbolic politics of nationalism. In 
discussing concerns about possible xenophobic violence against World Cup visitors, one 
commentator reflects that for the potential victims  
It may not matter whether their health is threatened by a German or by someone 
else, but for Germans the shame and disgrace is incomparable. In this history has, 
and must have, a lasting effect. It need not ruin one’s cheerfulness, but in this 
country one cannot completely get away without consciousness of the Nazi years. 
(Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24) 
Recalling Brandt’s characterization of the tragedy of the Munich Olympics, the harm to 
the reputation and self-esteem of the national population is more significant than the 
impact on the individual. This journalist recognizes the injustice of this, but cannot quite 
bring himself to dig into its more problematic implications for the value of life and death. 
One kind of death has symbolic significance, in that it can harm the national reputation, 
whereas the other would have the same result for the victim but no relevance for the 
national population. The Nazi years, here, stand as a constant threat to the national 
population’s legitimacy and happiness. They are less important for the lessons they offer, 
than for the shadow they cast on the nationally defined realm of politically significant 
life.  
The one clear example of the active vestiges of the leftist political critique from 
the era of the Historikerstreit emerged when leaders of Germany’s largest teachers’ 
union, the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), republished an excerpt 
from Benjamin Ortmeyer’s 1991 critical analysis of the history of Germany’s national 
anthem. This action was mentioned as evidence of resistance in five articles in the 
archive. Their stated goal was to emphasize the continued “need for a deep discussion of 
the history and present of nationalism in Germany” in order to avoid “whitewashing the 
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ever increasing social cleavages in this country and conflating integration with 
assimilation” xxiii  (Ortmeyer, 2006). According to the one article in the corpus that 
specifically examined the state of leftwing criticism in the context of the World Cup, the 
public backlash against the excerpt’s circulation was so harsh that the GEW was forced to 
apologize, stating that the “GEW did not want to spoil the World Cup for fans,” and 
acquiescing that “when young soccer fans sing the national anthem today, they do so out 
of joie de vivre and to support the German team”xxiv (Bilger, Langenau, & Stolzenberg, 
2006). Although the GEW framed their action not as outright condemnation but simply as 
a call to keep discussion of nationalist symbolism alive, the threat it posed to fans’ “joy” 
was cast as egregious. In this schema of biopolitical values, the agonism promoted by 
leftist critique threatens the pleasure of frictionless unity, and must therefore be 
delegitimized. As one journalist observed with bemused approval, even among the 
cultural elite there was hardly a critic left to be found: 
Suddenly, even late returnees (Spätheimkehrer) to patriotism in culture and 
politics discovered their hearts converted to the nation and fought loudly and with 
full physical strength against all forms of politically correct German self-
hatred.xxv (Mohr, 2006) 
The original term used for these converted critics is Spätheimkehrer, which refers to 
German late returnees from prisoner of war camps after the World War II. The use of this 
term, underscores that critics are prisoners of the past and characterizes their turn to 
embracing symbolic nationalism as finally coming home to a normal relationship with the 
nation. The discussion surrounding the World Cup not only excluded critical leftist 
perspectives on the past and present of nationalism, it offered the opportunity to exile 
them to the political margins. 
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The Integrated: Immigrants in the Sea of Flags 
 In 2006, the version of the German nation that was established primarily focused 
on the unity, health, and happiness of normative Germans, which is to say, those without 
apparent foreign heritage. In the corpus examined in this chapter, transnational Germans 
were given little explicit consideration within the schema of this “new German feeling.” 
While the 2006 national team already included several first- and second-generation 
German players, the increasing diversity of the team only became a focus of broader 
attention in 2010 (see Chapter 5). Most often in these commentaries, immigrants appear 
as taxi drivers or merchants who tell journalists that they proudly wave the German flag 
next to their other national flag and express their approval of the new German pride. 
Writing of a conversation about game day preparations with his taxi driver from Ghana, 
one journalist relays, 
His worst fear for this day: that he wouldn’t be able to get a hold of a German flag 
for the big party that evening. He wants to put it up on the roof next to the 
Ghanaian flag.xxvi (Mohr, 2006) 
In another article, the journalist talks to an immigrant flag salesman about his feelings on 
regarding the flag-draped celebrations: 
Salim Hadij stands before a stall on the Fan Mile and takes a flag out of its holder. 
He is happy that the relationship of Germans to national symbols is becoming less 
uptight. With his praise, the German-Algerian is not entirely disinterested. He 
runs a wholesale business in Charlottenburg with fan items and is pleased with 
torrential sales. “Germans want to be proud of their country too,” says Hadij, “as 
they must be.”xxvii (Todt, 2006) 
Transnational and non-normative Germans’ approval of World Cup flag celebrations 
supports the idea that soccer patriotism is universally acceptable and not exclusionary. 
This universal approval removes the nation and its symbolism from the realm of politics 
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and recasts it as a source of happiness and unity—temporarily transforming even 
integrant strangers who worship the flag into unambiguous friends, to use Baumann’s 
terms (1990). 
It was a festival of youth—without a heavy ideological superstructure. Germany 
had the world as its guest and the Germans recognized that they were far more 
multicultural and international than they and others realized. That’s why it was so 
easy to hang a German flag from the balcony: for the first time in the history of 
the Federal Republic black-red-gold did not represent any political claims—like it 
still did in 1989—rather it was the national symbolic colors of good humor. If 
there is going to be patriotism, then let it be this kind! And if the German flag is 
being hung all over the country in Turkish and Arab shops and businesses, then 
integration is perhaps not in such bad shape, as many politicians wanted us to 
believe before the World Cup.xxviii (Malzahn, 2006) 
Even temporarily, this transformation of stranger into member threatens more radical 
nationalists who hold more explicitly racist criteria for belonging.  This fact also serves to 
bolster the credentials of soccer patriotism as a force for good. The irritation of the far-
right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands) with the soccer patriotism and the participation of non-white players on 
the national team was raised as proof that the World Cup nationalism runs contrary to 
exclusionary and violent forms.  
The NPD ideologue Gansel, deeply disappointed with his people, concludes in a 
disgustingly racist but otherwise exactly correct way: 
“Soccer patriotism integrates, in fact, everyone whose knowledge of German 
makes him capable of acquiring black-red-gold cloth from some migrant 
merchant. What the parade of blacks in the white [jerseys] of the national eleven 
demonstrates, works equally on the dancing streets. Here even negroes become 
German patriots.”  
We have come so far. Nazis hate a cheerful, cosmopolitan patriotism like the 
devil hates holy water.xxix (Mohr, 2006) 
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German patriotism, which is equated in the last quote to a Christian sacrament, is 
portrayed as acceptable to and accepting of difference, unlike xenophobic right-wing 
nationalism that despises party patriotism because of its inclusivity. Although immigrants 
and minorities play a smaller part in 2006 than they come to play in 2010 and beyond, 
they appear already here at the constitutive margins of German soccer patriotism. 
The conditionality of the kinds of belonging granted by soccer patriotism is erased 
through comparison with the staunch ethnic nationalism of the NPD and the far-right 
generally. However, the provisional nature of belonging appears amid the multicultural 
national celebration as well. One Spiegel feature article, titled “The Integrated” (Die 
Integrierten) (Supp, 2006), that was published mid-way through the tournament, assesses 
the progress of Muslim Germans towards integration (figure 5). The appraisal situates 
itself in the context of immigrant participation in soccer patriotism, observing that—
“Berlin Turks in Black-Red-Gold, Germany flags on migrant cars—after five decades of 
immigration the gaze focuses on those new citizens who have found a Heimat in this 
country and who have not remained foreignersxxx (Supp, 2006, p. 58). Although the 
article claims to examine those who have “successfully integrated,” it is at least as much 
about providing examples of those who had the possibility to integrate, but chose not to. 
The article also presents the postwar history of migration and the myth, shared by 
Germans and Turkish guest workers alike, that the invited workers would someday return 
“home.”  
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Figure 4: This photo is placed above the article’s title, juxtaposing women wearing headscarves—a symbol 
of Muslim difference fetishized in the German public sphere—with the unifying symbolism of the German 
flag, implicitly asking whether these two symbols may function coherently together. (Supp, 2006)  
The stories of four immigrants of different generations are interwoven with the 
history of German migration policy. Two of those featured made their living 
portraying the dysfunction of Turkish-German society. The Turkish-born author 
Saliha Scheinhardt,  
Wrote about things that were true; she knew about the tradition of violence, the 
archaic-patriarchal power structures in parts of immigrant society; she knew about 
forced marriage, domestic violence, about the oppression of Turkish women. She 
was one of the first to tell about it.xxxi (Supp, 2006, p. 60) 
The article holds up Scheinhardt as an example of “integration” through her choice to 
leave the violence of the anti-modern Turkish society behind to embrace, in 
Scheinhardt’s words, the “freedom” of the “heavenly” German society. Similarly, Oktay 
Özdemir, an actor who debuted in the role of violent young gangster in the 2006 film, 
“Tough Enough” (Knallhart), affirms that “there is too little integration” among Turkish-
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German youth. He tells of his own difficult childhood on the streets. The article claims 
that this is not the exception, but normality. 
The adolescents, who experience violence as normality, at home in the gang. The 
13-year-old with drugs in his pocket, who looks for his role models in the tough 
scene, and naturally these role models exist in the neighborhood. Ghetto-German, 
that is their language. Ghetto-pride—that is the attitude on the street, at school. 
(Supp, 2006, p. 62). 
 In this article, Turkishness is defined as violent, patriarchal, and anti-modern. This 
statement casts the values and even the speech of these internal Others as fundamentally 
different, incomprehensible and antithetical to German social norms. As anthropologist 
Ghassan Hage observes (Hage, 2003), in a post-9/11 world, sociological explanations of 
problems ranging from criminality to terrorism have been displaced by the demand for 
unqualified condemnation. This is particularly true when the transgressions are 
considered endemic to non-Western or minoritized groups. In this “war-mentality” the 
ambiguous, humanized subject that emerges from a grounded and rigorous attempt to 
understand the Other presents a constant threat to order.  
Here, Turkish-Germans have a choice to either condemn this litany of anti-
modern traits and “choose the way into German society” or they can choose “another 
way,” as the final example of (refused) integration shows. The last example is Hülya 
Kandemir, who “was a musician with dreadlocks and a guitar and led a Western life, but 
[her brother] Mesut admonished her and she listened” (Supp, 2006, p. 62). She gave up 
her dreadlocks, which here stand as a sign of her adoption of a Western youth culture that 
borrows freely from other global counter-cultures, and chose the illiberal subservience of 
the headscarf and marriage to a strictly religious man. This parable illustrates the German 
fear of social disintegration through multiculturalism. It also affirms the impermanence of 
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integration. Integration is not the freedom to choose, with full knowledge and experience 
of one’s options, between different styles of life, but is instead the choice of the correct 
liberal German values. This article, which is not about the World Cup or soccer 
nationalism, appears in the middle of the tournament and is introduced by the implicit 
question of what it means when “Turks” wave German flags. It fits within the project of 
national narration that ran through coverage of the 2006 World Cup, affirming the 
boundaries of Germanness while entertaining the possibility of transnational difference 
within it. The role of transnational citizens in legitimating symbolic nationalism is hinted 
at in 2006, as the media campaign examined in Chapter 4 shows. However, as the case 
study in Chapter 5 demonstrates, by 2010 this role took center stage.   
Conclusion 
 Of the articles in the “soccer patriotism” corpus, one stands out as encapsulating 
the process of constructing patriotism above reproach, not because of its distinctiveness, 
but instead by its use of so many of the techniques and arguments leveraged throughout 
the corpus for this chapter. “Man, Woman, and Child Wear Black-Red-Gold” (Bock & 
Reuther, 2006) opens by enumerating some of the many consumer items that have been 
branded by the national colors: from bratwurst packages to thong underwear. The 
German national colors are ubiquitous like never before as “the national hosts display 
their flags.” How could a symbol attached to things as ridiculous as skimpy underwear 
and sausages pose any sort of threat? The article continues by listing examples from the 
many books being published to “teach Germans somewhat more self-love,” suggesting 
that lack of patriotism is a disorder that calls for an intervention.  
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In case the reader is wary of national symbols and their connection to the past, the 
authors explain the history of the national colors dating back to the supposed colors of 
uniforms of the Prussian Free Corps that fought the French in 1813. This story reminds 
readers of the liberal origins of the colors and of their freedom from implication in the 
“Nazi reign of terror.” The implication of this historical account is that since today’s 
German colors were not involved in past nationalist crimes, they should no longer be 
subject to critical interrogation based on the memory of nationalist excesses. The article 
evokes a memory of the past centered on the expulsion of the hereditary enemy and the 
desire for the union of the nation expressed in the failed 1948 revolution. Finally, it 
evokes the continuation of the legacy of shared German history reflected in the common 
characteristic of Prussian virtue. The article concludes with a tongue-in-cheek assurance 
for those who wonder, “in the style of Wilhelmenic obedience,” if it is even permitted to 
hang a flag from one’s balcony, that it is fine so long as it is not so large as to obstruct the 
view of others.  
Just as pointed as the article’s words, the images accompanying the piece drive 
home the message of the positive impacts of the public expression of national pride. The 
photographs are powerfully affective: a heterosexual couple clothed in the national colors 
kissing beneath a flag unfurling in the breeze (figure 6), a sleeping baby with a tiny flag 
on her tiny shirt (figure 7), and a young man asleep on a bench with a large flag clutched 
loosely in his hand—he is all tuckered out since, as the caption explains, “national pride 
can be tiring” (Bock & Reuther, 2006).  
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Figure 5: Representing the reproductive power of the national flag. The caption reads: “one German flag, 
two bottles of beer—and then the man comes closer to the womanxxxii (Bock & Reuther, 2006)   
 
The images represent the paradigm of peaceful normality, all courtesy of the comfort of a 
“natural” relationship to national pride. This article provides a historical trajectory for the 
flag that is free from tension while establishing the roots of present day Germany in a 
shared past. It also centers the flag within the reproduction of Germany, in this case quite 
literally. The flag provides cover and the affective spark for the couple’s intercourse and 
adorns the baby that results from its successful completion.  
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Figure 6: This German Press Agency (DPA) image was used in multiple articles in this chapter’s corpus.  
The World Cup provided journalists with the opportunity to craft new narratives 
around national symbols. Through repetitive language and imagery, journalists created 
collective memory of the World Cup even as they reported on the events as they 
unfolded. By the end of the World Cup, journalists had firmly established a recognizable 
narrative signified by terms like “soccer patriotism” that are invoked to recall the 
“Summer Fairytale” (Sommermärchen)16 that was the 2006 World Cup. The World Cup 
offered the ultimate public plebiscite on a massive level, affirming the desire of the 
                                                          
 
 
 
16 This term, heavily used by journalists, was coined as the title of a documentary film portraying the 
German national team’s preparations for the World Cup and following them through to their third-place 
finish and the following celebrations. The title, Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen refers to Heinrich 
Heine’s work Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen, a satirical and critical piece that also includes naturalized 
patriotic elements.  
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nation to unite as a collective. Two features are important here: the event created the 
opportunity to collect a vast public archive—visual, textual, and auditory—of public 
consent through media coverage, photos, and even a documentary film. In addition, the 
commitment to the new practices of national pride are built around a reoccurring event; 
the World Cup every four years, interspersed with the smaller scale Euro Cup, offers a 
new opportunity every two years to remember the 2006 tournament and keep the new 
traditions alive. During the 2006 World Cup, the media re-wrote German national 
identity around the practices of “soccer patriotism,” using it to restore the collective 
amnesia that obscures the brutality at the foundations of national cohesion.  
 The forms of public nationalism embraced in Germany during the 2006 World 
Cup are by no means unique to Germany. As was repeatedly noted in the articles I 
examined, the practice of banal nationalism is widespread and generally unquestioned 
outside of Germany. Furthermore, the individual interpretation of the experience of 
joining in the collective practice of acting as a fan of one’s national team may diverge 
sharply from the most common mediated interpretations. This is illustrated by one 
Spiegel Online article published following Germany’s 2014 World Cup win. It featured 
the responses of ten young people to a popular question in the German media: “are you 
proud to be German?” (“Deutschland ist Weltmeister,” 2014). The responses varied 
greatly, from those who identified fully with the national team and felt personal 
ownership for the German win to those who supported the team but disavowed 
generalized national pride. Unlike many of the articles in the 2006 corpus, this article 
does not build up skepticism of generalized national pride as a straw man or as 
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depressive, self-loathing. Skeptical respondents push back against external interpretations 
of the excitement and jubilation of fans. Of the World Cup, one fan responded, 
I joined in the fever too, watched every game, sweated, screamed, laughed. But I 
do that at concerts too. I’m not proud there either, I don’t feel responsible there 
either if a band’s album lands at the top of the charts.xxxiii (“Deutschland ist 
Weltmeister,” 2014) 
This analogy uses two collective events that inspire similar actions and feelings among 
fans to caution outside observers who seek to interpret the national meaning of World 
Cup celebration. At the same time, this response points to the fallacy of nationalist 
interpretations that extend the successes of exceptional individuals to the entire national 
population. For other respondents, this symbolic extension was meaningful, and they felt 
varying degrees of personal ownership over the German team’s victory. Contrary to the 
media framing that suggests that skepticism or ambivalence around nationalism emerges 
from oppressive guilt over the past, Germany’s national past does not appear as a factor 
in these responses. Instead, responses emerge from distinct political positions on the 
constitution and symbolism defining a national collective, positions that echo those 
proposed in the Historikerstreit, only without specific reference to the past. For some, the 
investment in symbolic nationalism is a meaningful and positive form of collective 
engagement; for others, collectivity emerges from specific institutions and forms of 
engagement. This unusual article suggests that the politics of fandom are far more 
complicated than the media portrayal generally suggests. The next chapter addresses the 
investment of the German media in the symbolic nationalism of the World Cup, and asks 
what kind of Germany it sought to produce.   
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In 2006, journalists argued for the right to establish a public form of patriotism 
unburdened by reflexivity as is practiced in other established nation-states. As can be 
seen in the United States, however, in elevating the celebration of national symbols, the 
work of democracy can fall by the wayside. In the United States, Lauren Berlant argued 
that “the national knowledge industry has produced a specific modality of paramnesia, an 
incitement to forgetting that leaves simply the patriotic trace, for real and metaphorically 
infantilized citizens, that confirms that the nation exists and we are in it” (1997, p. 50). 
This substitution of the symbol (national colors) for the thing (democratic processes) 
inhibits critical processes. During the 2006 World Cup, Germans could relegate to a 
distant past the lessons of the Berlin Olympics, which show how no patriotism, and 
certainly not sports patriotism should be exempt from scrutiny. 
Soccer patriotism and other forms of banal nationalism are a normalized part of 
contemporary life in countries worldwide. However, to explicitly deny the connection 
between sports and nationalism requires Germans to forget the symbolic significance of 
the 1936 Olympics as the international coming out party of National Socialism. 
Awareness of this memory is sometimes evident in traces of defensive discomfort in the 
coverage of the 2006 World Cup, but substantive engagement with the traumatizing past 
is explicitly avoided. This amnesia indicates the demise of the collective memory of the 
Berlin Olympics, and a relegation of the event into the annals of a history lived by 
“others.” The 2006 World Cup allowed Germans to reorient the collective memory of 
public displays of national enthusiasm away from the displays of the traumatic past and 
to build them instead around the purportedly apolitical, inclusive, and heroic global 
sporting spectacle. As the media made clear, “our” German patriotism has nothing to do 
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with “their” German nationalism. During the 2006 World Cup, the past “went away,” 
emancipating national symbols and placing patriotism in Germany above reproach. The 
next chapter analyzes efforts by politicians and the media industry to lay the groundwork 
for the patriotic revival of the 2006 tournament. It examines a massive marketing 
campaign organized by the major players in the German media industry with the stated 
goal of improving the national mood and stimulating a new national feeling in advance of 
the 2006 World Cup.  
                                                          
 
 
 
i Das Geheimnis des Fänchenerfolgs ist: Jede Gegenwehr wirkte schnell unentspannt, wo wir jetzt so super 
locker drauf sind. 
ii Fahnenmeer: Torjubel auf Norddeutschlands größter Fanparty in Hamburg 
iii Schwartz-Rot-Gold: Fanparty auf dem "Heiligengeistfeld" in Hamburg 
iv «Nicht jeder Fahnenschwenker wird gleich zum Patrioten oder Nationalisten», sagt Klaus Boehnke, 
Sozialwissenschaftler an der International University Bremen. Die große Masse mache sich über die 
historische Bedeutung der nationalen Symbole gar keine Gedanken. Sie werde vor allem durch 
momentane Euphorie getragen. 
v Wir erinnern uns: Es war Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft und Deutschland verwandelte sich für ein paar 
Wochen in eine euphorische Nation. 
vi Für den Bielefelder Historiker Hans-Ulrich Wehler ist das neuentdeckt Selbstbewusstsein der deutschen 
Fans kein Zeichen für aufkeimenden Nationalismus. Der Sport rufe vielmehr einen 
"Ersatznationalismus" hervor, "weil er mit Nationalfarben und einer Nationalmannschaft operiert." Für 
Wehler ist die Wiederentdeckung der deutschlandflagge ein "außerordentlich flüchtiges Phänomen", ein 
gefährlicher Nationalismus werde dadurch nicht hervorgerufen. 
vii Auf der Straße und in den Stadien ist die verdruckste Scham im Umgang mit nationalen Symbolen 
offenbar einem unverkrampften Verhältnis gewichen. 
viii „Ganz Deutschland jubelt schwarzrotgold—und Freunde aus aller Welt feiern fröhlich mit“, schreibt 
[Grünen Fraktionschefin Renate] Künast in einem Gastbeitrag für „Bild am Sonntag“. Die Fußball-WM 
sei ein „Fest der Farben, der Nationen, der Menschen, und Schwarzrotgold ist unser Ausweis als 
Gastgeber: Kommt her, wir zeigen euch, wie schön Deutschland sein kann“. 
ix Die WM-Hysterie ist ungebrochen. Und ebenso stark scheint in diesen Wochen der Patriotismus 
ausgeprägt. Vor allem die Deutschen als Gastgeber des Fußball-Spektakels zeigen Flagge. 
x [Junge deutschen] sind längst globalisierte Partygänger, und jetzt sind sie die Gastgeber. Da wollen sie 
nicht griesgrämig sein. Während einer WM heißt Globalisierung auch: Wettstreit der Heiterkeitskulturen. 
Die Deutschen machen kräftig mit. 
xi In Deutschland gibt es immer ein großes „aber“, wenn es um Deutschland geht. Ist das nicht schon zu viel 
Schwarzrotgold auf den Plätzen und Bildschirmen? Darf man das Deutschlandlied inbrünstigsingen? 
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xii Die Bundesdeutschen haben sich immer schwergetan mit dem Fahnenschwenken, mit dem Schminken, 
mit dem Singen. 
xiii Internationale Studien bescheinigen den Deutschen im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern immer noch ein 
schlechtes Selbstwertgefühl…. Ein Großereignis wie die Weltmeisterschaft schüre aber das 
Gemeinschaftsgefühl und sei gerade für junge Menschen eine Chance, sich mit dem Land zu 
identifizieren. 
xiv Die Unverkrampftheit finde ich neu und höchst erfreulich…. Man merkt, wie verkrampft man selber die 
Dinge lange Zeit gesehen hat. 
xv  Patriotismus ist kein Luxus, sondern eine Überlebens-Notwendigkeit. 
xvi Da gibt es die deutschen Dichter und Denker, den deutschen Wald, die deutsche Gemütlichkeit, die 
deutsche Effizienz, die deutsche Sehnsucht nach Italien, und es gibt Winnetou. 
xvii Winnetou ist der bundesdeutsche Held schlechthin, ein Tugendbold, ein Naturfreak, ein Romantiker, ein 
Pazifist im Herzen, aber in einer kriegerischen Welt der beste Krieger, flink, stark treffsicher. Elf 
Winnetous, und wir würden am 9. Juli Weltmeister. 
xviii Identität und Deutschland sind Widersprüche. Dafür war das, was Deutsch hieß, zu lange Reich mit 
unbestimmten oder ständig veränderten Grenzen und Bevölkerungen. Dafür ist der Holocaust zu sperrig. 
Man kann sich mit ihm nicht in einer Identität einrichten, schon gar nicht ohne ihn.... In Wahrheit ist die 
Suche das Ziel. Sich suchen, ohne sich finden zu können—das ist deutsch, das ist auch ein deutsches 
Vergnügen. 
xix Von dem Reigen in Schwarz-Rot-Gold den Ausdruck eines wieder erstarkten Nationalgefühls 
abzuleiten, ist absurd. 
xx Fachleute halten die Kritik für typisch deutsche Miesmacherei und reflexhaft. «Das nehme ich nicht 
ernst», sagt beispielsweise Heinz Grüne, Geschäftsführer von Rheingold (Köln), einem Institut für 
Markt- und Medienanalysen. 
xxi Dröhnenden Nationalstolz werde es in Deutschland nicht mehr geben, sagte Lammert. Deshalb wies er 
Kritik an der WM-Euphorie zurück: «Der Versuch, einen solchen gesunden Patriotismus für anstößig zu 
erklären, begünstigt die Aktivitäten der rechtsextrem Verwirrten». 
xxii Lange hat man sich gefragt: "Dürfen wir das?" Natürlich dürfen wir. Wir haben uns Fragen gestellt, die 
nicht zu stellen sind. Nun ist das alles fraglos normal. Das ist richtig gut. Zudem ist die 
Außenwahrnehmung sehr viel entspannter als unsere eigene. Das alles bedeutet ja nicht: Jetzt marschiert 
Deutschland wieder. Wer das, was geschieht, dennoch so empfindet, der hat einen Vogel. 
xxiii “Die Notwendigkeit einer tiefgehenden Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte und Gegenwart des 
Nationalismus in Deutschland.… Nationalismus, der die immer größer werdende soziale Kluft in diesem 
Land übertünchen soll und Integration mit Assimilation verwechselt.” 
xxiv Die GEW wolle nicht „den Fans die Fußball-WM vermiesen… Wenn heute junge Fußballfans die 
Nationalhymne singen, tun sie das aus Lebensfreude und zur Unterstützung der deutschen Mannschaft.“ 
xxv Plötzlich entdecken auch patriotische Spätheimkehrer aus Kultur und Politik ihr Konvertitenherz für die 
Nation und kämpfen lautstark und mit vollem Körpereinsatz gegen jede Spielart des politisch korrekten 
deutschen Selbsthasses. 
xxvi Seine schlimmste Befürchtung für diesen Tag: Dass er für die große Party heute Abend keine 
Deutschland-Fahne mehr auftreiben kann. Die will er sich neben der von Ghana ans Dach stecken. 
xxvii Salim Hadij steht vor einem Verkaufsstand auf der Fanmeile und nimmt eine Fahne aus der Halterung. 
Er freut sich darüber, dass das Verhältnis der Deutschen zu nationalen Symbolen unverkrampfter wird. 
Der Deutsch-Algerier ist mit seinem Lob allerdings nicht ganz uneigennützig. Er betreibt in 
Charlottenburg einen Großhandel mit Fanartikeln und freut sich überreißende Absätze. "Auch die 
Deutschen wollen stolz sein auf ihr Land", so Hadij, "das muss doch auch so sein." 
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xxviii Es war ein Festival der Jugend—ohne bleiernen ideologischen Überbau. Deutschland hatte die Welt zu 
Gast und die Deutschen erkannten, dass sie selbst längst viel multikultureller und internationaler sind, als 
sie von sich und andere über sie annahmen. Deswegen fiel es so leicht, eine deutsche Flagge am Balkon 
zu hissen: Schwarz-rot-gold repräsentierte zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik keinen 
politischen Anspruch—wie auch noch 1989—sondern war das nationale Farbensymbol guter Stimmung. 
Wenn schon Patriotismus, dann diesen! Und wenn die deutsche Flagge inzwischen auch landauf landab 
in türkischen und arabischen Lokalen und Geschäften gehisst wird, dann kann es um die Integration 
vielleicht doch nicht so schlecht bestellt sein, wie so manche Politiker vor der WM noch glauben machen 
wollten. 
xxix Der von seinem Volk zutiefst enttäuschte NPD-Ideologe Gansel schlussfolgert ekelhaft rassistisch, aber 
sonst ganz richtig: "Der Fußball-Patriotismus integriert in der Tat jeden, dessen Deutschkenntnisse ihn 
dazu befähigen, bei irgendeinem Migranten ein schwarzrotgoldenes Tuch zu erwerben. Was mit der 
Schwarzenparade im Weiß der Nationalelf vorexerziert wird, klappt auf der tanzenden Straße sowieso. 
Hier werden selbst Neger zu deutschen Patrioten." So weit also haben wir es gebracht. Nazis hassen 
einen fröhlichen weltoffenen Patriotismus wie der Teufel das Weihwasser.  
xxx Berliner Türken in Schwarz-Rot-Gold, an Autos von Migranten Deutschland-Fähnchen—nach fünf 
Jahrzehnten Einwanderung richtet sich der Blick auf diejenigen Neubürger, die in diesem Land eine 
Heimat gefunden haben und nicht Fremde geblieben sind. 
xxxi Schrieb über Dinge, die Wirklichkeit waren, sie wusste um die Gewalttradition, die archaisch-
patriarchalischen Machtstrukturen in Teilen der Einwanderergesellschaft, wusste um Zwangsehen, 
Familiengewalt, um die Unterdrückung türkischer Frauen. 
xxxii Eine Deutsche Fahne, zwei Flaschen Bier—und schon kommt Mann der Frau näher. 
xxxiii Auch ich habe mitgefiebert, jedes Spiel geschaut, geschwitzt, geschrien, gelacht. Aber das mache ich 
auch auf Konzerten. Da bin ich auch nicht stolz, da fühle ich mich auch nicht verantwortlich, wenn eine 
Band mit ihrem Album auf Platz eins der Charts landet. 
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CHAPTER 4 – SELLING THE NATION ON ITSELF: THE MEDIA, SYMBOLIC 
POWER, AND GLOBAL SPORTS SPECTACLE 
 
If you were watching television in Germany on the evening of Tuesday, 
September 26, 2005 you most likely saw, nearly simultaneously with 17 million others, a 
two-minute commercial featuring in quick succession over 30 prominent Germans 
interspersed with “everyday citizens.” The uncommonly long ad is a whirlwind of faces, 
places and phrases, moving at a brisk pace. The message of the ad is that “You Are 
Germany” (Du bist Deutschland). Breaking the third wall, this ad crossed into the private 
sphere and invited citizens into the collective fold via an empowering narrative of 
national identification. The campaign juxtaposes the grandiose with the infinitesimal, the 
obviously significant with the seemingly insignificant, the celebrity with the unnamed 
citizen, Germany with “you.” It collapses the categories of individual and society, 
arguing that although no one knows who “you” are, you are equally responsible for the 
success of the nation as its most prominent members. This, the campaign claims, will cut 
through the pessimism that is preventing Germany from reaching its fullest potential as a 
nation and motivate citizens to “take their foot off the break” and fuel the nation’s 
growth. The campaign confirms that with this identity comes the responsibility to be a 
productive part of the national economy. Serving as the keystone of the effort to prepare 
Germany and Germans to host the men’s 2006 FIFA World Cup, this campaign reveals 
essential aspects of the assemblage of political and economic interests mobilized by 
global sports spectacles.  It serves, thus, as a locus through which to examine the 
dialectical relationship between the nation-making and global-marketing capacity of sport 
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as well as broader developments in political and economic approaches to national 
identification. 
Building on the analysis of the new forms of nationalist practice outlined in 
Chapter 3, this chapter investigates the investment of media industries in promoting an 
affectively charged and uniform nationalism. To do so, it traces the form and function of 
the unprecedented social marketing and nation branding campaigns leading up to the 
2006 World Cup in Germany. The examples in this chapter further elucidate the 
connections between the personal and affective politics outlined in Chapter 1 and the 
pragmatic and utilitarian metrics of social citizenship outlined in Chapter 2. The social 
marketing campaigns that began in 2005 demonstrate a new approach to nation building 
that accommodates and even promotes visible forms of difference within the population 
while constructing new qualifications for citizenship according to the individual’s 
contribution to the wellbeing and life of the national population. Specifically, this chapter 
focuses on the Du bist Deutschland (DbD) campaign, the centerpiece of the marketing 
effort, which had the stated goal of empowering and lifting the moods of Germans. The 
investment of media institutions in these marketing campaigns cannot be explained in 
terms of the usual quid pro quo relationship cultivated by the promoter of a product and 
the consumer. Even in the realm of social marketing campaigns, which focus on raising 
awareness of and support for issues such as environmental protection and public health, 
the “mood-boosting” German campaign is an outlier. Although the campaign raised 
lively discussions in the German press, with a few exceptions it garnered remarkably 
little attention from scholars, generally receiving little more than anecdotal treatment.  
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This chapter examines how political and industrial stakeholders leveraged the 
liminality of the mega sports event to normalize banal nationalism and promote a new 
form of national identity more suited to a globalized economy. Understanding the 
purpose and function of the campaign requires an examination of the political, social and 
historical framework within which it operates. After outlining the historical context, the 
second section consists of a textual and critical discourse analysis of the two-minute 
advertisement that formed the core of the first iteration of the campaign in 2005. The 
campaign denounces a critical stance towards public affairs and towards the nation.  
Instead, it promotes national membership based on the productivity of citizens and their 
willingness to support the nation. This allows for the inclusion of migrants and Germans 
of color so long as they are productive members of society. At the same time, by making 
belonging a result of personal engagement, the campaign suppresses questions of 
hierarchies and power relations between different groups, both cultural and socio-
economic. In addition to the campaign’s advertisements, this chapter concludes with an 
analysis of press articles written on the campaign in the top national periodicals (see 
Introduction).17 A search for the terms “Du bist Deutschland” AND “Kampagne” 
(campaign) returned 124 relevant results. After examining these articles, I noticed that a 
distinct subsection of articles focused on the campaign creators and stakeholders, clearly 
                                                          
 
 
 
17 This corpus does not include articles from the Bild, which does not maintain comprehensive electronic 
archives. The archive search on the Bild website did not return any relevant results for the search terms 
used in this chapter. 
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articulating their public explanation of the campaign’s intended purpose and meaning. 
These carefully crafted messages convey a distinct ethic and set of ideals for German 
society. To focus more deeply on this perspective, I selected the articles that focused on 
the campaign’s creators and industry supporters. The resulting corpus of 29 articles 
includes media industry analysis and interviews with campaign creators to provide 
insight into the campaign’s stated goals as well as a range of journalistic perspectives on 
the campaign’s political and social implications. I coded these articles using grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to determine the predominant themes and their 
relationships. 
Table 3: Search Results from “Du bist Deutschland” AND Kampagne 
Sources All Results 
 Selected  
(Stakeholder- Focused) 
Focus 7 0 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 9 5 
Der Spiegel 13 3 
Spiegel Online (SPON) 13 0 
Die Süddeutsche Zeitung 18 6 
Stern 5 1 
Die Tageszeitung 18 4 
Die Welt 19 6 
Die Zeit 23 4 
Total 124 29 
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This analysis focuses on the advertisements themselves as the primary texts, and 
considers the paratextual role of journalistic coverage. This campaign reveals the strategy 
and motivations that undergird the media industry’s investment in national pride and its 
role in the economics of global sports spectacles.  
“World Champions of the Heart”18: Branding the Host 
In the fall of 2005, the Du bist Deutschland campaign seemed to come out of 
nowhere; its development and the actors who created it were largely unknown (Speth, 
2006). The partnership that produced the campaign included nearly all major German 
media companies, and yet there was very little advanced discussion of the campaign in 
the press. In the larger corpus of 124 articles, only 6 were written before the campaign’s 
debut. These and subsequent articles and provide very little insight into the material 
motivations of the campaign’s creators and stakeholders. Instead, they cite the affective 
goal of improving the national “mood” (Stimmung). Understanding the strategies that 
motivated the campaign requires looking back to broader political and economic 
developments in Germany around the turn of the millennium. During a period of 
economic deregulation and labor market liberalization, social marketing campaigns like 
                                                          
 
 
 
18 This slogan appeared in 2004, but it gained traction in the media and among the public during the 
tournament, both to celebrate the goodwill generated by the successful tournament and to cushion the 
disappointment of not taking home the World Cup trophy. It is still referenced today.  
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DbD communicated a new social vision for Germany that values self-reliance and an 
optimistic and agreeable stance toward the nation-state. 
Although the postwar German economy has traditionally been regarded as a 
paradigm of socially conscious and constrained capitalism based on the idea of the social 
market economy (sozialer Marktwirtschaft), since reunification in the 1990s, the German 
economy has become increasingly liberal (Menz, 2010). The most radical of recent 
liberal reforms, collectively called Agenda 2010, were implemented under the leadership 
of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats beginning in 2003. These 
reforms were enacted to address the period of slow economic growth and rising 
unemployment that followed German reunification in the 1990s. In the first two years 
after reunification, the GDP in the Eastern states collapsed by a third (Hunt, 2006, p. 2).  
Restructuring and incorporating the “new states” from the former GDR involved the 
largest transfer of wealth in economic history (Streeck, 1997). In order to finance the 
costs of reunification, the government raised taxes in the 1990s and, even with new tax 
income, debt increased from 41.8% of GDP in 1989 to 64.2% in 2003 (Hunt, 2006, p. 9). 
Even before reunification, the high-wage West German economy had been suffering from 
growing unemployment and concerns about the capacity of German industry to develop 
innovation and maintain control in the high-end markets (Streeck, 1997). By the early 
2000s Germany’s financial outlook was grim enough that the liberal periodical The 
Economist dubbed it “the sick man of Europe” (Minton Beddoes, 2013). Strong 
protections for workers, high wages, and generous welfare provisions made the German 
labor market more expensive than in neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Slow 
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growth and rising unemployment supported arguments by industry leaders to enact 
reforms to lessen the labor market protections of the social market economy approach.  
As part of the effort to convince political leaders to enact reforms to liberalize 
Germany’s economy, industrial groups began to develop new communicative approaches 
to influence policy and public discourse. Rudolf Speth (2004, 2006) followed the 
development of these new lobbying strategies during the Schröder government, tying 
them to a fundamental shift in the German political and industrial organization. Whereas 
West German industry had long been characterized by high levels of coordinated 
“organization, concentration, and centralization,” with the government playing an active 
role in making sure the markets addressed social imperatives (Zysman, 1983, p. 252), the 
established means of coordination and communication between government and industry 
began to shift in the 1990s. While traditional trade unions weakened, businesses became 
more independent. At the same time, the public relations sector was also becoming more 
professionalized (Speth, 2006). Public relations agencies saw opportunities in working 
with industry groups to influence public and political communication using modern 
marketing techniques to establish “discursive sovereignty using economic research 
expertise in conjunction with the media” (Speth, 2006, p. 9). Speth shows that campaigns 
and initiatives developed by industry groups proliferated in the first years of the new 
millennium, successfully winning political advocates for economic reform. However, the 
abandonment of the social contract that had long governed German capitalism was not 
popular among the public. 
Halfway through his second term as chancellor, Schröder’s attempts at 
implementing reforms through consensus between business and labor interests had 
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yielded paltry results (Camerra-Rowe, 2004). As unemployment spiked and their 
electoral advantage began to slip away in 2002, political leaders of the ruling Social 
Democrats came under increasing pressure to implement reforms to address the long-
term economic slump and to sell those reforms to an economically distressed population. 
In 2003, Schröder announced the Agenda 2010 reforms as well as plans to initiate an 
“innovation offensive” the following year (“Sick man walking,” 2003). In January 2004, 
Chancellor Schröder convened an “Innovation Conference,” bringing together leaders of 
industry and research to forge a plan to promote German industry and research 
(“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). At the January meeting, Schröder announced his intention to 
form a “Partnership for Innovation” between leaders in the private and public sectors 
(“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). Six months after this initial 
meeting, the “Partners for Innovation” agreed upon a mission statement committing to 
“work together for a new culture of innovation in Germany” (“Partner für Innovation - 
Mission,” n.d.). The initiative included industrial giants such as BASF, Deutsche 
Telekom, and Siemens as well as think tanks and lobbying groups such as the German 
Industry Association (BDI: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) and the German 
Trade Union Federation (DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). At the same time, 
another government-supported initiative involving many of the same industry partners 
formed under the campaign that eventually became known by the slogan, “Germany—
Land of Ideas.” This first campaign, which debuted under the soccer-club-inspired name 
“FC Deutschland 2006,” garnered bad press due to its poor organization. It also provoked 
the ire of the leading opposition party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) for using public money as well as industry donations to fund what they 
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characterized as a campaign for the Social Democrats for the 2006 elections 
(Hammerstein et al., 2004). The Land of Ideas campaign was plagued by suspicions of 
political motivations, drawing unwanted attention to the campaign’s founders and 
eroding trust in its message.  
While the Land of Ideas campaign was publicly struggling, a more abstract social 
marketing campaign was quietly in development to fuse the individual and the nation 
under the slogan, Du bist Deutschland. Media reports on the DbD campaign traced it to 
the Partners for Innovation initiative, but the campaign emphasized its independence 
from other groups and, above all, from the government and politics (von Petersdorff, 
2005). According to one of the initiators of the DbD campaign, Bernd Bauer, the projects 
of the Partners for Innovation had been successful as a collaboration to create a reform 
friendly atmosphere in Germany; however, “the problem with the project was, that we 
did indeed reach the opinion leaders… We had the feeling, though, [that] now is the time 
to address all Germans. To motivate them to surprise themselves”i (Moring, 2005).  
Among the Partners for Innovation was the Bertelsmann AG, Germany’s largest media 
corporation and one of the top five media corporations in the world. Under Bertelsmann’s 
leadership, the social marketing campaign was developed independently from the 
Partners initiative, and assembled the country’s biggest media players from television and 
publishing to cinemas all participating pro bono. The strong division between the 
government- and the industry-led projects created a bulwark for the DbD campaign 
against the accusations of political propaganda that plagued the Land of Ideas initiative. 
Although this safeguard was not impervious to critique, it worked as part of a strategy to 
diffuse suspicion and enervate criticism, enhancing the plausibility of the claim of purely 
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philanthropic motivation. Altruistic claims aside, an analysis of the mechanisms of this 
nation branding effort—and particularly the role of the domestically focused 
component—reveals the strong economic logic driving this instance of corporate 
philanthropy. 
The Economics of Global Sport Spectacle and the Corporate Value of National Identity 
The wilting German economy and the unpopular reforms developed to 
“modernize” it provided one major impetus for the emergence of several new high-profile 
promotional campaigns. The other push came from hosting the 2006 World Cup, which 
was seen as both an opportunity and a justification for these new campaigns 
(Hammerstein et al., 2004). During the World Cup, the eyes of the world would be 
focused on Germany. In general, despite the highly visible economic activity spurred by 
hosting a global sporting spectacle, the activities directly related to the event have little 
economic value to host communities. The benefits of hosting, from the political and 
industrial perspective, have everything to do with their ability to create audiences or 
publics. As Wolfgang Maenning and Andrew Zimbalist’s comprehensive collection, 
International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events (2012) demonstrates, 
the direct economic benefit to nations and cities of hosting sports mega-events are 
minimal at best. In fact, events usually result in a legacy of increased tax burden on 
citizens and superfluous “white elephant” facilities not suited to local use (Feddersen, 
Grötzinger, & Maennig, 2009; Maennig & Feddersen, 2010; Zimbalist & Maennig, 
2012). In the case of less developed countries the economic impact can be particularly 
dismal. The hosts of the 2006 World Cup in Germany were at a significant advantage 
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compared to less developed countries. Germany’s infrastructure as well as its 
professional sports infrastructure, was already strong. The German Football Association 
(DFB) worked with private stakeholders to arrange for the costs of stadium development 
to be predominantly borne by soccer clubs and other forms of private investment.  
Even under these auspicious conditions, the regional economic benefit from the 
World Cup to regional hosts was difficult to discern (Feddersen et al., 2009). Although it 
is well-known that sports mega events almost always result in a public deficit, 
competition to host these events is growing (Dowse, 2011). Scholars writing on sports 
economics agree that the motivation of national leadership to host sports mega-events 
cannot be explained by aspirations of direct economic benefit to the country. Instead, 
motivations are driven by a complex political economy consisting of a range of actors 
with set agendas, including transnational corporations, domestic sport associations and 
politicians and policymakers from different levels of governance. As Scarlett Cornelissen 
points out, “the manner in which the interests of these actors overlap or diverge 
determines the processes by which tournaments take shape, and the longer-term 
consequences such events bear for the wider host society” (2007, p. 248). Each 
tournament emerges from a different and contextually dependent set of interests.  
In the case of the 2006 World Cup, a point of consensus between domestic 
corporate and political stakeholders was the priority of the promotion of the nation, the 
remaking of brand Germany. Consistently generating audiences unparalleled by other 
types of media events, global sports spectacles offer ideal opportunities to exploit focused 
attention to shape narratives of the nation for domestic and international purposes. Since 
the first expos and world fairs of the nineteenth century, global spectacle has played this 
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role as both a product of and a contributor to modern nationalism (E. Hobsbawm & 
Ranger, 1992; Roche, 2000). Maurice Roche observes that from their advent, 
international and supernational cultural events helped to create a fragile space, 
something of an “international public culture,” in which “official” versions of 
collective identities, particularly but not exclusively national identities, were 
asserted and recognised in a (usually, at best, hierarchic and exclusionary; at 
worst hate-filled and warring) international “world of nations.” (2000, p. 22) 
These events created an international consciousness at a global level, and gave 
governments a tool for creating and assigning meaning to collective national 
consciousness. Although these functions of global spectacle have a long history, they 
have recently undergone a subtle but important transformation that is reflected in the rise 
of the theory and practices of “nation branding.”   
Nation branding, or “competitive identity,” as one of its major proponents, Simon 
Anholt has come to call it, essentially refers to approaching the nation as a product. 
Anholt, an independent policy advisor, argues that “governments now find themselves 
competing in ways that they are scarcely prepared to deal with, and inhabiting a world of 
global competition and mobile consumers where few of their traditional approaches 
work” (2007, p. 16). However, managing this type of competition is what businesses 
have perfected. According to Nadia Kaneva’s review of the literature, nation branding 
supporters share the assumptions that “nation-states operate in a global competitive 
context” and that “by managing their reputations strategically, nations can advance their 
interests in the international arena,” whether political or economic (2011, p. 125). This 
blending of economic and market rationalities into political communication distinguishes 
nation branding from traditional forms of strategic messaging and propaganda. 
Proponents of nation branding generally see it as the natural development of these earlier 
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forms to respond to the new demands of governance from a globalized economy 
(Kaneva, 2011). The market fundamentalism that underlies much of the work on nation 
branding sees it as more peaceful form of collective identity than traditional nationalism. 
Anholt concisely expresses this view that 
the market-based view of the world, on which the theory of place branding is 
largely predicated, is an inherently peaceful and humanistic model for the 
relationships between nations. It is based on competition, consumer choice and 
consumer power; and these concepts are intimately linked to the freedom and 
power of the individual. For this reason, it seems far more likely to result in 
lasting world peace than a statecraft based on territory, economic power, 
ideologies, politics or religion. (Anholt, 2006, p. 2; quoted in Kaneva, 2011, p. 
126) 
This view is based on a politics and morality that uses market metaphors and extends 
them beyond the realm of material exchange into all realms of life. In this way, even 
something as intangible as happiness can be “registered” and “recognized” as “having 
negotiable value” (Anholt, 2006, p. 2).  
The significance of the role of cultural identity in economic competition is only 
recently starting to become clear. Less than three decades ago, corporations 
enthusiastically embraced Theodore Levitt’s prediction of the disappearance of cultural 
difference in the face of the proliferation of “global corporation” (1983, p. 3). However, 
local cultures were not as easily penetrated as Levitt imagined. Levitt’s global 
corporations faced unexpected resistance in the form of local competition and backlash 
against the overexposure of global brands (Silk, Andrews, & Cole, 2005, p. 1). 
Corporations were forced to reformulate global strategies to take local cultural difference 
into account.  
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The value of negotiating identity for corporations seeking to capture broader 
markets is clear. But as globalization has involved national governments in new 
unaccustomed forms of competition, nation-states have taken a new look at the value of 
the symbolic capital of the “national brand.” The increasing mobility of capital has 
undermined many of the traditional prerogatives which nation-states were founded to 
maintain. “The modern nation-state emerged as a cohesive political, economic, and 
cultural entity designed to consolidate and regulate capital accumulation within the 
boundaries of a specific geographic location” (Silk et al., 2005, p. 2). As the boundaries 
dividing national and global markets have largely dissolved, the globalized conditions of 
late capitalism have undermined traditional national sovereignty in crucial ways. The 
conditions that have unsettled the traditional jurisdiction of the nation-state are the same 
that have given rise to global corporatism. Silk et al. argue that “while human civilization 
is being increasingly corporatized, the nation and national culture have become principal 
accomplices within this process, as global capitalism seeks to—quite literally—capitalize 
upon the nation as a source of collective identification and differentiation” (2005, p. 7). 
Rather than making the nation obsolete, under advanced globalization the nation-state 
and global corporations have grown together, sharing an interest in the symbolic capital 
and affective power of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006) as well as of imagined 
Others.  
In the case of the 2006 World Cup, this opportunity came with a particular set of 
political and historical challenges. As was discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, even though the 
call for generalized national pride gained strength through reunification, resistance 
against abstract symbolic national pride persisted among segments of the leftist political 
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and intellectual establishment. However, a comprehensive marketing approach to the 
nation requires the cultivation of an abstract form of nationalism. According to Anholt, 
“the first and most important component of any national C[ompetitive] I[dentity] strategy 
is creating a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the populace, notwithstanding its 
cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial and historical divisions” 
(2007, p. 16). The perception of the national brand among the internal population, Anholt 
argues, is a driver of the external perception of the brand. However, Anholt sees this as a 
long-term, comprehensive project. In an article in Die Zeit about Germany’s major pre-
World Cup campaigns, Anholt expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the DbD 
campaign, calling it an “absolutely laudable effort that, I am certain will do absolutely 
nothing”ii (Hoff, 2005). From Anholt’s perspective, much longer term and more targeted 
programs are necessary to create appreciable change in a Nation Brand. However, while 
the concrete impact of such campaigns may be hard to measure and may even be 
indiscernible despite campaign creators’ references to survey data showing that ten 
million people were “motivated to take things on” by the campaign (Bauchmüller, 2006), 
they are significant for what they reveal about industrial and political concepts of society.  
The Power to Define Reality: The Media and the National Symbolic 
 Recognizing the symbolic potential of the World Cup, German politicians, 
industry and the media sought to harness its full potential by creating a broad-ranging 
marketing strategy including campaigns to initiate the German people in their upcoming 
role as national hosts. These “social marketing” campaigns were facilitated and justified 
by the upcoming World Cup, but their symbolic utility was not limited to this event. 
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While other campaigns, like the Land of Ideas, made soccer a central point of reference, 
DbD was more general, utilizing sports, and above all national-level soccer, as one point 
of reference among many nationally charged symbolic scenes. Under the auspices of 
benign corporate citizenship, the domestically-focused DbD campaign proposed a new 
relationship between Germans and the nation-state characterized by American-style 
meritocracy and patriotism. In her classic work Decoding Advertisements, Judith 
Williamson outlines the construction of systems of meaning through advertising. She 
writes that “advertisements are selling us something else besides consumer goods: in 
providing us with a structure in which we, and those goods are interchangeable, they are 
selling us ourselves” (Williamson, 1978, p. 13). In a very literal application, when the 
nation is the good being sold, advertising is thus selling the unification of nation and self, 
the you becomes Germany.  
Although most my analysis deals with the 2005 television spot, the print branch of 
the first campaign merits consideration as well. This branch consisted of print 
advertisements featuring a variety of famous Germans from the past and present. These 
ads appropriated the prestige of successful individuals such as Ferdinand Porsche and 
Albert Einstein and bestowed it on the audience, promising that if they try hard enough, 
they too can become as important as these figures. The mode of transference is through 
the nation. Germany is the connection between the aspirant and the prominent person. It 
is thereby implied that as the national culture cultivated past success, by your association 
with it you too will be successful. However, in their choice of figures the campaign was 
again caught up in a historical trap that opened it to critiques of callous opportunism. As 
one critic pointed out, in his lifetime Albert Einstein was emphatically told, “Du bist 
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nicht Deutschland!” (you are not Germany) (Böss, 2009) Another critic pointed out that 
the campaign proved Einstein right when he said, “If my theory of relativity is proven 
successful, Germany will claim me as a German and France will declare that I am a 
citizen of the world. Should my theory prove untrue, France will say that I am a German 
and Germany will declare that I am a Jew.” The choice of Ferdinand Porsche similarly 
inspired critique over the role Porsche played in the war effort during the Second World 
War. The unsuccessful dehistoricization of historical figures in the print ads also made 
them popular fodder for internet satirization and critique. 
 The television spot stayed on safer ground by largely maintaining a present and 
future orientation. The opening shot, fading in from black, is of the sun peeking through 
the foliage of the trees lining a field. The quality of the light and the misty air suggests 
the sunrise. The sky deepens toward the edge of the frame to a clear blue. The camera 
tracks to the left and the sound of birds chirping accompanies opening notes of Alan 
Silvestri’s theme for the film Forrest Gump. In the choice of theme music, the campaign 
evokes the values promoted in the American film, which—according to Lauren Berlant’s 
reading—is “one of the most popular vehicles celebrating citizenship’s extraction from 
public life…which uses spectacles of the nation in crisis to express a nostalgic desire for 
official national culture” (1997, p. 180). Forrest is incapable of being corrupted by 
national crisis because of his limited ability to conceptualize. Even being the namesake of 
the founder of the Ku Klux Klan cannot besmirch his innocence.  “He encounters history 
without becoming historical” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 180). In this way, the connection 
with the film expresses a desire to be liberated from personal association with history, 
like Forrest. In its condemnation of the political movements of the 1960s, the film also 
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mirrors the attacks by conservative Germans on the value of the debates forced upon the 
public sphere by the protests of the postwar generation that famously turned a critical eye 
to their parents’ activities under Nazi rule.  
By moving from darkness to the dawn, the viewer is reborn in the opening shot. 
The shot divorces what will follow from that which came before. As in Berlant’s allegory 
of infantile citizenship, the nation is conflated with the natural. “The nation’s priceless 
essence is located in what transcends the world of practical citizenship, with its history of 
nationally sanctioned racial, sexual, and economic exploitation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 
40). Although Berlant is writing about the United States, the fact that her theories 
correspond with many of the key points of the campaign reflects the desire to adopt forms 
of privatized citizenship like those being promoted in the US. This form of citizenship is 
built on the normalization of the national symbolic. In becoming normal, “hardly anyone 
asks critical questions about its representativeness” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 36). Although 
the symbolic body of the national flag was not yet “normal” enough to be utilized without 
raising critical questions, the ad’s creators accessed the symbolic national body in the 
form of nature.  
The second shot reveals a beautiful older woman with flaxen hair standing with 
her back to a tree and the sun illuminating her face. Like a loving grandmother, she 
smiles into the camera ad she says, “you are the miracle of Germany.” As she pronounces 
the final word, the camera pulls back to a medium long shot, emphasizing the move from 
the particular to the general. Her statement refers to the unexpected 1954 World Cup 
victory of the West German team, commonly known as “the miracle of Bern” (Das 
Wunder von Bern). Here, the “miracle” also evokes Germany’s rapid postwar economic 
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recovery, commonly called the “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder). Immediately, 
the audience is immersed the system of meaning of the sporting spectacle, and more 
specifically, the meanings and sensations of victorious competition. The particular 
victory referenced was also the spiritual rebirth of the nation from the ashes of the World 
War II. The reference to this victory also prepares viewers to associate the campaign 
slogan with the slogan “Wir sind Weltmeister” (we are world champions), which is the 
chant that corresponds to the celebration of World Cup victory. This associate did not 
escape notice in the press (see Corinth, 2005). 
Germans would have made these connections with ease, especially with the debut 
of the film “The Miracle of Bern” in 2003. The film tells the fictional story of a prisoner 
of war returning to his family from internment in Siberia. It chronicles the difficult 
reunion of the family shattered by war. Ultimately, the victory of the national team finally 
succeeds in reuniting the estranged father and son. The allegory is brought full circle, as 
it is the son’s special relationship with one of the national players that inspires the player 
to score the winning goal in the final game. Thus, the “infantile citizen” delivers the 
national victory that unites his family and his nation. By reframing the memory of the 
war around the suffering of the postwar period and the intimate relationships intertwined 
with the symbolic national victory, the traumatic past is contained and the present is freed 
from its burdens.  
After the ad’s symbolically laden first three shots, the next shot is a simple close-
up of a woman resting her face on her right hand. The background is out of focus, but 
appears to be a cobbled street which is again lit by the angled light of a bright morning 
sun. Referencing a popular interpretation of the mathematical chaos theory, she informs 
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us that “a butterfly can unleash a typhoon.” The next shot presents a young woman, 
frame left, in a yellow shirt cradling a baby swaddled in blue. The swaddling reflects the 
color of the sky. On the right side of the frame the Berlin TV tower stands tall. The 
woman, who appears to be of East-Asian descent, looks up from her baby and continues 
that “the gust produced by its wings may uproot trees kilometers away.” In the middle of 
the pronouncement the shot cuts to a winged stage performer creating a translucent arch 
with a bubble blown with a wand.  
The next shot is a tracking shot from an extremely low angle that shows young 
people peeling off and dropping yellow flyers from what is appears to be a balcony in an 
official building. The man speaking is one of the protestors and as the shot moves to him, 
a fragment of a protest sign becomes visible behind him. The next shot is from below 
shooting directly upwards. The illuminated dome is visible above as fliers flutter down 
toward the camera. The next shot is a long shot from a low angle in which the protestors 
are visible on the balcony of the rotunda. It is now clear that the signs contain crossed out 
swastikas. The anti-Nazi association of this scene is driven home by the shot of the 
falling fliers, which mirrors almost exactly a shot from the 2005 film Sophie Scholl: The 
Final Days, which chronicles the interrogation and execution of White Rose activists 
Sophie and Hans Scholl when they were found guilty of high treason after being caught 
distributing anti-war leaflets. Closer inspection reveals that the scene is shot in the atrium 
of Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, the location of the Scholl siblings’ 
apprehension in real life and in the film. This scene associates the messages promoted by 
the campaign with heroic activism and thereby positions the patriotism promoted in the 
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campaign in opposition to past nationalisms. In fact, this scene suggests that it is through 
a strong identification with the nation that nationalism is best resisted.  
All of this has been presented in the first 17 seconds of the two-minute spot. In 
total, the ad is composed of 66 shots, none of them longer than three seconds long, most 
of them less than two. These shots feature 43 different speakers, over 30 of them 
celebrities of differing calibers. The themes expressed in the campaign’s text—which 
creators dubbed a “manifesto”—emphasize the power of the seemingly insignificant (the 
individual citizen) and the obligation of the individual to the collective embodied in the 
nation. Individuals are not positioned as important in themselves, but rather in their 
relation to the national symbolic. “Why do you wave flags while [Michael] Schumacher 
makes his rounds?” asks a man standing by the side of a pool as a swim team practices. 
“You know the answer,” suggests a man emerging from between the grey pillars of 
Berlin’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. “Unrealistic, you say? Then why do 
you cheer on your team if your voice is so unimportant?” The many (individually 
insignificant) all contribute to support the national symbolic, embodied in its most 
successful members.  
Another prominent theme is the need for self-sufficiency. In a reformulated 
version of JFK’s famous speech, a male surgeon instructs the audience to “ask not what 
others can do for you.” German national team member Gerald Asamoah picks up this 
point, saying “You are the others. You are Germany.” To drive this point home, the ad 
features people in humble positions, including a bathroom cleaning lady, sitting alone in 
a bathroom with a plate for tips on a table beside her, or an impeccably dressed and 
coiffed—yet presumably homeless—man selling copies of BISS, a street magazine 
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designed to “help the homeless help themselves.”19 Two harbor workers in the familiar 
overalls of manual laborers emphasize that “it doesn’t matter where you work, or what 
position you hold. You keep the store running.” A waitress in a Japanese restaurant says 
in accented German, “You are the store.” Tied up with these themes is an injunction 
against criticizing or demanding anything from the government, as in the line “treat your 
nation like a good friend. Don’t complain about him, offer him your help.” The alignment 
of these values with those of neo-liberalism was not lost on critics (see for example 
Jessen, 2005; Wulf, 2005).  
Although the liberal economic philosophy of the “manifesto” was decoded and 
soundly critiqued by a handful of journalists and commentators in the German public 
sphere, the politics of its images and characters received less attention. In particular, what 
is the connection with the demographic characteristics of the figures and the roles in 
which they are cast? One fact stands out in this analysis: white men are the norm. The ad 
carefully includes individuals representing other demographics—a fact that rarely 
escaped explicit mention in the press. Ghanaian-born German national team member 
Gerald Asamoah’s inclusion sparked particular interest. Other visible minorities include a 
man with Down Syndrome, the waitress of East-Asian heritage, as well as R&B singer 
Xavier Naido and Vietnamese-German television moderator and actress Minh-Khai 
                                                          
 
 
 
19 BISS—Bürger in sozialen Schwierigkeiten (Citizens in Social Difficulties)—is a Munich-based monthly 
street magazine published by a non-profit group to offer homeless people a means to support themselves 
through its sale. Different versions of this program can be found in major cities across Germany.  
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Phan-Thi. Although commentators are right to celebrate the inclusion of disabled and 
non-white individuals in the campaign’s construction of the German nation, it is not clear 
that these representations challenge the expected roles of Germans of color, and 
particularly those recognizable as Turkish- or Muslim Germans. Turkish-Germans are 
represented by rapper Kool Savas, who is shown with his characteristically urban style 
and distinctive style of German common among transnational urban youth. An interior 
shot of a group of five dark-haired young men riding in a car and flashing hand-signals 
also suggests a typical conception of “urban” Turkish or Arab young men.  
 The portrayal of gender in the campaign is even more starkly normative. Of the 
41 adult speakers, only 13 of them are women. This disparity is masked by the 
positioning of more women at the beginning and end of the advertisement. The ratio 
among prominent figures portrayed is even worse, with three times more famous men 
than women. Only four of the women are portrayed in the context of a non-domestic 
profession. Two of those professions are bathroom attendant and waitress. Another, 
fashion designer Gabriele Strehle, is accompanied in her studio by her industrialist 
husband. Only champion cyclist Judith Arndt is portrayed actively participating in a non-
traditional profession. Of the women not portrayed in active roles, three of them are 
portrayed inside the home, while not even one of the men appears in a private setting. 
The men, on the other hand, are portrayed in a wide variety of settings and professional 
roles, from academic and symphony conductor to mechanic.  
 Finally, one of the most salient features of the campaign is the prominence of the 
media itself. Twelve of the featured celebrities are either journalists or actors or both. In 
the content and the structure of the campaign, media’s authority to represent the nation is 
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repeatedly reinforced. The resonance of this impact was increased through the media 
coverage of the campaign. A campaign press release cited a study showing that in its 
five-month duration, the campaign had reached 98% of the population in Germany, with 
every German over age 16 having been exposed on average 21 times. Despite lively 
criticism on the web, 54% of respondents liked the campaign and 41% felt personally 
invested in the topic (Diel, 2006). According to the same press release, the campaign was 
mentioned in more than 2,500 press articles. As will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter, this not only increased exposure for the campaign itself but also provided the 
opportunity for campaign leadership to build narratives around the creation of the 
campaign emphasizing the charitable intentions that drove it. Even the criticism of the 
campaign by some journalists was spun by campaign leaders to prove that the power of 
media institutions does not undermine the diversity of journalistic opinions and the free 
press. DbD served to legitimate the media as the framer of national reality by reinforcing 
the importance of media personalities. The juxtaposition of known and unknown persons 
suggests that it is through the media—and the national symbolic as expressed in the 
media—that unknown citizens become connected to the mythical national center.  
Intimacy, Politics, and National Reproduction 
 Multiple “social marketing” campaigns that emerged in advance of the 2006 
World Cup targeted ambitious goals of renewing Germany’s image and generating 
excitement about Germany both domestically and abroad. DbD is distinguished by its 
primary focus on abstract idea of “mood” (Stimmung). While the concurrent Land of 
Ideas campaign also targeted sentiments of excitement and fun using enthusiasm for 
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World Cup soccer, it was more pragmatically legible, promoting specific German 
industries and knowledge sectors and encouraging specific actions like inviting 
international investment (see figure 9). In contrast, the original DbD campaign addressed 
abstract sentiments and values. Even the more specific second incarnation of the 
campaign in 2007, which focused on encouraging “child-friendliness,” maintained a 
carefully broad message, skirting clear exhortations while promoting the adoption of a 
generalized public disposition. In the second campaign “you” refers to children, and the 
narrator speaks as a parent. The audience watches the children on screen from the 
position of parents while the soothing female voice claims that “there is no bad time to 
have you.”iii The creators’ statements to the press show that Du bist Deutschland is not 
only a project to evoke emotional reactions in audiences; it is a much more ambitious 
project to cultivate a system of values prioritizing a neoliberal politics of private 
responsibility and biopolitical values of production and reproduction.  
 
Figure 7: After over a year of negative press coverage of internal disputes and flagging support, the Land 
of Ideas campaign had its first major public success with internationally-placed ads that invited (male) 
investors to couple with Germany as embodied by supermodel, Claudia Schiffer, promising full satisfaction 
including “breakfast in the morning.”  
This final section draws on the text and images of the 2005 and 2007 DbD 
campaigns along with media coverage of their creators to identify three overlapping 
aspects of this political project. First, the campaigns promote an intimate and affective 
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form of citizenship that prioritizes the cultivation of an optimistic predisposition and casts 
it as the precursor to economic well-being. The definition and function of affect is a 
matter of significant discussion among theorists. One point of tension is its distinction 
from and relationship to emotion. Both affect and emotion related to aspects of feeling. 
Lawrence Grossberg proposes that "emotion is the articulation of affect and ideology" 
(2010, p. 316). Affect can be understood as feeling before its articulation in a particular 
instance, as the feelings and associations that circulate in public and "stick" - in Sara 
Ahmed's words - to reproduce the associations between "ideas, values, and objects" 
(2010, p. 29). As with the concept of Heimat discussed in Chapter 1, affect is both a 
public form of feeling and the basis of apparently intimate lives, giving "circuits and 
flows the forms of a life" (Stewart, 2007, p. 2). In this case, I connect the emotions 
expressed in this case to the affective politics of the economic vision of life they support. 
Instead of seeing happiness as resulting from material security, the first DbD 
campaign proposes that a positive attitude is the necessary precursor to economic growth. 
The second DbD campaign in 2007 ties happiness to literal—not just symbolic or 
economic—reproduction. This affective orientation also extends to politics and the 
relation to the nation. The next and closely related aspect of this project is a new framing 
of the responsibility of individuals to the nation. Instead of viewing the nation-state as 
responsible for creating the conditions enabling citizens to be productive, this framing 
removes the state and makes the individual responsible for creating the nation with their 
productive action and positive disposition. Once this relationship was established in the 
first campaign, the second DbD campaign’s apparent leap to encouraging literal 
reproduction as a national project is revealed instead to be a seamless continuation.  
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Finally, DbD campaign proposes a new identitarian schema for Germany that de-
emphasizes ethnic and cultural forms of identification in favor of citizenship based on 
individual, private (re)productivity. This is accomplished through a narrative of a color-
blind and classless society, in which the self-conscious placement of a handful of visible 
minorities among normative citizens smoothes over economic and racial inequalities. 
DbD promotes an explicitly nationalist framework, but does so—and perhaps is only able 
to do so—by altering the vision of the nation, moving away from the explicitly culturalist 
and genealogical definitions of the German people. Instead, it offers a new cosmopolitan 
meritocracy that fiercely promotes the nation even as it alters the qualifications for 
national citizenship. This alteration is, in one sense, a broadening in that it offers equality 
to all regardless of race or class. However, as observers of American fantasies of 
meritocracy well know, by privatizing risk this apparent opening also introduces new 
forms of precarious citizenship. 
These campaigns may be best understood through comparison with another 
national context: the cultural politics of right-wing America. Although the social or 
“coordinated market economy” of postwar Germany and the liberal anarcho-capitalism of 
the United States are often considered as oppositional varieties of capitalism (Crouch & 
Streeck, 1997; Menz, 2010), their theoretical origins are actually the same. Foucault 
argues that the foundation of this form of government or governmentality is the idea that 
the only acceptable form of social policy is economic growth. In order to achieve this 
growth, government must intervene to create the conditions for optimal functioning of the 
market, so that competitive mechanisms can play their proper regulatory role in all areas 
of life (Foucault, 2008, p. 144). They key difference between the German “social market 
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economy” and American neoliberalism is the belief among German theorists that the 
market mechanisms are so fragile that they must be carefully managed by a socially 
interventionist policy (Foucault, 2008, p. 323). In this sense, the “enterprise society 
imagined by [German] ordoliberals is… a society for the market and a society against the 
market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The American version eliminates this ambiguity, 
generalizing the economic form of the market “throughout the social body and including 
the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary 
exchanges" (Foucault, 2008, p. 243). However, the Du bist Deutschland campaign and 
the concurrent economic reforms passed by the German government suggest an erosion 
of this ambivalent stance in favor of a purer commitment to the generalization of market 
mechanisms, proposing a fundamental change in the role of the state in mediating 
between markets and the population. This shift is also accompanied by a more expansive 
role for industry in social affairs. In responding to the question of what constitutes the 
campaign’s deeper message, advertising executive and DbD creator Fischer-Appelt 
summarized it as an affirmation “that the industry is ready to take over responsibility for 
this country”iv (Ax, 2005). In place of state support, industry aspires to assume social 
responsibility by propagating the personal embrace of market rationalities. 
Lauren Berlant’s (1997, 2011) work on American cultural politics demonstrates 
the consequences of this generalization of market rationality, which reached new levels 
through what she calls the “Reagan revolution” beginning in the 1980s. Central to this 
process is the simultaneous expansion of the nation idea and contraction of the idea of the 
state. The state’s role is to support the generalization of market logics rather than to 
provide public services. In this increasingly “intimate” public sphere, private values and 
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practices are the basis of citizenship. Here, citizenship practice is, above all, oriented 
towards or emerging from the family sphere. “No longer valuing personhood as 
something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a 
public good only in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private 
worlds” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). In this privatized, intimate national sphere, the 
“public” in the traditional modernist sense of deliberative democracy ceases to be the 
central ideal of the body politic. Central aspects of this public life, from the protests of 
social movements—at least those not concerned with family politics—to the professional 
practice of politicians have “been made to seem ridiculous and even dangerous to the 
nation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). Instead of looking to the public sphere to formulate 
political solutions to problems, responsibility is placed on the individual and risk is 
shifted to the personal sphere.  
Berlant’s concept of intimate publics is complex and varied. Introducing a 
discussion with Berlant, Jay Prosser proposed that intimate publics “are both the 
strangers formed into communities by affective ties; and the assumptions of shared 
emotions and worldviews that precede, create, and then often render anxious and 
ambivalent such publics” (L. Berlant & Prosser, 2011, p. 180). Intimate publics can 
function at the small scale of specialized communities of interest on the internet or at the 
large scale of national or transnational communities. They are both actual people bound 
by shared experiences or concerns and assemblages of norms that organize, mobilize, and 
interpret collective sentiments. What makes them so effective is their ability to connect 
with people through a sense of “authenticity.” Their relationship to politics is also 
complex. In the same discussion, Berlant clarifies that 
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Intimate publics usually flourish to one side of politics, referring to historical 
subordinations without mobilizing a fundamental activism with respect to them 
….in times of crisis, though, such as the present, their relation can become newly 
fraught and dynamic. Political publics in struggle often take on the logics of 
intimate ones, deploying sentimental models of affective recognition to establish 
political grounds for imagining survival according to their own interest. Indeed, 
they often try to co-opt or affiliate with existing intimate publics, for good or ill, 
as when they claim that their own politics is really about realizing a world for 
affective community, and not about power as such. (2011, p. 184)  
This is the function of intimate publics that most clearly applies to the campaigns 
analyzed in this chapter. As with the dramatic appearance of the intimate public that 
Berlant observes at the heart of the new conservatism of the late twentieth century, the 
campaigns of the coalition of German industries and politicians in the Partners for 
Innovation and the Land of Ideas initiatives address the nation as an affective community 
to support specific political and economic agendas. While the American form focused 
primarily on social conservatism and rigid norms of reproductive bodies, the German 
version focuses less on regulating the particulars of sex—although it is at least as 
concerned with reproduction, as is abundantly clear in the second DbD campaign and the 
Sarrazin debate (see Chapter 6). The German form concentrates more on economic 
liberalism and personal responsibility for creating what Berlant calls “the good life” 
(2011). In both contexts, the abstract sentimental nation takes center stage. The first DbD 
campaign centers on deploying sentimental images and ideas to create the idea of a better 
life through affective national bonds.  
Affective Economy 
“You are Germany. So how about you celebrate yourself again?”v—Du bist 
Deutschland Manifesto 
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The most important motivation cited by campaign creators in the press was the 
desire to change and brighten the national “mood” (Stimmung). From the first discussions 
at Chancellor Schröder’s “Innovation Conference” in January 2004, a link emerged 
between the “right” disposition and the continuation of the good life in Germany. 
Schröder criticized cautious and conservative approaches in German business and 
research and exhorted the assembled industrial, political, and academic elite to “speak 
first about opportunities and only then about risks” (“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Schröder 
zu Innovation,” 2004). The chancellor framed this as an existential matter for the nation, 
arguing that Germany’s prosperity depends on its ability to outcompete its rivals in global 
markets. To do so, Schröder emphasized again the importance of attitude: “The goal is to 
strengthen renewal in Germany, to deconstruct barriers and to awaken new confidence in 
the productive capacity of this country”vi (“Schröder zu Innovation,” 2004). Besides 
committing the government to increasing funding for research universities, the 
Innovation Conference had few clear goals beyond uniting important national players to 
clarify shared interests and underscore the need for attitudinal change. As was outlined at 
the start of this chapter, this meeting lead to the foundation of the Partners for Innovation 
who went on to create the DbD campaign. As the story was narrated in the press, leaders 
of one of the world’s top media conglomerates, Bertelsmann, were inspired to attack the 
disordered national affect that had developed from the economic malaise:  
Germany in autumn. Gray skies, veil of mist, bad humor. Many people have 
resigned themselves to unemployment, bankrupt companies, lost prosperity. As 
trees lose their leaves in the autumn, they lose their courage, cast off 
responsibility. In Germany in autumn 2004, Bertelsmann CEO Gunther Thielen 
and his friend Bernd Bauer refused to come to terms with it. Optimism and 
responsibility were needed, not self-pity. Everyone should know this. The idea: 82 
million people identify again with Germany.vii (Moring, 2005) 
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In this narrative, the campaign came from the spontaneous inspiration of titans of 
industry who had become frustrated with the passivity of the economically depressed 
population. The use of the seasonal metaphor sets up a curious relationship between the 
economy and individuals. Changing seasons usually indicate that which is outside of 
individual control or social influence. The dropping of leaves in autumn is not something 
that a tree could be expected to change or take responsibility for. However, even this 
extreme example of a situation governed by inexorable structure does not justify 
complaint or the abdication of individual responsibility. The prospect of economic winter 
demands “optimism and responsibility, not self-pity.” Yet, it is telling that the metaphor 
for the economy is a force of nature. The message is not that people should mobilize to 
find political solutions to change economic conditions. It would be foolish to try to 
prevent seasons from changing. To weather harsh economic conditions, individuals must 
muster their own reserves and take care of themselves. The source of affective fortitude, 
stated as if it were self-evident, is the collective identification with the nation.  
The primary target of the DbD campaign, in both its 2005 and 2007 iterations, 
was to alter the sentimental climate of Germany. One of the most common words to 
appear in the corpus of stakeholder-focused articles is Stimmung, which translates to 
collective mood, sentiment, or morale. In the press corpus for this chapter, coded 
segments related to emotions outnumbered all other themes. More specifically, campaign 
creators claim that Germany’s most pressing problem is a collective bad attitude:  
The aspirations with which organizers have set out are not exactly modest: they 
want to fight whiners, defeatists, and self-doubters. No longer should every other 
German have to report that he is afraid of the future. “We want to reach an 
awakening in Germany” says campaign leader, Bernd Bauer.viii (A. Kaiser, 2005) 
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This framing of Germany’s problems as primarily attitudinal goes back at least as far as 
the first campaign proposed by Chancellor Schröder, FC Deutschland, which became the 
Land of Ideas. This early campaign was described in a Spiegel article from 2004:  
Enough with despondency, self-doubt, and fear of the future, so speaks a 
melodious voice to the audience. We can do it. We are somebody. We are, above 
all, a great community, capable of getting fired up.ix (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p. 
23) 
The authors of this article observe that this kind of emotional politics represents a stark 
departure from the traditional position of the Social Democratic Party:  
Officially, it is about a brightened mood in the country organized by the modern 
advertising industry. Schröder wants to impart a new we-feeling to Germans 
tormented by fear of social decline. Highly emotional PR has thus arrived among 
those who had always fought against such efforts to smooth over reality. They 
once wanted to be “the voices of critique” or even to organize a “counter public;” 
they no longer recoil from targeted mass influence.x (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p. 
22) 
These campaign ideas indicate the rightward shift of the center-left Social Democrats, 
moving from an agonistic politics of deliberation to an emotional, intimate politics more 
commonly associated with the political right. Although FC Deutschland never took off in 
the specific form proposed in 2004, the political and economic rationality of the Schröder 
government was readily adopted in the media industry’s DbD campaign. In a reversal of 
the philosophy of the German social market economy, here the emotional life of the 
population is not to be supported by the markets guaranteed by the state, instead the 
markets are to be supported by the appropriately buoyant emotions of the population. The 
people must be optimistic, because it is what the market/nation requires.  
The Productive Citizen 
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The purpose of cultivating a positive disposition is to improve the individual 
potential for productivity and to stimulate “courage” to take personal responsibility for 
the prosperity of the nation. You are Germany when you have a positive attitude and you 
use your energies for entrepreneurial and productive purposes. In interviews and press 
statements, campaign creators emphasize the goal of catalyzing individual action, 
framing passivity as a core contributor to German economic problems:   
“That is the goal: to finally drag Germans out of a standstill, to give the starting 
shot so that they want to get moving,” says [campaign] initiator Bernd Bauer.xi  
(Moring, 2005) 
The [campaign] initiators hope that many citizens become active. “Do 
something,” they want to call out: “Make something, you can do it”xii (“Wir in 
Deutschland,” 2005).  
The [slogan] fits, because we want to tell people: it depends on you, what happens 
in Germany. It has to do with you! … We wanted to seize people. So that every 
person does what they can. That is why we have the passage: “Germany has 
enough hands, to reach out to each other and grab hold. We are 82 million.”xiii 
(Oliver Voss quoted in A. Kaiser, 2005)  
This national inertia is framed as a result the failure of personal responsibility or, framed 
euphemistically, the failure to believe in oneself. As advertising executive Holger Jung 
stated in an interview,  
We concentrated on a characteristic tendency that is currently obvious in this 
country: to push the responsibility for all the problems of this world away from 
oneself and to say, “It’s not my fault, it is theirs.” The intelligentsia finds this 
[formulation] too simple for a problem that is certainly very complexly 
interwoven. But a campaign can’t solve that; it has to concentrate on a key 
problem that lies with every individual.xiv (Grimberg, 2006) 
Jung’s statement acknowledges the complexity of social and economic problems, but 
absolves his branch from the responsibility to do justice to this complexity, citing the 
inherent limitations of the format of advertising. It is portrayed simply as a matter of 
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expedience that they have chosen to focus on individual responsibility and to ignore 
complex, structural causes.  
The creators acknowledge, however, that it would not be effective to show a 
completely positive picture. They make a concession to reality by admitting the difficulty 
of the task they propose, as in the 2005 DbD “manifesto” with the line “our time does not 
taste like cotton candy. No one wants to claim that it does. It may be that you have your 
back to the wall….Yet once we tore a wall down together”xv (“Das Manifest: ‘Du bist 
Deutschland’ im Wortlaut,” 2005). By including low-wage workers and even a 
presumably homeless—albeit well-dressed—man, campaign creators lend plausibility to 
their claim to represent a reasonable assessment of the contemporary situation in 
Germany. As the creator of the campaign slogan, Oliver Voss, puts it, “if we had just 
shown happy people, that would have been a lie. Through the direct address, in which we 
pointed a finger out through the television, people are almost forced to react”xvi (A. 
Kaiser, 2005). But the purpose of this concession is not to focus attention on 
understanding the problems themselves, but to acknowledge them so that they can be put 
aside to make way for the call to action.  
The statements of campaign creators underscore a contradictory stance towards 
politics, conflating productive activity with civic or political action. When confronted 
with the question of what authorizes industry to take on “such a massive political 
initiative” (Ax, 2005), Michael Trautmann, one of the advertising executives engaged in 
the campaign, affirmed first the formal right of any interested party to engage in building 
political will and shaping public opinion. At the same time, Trautmann emphatically 
denied that the campaign has any political content: 
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This advertisement is not propaganda….it does not aim to convince anyone of a 
political opinion. It only aims to remind every citizen of his responsibility and to 
push him to take part in the political debate. There can be no doubt that this goal 
is legitimate.xvii (Ax, 2005) 
This statement is a poor fit with the content of the campaign, which directly discourages 
critical politics through its exhortation to “treat your nation like a friend,” and to stop 
complaining and take responsibility for yourself. In the campaign, responsibility does not 
refer to political engagement, unless all productive activity is equated with civic or 
political engagement. Trautmann’s denial of a political agenda cloaks the campaign’s 
promotion of a politics of the apolitical, a politics of personal productivity and collective 
identification with the nation. This statement is even more disingenuous when paired 
with the acknowledgement by campaign co-founder Bernd Bauer, quoted above, that the 
motivation for the campaign was to extend support for economic reform policies beyond 
the political elite to the general population (Moring, 2005). As one cultural critic writing 
in the typically reform- and campaign-friendly Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
summarized, 
Economic problems appear in this perspective as psychosomatic suffering, 
unemployment is seen as a consequence of a nationwide depression and no longer 
as the result of decisions that have created particular structural conditions.  
Because they have apparently given up on believing in the ability to change them, 
they logically seize on a rhetoric of revitalization, which reduces the nebulous 
realm of struggle to the question of solely personal commitments: “You are 
Germany. Your will is like fire under your behind. You hold the store together. 
You are the store. You are Germany.”xviii (Reents, 2006) 
In short, the campaign seeks to reshape the field of public engagement, locating it in the 
terrain of the “intimate public” and foreclosing a systemic or structural approach to 
solving political problems.  
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The biopolitical logics of productivity underlying these qualifications for fully 
“being Germany,” which is to say, for being a full citizen took on an even stronger role in 
the second part of the DbD campaign that debuted in 2007. The second iteration 
replicated the format of the first and boasted an even bigger budget, saturating Germany’s 
media-sphere. In the first campaign the addressee is the potentially productive person 
who is exhorted to be Germany by taking productive action, through some form of labor 
or philanthropy. The speaker is the national collectivity embodied in celebrities and 
media personalities and unknown Germans including visible minorities. In the second 
iteration, the addressee is a child—all children—and the speaker is the parent figure. The 
ad reflects long-standing anxieties about Germany’s aging and insufficiently fertile 
population (T. Kaiser, 2007). In interviews, campaign creators frame Germany’s 
demographic decline—its failure to achieve optimal reproduction—once again as an 
affective problem. They seek to create an atmosphere of child-friendliness, which they 
carefully distinguish from directly arguing that people have more children (Iken & 
Gerlach, 2008). Again, the ad’s “manifesto” addresses the difficult and unpleasant parts 
of parenting, providing dramatic tension that is overcome by the full wash of emotions, 
love and purpose that children represent. “You make us crazy” the warm female voice 
says, pausing before adding, “with happiness.” The adult, in reproducing, has reproduced 
the nation in its ideal, infantile form, still unsullied by history and existing as pure 
potentiality.  
Integration and the Equal Inequality of Neoliberal Citizenship 
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For DbD, full German citizens must be productive, optimistic, and independent in 
the face of adversity. One requirement that the campaign sets aside, however, had until 
recently been a formal requirement under the law: decent from German parents. Among 
the dozens of children pictured in the second DbD television advertisement, a handful of 
non-white children appear. While white children clearly represent the norm, as in the first 
iteration, this version consciously includes children of color as well as several children 
with Down Syndrome to show that the nation it invokes is not defined in the ethnic 
primordialist sense.  
The campaign creators position themselves against old ways of defining 
Germanness. In fact, when a historical photograph surfaced showing the slogan “Denn 
Du bist Deutschland” (Because you are Germany) on a large banner at a Nazi 
demonstration in the mid-1930s, campaign leaders dismissed any connection between the 
campaign and past nationalism as absurd. According to ad executive Holger Jung, the 
revelation of the photo caused a serious internal discussion among the creators, but when 
they determined that it was a call to join a local event, and was “in no way a Nazi slogan 
at the level of Arbeit macht frei,20 or the like, [they] were relieved” (Grimberg, 2006). 
When historians confirmed the insignificance of the slogan for National Socialist 
messaging, they felt they could “move forward with the slogan in good conscience.”xix 
Jung then pointed to the content of the campaign as clear evidence disproving nationalist 
                                                          
 
 
 
20 “Work sets you free.” This slogan was famously displayed over the entrance to Auschwitz and other Nazi 
concentration camps. 
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goals: “Just look at the campaign and the advertisement: the very last thing that we want 
is to slip off into a nationalist direction. That would be practically exactly the opposite of 
the campaign”xx (Grimberg, 2006). Holger’s statement here, and the relative ease with 
which campaign creators and historians (see for example Meyer-Gatermann, 2005) 
dismissed any meaningful parallel in the historical example, reveal a very narrow 
conception of nationalism. Nationalism is never defined but is understood to be negative, 
chauvinistic, and archaic. Cultivating a “national feeling” or an identification with the 
nation is frequently cited by the media and creators as a principal goal of the campaign, 
yet this is somehow unquestionably distinct from, or even contrary to, nationalism.  
The supposedly stark distinction between the desired national feeling and 
identification and chauvinist nationalism is so self-evident that they do not elaborate on 
it. Holger’s statement implies that one only need look at the campaign’s inclusion of 
visible minorities to see the inclusiveness of the campaign’s vision of Germany. What 
this narrow conception of nationalism fails to consider, however, is that nationalism’s 
categories of belonging may change, but it always fundamentally involves decisions 
about who qualifies as a member and who does not. The parallel in the slogans old and 
new is defined not by the specific qualifications it makes, but rather by the fact that it 
serves as a system of qualification. Furthermore, nationalist systems of affiliation 
function at multiple levels, from formal juridical qualifications to cultural, moral and 
substantive forms. The value of this parallel then, is not to show that DbD shares 
National Socialism’s brand of exclusion, but rather to draw attention to the importance of 
interrogating every nationalist discursive framework to understand its logics of inclusion 
and exclusion.  
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While DbD includes visible minorities within its schema of Germanness, it does 
so alongside new qualifications, namely, that all may “be Germany” who 1) embrace a 
positive disposition towards growth and reproduction, 2) do not complain or protest, and 
3) who contribute to national prosperity. The fairness of these dictates is built on the 
presumption of equality—of equal opportunity in a fair and unbiased system. The 
campaign accepts the existence of economic inequality by featuring menial workers and a 
newspaper-selling homeless person along with Germany’s wealthy industrialists and 
celebrities. It argues that these differences do not matter, because, as Michael Trautmann 
put it, “anyone who does something is a role model, like Einstein or Ludwig Erhard”xxi 
(Moring, 2005). Trautmann erases the differences between Germany’s most famous and 
successful citizens and its humblest by elevating productive action to the status of moral 
virtue. The campaign’s choice of Ludwig Erhard is particularly meaningful (see figure 
10). Erhard served as the first Minister of Economics after the war and is widely credited 
for West Germany’s postwar economic boom, known as the Wirtschaftswunder 
(economic miracle). As Foucault observes, he was also instrumental in establishing 
economic freedom and prosperity as a basis of the legitimacy of the new Federal 
Republic of Germany, which had lost its legitimacy through the Nazi defeat and foreign 
occupation. Erhard helped establish a framework in which “economic development and 
economic growth produces sovereignty….the economy produces legitimacy for the state 
that is its guarantor” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). The state guarantees free economic activity 
and,  
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Figure 8: This 2005 print advertisement depicting a woman with an unusually large cabbage refers to 
former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard who was one of the principle architects of postwar economic policy, and 
is widely credited for Germany’s “Economic Miracle.” The text reads in part, “Do you believe that a 
miracle is the result of hard work? Then you have something in common with Ludwig Erhard…. You too 
can work for your miracle. You decide whether you reach your goal. Not fate.”xxii  
consequently, those who participate in that activity legitimate the state through their 
participation. This 
Produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within 
these economic processes, as investors, workers, employers, and trade unions. All 
these economic partners produce a consensus, which is a political consensus, 
inasmuch as they accept this economic game of freedom. (Foucault, 2008, p. 84) 
This economic philosophy that legitimizes the state is easily extended to legitimize the 
citizenship of minorities who appear as agents within economic processes. All those who 
participate in economic activity contribute to the legitimate sovereignty of the state. As 
Chapter 6 shows, however, this act of inclusion does not inhibit racialized forms of 
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exclusion. In fact, when some groups are conceived as congenitally deficient economic 
actors, it becomes very easy to condemn the group while denying racism with the claim 
that any economically contributing individual, regardless of race, is a valid citizen. 
Furthermore, the focus on the relatively high rates of reproduction among minority 
groups defined as undesirable shows that not all children or “child-friendly” communities 
“are Germany.” Instead, they may be defined as the source of Germany’s eminent 
demise.  
Conclusion 
The social marketing campaigns inspired by hosting the 2006 World Cup 
attempted to create consensus around increasingly neoliberal economic and political 
policies. To do so, they mobilized an intimate version of the public, which is tied together 
as an affective community through affiliation with an abstract, imagined Nation. 
Although the direct appeal to mass emotion used in this campaign was a significant 
departure from postwar political communication in West Germany, the idea of economic 
activity as a force constituting national legitimacy, as “a circuit going from the economic 
institution to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84) goes back to the foundation of the Federal 
Republic. In Ludwig Erhard’s deceptively simple words, “only a state that establishes 
both the freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of 
the people” (quoted in Foucault, 2008, p. 81). As Foucault shows, freedom here refers 
primarily to economic freedom, to the ability to act as an agent in economic processes. 
Responsibility refers to the state’s obligation to create the proper conditions for market 
rationalities, or incentives, to function. In this way, the discourse of DbD is connected to 
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a well-established German political economy. At the same time, its expansion into 
intimate and affective realms and the reduction of the role of the state signals a move 
toward more all-encompassing forms of neoliberalism. As the state’s direct social role is 
diminished, the idea of the nation moves to the fore.  
DbD also marks an important change in the place of visible minorities in the 
German identitarian schema. Their inclusion can be seen in pragmatic terms as a means 
of diffusing critiques that the campaign represents a “bad” kind of nationalism. Yet, this 
move also signals something more profound. It signals the introduction of colorblind 
norms of citizenship that propose to unite the population under a moral framework of 
economic “freedom and responsibility.” This is a fundamental aspect of integration 
discourse, which holds that the path to full citizenship is equally available to all who 
formally qualify. The advertisement proposes that in today’s Germany, all who follow 
this moral framework belong to the nation. Those who fail, do so of their own choosing. 
However, as we will see in the final three chapters, the question of visible minorities’ 
qualifications is never fully settled. Instead, integration discourse holds integrant 
candidates in a separate space of evaluation, where they may be celebrated as a success 
and a credit to the nation or classified as threatening to its continued existence. The next 
chapter examines the case of an immigrant family whose defense of an oversized German 
flag against anti-nationalist attacks during the 2010 World Cup attracted the attention of 
the media and the praise of experts and politicians. As in the DbD campaign, the 
patriotism of these “new Germans” serves as a pedagogical example for normative 
Germans, authorizing and even demanding the generalized practice of public patriotism.  
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i Das Problem bei dem Projekt war, daß wir zwar die Meinungsführer erreicht haben… Wir hatten aber das 
Gefühl: Jetzt ist die Zeit, alle Deutschen anzusprechen. Sie zu animieren, von sich selbst wieder 
überrascht zu sein. 
 
ii  Hier soll wohl „Du bist Deutschland“ Abhilfe schaffen—„Ein löbliches Unterfangen“, meint Anholt, 
„das, da bin ich sicher, absolut nichts bewirken wird.“ 
iii Du zeigst uns, dass es nie den falschen, sondern eigentlich nur den richtigen Zeitpunkt gibt dich zu 
bekommen. 
iv Daß die Wirtschaft bereit ist, gesellschaftliche Verantwortung für dieses Land zu übernehmen" 
v Du bist Deutschland. Also, wie wäre es wenn du dich mal wieder selbst anfeuerst?  
vi Ziel ist es, die Erneuerung in Deutschland zu stärken, Hemmnisse abzubauen und neues Vertrauen in die 
Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes zu wecken. 
vii Deutschland im Herbst. Grauer Himmel, Nebelschleier, schlechte Stimmung. Viele Menschen haben sich 
längst abgefunden mit Arbeitslosigkeit, Unternehmenspleiten, Wohlstandsverlusten. Wie die Bäume im 
Herbst die Blätter verlieren sie den Mut, werfen die Verantwortung ab. In Deutschland im Herbst 2004 
wollten sich Bertelsmann- Vorstandschef Gunther Thielen und sein Freund Bernd Bauer damit nicht 
abfinden 
viii Der Anspruch, mit dem die Organisatoren daherkommen, ist nicht gerade bescheiden: Sie wollen gegen 
Nörgler, Schlechtredner und Selbstzweifler angehen. Nicht mehr lange soll jeder zweite Deutsche 
bekunden müssen, er habe Angst vor der Zukunft. „Wir wollen einen Aufbruch in Deutschland erreichen“, 
sagt der Leiter der Kampagne, Bernd Bauer. 
ix Schluss mit Verzagtheit, Selbstzweifel und Zukunftsangst, so spricht da eine wohlklingende Stimme auf 
den Zuhörer ein. Wir können was. Wir sind wer. Wir sind vor allem eine große Gemeinschaft, die sich zu 
begeistern vermag. 
x Offiziell geht es um eine mit den Methoden moderner Werbewirtschaft organisierte Stimmungsaufhellung 
im Lande. Den von Abstiegsängsten gepeinigten Deutschen will Schröder ein neues Wir-Gefühl 
vermitteln. Die hoch emotionale PR ist damit auch bei denen angekommen, die derartige 
Realitätsglättungen stets bekämpft haben. Wollten sie einst "die Stimme der Kritik" sein oder gar 
"Gegenöffentlichkeit" organisieren, schrecken sie nun vor gezielter Massenbeeinflussung nicht mehr 
zurück. 
xi "Das ist das Ziel: Die Deutschen endlich aus dem Stillstand zu holen, den Startschuß zu geben, damit sie 
sich bewegen wollen", sagt Initiator Bernd Bauer. 
xii Die Initiatoren hoffen, daß so viele Bürger aktiv werden. „Tu was“, wollen sie ihnen zurufen: „Mach 
was, Du kannst das“. 
xiii Der Satz paßt, weil wir den Leuten damit sagen: Es hängt an Dir, was in Deutschland passiert. Es geht 
um Dich! … Wir wollten die Leute packen. Damit jeder tut, was er kann. Deshalb die Passage: 
"Deutschland hat genug Hände, um sie einander zu reichen und anzupacken. Wir sind 82 Millionen." 
xiv Worauf wir uns konzentriert haben, ist eine Eigenart, die hierzulande derzeit ganz offensichtlich ist: Bei 
allen Problemen dieser Welt die Verantwortung von sich wegzuschieben und zu sagen: "Ich bin nicht 
schuld, das sind ja die anderen." Das findet die Intelligenzija dann zu eindimensional für ein Problem, das 
sicherlich hochkomplex verstrickt ist. Aber das kann eine Kampagne nicht lösen, sie muss sich auf ein 
Schlüsselproblem konzentrieren, das bei jedem Einzelnen liegt. 
xv Unsere Zeit schmeckt nicht nach Zuckerwatte. Das will auch niemand behaupten. Mag sein, du stehst mit 
dem Rücken zur Wand, oder dem Gesicht vor einer Mauer. Doch einmal haben wir schon gemeinsam eine 
Mauer niedergerissen. 
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xvi Wenn wir nur glückliche Leute gezeigt hätten, wäre das doch verlogen gewesen. Durch die direkte 
Ansprache, indem ein Finger aus dem Fernseher hinauszeigt, ist man zum Reagieren geradezu 
gezwungen. 
xvii Diese Werbung ist ja keine Propaganda.… Sie will niemanden von einer bestimmten politischen 
Meinung überzeugen. Sie will nur jeden Bürger an seine Verantwortung erinnern und ihn anregen, sich an 
der politischen Debatte zu beteiligen. Es kann keinen Zweifel daran geben, daß diese Absicht legitim ist 
xviii Ökonomische Probleme erscheinen in dieser Perspektive als psychosomatisches Leiden, 
Arbeitslosigkeit wird als Folge einer landesweiten Depression betrachtet und nicht mehr als Ergebnis 
bestimmter, sich aus Entscheidungen ergebender Rahmenbedingungen. Weil man es offenbar aufgegeben 
hat, an deren Veränderbarkeit zu glauben, greift man, höchst konsequent, zu einer Erweckungsrhetorik, 
welche die vage im Raum stehenden Schwierigkeiten auf die Frage ganz persönlichen Engagements 
reduziert: „Du bist Deutschland. Dein Wille ist wie Feuer unterm Hintern. Du hältst den Laden 
zusammen. Du bist der Laden. Du bist Deutschland. “ 
xix Als wir dann herausbekamen, dass es sich lediglich um einen lokalen Aufruf für einen kleinen lokalen 
Aufmarsch in Ludwigshafen handelte und keineswegs um einen Nazi-Slogan auf dem Level "Arbeit 
macht frei" oder Ähnliches, waren wir erleichtert. Zumal uns das Historiker bestätigt haben. Da konnten 
wir guten Gewissens mit dem Slogan weitermachen. 
xx Denn sehen Sie sich die Kampagne und den Spot an: Das Allerletzte, was wir wollen, ist, in eine 
nationalistische Richtung abzugleiten. Das wäre praktisch genau das Gegenteil der Kampagne. 
xxi Denn jeder, der etwas tut, ist ein Vorbild, wie Einstein oder Ludwig Erhard. 
xxii Du glaubst, dass ein Wunder das Ergebnis harter Arbeit ist? Dann hast du etwas mit Ludwig Erhard 
gemeinsam…. Auch du kannst dir dein Wunder erarbeiten. Ob du dein Ziel erreichst, entscheidest du. 
Nicht das Schicksal.  
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CHAPTER 5 – IMMIGRANT PATRIOTISM: TEACHING GERMANS TO 
CHEER 
 
After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the 
practice of public celebrations of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost 
obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World 
Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of 
the 2010 World Cup inspired minority Germans and immigrants to join in the patriotic 
displays in greater numbers. Even second and third generation migrants who inhabit the 
physical space of the German nation have only recently been allowed to lay claim to the 
metaphysical, abstract space of national citizenship. In this context, performances of 
patriotism including the marking of physical space controlled by immigrants with 
German national symbols can serve as a challenge to exclusionary ethnic ideas of 
national identity. At the same time, the promotion of civic forms of national identification 
as a challenge to ethnic nationalism reinforces the legitimacy of the nation-state as the 
paramount form of social identification. In Germany, ethnic norms of citizenship 
continue to operate alongside new conceptions of citizenship that emphasize liberal 
democratic norms of economic and social citizenship; these norms of equality, human 
rights, and freedom are framed as universal in their validity, but also endemic to 
Germany and “the West” (see Introduction and Chapter 2). Thus, while to be German 
without qualification still depends on apparent German descent, affective civic nationalist 
performances have emerged as a new route for visible minorities to claim citizenship as a 
“new German.” By moving between the arguments and rhetorical frames within the 
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media coverage and the political and social contexts they are in conversation with, this 
chapter aims to untangle these tensions as well as the political strategies and stakes of 
immigrant patriotism in Germany.  
To understand these dynamics, this chapter examines the media spectacle 
generated by a flag fight between German flag hoisting immigrants and left-wing anti-
nationalists in the Berlin neighborhood of Neukölln during the 2010 World Cup. As 
Youssef Bassal, a protagonist of the flag fight, argued, “we belong here, no matter if the 
leftists or extreme right does not like us. In the end we're even going to teach the 
Germans how to cheer for Germany again” (Grieshaber, 2010). In this conception, 
marking space in an immigrant neighborhood with the national flag of the adopted nation 
allows non-ethnic Germans to claim full access to both abstract and physical national 
space through civic national displays. In exchange for the right to identify with the 
national core, immigrants provide a model of “infantile citizenship” (L. G. Berlant, 
1997). Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past, immigrant patriotism 
authorizes and invites ethnic Germans to participate in quotidian forms of nationalist 
expression. The harmless depictions of the Bassals and their neighbors celebrating in 
over-the-top costumes bearing the national colors infantilizes the immigrant patriots and 
attests to the benign nature of symbolic celebration (figure 11). At the same time, it 
serves as a pedagogical performance aimed at teaching the diverse constituencies of the 
German nation-state how to practice civic nationalism. 
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Figure 9: Ibrahim Bassal poses with his German flags and novelty items. (Anker, 2010a) 
 
The coverage of the case examined here demonstrates how global sporting 
spectacles provide an apparently apolitical space of mediated national self-reflection. 
These popular events are focal points of national attention and frequently provide the 
stage on which debates of national significance play out. At the same time, as Maurice 
Roche observes, sports mega events reveal connections between the cultural, the political 
and the economic in modern societies and the contemporary world order (2000, p. xi). 
Moreover, the (trans)national appeal of these events invokes a powerful articulation of 
popular communication: it embodies at once the structural forces of transnational capital, 
cultural globalization, and the political dynamics at the juncture of local histories, 
representations and nationalisms in globalized contexts. Studying these dynamics, as 
occasioned by the incidents and discourses under discussion in this chapter, reveals the 
powerful structural, affective, and textual articulations of popular communication. 
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The relatively small scale of the incident required a broader search methodology 
than was used in other chapters. I used the surname of the family, Bassal, in an expanded 
Google Custom search set to search 234 German periodicals. I also searched international 
coverage of the incident using LexisNexis and the terms Bassal AND Germany. These 
searches returned 66 unique articles (table 2). Sources included regional papers from 
across Germany but mostly concentrated in Berlin, national prestige publications, as well 
as several international sources including the Wall Street Journal (US) and The 
Independent (UK). To contextualize this case, this paper builds on the discourses 
analyzed within the press coverage of the 2006 World Cup in Chapter 3. These sources 
represent a broad cross-section of the German media-scape in terms of geographical scale 
and political orientation. The national and international reach of the coverage indicates 
the broad scope of the story’s media appeal.  
Table 4: Combined Search Results for Bassal (German Periodicals) and Bassal AND Germany 
(LexisNexis) 
 
Periodical Type Total 
International 12 
National 27 
Local/Regional 27 
Total 66 
 
This case illustrates the attempt by some immigrants to contest their exclusion 
from the German citizenry from the peripheral space of a frequently-maligned immigrant 
neighborhood. Through the case we can also see glimpses of how the recent broadening 
of Germany’s legal definition of citizenship is already beginning to impact the inclusion 
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of immigrants and new Germans in German national life and in the abstract space of 
national identity. At the same time, the case shows how the opening of national 
identification on civic lines may coexist with the continued privileging of ethnic norms. 
Furthermore, the discourse of civic nationalism in the flag battle also posits the necessity 
of normalized displays of nationalism, discrediting critiques of casual forms of 
nationalism. 
The tension between the boundaries of the state and the ethnic categories of the 
people included and excluded by those boundaries is a hallmark of the modern nation-
state. Under Gellner’s famous definition, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, 
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (2006, p. 1). To 
legitimate the claim of sovereignty, the liberal democratic state must foster the belief in, 
and dedication to a common culture defined in some combination of ethnic, religious, 
linguistic, philosophical or juridical terms. This form of common identification is 
essential in liberal democracy since, as Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle write, “only 
nationalism motivates the sacrificial devotion of citizens without which there can be no 
effective governance” (1996, p. 10). The affective requirements of modern nationalism 
are thus a far more important part of the function of the modern state than the rational 
Enlightenment values of liberal democracy would acknowledge.  
George de Vos offers three basic temporal orientations for group identification: 
“past-oriented (familial-cultural), present-oriented (functional), and future-oriented 
(ideological)” (1995, p. 27). The first category correlates with ethnic nationalism and is 
rooted in the perceived common territorial origins of a social group. The second category, 
which correlates with civic nationalism, focuses on the space of experience and 
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emphasizes present participation (de Vos, 1995, p. 26). The final orientation emerges out 
of dissatisfaction with past- and present-oriented forms of national identification. 
Although some forms of this movement- or cause-orientated identity may seek to operate 
within the nation-state system, I will refer to this form as post-nationalist. In reaction to 
the nationalist atrocities of the past, post-nationalism in Germany can be seen in the 
traditional—though currently faltering—support for the supranational political project of 
the European Union as well as in the far-left politics of antifascist groups. As de Vos 
notes, these categories are by no means mutually exclusive. Still, they provide a useful 
framework for analyzing the priorities and strategies of a nation-state in defining the 
requisites for belonging to the dominant social category. They can also be used to 
understand the struggles of the members of subordinated groups to access a more 
favorable standing in society. 
These struggles can be observed in neighborhoods of multicultural cities that 
exemplify the dynamism and complexity of spaces of identity not easily accounted for by 
the homogenizing category of national citizenship. In particular, immigrant 
neighborhoods represent the permeable boundaries between the hegemonic identities of 
the majority and the competing and complementing identities of immigrant minorities. In 
nations that impose civic nationalism as the norm, de Vos writes that “some members of 
subordinate groups may seek to change their assigned or ascribed lower-status positions 
to more congenial past or future designations of self and group” (1995, p. 28). This form 
of resistance can be seen among some transnational Americans who use the flag of the 
ancestral homeland to protest American structural inequality, which often hides behind 
the symbolic equality of universal national allegiance to the stars and stripes (Flores-
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Gonzalez, 2001, p. 14). In other cases, groups marginalized by ethno-nationalist norms 
may seek to claim access to national identity through civic nationalism.  
Territory, Ethnicity and Citizenship in the Modern German Nation-State 
In Germany, the union of nation and state has been particularly strong. Although 
old regional identities—along with their differentiated languages and customs—remain, 
the conception of Germany as a territory occupied by and ruled by and for Germans (in 
Geller’s national sense) remained strong even through the cataclysmic changes of the last 
century. Although at the time of Germany’s foundation as a modern nation in 1871 it 
adopted a territory-based rule of citizenship (jus soli), “blood” (jus sanguinis) has been a 
key concept in German citizenship since 1895 after a rightward populist turn of German 
conservatives that eventually led to the fully descent-based citizenship laws of 1913.21  
These rules remained in effect, with the addition and later removal of Nazi 
policies of exclusion and racial expulsion, through the end of the millennium. Despite the 
rapid growth of the foreigner population, until 2000 a child acquired German citizenship 
only by descent from a German parent. Although naturalization was contemplated in law, 
even for highly qualified candidates, the process was ambiguous, arbitrary and 
prohibitive (Göktürk et al., 2007, p. 151). When the revision of the Nationality Act22 was 
enacted establishing jus soli citizenship in 2000, there were approximately 7.5 million 
                                                          
 
 
 
21 1913 Reichs- und Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz 
22 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG 
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foreign nationals living in Germany, which represented nearly 10 percent of the country’s 
population. Nearly 1.5 million of these “foreigners” were born in Germany. In fact, one-
third of all foreigners had been in Germany for over twenty years (Abraham, 2008, p. 
149). The new citizenship laws opened membership to German society to millions of 
residents, at least legally.  
The introduction of jus soli citizenship rights through the revision of the 
Nationality Act in the late 1990s was highly contentious (Göktürk et al., 2007). It was 
passed with varying degrees of resignation, even among many leaders in the governing 
coalition of the center-left Social Democratic (SPD) and the center-right Free Democratic 
parties (FDP) that proposed the reforms (Nathans, 2004, p. 252). This is clear in the 
remarks of then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who introduced and concluded the section 
of his speech to the Bundestag addressing the law by focusing on the need to face what 
he called “reality,” that is, that recent immigrants were unlikely to leave. The lack of 
enthusiasm for the changes is even clearer in the statements of one of the Social 
Democratic Party experts on citizenship law, Dieter Wiefelspütz, who said in a 1997 
debate that “we aren’t going to be rid of the people here now” (quoted in Nathans, 2004, 
p. 255). Territorial rights to citizenship introduced new forms of uncertainty into the 
definition of society and the population.  Under the sole rule of “blood” rights to 
citizenship, the biopolitical metaphor of the social body functioned with seeming 
transparency. The blood connection limited the types of birth that were relevant in 
biopolitical terms. Territorial birthright introduced new concerns about disparate fertility 
rates among various groups for the national future (see also Chapter 6). With the 
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expansion of the definition of the population to include territorial rights, the increased 
complexity of defining the population has spurred new forms of surveillance and control. 
This expansion of access to citizenship has been accompanied by new restrictions 
on immigration. Liberalizing the laws governing citizenship was easier when the 
government seemed better able to control who might come to live in the country 
(Nathans, 2004, p. 252). Before 2000, restrictions on immigrants from European 
countries and on ethnic German Spätaussiedler23 were much looser than on immigrants 
from countries perceived as less “culturally compatible.” In practice, this cultural 
incompatibility was primarily ascribed to Turks and immigrants from other 
predominantly Muslim countries. This process has continued in the 2000s with the new 
immigration act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), that, as Markus Schmitz writes, “unmistakably 
opted for the Europeanization of the national immigrant labour market and for centralized 
control over non-EU immigrants” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 262). This law includes new 
requirements for residency that “specifically [regulate] the national (re-) socialization of 
immigrants from non-European countries who are required to attend so-called 
‘integration courses’”. These laws are applicable to new immigrants as well as those who 
already reside in the country but are determined to be “in particular need of integration 
measures.”  
                                                          
 
 
 
23 In 1993, the ‘Right of Return’ was extended to individuals of German ethnicity living in the former 
communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
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Integration and Redemption: A Civic Alliance for New Nationalism 
In Germany, where the connection of ethnic nationalism to the crimes of the Nazi 
period lingers despite efforts to relativize and historicize it, the persistence of ethnic 
conceptions of Germanness have made celebrating national pride contentious. Leftist 
anti-fascist (Antifa) and anarchist groups attempt to maintain the awareness of this 
connection through attacks on banal nationalist discourse and symbolism. However, in 
the battle between critical and celebratory approaches to national symbolism, the latter 
have made significant gains in recent years.  The “soccer patriotism” of men’s World 
Cup soccer has opened a new path in Germany for mitigating the negative associations of 
ethnic nationalism without following the post-nationalists in abandoning nationalism all 
together (see Chapter 3). That the 2006 World Cup provided the setting for the renewal of 
German nationalism concords with scholarship on mega-events and the symbolic 
cultivation of the modern nation-state. According to Maurice Roche, since their invention 
in the late 19th century, modern states have used international and supranational cultural 
events to create a space of transitory uniqueness. They offer concrete, if transitory, 
versions of symbolic and participatory community (2000, p. 7). Since the establishment 
of broadcast media, sporting spectacles have consistently provided the largest audiences 
ever assembled (Wenner, 2002). The symbolic power of these events is amplified by the 
fact that more than any other popular genre, sports has demonstrated the capacity to 
assemble publics that approach the totality of the public. The pretext of hosting an 
international sporting event gave the German public license to worship national symbols 
while still maintaining that the celebration had nothing to do with the nation, but was 
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merely an expression of enthusiasm for the game. Given their role as hosts, many in the 
media even portrayed patriotic displays as the duty of the host nation.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, during the 2006 World Cup, the German press heralded 
the birth of a new civic religion. The language in the press characterized new patriotism 
in religious terms. The experience of thus losing the individual self in the totality of the 
whole, through communication with the national symbolic is described in the media as a 
hyperbolic experience of “euphoria”, “exultation” or “jubilance”. To use the terminology 
of Marvin and Ingle, through devotion to the “totem god” made tangible in the vernacular 
flag (1996), the German people are said to have been restored, made whole again. In 
2010, immigrants and minority Germans joined ethnic Germans in civic nationalist 
displays in unprecedented numbers, according to the German and international media. 
Cheering for the national team was made more attractive by the teams unprecedented 
diversity. In fact, 11 of the 23 national players in 2010 had a transnational background. A 
significant proportion of the team would not have legally qualified to wear the German 
jersey just 10 years prior. The black, red, and gold-draped celebrations of soccer fans 
including many immigrants, and the backlash they provoked among left-wing post-
nationalists, provided an opportunity to establish a new nationalist pedagogy designed to 
reorient German national identity. In the Neukölln flag fight in particular, the media used 
the immigrant example to “teach the Germans how to cheer for Germany again.”  
Broadcasting New Nationalism 
 In the immigrant neighborhood of Neukölln, which, as journalists emphasized, is 
home to 300,000 in habitants from more than 160 nations, owners of a small family-run 
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electronics shop on the Sonnenallee gained national attention for the struggle surrounding 
their enormous German flag. The family—alternately described as “Arab”, “Lebanese”, 
“Lebanese living in Germany,” “German-Lebanese,” “Lebanese-German”, “German of 
Lebanese descent,” “German of Lebanese background,” “German,” “shopkeepers with 
Arab roots”—ordered a German flag measuring 22 meters tall and 5 meters wide 
specially made to cover the façade of their five-story building at a cost of 500 EU. They 
had hung small German flags outside for years without incident. The cousins, Youssef 
and Ibrahim Bassal, and Badr Mohammed told journalists that immediately upon hanging 
their flag they were approached by leftist individuals who criticized them, demanded they 
take the flag down, and accused them of nationalism. The encounters escalated and the 
flag was attacked, set on fire, and cut down by an unidentified party that accessed it by 
climbing onto the roof. According to an article published on June 25, one cousin, Badr 
Mohammed, stated that if the flag antagonists were successful in destroying the flag, they 
would not order a second one due to the prohibitive cost (Anker, 2010a). Despite 
organizing a neighborhood watch the flag was successfully damaged or stolen on three 
occasions (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010).  But, as the coverage asserts, the attacks 
only steeled the family’s resolve to display their national devotion to Germany, leading 
them to purchase two more identical replacement flags. 
 Their explanations for their devotion to German symbols emphasize their right, 
based on their affective devotion and their lived experience, to identify with their adopted 
nation. The Bassals shared pieces of their migration narratives to illustrate their process 
of becoming German.  
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“When I came to Berlin in the middle of the 1980s, I couldn’t speak a word of 
German. It annoyed me so much that I couldn’t understand anything, that I 
wanted to learn the language quickly. Today Berlin is my home; I am German, 
have a German passport, my kids were born here. I live and work here, pay taxes. 
Why shouldn’t I also support the German soccer team,” asks Ibrahim.i 
(Nachtsheim, 2010) 
This narrative begins with learning the German language as the first point of entry into 
German society. Language learning, and the supposed inability and unwillingness of 
immigrants and their children to learn German, is one of the primary objects of scrutiny 
in German debates on integration (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010; Gramling, 2009; Wiese, 
2015; see also Chapter 7). I. Bassal starts with his journey to linguistic competence and 
then lists a series of other qualifications, from the official state sanctioning of the 
passport and contributions to government coffers, to the lived experiences of raising 
children and working. Bassal shows that he is a fully active and competent citizen. In 
other articles the cousins mention their relatives in the police and the army, emphasizing 
the ultimate sacrifice they, as a community, are willing to make for the nation.  
[I. Bassal] has spent most of his life here. His family as truly arrived in Germany. 
His nephews serve in the military, and one is now even training with the Berlin 
police, in the “higher levels of the civil service,” as Ibrahim stresses.ii (Klatt, 
2010) 
Ibrahim Bassal: “I say: We feel like Germans. I was born here. My two children 
were born here, and one of my friends fights with the army in Afghanistan. We 
identify with Germany and, naturally, with the German flag.”iii (Schupelius, 2010) 
 This last statement, which was repeated in several articles, claims territorial birthright to 
citizenship, whereas in most of the statements the Bassal cousins state that they 
immigrated decades earlier. In other articles, the cousins’ claim to German belonging—
and to self-determination generally—is even more assertive, almost a provocation.  
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“We won’t let anyone tell us, that we can’t hang the flag.” And furthermore: “We 
live here, we have our existence here, and also our roots—little by little.”iv 
(Grabitz, 2010) 
 “‘I am a German,’ he declared in between customers, many of whom he spoke 
with in Arabic. ‘It’s that simple’” (Angelos, 2010).  
Moving between German and Arabic, while claiming the legitimacy of his citizenship 
affirms that pluralism and transnationalism should now be considered part of what 
defines the German population. Other quotes from non-ethnic German Neuköllners 
echoed these sentiments (see “Trommeln für Deutschland,” 2006). The family’s claims to 
legitimate citizenship using the evidence of their devotion to national symbols were 
celebrated in the press, presented as a model for minorities and immigrants as well as for 
normative nationals.  
Nationalism as Normality 
This case reveals a persistent tension in the German relationship to the flag and 
nationalist celebration. Even while there is a belief that Germans are prevented from 
celebrating freely because of past nationalist excesses, press discourse in this case affirms 
that nationalist celebration is normal, natural, and salutary. Frustration with this tension is 
revealed in the ascription of normality and abnormality to the actions of the event’s 
players. To alleviate the tension and situate national celebration as normal and good, 
moral reservations about it need to be discredited and inhibitions dismissed as illegitimate 
or abnormal. The first assumption of normality that the articles affirm is that citizens 
should venerate their national symbols. As Butler writes about the instantiation of the 
sexed position, through the assumption of the national position and its appropriate 
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performances in this instance, the media creates the fiction of the preexisting positions 
and behaviors it assumes (2011, p. 71). Journalists (re)iterate the assumption that national 
subjects should naturally venerate the national flag. The actions of the white German flag 
antagonists violate this assumption.  
So [Badr Mohammed] fights against Germans and for the German flag. 
Sonnenallee 36 stands for the contradictory relationship of many Germans to their 
country.v (Stawski, 2010) 
The leftist scene in Berlin has started a campaign against German flags. The juicy 
part: most German flags hang from the apartments of foreigners—they don’t 
understand the world anymore.vi (“Linksradikale reißen Deutschlandflaggen ab,” 
2010) 
In Neukölln the world stands on its head. Turks and Arabs hoist the German 
flag—on their cars, their shops, their houses and apartments. They rejoice over 
our national eleven. At night radical German leftists come [and] tear the flags 
down or light them on fire.vii (Schupelius, 2010) 
While the coverage assumes that normative Germans should celebrate the flag, the 
articles frequently frame it as counterintuitive that immigrants would venerate the flag of 
their adopted nation, assuming, at the very least, that they should be less ardent devotees 
than autochthonous Germans.  
The flag fight, which is described as “bizarre” and “grotesque,”  transgresses this 
expectation by emphasizing the sacrifices of the immigrant protagonists and their 
neighbors, their flag devotion descripted as “a minor miracle” (Scally, 2010). The flag-
defending cousins are frequently quoted emphasizing this transgression of normality. 
The two [cousins] cannot comprehend that Neuköllners of Arab heritage [have to] 
defend the German flag against those of German heritage.viii (“Linke bekämpfen 
vermeintlich zu deutsche Araber,” 2010) 
Almost bemused, they state that the Neuköllners of Arab heritage from the 
Sonnenallee are defending the German flag against those of German heritage. 
Upside-down world, they find.ix (Anker, 2010a) 
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[Bassal] simply cannot understand that the protest is coming from the German 
side.x (Hagen, 2010a) 
Bassal is baffled. He finds it strange—and also irritating—that Germans want to 
forbid a Lebanese from hanging up a black-red-gold flag.xi (“Fahnen-Streit,” 
2010) 
Why are Germans tearing down their flag, while people of all nations celebrate 
the black-red-gold?xii (Nachtsheim, 2010) 
The cousins’ statements are used to affirm that not only is it natural for normative 
citizens to celebrate the flag, the fact that immigrants and foreign-nationals would do so 
proves that it cannot involve the taint of exclusionary forms of German nationalism. In 
this case, the blurring of the boundaries of the national subject to include immigrant 
patriotism reconciles nationalist norms with liberal democratic expectations of tolerance 
and, thus, secures the foundations of contemporary German nationalism. The last 
question posed above, by a German commentator, characterizes the flag fight as a 
transgression of the benign order of a German patriotism in the naturalized world of 
nations. This rhetorical question set the grounds for the reaffirmation of patriotic practice 
as distinct from, and opposed to, chauvinism in order to invalidate the post-nationalist 
critique of symbolic nationalism.  
Invalidating the post-nationalist critique 
“Flag fighters mistake patriotism for nationalism” 
The corollary of the immigrant’s unexpected German patriotism is the aberrant 
anti-nationalism of the German activists. Their rejection of the flag is characterized as 
unnatural but not entirely unexpected. It is framed as evidence of a pathology in German 
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national self-conception that results in the misconception of all national symbolism and 
sentiment as tantamount to Nazism. The flag thieves’ critique of nationalism as a political 
system was simplified to the point of absurdity, characterized as illogical and incoherent.  
A question posed by the flag protagonists across the body of articles is, “Why 
shouldn’t we cheer for Germany?” The articles identify and invalidate two possible 
answers to this question. The first possible answer is that the brutality of past crimes of 
German nationalism is so exceptional as to make German national celebration immoral in 
perpetuity. As one 58 year-old woman is quoted as saying, "Germany did too many 
horrible things during the Third Reich to be able to cheer out loud for this country" 
(Grieshaber, 2010).  The press coverage of this case shows almost universal skepticism of 
this view.  To this point, Youssef Bassal is quoted as saying, "It's not like there is still a 
swastika on Germany's flag" (Grieshaber, 2010). Because immigrants are not implicated 
in the Nazi atrocities, they are taken as having the authority to absolve the present 
generation for past German crimes. This portrayal characterizes anti-fascist flag fighters 
as foolish and their critique as preposterous.  
The flag is not hanging there “because of the Second World War, but rather for 
the German team: because the German team is no longer really German; it’s 
multi-kulti and we belong to that” explains Bassal.xiii (“„Wir werden die deutsche 
Fahne verteidigen”,” 2010) 
Here they have made a point of destroying and removing Germany flags hanging 
outside shops and vehicles because they believe the proud patriotism hearkens 
back to the ugly nationalism of the Third Reich. (“Leftists Harass Immigrants for 
Supporting Germany,” 2010) 
As soon as [Bassal hung the flag], young people aggressively came into his store 
and accused him of supporting nationalism and waking Nazi feelings in the 
German population once again.xiv (T. Reitz, 2010) 
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In Berlin-Neukölln, the multi-kulti neighborhood par excellence… above all 
German-Turks and German-Arabs adorn their shops in black-red-gold. The 
“Autonomous” scene from the black block— “Never again Germany!”—naturally 
cannot tolerate this. The antifascist fight knows no mercy, and even the 
shopkeeper from Lebanon can be a menacing flag-Nazi”xv (Mohr, 2010) 
To associate immigrants waving the German flag with National Socialism is intuitively 
ludicrous. Pointing this out invalidates critiques of “event-dependent nationalism,” as one 
anti-fascist group called it, and places it above accusations of chauvinism. In addition, it 
invalidates any argument that seeks to make comparisons between present and past forms 
of nationalism, enshrining the Nazi past as exceptional and aberrant. As one article puts 
it, “the Bassal cousins say their patriotism has nothing to do with the evils that transpired 
long before they immigrated to Germany. Rather, they say, the flag is an expression of 
the good life they've built here” (Angelos, 2010). This narrative emphasizes a present- 
and future-oriented nationalism—or “patriotism” as it is invariably called—based on the 
economic prosperity of post-war Germany, while marginalizing arguments referencing 
the Nazi past. 
The flag fight narrative naturalizes and solidifies the distinction between the 
“good” patriotism of the immigrant flag protagonists and the “bad” nationalism of the 
National Socialist past and the xenophobic racism of the present. Today’s German flag is 
characterized as anathema to nationalism, which belongs to despotism. As one editorial 
put it, “Not for nothing was the flag of German Democracy forbidden during the Third 
Reich”xvi (“Schwarz-rot-bunt,” 2010). As in the coverage of the “soccer patriotism” of 
the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 3), the disapproval of the openly xenophobic far-right 
is used to show the morality of the object under discussion. It is as if the democratic 
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pedigree of the national colors prevents them from falling in the realm of nationalism, 
which is presumed to be anti-democratic.  
However, as Michael Billig’s work on banal nationalism shows, even on the far-
right, nationalists rarely characterize themselves as such. Instead, in-groups tend to 
describe their motivations as patriotic (Billig, 1995, p. 57). Popular and scholarly claims 
of an obvious distinction between aggressive nationalism and defensive patriotism fall 
apart under examination. To illustrate, Billig references writings on nationalism from the 
Nazi period observing that “fascists will protest that they are defenders, not attackers, 
only taking against foreigners when the latter are a danger to the beloved homeland” 
(1995, p. 57). Even the most ardent nationalists conceptualize their actions as 
domestically oriented, defensive and motivated by the love of the homeland and its 
people. While the specific projects carried out following nationalist assumptions may 
vary radically, encompassing projects of solidarity and of violent exclusion, 
distinguishing negative and positive form as distinct psychological phenomena does not 
hold up to scrutiny. In deconstructing this distinction, Billig is not making a normative 
argument demonizing patriotism; instead he strips away the normative distinction that 
uses the nationalism of “others” to place “our” patriotism above reproach, naturalizing 
the world of nations with its “universal code of particularity” (1995, pp. 72–72). Billig 
argues for critically examining the construction  of the globalized “habitus” (Bourdieu, 
1994) of nationalism, a phenomenon that has been so successful that it is rarely noticed 
and very difficult to imagine elsewise. Billig examines the relationship between the 
waved and the unwaved, forgettable flag. Both modes of flagging make up banal 
nationalism, although Billig’s primary intervention is focusing attention on the ignored 
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unwaved form. Billig proposes that in the stable nation-state, the unnoticed form 
overtakes the actively symbolic and communicative form of flagging that accompanies 
disputes over territory and national identity. In the German case, the desire to erase 
contention around the flag played out most strongly in the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 
3). While the 2010 flag fight was a contentious episode, the press used it to discredit the 
flag antagonists and establish the propriety of banal nationalism, which includes both 
unnoticed everyday flagging and organized, sanctioned episodes of exuberant flag 
waving.  
The media’s characterization of normality in the flag fight suggests that despite 
the friction that regularly manifests around nationalism in Germany, assumptions of the 
proper behavior of nationals—that they should celebrate and defend the national flag—
were already well established in the mediated public sphere at the time. The participation 
of the immigrant protagonists is posed as proof of the inclusive, democratic nature of 
contemporary German nationalism. The flag’s defense by immigrant patriots nullifies any 
association with nationalism, as with Y. Bassal’s rhetorical question “What, pray tell, 
have I got to do with the Nazis?”xvii (Lau, 2010). Both the flag skeptics and enthusiasts of 
national celebrations share the assumption that the Nazi past is exceptional, and therefore 
incomparable. For the skeptics of nationalism, this means that Germans have an 
exceptional moral obligation to abstain from the nationalist celebration that is a global 
norm. For national celebrants, the exceptionalism of the Nazi past means that any 
reference to it as a comparative tool is illegitimate. Furthermore, national celebrants 
consider the moral obligations advocated by the skeptics to be unfair and discriminatory.  
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However, if we do not accept the exceptionalism of the discourses of nationalism 
from the Nazi period, both of these positions are destabilized. This is not to deny the 
importance of ethical and normative discussions examining the extent of the evils of the 
period. Instead, it clears the ground for important discussions about the extent to which 
banal nationalism may provide a basis of continuity that has made it possible to maintain 
the idea of a coherent nation through successive transformations of the state. It also 
enables the crucial consideration of the continuities in conceptions of “the people” and 
the ways threats to the population are conceptualized. After all, the most valuable 
understandings to be gained from the Nazi period are not simply the recognition of the 
human capacity for brutality but rather how, as Agamben puts it, a nation can transition 
so easily from modern parliamentary democracy to totalitarianism and back to democracy 
(1998, p. 122). Agamben argues that the ease of this transition points to the extent to 
which politics has become biopolitics. The banality of nationalism—with its assumptions 
about citizenship and about which life has political value—is deeply implicated in this 
process. This question has relevance far beyond German borders. Events like the flag 
fight provide opportunities to modify and affirm consensus around these assumptions and 
to discuss nationalist norms in order to forget them (Billig, 1995).  
 In waging war against what the anti-fascist representatives on the internet called 
“event-dependent nationalism,” flag antagonists sought to underscore the repressive and 
racist authority of the nation-state. In a statement made on the internet calling for a 
national World Cup flag battle, a person identified as Ines Müller wrote, "It seems as 
though the Germans are yearning for a basis for their identity that would allow them to 
push the German state and its past in the background, but neither the present nor the past 
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can be repressed" (Angelos, 2010). Post-nationalist statements regarding the flag fight 
raise reasoned arguments linking soccer nationalism to everyday discourses delineating 
and excluding “those who do not fit the image of the ‘good German’” (Autonome 
Neuköllner Antifa, 2010). More fundamentally, they raised objections to the hegemony 
of nationalism as a mode of governmentality. In a statement regarding the media 
interpretations of the flag fight, one Neukölln-based antifascist group, which did not 
claim to participate in flag-stealing activities, characterized the nation as “an obligatory 
collective in which societal contradictions—such as the permanent competitive 
relationship between individuals—must be obscured and individual happiness must defer 
to the supposedly superior interests of the national collective” (Autonome Neuköllner 
Antifa, 2010). In choosing to wage their battle against the private property of individuals, 
however, the broader post-nationalist political agenda was ignored or villainized in the 
press. Instead, the illegal anti-fascist actions are used to portray the flag-wavers as 
courageous heroes (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). The clear immorality of the attack on 
personal property bestows moral authority on the victim who resists the attackers. 
“Flag fighters are anti-immigrant” 
Once the activist critique of nationalism is ruled unreasonable, the remaining 
answer proposed in the articles to the question of why the Bassal’s flag was targeted is 
that activists must believe immigrants do not have the right to affiliate themselves with 
the German nation. In several statements, the cousins recognize the distinction between 
the xenophobia that motivates right-wing extremists and the motivations of the leftists. A 
typical example of this reads, “For the fascists we are foreigners, and for the anarchists… 
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actually, I have no idea what we are to them”xviii (Hagen, 2010a, 2010b). However, in 
most of the coverage, about the nature of the identitarian politics motivating leftists’ 
actions gives way to statements that directly conflate leftist positions with xenophobia 
and hatred. 
From their perspective, we are migrants. They don’t understand Germans who 
defend Germany who are not of German descent. (I. Bassal quoted in Anker, 
2010a)  
Youssef Bassal doesn’t understand the world anymore: “We have relatives who 
serve in the military and with the police. Germany took us in when we had to flee 
war in Lebanon. We know how much we owe to our new Heimat. And this 
hatred…xix (“Deutschland-Hasser terrorisieren Fußball-Fans,” 2010) 
In this way, the leftists’ actions are attributed to ethno-nationalist rather than post-
nationalist ideologies. Left-wing radical groups may practice their own forms of ethnic 
essentialization (see Chapter 3 for discussion of the leftist form of German 
exceptionalism). In fact, the statement about the fear of waking “Nazi feelings” in 
normative Germans attributed to flag-critics in the article by Reitz quoted above shows a 
kind of exceptionalism regarding Germans’ relation to nationalism. If this second-hand 
repetition is accurate, this statement implies that Germans are particularly susceptible to 
dangerous forms of nationalism. While this form of essentialism merits critical 
deconstruction, the articles in the archive tended to skirt this more complex question, 
simply characterizing the flag-thieves as anti-immigrant and their anti-nationalist politics 
as facile and absurd.  
For German post-nationalists, the cultivation of a national identity at the state 
level is necessarily dependent on the definition of Others, which leads to racism and 
group-based hatred. In a photograph taken during the flag fight, the masked members of 
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the group Anti-Racist Alliance Neukölln (Antirassistische Bündnis Neukölln) stand over a 
mound of flags with a banner that reads, “German flags can’t help against racism” (see 
figure 13). The picture, which was posted on the website Indymedia linksunten, was 
accompanied by a letter claiming responsibility for the theft of 5,000 flags, including 
“one of the internationally known giant Sonnenallee flags” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010). 
Post-nationalists do not believe in a benign, egalitarian form of nationalism. The flag 
thieves position themselves against all forms of flag celebration, whether by immigrants 
or by established Germans, stating, “We oppose the media discourse that accuses us of 
making our neighbors into ‘foreigners.’ The debate around the ‘Neukölln flag fight’ only 
serves one thing: the image of a ‘cosmopolitan’ German nation!”xx This goal of 
promoting Germany as cosmopolitan, or open to the world (weltoffen), using national 
symbolism runs contrary to the post-nationalist conviction that flags are necessarily tools 
that divide populations.  
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Figure 10: This was published on the website linksunten.indymedia.org along with a letter claiming 
responsibility for the theft of 5000 flags. The banner reads: “German flags can’t help against racism! Attack 
nationalism! Stop deportations!” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010) 
 
The flag thieves argue that integration is an idea that is used to dictate that 
immigrants undertake one-sided adaptation even while they are denied full societal 
participation (AntiraBündnis44, 2010). However, as they protested in their statement, the 
narrative that developed in the press framed the anti-flag campaign as an anti-immigrant 
action, suggesting that they took particular issue with immigrant patriotism. In all the 
articles examined for this chapter, only one, from the progressive independent Die 
Tageszeitung, challenged this narrative, pointing out that it makes more sense to see the 
attacks on immigrants’ German flags as evidence that the leftists see anyone waving a 
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(German) flag as an equal antagonist; “They do not pay attention to origins, for them 
every flag waver is a nationalist and, therefore, the enemy”xxi (Alke, 2010). Without 
necessarily agreeing with their politics, this journalist was the only one to question the 
logic of framing the flag vandals’ actions as anti-immigrant.  
Teaching civic nationalism 
 
Then a small boy enters the store. He reaches for one of the small flags meant for 
mounting on cars.  
"What sort of flag do you have there?" Bassal asks the child.  
"Germany," the child, who also appears to be of immigrant descent, replies 
quickly.  
"And what do you love?" Bassal asks.  
"Germany," the child calls out.  
Bassal smiles, satisfied.  (Hagen, 2010b) 
 
After resolving the question of the legitimacy of German patriotic displays by 
minority Germans and immigrants, the media turn to the task of broadcasting the Bassal 
cousins’ lessons on civic nationalist comportment. Media coverage of the flag fight 
portrays immigrants as natural teachers, “leading the way in teaching Germans how to 
feel good about themselves” (Grieshaber, 2010). Journalists observed that in 2010 the 
immigrant neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln seemed to be even more heavily 
bedecked with the German flags than the “traditionally German” neighborhoods in Berlin 
(Stollowsky, 2010b). “Former immigrants” are showing “bio-Germans,” with their 
inhibited relationship with the flag, how to be more relaxed showing the flag (Anker, 
2010b). The use of the term “bio-German” here reinforces the normativity of ethnic or 
blood-based citizenship. The use of “former” as a qualifier for immigrants suggests that, 
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although the family members had undertaken immigration, in this context they have 
overcome their immigrant status.  
Journalists describe the Bassal’s electronics shop as the center of World Cup 
activity in Neukölln. The oversized flag outside the store calls to wayward patriots, and 
invites them to enter the church of civic religion. “Now the little shop is almost full of 
people,” states one article, “all curious to hear the story of the giant flag” (Hagen, 2010b). 
The flag even draws pilgrims, as another article shows: “an older woman enters the store. 
She isn’t interested in a cell phone card or a TV cable, instead she says, ‘I’ve come all the 
way from Wilmersdorf. I absolutely had to see the flag.’”xxii (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 
2010). Ibrahim Bassal, who jokes that he has a dry tongue from so much storytelling, is 
always willing to tell the story one more time, and so are journalists.  
According to Bassal family statements, what started as an idea to do “a little 
something extra” in celebrating the World Cup that year became something more. The 
conflict and the public attention it generated solidified their defense of the flag into a 
mission to promote patriotic performance. Articles show that hanging the flag was 
carefully orchestrated to make a statement and teach a lesson to fellow immigrants and 
ethnic Germans alike, breaking through the boundaries of the “parallel society” 
(Parallelgesellschaft) supposedly exemplified by the neighborhood.  
It is often said of the Germans, that their relationship to their own flag is 
sometimes tense. But as during the Summer Fairytale four years ago or the 
European Championship two years ago, former immigrants showed the “bio-
Germans,” according to [Green Party politician Özcan] Mutlut [sic], how to be 
more relaxed with showing the flag.xxiii (Anker, 2010b) 
The flag represented a conscious effort to demonstrate and claim belonging, and to reach 
out to ethnic Germans. Ibrahim Bassal went so far as to say that the five-story flag was “a 
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small gift to this country.” In explaining their decision to order the flag, Badr Mohammed 
was quoted as saying, “we considered amongst ourselves what we could do to show 
everyone: ‘we belong together’”xxiv (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Mohammed is a politician in 
the ruling center-right Christian Democratic Party, and is consequently well versed in the 
perceptions and interpretations of immigrant actions (“Flagge zeigen,” 2010). After 18 
years with the center-left Social Democrats, Mohammed switched to the Christian 
Democrats in 2009 after dissatisfaction with the social democratic approach to the 
politics of integration. In a statement made at the time of his decision, Mohammed 
emphasized the need to “build the unity of Germans of diverse backgrounds and 
religions”xxv (Schulz, 2009). Mohammed emphasized the need for immigrants to be 
productive and loyal German citizens, a position which he said was not sufficiently 
supported by the center-left party. The statements of the flag defending family self-
consciously wield their particular patriotic authority to position themselves at the center 
of the new diverse Germany they are seeking to promote. This immigrant patriotism 
resonates with the desire of German conservatives to popularize a new form of banal 
nationalism that cannot be associated with past nationalist atrocities (Geisler, 2005; see 
also Chapters 1 and 3). Aware of the political implications of the flag spectacle, the 
cousins’ enactment of multicultural patriotism must be read as a political and pedagogical 
act directed at both ethnic Germans and new Germans. 
The news stories show that the lesson was enthusiastically received by German 
politicians as well as by the wo/man on the street. “Integration expert” Burkard Dregger, 
also of the center-right Christian Democratic Party, is quoted opining that the flag was 
exemplary in showing that those who hung it were ready to “identify with our nation. 
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Many long-time Berliners could take a lesson from them”xxvi (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). 
Ethnic Germans quoted on the scene all approve of the flag and its owners’ fight to 
defend it. Still, the divisions separating the categories of native and migrant run deep. 
Although the ethnic Germans quoted are enthusiastic about the family’s message of 
unity, their statements maintain the normative notion of Germanness, constructing 
“integration” as unidirectional process. “We have to get away from calling these people 
foreigners,” 19-year-old customer, Manuel Hornauer, is quoted as saying. “It is super 
when they are so integrated” (Hagen, 2010b). Similarly, an elderly woman in the 
company of two friends who made the pilgrimage to see the flag commented, “When the 
Turks feel like Germans, I find that beautiful,” wrongly assuming the cousins to be 
Turks. “It’s good that they feel like us” (Angelos, 2010). Others have even more trouble 
internalizing the pluralist identifications possible under civic nationalism. On another 
occasion a woman stopped by the store to ask why the Bassals didn’t put up a Palestinian 
flag (Angelos, 2010). The flag fight revealed the normative ethnic nationalist 
assumptions of majority Germans, while providing an opportunity to supplement them 
through the affirmation of a broader form of civic nationalism.  
Soccer Patriotism and Sports Integration 
The flag fight was widely hailed in the media as a “sign of integration” (Anker, 
2010a). The term “integration,” along with its adjective and verb forms, appears 93 times 
in the corpus in 40 different articles. The patriotic performance of the Bassal family from 
the heart of one of Germany’s most stigmatized neighborhoods is so powerful and 
unexpected that many journalists claim it has made them reconsider common portrayals 
274 
 
of the neighborhood. Neukölln is described as a foreign space and its enthusiasm for 
German national symbols is, therefore, portrayed as unexpected.  
This alone is remarkable: an Arab family has rolled out likely one of the biggest 
German flags in the country here of all places, in Neukölln where every fifth 
person is a foreigner.xxvii (Stawski, 2010)  
Terms used to describe Neukölln include “social problem area” (Bein, 2010), “problem 
neighborhood” (Grabitz, 2010; Zehrt, 2010), and “social combustion point” (Anker, 
2010b).  It is described as being “like an oriental bazar” (Stollowsky, 2010a) boasting 
“the busiest police station,” “the largest unemployment office in Germany” and “at least 
one suspicious mosque” (Keseling, 2006).24 The “Sonnenallee is a man’s street” 
(Keseling, 2006) in a neighborhood that is plagued by “language deficits,” “criminality 
and poverty” (Anker, 2010a) that also “brings many children into the world” (Keseling, 
2006). Journalists exoticize the neighborhood, emphasizing its difference in classically 
Orientalist terms and associating that difference with social deficits. It is masculine, 
dangerous, and highly fertile. One article lists a litany of commonly known critiques of 
the neighborhood, claiming that the flag fight does not fit with this picture.  
Neukölln has for years earned a rather ignominious fame as a social combustion 
point. Unemployment, low level of education, high percentage of foreigners, 
criminality, and poverty are more pronounced here than in other neighborhoods. 
More than 300,000 inhabitants from more than 160 nations live in Neukölln… 
The flag fight does not fit in this image of Neukölln.xxviii (Anker, 2010a) 
                                                          
 
 
 
24 This article, which appeared four years before the flag fight, was a feature piece on Neukölln that 
included a short portrait of Youssef Bassal. Although it predates the flag fight, it sheds light on long-
standing perceptions of the neighborhood. Since it also includes one of the central flag fight protagonists, I 
decided to include it in the corpus.  
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More neutral characterizations of the neighborhood refer to it as “multi-kulti,” but most 
often its diversity is associated with other social deficits. English language articles 
describe the neighborhood in less negative terms, such as “working-class district” 
(Hagen, 2010b) and “multicultural neighborhood”  (Scally, 2010). Journalists repeated 
familiar tropes of the neighborhood’s marginality, foreignness, and deficiency, and then 
proposed that the patriotic performance of the flag fight could be cause to reconsider this 
image.  
Throughout the corpus, the patriotic performance of the Bassal family is directly 
equated with integration. The fierceness of their loyalty to Germany was increasingly 
emphasized as the flag battle progressed, as evidenced by the financial and even physical 
sacrifices made to the flag. The willingness to sacrifice to the national totem (Marvin & 
Ingle, 1999) provides proof of their integration. As discussed above, the Bassals provide 
other arguments and evidence supporting the legitimacy of their claim to German 
citizenship, but, in the end, the flag and its defense provide the key evidence.  
A few streets away is the notorious Rollberg quarter, where gangs of youth, 
mostly Lebanese multiple offenders, make trouble…. Failed integration? The 
Bassal cousins have their own perspective on things. They defend the German 
flag.xxix (Grabitz, 2010)  
With three plush soccer balls atop his oversized Germany hat, Ibrahim Bassal 
does not exactly look fearsome, but he is very serious. “We will defend our flag 
even with our blood. No one will tear it down again,” says the 39-year-old 
[Bassal] full of passion, pointing with his index finger to the giant black-red-
golden flag above his electronics shop… “From now on we will keep watch 
around the clock”xxx (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010) 
Youssef Bassal’s face color has turned somewhat grey-green. He has not slept 
much in the recent days—since “these strange Germans” turned up at his shop 
wanting to tear down his flag. He smiles, tired but satisfied like someone who is 
fighting the good fight. Bassal is fighting for the honor of the German flag: “I will 
defend this flag—[even] if I don’t get to sleep at all!”xxxi (Lau, 2010) 
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“We sit here every night with two or three men and keep night watch,” [I.] Bassal 
explains. “The flag will be defended until the last breath.”xxxii (Zehrt, 2010) 
Kahled Hossen, who fastened the flag to the roof, risked his life to do so. Even if 
autonomists keep tearing and igniting it: “We will keep on repairing it.”xxxiii 
(“Flagge zeigen,” 2010) 
The militaristic language and sacrificial zeal of these statements belie the apolitical 
harmlessness projected by the plush soccer ball hat. The coverage glorifies the sacrificial 
offerings for the “honor” of the flag. Offering their blood, breath, and lives for the 
protection of the symbol points to the transformation of bodies into worthy lives through 
their association with the national (Agamben, 1998).  
If integration is equated here with displays of loyalty to national symbols, then to 
criticize or question the legitimacy of national symbols is to actively block integration. 
Bassal and the journalists covering this story impugned Germans who are not holding up 
their end of the integration bargain. For immigrants to “integrate,” they must be allowed 
to belong as full members of the nation. These proponents of civic nationalism argued 
that minority integration and essentialist conceptions of national identity are mutually 
exclusive. Instead, this essentialist ideology was ascribed to the post-national flag 
opponents, letting ethno-nationalists off the hook and placing blame for the inability of 
visible minorities to achieve equal status in German society onto post-nationalists. After 
sharing quotes from international newspapers praising Germany’s diverse national team 
as evidence of Germany’s success in embracing its multi-ethnic society, one article uses 
the flag fight as evidence that there are still “problems with the co-existence of 
demographic groups in Germany” (“Fans froh,” 2010). The flag vandals are cast as 
antagonists against the immigrants as such rather than against the hegemony of 
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nationalism in Germany and beyond. Here, post-nationalist politics, rather than structural 
and everyday forms of social exclusion, are identified as the cause of social conflicts. 
Statements by politicians go even further in situating post-nationalist ideology as a threat 
to an inclusive Germany: 
For Green [Party politician] Özcan Mutlu, the bizarre fight represents an “upside-
down world.” “It is expected that immigrants integrate, but when the identify with 
the colors of democracy, they are attacked,” said Mutlu.xxxiv (Anker, 2010b).  
In this statement, the Turkish-born Mutlu supports the normality of nationalist celebration 
and conflates national symbolism with politics itself. The actions of the integrants in 
protecting the flag proves their commitment to democracy. In attacking the flag, the 
activist vandals are not merely transgressing the law, they are attacking democracy itself. 
Mutlu’s statement creates a complex “chain of equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), 
equating nationalist with democratic performance and using nationalist celebration as the 
anchoring point to define integration. 
The dependence on self-contemplation through examination of the margin is 
demonstrated by some articles that even suggest that the lack of German national pride 
has contributed to Germany’s inability to integrate immigrants. An article quoting 
sociologist Klaus Bade, the head of Germany's Expert Council of Foundations for 
Integration and Migration (SVR) suggests that the causes of two of the key problems 
Germany faces, low standards of education in immigrant communities and the growth of 
an ethnically defined underclass,  
stem from Germany's difficult history and a resulting lack of national pride, after 
the atrocities of two world wars. Unlike France or the US, Bade said, Germany 
lacked a sense of confidence and greatness for immigrants to identify with and 
aspire to. In contrast, he pointed out that Germany's large Turkish population 
respected and honoured the "great country and tradition" of their homeland. 
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"We're proud of being Turkish, are you proud of being German? No, you're 
somehow embarrassed to be German," Bade paraphrased their attitude. (Maguire, 
2010) 
Although Bade’s concerns with the impact of persistent discrimination are briefly 
mentioned later, this quote promotes the idea that that the lack of civic national pride on 
the German side discourages immigrants from claiming German identity as their own. 
This argument assumes that German identity is freely available for the taking by non-
ethnic Germans. On the contrary, the history of German debates on citizenship and 
immigration shows that the norms of Germanness still exclude non-white and Muslim 
Germans. Even with legal liberalization, those who claim belonging but who do not meet 
the ethnic criteria can still expect to be met with incredulity.  
Still, the protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight frame their actions in part as a 
model of empowerment for fellow immigrants and minority Germans. In this arena, at 
least, it is the immigrants who have access to a lesson that Germans desire to learn: how 
to openly demonstrate pride in one’s country. The Bassal family sees this knowledge as a 
gift they can bestow—demonstrating an uninhibited and unburdened relationship to 
national symbols, free from the past. As Youssef Bassal was quoted as saying, “we can 
teach the Germans a little national pride, regardless of history”xxxv (“Fans froh,” 2010). 
Unfortunately, however, although the lesson of the moral authority of civic religion was 
easily assimilated, their effort to dismantle the boundaries reproducing the idea of a 
“parallel society” of dangerous internal others did not have such an enduring impact.  
Understanding the importance of boundary maintenance for the stability of 
dominant identities reveals the precariousness of societal integration through soccer 
patriotism: while minority patriotism offers a potent tool for strengthened nationalist 
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discourses, truly acknowledging the permeability of boundaries separating the national 
majority from the foreign subaltern would require relinquishing a fundamental tool for 
majority self-conception. The Bassal cousins were seeking to open the abstract space of 
German identity to include those with experiential and affective ties to German national 
space. In doing so, they aligned themselves with the symbolic nationalist politics of the 
German center-right.  
While this might theoretically pose a threat to conservative ideology, the centrist 
conservative politics that dominate German governance recognizes the pedagogical value 
of this parable of civic nationalism. Furthermore, enshrining the example of the Bassal 
family’s loyalty to Germany does not necessarily preclude politicians from reverting to 
the condemnation of the supposed “parallel societies” as soon as the Bassals’ lesson has 
served its purpose. Thus, diversity can be acknowledged, and even celebrated within the 
context of the unifying force of broader civic national identity. While this national 
allegiance remains unchallenged, the majority can feel free to emphasize the diversity of 
those united under the flag. This can even serve to underscore the power of the totem: the 
greater the diversity of its worshipers, the greater its unifying power must be.  
Indeed, the news coverage shows that the media and politicians capitalized on the 
story to push for more open nationalism and use this case to impugn the morality of those 
who critique nationalism. They also used it to showcase the “good” migrant who is 
playing by the rules, thereby conflating nationalist expression with socially desirable 
integration. In this vein, Dregger was quoted as saying, “Burning and tearing our flag is 
abhorrent enough. But to reproach well integrated immigrants for their integration is 
downright perfidious” (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Chancellor Angela Merkel, also a 
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Christian Democrat, is cited numerous times in the articles championing Germany’s 
“international team” (Maguire, 2010) and celebrating displays of patriotic enthusiasm in 
immigrant neighborhoods “as a sign of long-awaited positive integration” (Paterson, 
2010). The precariousness of this support for pluralism was demonstrated only three 
months later when Merkel again declared “the absolute failure” (“Der Tag, als Multikulti 
für tot erklärt wurde,” 2010) of the multicultural society in the wake of the runaway 
success of Thilo Sarrazin’s statistical condemnation of “undesirable” immigrants (see 
Chapter 6).   
Legible Space and Ethnic Discrimination 
As the debates and legislation on immigration suggest, despite the opening of 
ethnic citizenship laws in Germany since the 2000, the ethnic idea of national affiliation 
in Germany continues as the norm. This has been most evident in the backlash against 
multiculturalism and in the efforts of conservative politicians to legally enshrine the 
hegemony of the German Leitkultur. As a proposal released by the ruling Christian 
Democratic leadership several months after the flag fight states, “our cultural values, 
formed through a Judeo-Christian tradition to which the Christian Democratic Party feels 
particularly bound, and historical experiences are the basis for the societal cohesion that 
constitutes our Leitkultur. We expect those who come to us to respect this” (Wittrock, 
2010). This proposal assumes a clear delineation of German (Judeo-Christian) culture 
from the culture of unassimilated (Muslim) Others. It also establishes the hierarchy of 
this binary within German territory.  
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These religious and cultural Others are at their most dangerous when they are 
perceived as being organized into a “Muslim parallel society” (muslimische 
Parallelgesellchaft) (Schmitz, 2011). These parallel societies are epitomized by the 
Berlin neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, as was evident in the coverage of the 
World Cup flag fight. The availability of low-cost housing in these formerly neglected 
West-Berlin neighborhoods made them essentially obligatory destinations for guest 
workers in the post-war reconstruction period. Workers’ hostels offered substandard 
housing for migrant workers who were eventually able to afford lodgings of their own in 
the inexpensive neighborhoods. These communities grew in the following decades and 
remain well-established today.  
A key technique for maintaining state control in complex and heterogeneous 
systems, is the narrowing of vision and simplification (J. C. Scott, 1999). One of the most 
successful simplification strategies is the state-administered gathering of census 
information. By increasing the legibility of the nation’s population, the census provides 
important tools for the state’s power to define demographics and spaces as valuable or as 
liabilities. In Germany, local police precincts administer a comprehensive population 
registration system. According to the law, all residents of Germany must report to a local 
police precinct within a week of changing their domicile. Registration is difficult to avoid 
since it is necessary to open bank accounts and for a wide array of official business. As 
part of this registration, demographic information is gathered. This information is 
processed by regional statistical offices that produce regular demographic reports. The 
series of biannual registered population reports produced by the Berlin Brandenburg 
statistical office focuses primarily on two metrics: ethnicity and age—two metrics that 
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are at the root of anxieties about the future of the aging and dwindling German nation 
(Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011).  
Despite the new citizenship rules, the statistical reports of the state maintain the 
German/migrant binary by dividing the population into the categories of those with or 
without a “migration background”—a category introduced by the State and Federal 
Statistical Offices in 2005 to describe any person who has at least one parent who 
immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Statistisches Bundesamt, n.d.)—before breaking it 
down by citizenship status. In Berlin, these reports are broken down by neighborhood. 
They thus render the spaces of ethnic minorities visible and legible. Focusing on the 
ethno-nationality of residents and their ages in the reports suggests that these are the most 
meaningful metrics for interpreting the social space of the city. Whether because the 
reports suggest this, or because the writers share the basic anxieties of the state, writers 
critiquing German social space focus heavily on ethno-nationality and fertility in their 
assessments, raising fears that the least culturally “fit” among the population will 
outbreed the country’s more “intelligent” and successful members (see Chapter 6). These 
treatments use statistics and pseudoscience to reify the boundaries separating ethnic 
Germans from immigrants and their progeny. The most well-known of this genre is Thilo 
Sarrazin’s popular Deutschland schafft sich ab (“Germany Does Away with Itself”) (see 
also Heisig, 2010; Hug, 2010; Ulfkotte, 2010), which debuted just two months after the 
peak of the multicultural “party patriotism” of the 2010 World Cup.  
Sarrazin’s work, which will be the subject of Chapter 6, uses suggestive statistics 
to draw boundaries creating the internal Other to stabilize and promote a stronger sense 
of Germanness tied to ethnicity. Sarrazin does not reject immigration out of hand, but 
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rather argues that “good” immigration from “culturally compatible” nations needs to be 
encouraged and undesirable immigration curbed. Above all, Sarrazin distinguishes the 
bad immigrants from the good by their Muslim background. Sarrazin portrays Muslim 
immigrants as an existential threat to European society. Mehdi Semati defines 
Islamophobia as “a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global) 
social order by attributing them to Islam” (2010, p. 266). The extraordinary success of 
Sarrazin’s book brought Islamophobia into the open in the center of society. In Sarrazin’s 
book and others like it, the dangers of “Muslim parallel societies” are embodied within 
immigrant neighborhoods. Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, as the quintessential 
national exemplar, are the focus of intense scrutiny (see for example Buschkowsky, 
2012). 
Portrayals of the area are characterized by the “ambivalent interplay between 
celebrating and stigmatizing cultural difference” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 269). These 
neighborhoods are alternately characterized as dangerous, poor, and culturally desolate or 
as edgy, hip, and shabby-chic. Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1979), Schmitz 
writes that the idea of the parallel society functions as a spatial reference for the 
Muslim’s refusal to integrate; “at the same time, it represents all that is not compatible 
with Germany’s imagined cultural homogeneity” (2011, p. 269). In the context of 
supposedly parallel societies, the display of allegiance to German national symbols (not 
the least of which is the national soccer team) by minority Germans and immigrants 
defied the expectations of the normative population.  
Conclusion: Persistent hierarchy 
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 The compelling characters of the Neukölln flag fight were mobilized by 
the German media to 1) sever the link with the past using the de-historicized, present-
focused nationalism of the immigrant and to discredit those who would maintain the link 
between nationalism and racism, to 2) spread the gospel of the new civic religion, again, 
by using the example of devout immigrants who demonstrate the proper relationship 
between worshippers and its most powerful symbol: the national flag, and 3) to secure the 
morality of the new nationalism by emphasizing its egalitarianism and tolerance of 
difference. This serves to allay fears of the bloodthirsty, violent nature of the new 
nationalism (Marvin & Ingle, 1999) by substituting purportedly peaceful international 
sporting competitions for war. This benefits the media and the political elite by restoring 
nationalism to the toolkit for governance and national narration. The desire of immigrants 
to wave the flag is a powerful ally in the battle to bolster and legitimate the power of the 
totem. Because the immigrant chooses their new flag rather than simply accepting its 
assignation by birth, immigrant patriotism demonstrates the desirability of identification 
with Germany. Furthermore, the immigrant’s love of their host nation is present-based 
and untainted by the stain of past abuses of national power. At the same time, the 
immigrant and new German protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight used the event to 
claim their place in the nation and to challenge their exclusion from the privileged space 
of national belonging.    
In the flag fight, the Bassal cousins used civic nationalist norms to attack the 
cultural differentialism that closes German citizenship to Muslim immigrants, in 
particular. In doing so, however, the Bassals and the German media strengthened the 
hegemony of nationalism in Germany, bringing it one step closer to achieving unnoticed 
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banality. In contrast, in their fight against nationalist symbols, German anti-fascists 
proclaimed the inevitable racializing functions of nationalism as a system for managing 
difference. However, their attacks on the flag in Neukölln ended up providing a 
compelling narrative on which to base a powerful civic nationalist pedagogy affirming 
the moral superiority of civic nationalism. Anti-fascist forms of post-nationalism, then, 
became the nationalist’s straw man. The coverage of the flag fight was a useful space for 
the re-negotiation of national identity, but a surface reading of that coverage and of the 
event can miss underlying problems that such a conception of identity glosses over. The 
celebration of immigrant patriotism shores up the universalist and egalitarian credentials 
of the nation (see also Chapter 2), but, as the following chapter shows their contribution 
to the legitimacy of civic nationalist celebration does not necessarily undermine the 
particularism that disrupts the inclusion of immigrants and minorities as part of the 
national category.  
The next chapter examines the consequences of this persistent particularism in an 
event that occurred several months after the flag fight: the debate that followed the 
publication of a book that predicted the destruction of the German people through the 
dual threat of proliferating Muslim immigrants and declining birthrates among educated 
white Germans. This case also demonstrates the difficulties in discussing race and racism 
in the German context. Intolerance stoked by cultural, religious, and linguistic difference 
is more easily portrayed as benign and justifiable than racial intolerance. Perhaps this is 
because, as Stuart Hall (2000) notes, the biological referent of ethnic differentiation is 
less direct. In conceptions of ethnicity, the biological articulation of difference is present 
but is indirect, operating through kinship. As civic nationalism establishes itself as a new 
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norm in Germany, its relative inclusivity should not be allowed to render it invisible and, 
thus, above critique. As the book debate shows, civic nationalism does not necessarily 
mitigate pseudo-scientifically legitimated models of social and cultural deficiency that 
plague representations of immigrants. Although it opens new possibilities for legitimating 
minority identification with the nation, it also supports a binary of the “successfully 
integrated” versus the “unassimilable and intractable” immigrant.  
                                                          
 
 
 
i „Als ich Mitte der 80er-Jahre nach Berlin kam, konnte ich kein Wort Deutsch. Es hat mich so genervt, 
dass ich nichts verstanden habe, dass ich so schnell die Sprache lernen wollte. Heute ist Berlin mein 
Zuhause, ich bin Deutscher, habe einen deutschen Pass, meine Kinder wurden hier geboren. Ich lebe und 
arbeite hier, zahle Steuern. Wieso soll ich also nicht auch für die deutsche Fußballnationalmannschaft 
sein“, fragt Ibrahim. 
ii Die meiste Zeit seines Lebens hat er hier verbracht. Die Familie sei in Deutschland angekommen. Die 
Neffen dienten bei der Bundeswehr, einer mache jetzt sogar eine Ausbildung bei der Berliner Polizei, 
»gehobener Dienst«, wie Ibrahim betont. 
iii Ibrahim Bassal : "Ich sage: Wir fühlen uns als Deutsche. Ich wurde hier geboren, meine zwei Kinder 
wurden hier geboren, und einer meiner Freunde kämpft mit der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Wir 
identifizieren uns mit Deutschland und natürlich mit der deutschen Fahne." 
iv "Wir lassen uns nicht sagen, dass man die Fahne nicht aufhängen darf." Und weiter: "Wir leben hier, wir 
haben unsere Existenz hier, auch unsere Wurzeln - schon langsam." 
v [Badr Mohammed] kämpft also gegen Deutsche und für die deutsche Fahne. Die Sonnenallee 36 steht 
längst für das widersprüchliche Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zu ihrem Land. 
vi Die linke Szene in Berlin hat eine Aktion gegen Deutschlandflaggen gestartet. Pikant: Die meisten 
deutschen Flaggen hängen an Wohnungen von Ausländern - die verstehen die Welt nicht mehr. 
vii In Neukölln steht seit Tagen die Welt Kopf. Türken und Araber hissen die deutsche Fahne. An ihren 
Autos, ihren Läden, ihren Häusern und Wohnungen. Sie freuen sich über den Erfolg unserer Nationalelf. 
Nachts kommen deutsche Linksradikale, reißen die Fahnen herunter oder zünden sie an. 
viii Die beiden können gar nicht fassen, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner die Deutschlandfahne gegen 
die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen. 
ix Fast belustigt stellen sie fest, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner aus der Sonnenallee die 
Deutschlandfahne gegen die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen. Verdrehte Welt, finden sie. 
x Dass die Proteste gerade von deutscher Seite kommen, kann er einfach nicht verstehen. 
xi Bassal ist verständnislos. Dass Deutsche einem Libanesen verbieten wollen, eine schwarz-rot-goldene 
Fahne aufzuhängen, findet er „komisch“. Und ärgerlich auch. 
xii Warum reißen Deutsche ihre Fahne herunter, während Menschen aller Nationen Schwarz-Rot-Gold 
feiern? 
xiii Die Flagge hänge dort „nicht wegen des Zweiten Weltkriegs, sondern wegen der deutschen Mannschaft: 
Weil die deutsche Mannschaft ja nicht mehr richtig deutsch ist; das ist ja Multikulti, wir gehören dazu”, 
erläuterte Bassal gegenüber der JF. 
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xiv Kaum geschehen, seien junge Leute aggressiv in seinen Laden gekommen und hätten ihm vorgeworfen, 
er fördere den Nationalismus und wecke wieder Nazigefühle in den Deutschen 
xv In Berlin-Neukölln, dem Multikulti-Kiez par excellence. Vor allem Deutschtürken und Deutscharaber 
staffieren ihre Läden schwarzrotgold aus. Das konnten die Szene-"Autonomen" vom schwarzen Block - 
"Nie wieder Deutschland!" - natürlich nicht dulden. Der antifaschistische Kampf kennt keine Gnade, und 
auch ein Kleinhändler aus dem Libanon kann ein gemeingefährlicher Flaggen-Nazi sein. 
xvi Nicht umsonst war im Dritten Reich die Fahne der deutschen Demokratie verboten. 
xvii Was habe ich denn bitte mit den Nazis zu tun? 
xviii "Für die Faschisten sind wir Ausländer und für die Autonomen…" - Bassal hält inne und denkt nach - 
"keene Ahnung watt". (In this statement, the journalist transcribed Bassal’s switch to the Berlin dialect in 
the second part of the sentence. This shows Bassal to be both fluent in standard German, but also in the 
regional dialects of his German hometown.) 
xix Youssuf Bassal versteht die Welt nicht mehr: "Wir haben Verwandte, die dienen bei der Bundeswehr 
und bei der Polizei. Deutschland hat uns aufgenommen, als wir aus dem Krieg im Libanon flüchten 
mussten. Wir wissen, was wir unserer neuen Heimat zu verdanken haben. Und dann dieser Hass ..." 
xx Wir wenden uns gegen den medialen Diskurs, der uns beschuldigt, unsere Nachbar_innen zu 
"Ausländern" zu machen. Nur einem dient die Debatte um den "Neuköllner Fahnenstreit": Dem Image 
einer "weltoffenen" deutschen Nation!   
xxi Sie achten nicht auf Herkunft. Ihnen ist jeder Fahnenträger Nationalist und damit Feind. 
xxii Eine ältere Frau betritt den Elektroladen. Sie interessiert sich nicht wirklich für eine Handykarte oder ein 
Fernsehkabel, sondern sie sagt: „Ich komme extra aus Wilmersdorf und wollte unbedingt diese Fahne 
sehen. 
xxiii Den Deutschen werde oft nachgesagt, ihr Verhältnis zur eigenen Flagge sei mitunter verkrampft. Aber 
wie schon beim Sommermärchen vor vier Jahren oder bei der Europameisterschaft vor zwei Jahren 
hätten ehemalige Zuwanderer den "Bio-Deutschen", so Mutlut, gezeigt, wie man das Flaggezeigen 
lockerer sehen könne. "Das Zeigen der Farben der deutschen Demokratie bei öffentlichen Anlässen wie 
einer WM muss nicht unbedingt mit dumpfem Nationalismus zu tun haben", sagt der Grünen-Politiker. 
xxiv  „Wir haben uns überlegt, was man machen könnte, um allen zu zeigen: ‚Wir gehören zusammen’“ 
xxv Meine Position ist die, dass die Einheit der Deutschen verschiedener Herkunft und Religion hergestellt 
werden muss. 
xxvi Die Fahne beweise „vorbildlich“, dass diejenigen, die sie aufgehängt hätten, bereit seien, „sich mit 
unserem Land zu identifizieren“. „Daran könnten sich viele alteingesessene Berliner ein Beispiel 
nehmen“, findet Dregger 
xxvii Allein das ist bemerkenswert: Eine arabische Familie hat ausgerechnet hier, in Neukölln, wo jeder 
Fünfte ein Ausländer ist, wohl eine der größten Deutschlandfahnen im Land ausgerollt. 
xxviii Neukölln hat seit Jahren eine eher unrühmliche Bekanntheit als sozialer Brennpunkt erlangt. Die 
Arbeitslosigkeit, ein geringer Bildungsgrad, ein hoher Ausländeranteil, Kriminalität und Armut sind hier 
ausgeprägter als in anderen Bezirken. Es leben mehr als 300.000 Einwohner aus mehr als 160 Nationen 
in Neukölln…. Der Fahnenstreit in der Sonnenallee passt nicht in dieses Neuköllnbild. 
xxix Wenige Straßen weiter liegt das berüchtigte Rollbergviertel, wo Gangs von jugendlichen, meist 
libanesischen Intensivtätern ihr Unwesen treiben.... Die Bassal-Cousins haben ihre eigene Sicht der 
Dinge. Sie verteidigen die deutsche Fahne. 
xxx Mit den drei Plüsch-Fußbällen auf dem viel zu großen Deutschland-Hut wirkt Ibrahim Bassal nicht 
wirklich furchteinflößend, doch er meint es ernst. `„Wir werden unsere Fahne bis aufs Blut verteidigen, 
die reißt uns keiner mehr runter“, sagt der 39-Jährige voller Pathos und deutet mit dem Zeigefinger auf 
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die scharz-rot-goldene Riesenfahne über seinem Elektroladen in der Sonnenallee des Berliner Bezirks 
Neukölln: „Ab jetzt halten wir rund um die Uhr Wache.“ 
xxxi Youssef Bassals Gesichtsfarbe changiert schon ein wenig ins Graugrünliche. Er hat nicht viel 
geschlafen in den vergangenen Tagen—seit »diese komischen Deutschen« nachts vor seinem Laden in 
Berlin-Neukölln aufkreuzen und ihm seine Fahne herunterreißen wollen. Er lächelt müde, aber zufrieden 
wie einer, der einen gerechten Kampf ausficht. Bassal kämpft für die Ehre der deutschen Flagge: »Ich 
werde diese Fahne verteidigen—und wenn ich überhaupt nicht mehr zum Schlafen komme!«  
xxxii "Wir sitzen hier jeden Abend mit zwei, drei Mann und schieben Nachtwache", erklärt [I.] Bassal. "Die 
Fahne wird verteidigt bis zum letzten Atemzug." 
xxxiii Kahled Hossen, der die Flagge auf dem Dach befestigte, hat dafür sein Leben riskiert. Auch wenn 
Autonome immer wieder an der Fahne zerren oder zündeln: "Wir werden sie auch immer wieder 
reparieren." 
xxxiv Für den Grünen-Bildungspolitiker Özcan Mutlu stellt der bizarre Streit eine "verkehrte Welt" dar. "Es 
wird erwartet, dass sich die Zuwanderer integrieren, aber wenn sie sich zu den Farben der Demokratie 
bekennen, werden sie angegriffen", sagt Mutlu. 
xxxv Cousin Yussuf will helfen: «Wir können den Deutschen ein wenig Nationalstolz beibringen, Geschichte 
hin oder her.» 
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CHAPTER 6 – DESTRUCTIVE PRODUCTIVITY: THE SARRAZIN DEBATE 
AND THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATING NON-CITIZENS 
 
Just weeks after the national celebration of Germany’s immigrant patriots and 
multi-ethnic national team emerged as a major theme of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the 
release of politician and Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin’s book positing the 
demographic demise of Germany triggered a nationwide debate on racism, immigration, 
political correctness, and the effectiveness of German social policy. In the media sphere, 
Sarrazin’s polemical book incited impassioned denunciations, cautious interest, and the 
heralding of a brave harbinger of inconvenient truths even before its publication. The 
firestorm of public responses peaked national interest and contributed to the book selling 
out on the first day of its public release (Stein, 2012, p. 1). Over the following six weeks 
of intensive public debate, the “Sarrazin debate” quickly morphed into an “integration 
debate.” What began as a debate about the problematic nature of Sarrazin’s racially 
charged arguments developed into a debate about migration policy and the integration 
status of Muslim populations. The book, and the public debate it triggered, constituted a 
contentious public event through which the boundaries and values of the nation were 
discussed and consolidated.  Whereas previous chapters focus on the celebration of 
immigrants and “new Germans” in social marketing campaigns, sports integration 
programs, and sporting nationalism, this chapter examines one of the most visible public 
debates of the past decade in Germany to analyze the exclusionary side of integration 
discourse. But while the emphasis in this chapter’s case shifts from celebration to 
condemnation, both modes of integration discourse depend on the same theories defining 
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the ideal political and economic conditions to secure the future of the German national 
population.  
This chapter critically examines patterns and themes of public discourse on 
culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national core and 
managing difference. In particular, it analyzes the construction and fortification of 
divisions between normative citizens and racialized groups including immigrants and 
Muslim Germans—between integration failures and successes. The Sarrazin debate 
demonstrates how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so that 
the power to “make live” (Foucault, 2003) can be optimized by confining social ills to 
particular segments of the population. To determine which rhetorical structures resonated 
most strongly among his readership, I analyzed the reader reviews posted in response to 
the book on Amazon.de. Of the 227 reviews posted during the first 8 weeks of the debate, 
I selected for close textual analysis the 45 reviews that received over 100 votes from 
other users as either “helpful” or “unhelpful.” Reviews were analyzed using the iterative 
descriptive coding process outlined by Glaser and Straus (2006). 
In addition, I examined articles discussing the book and the surrounding debate 
published in Spiegel25 and the Bild. Sections from Sarrazin’s book were pre-circulated in 
these two periodicals, placing them at the center of the debate. I conducted searches in 
the online archives of Spiegel and Bild for the term “Sarrazin” from August 23, 2010, 
                                                          
 
 
 
25 Including the print Der Spiegel and Spiegel Online.  
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when book excerpts were published in Spiegel and Bild, until October 31, 2010. Although 
the discussions of the Sarrazin debate continue today, I consider the last major event of 
the debate to be Angela Merkel’s declaration of the failure of multiculturalism on 
October 16th, 2010. I included Amazon.de reviews posted until two days after Merkel’s 
speech. To include reactions to Merkel’s speech, I followed news coverage until the end 
of October. The initial periodical search returned 191 results on Bild.de and 243 results 
from the Spiegel archives. I eliminated news stories that primarily summarized events 
and public statements and I focused on features, commentaries, interviews, and letters-to-
the-editor analyzing and debating Sarrazin’s book and the subsequent fallout from its 
publication. This resulted in a collection of 46 items from the Bild and 36 items from Der 
Spiegel. Press articles were studied to determine the overall development of the mediated 
debate.  
  
Table 5: Results for Sarrazin in Bild and Der Spiegel, Aug. 23—Oct. 31, 2010 
 
Periodical Article type Total 
Bild  46 
 Feature 6 
 Commentary/Analysis 28 
 Letter to the editor 7 
 Interview 5 
Der Spiegel  536 
 Feature 216 
 Commentary/Analysis 19 
 Letter to the editor 6 
 Interview 5 
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Total  982 
   
 
The Book and its Debate 
The book, Germany Does Away with Itself: How We Are Putting Our Country on 
the Line (Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen), opens with a 
laudatory statement on the success of the German people in rebuilding their nation from 
the ashes of World War II and the “pride and faith in the solidity of its economic and 
social models” that carried Germany through four global economic crises (Sarrazin, 
2010a, p. 7). According to Sarrazin, the strong values and optimism of the German 
people have allowed the nation to prosper and withstand the pressures of globalization. 
Unfortunately, he claims, this optimism and success has “clouded the vision of 
Germans,” preventing them from seeing the “hazards and putrefaction in the core of 
society”i (2010a, p. 7). He attributes this putrefaction to the “quantitative and qualitative” 
decline of the German population. The “quantitative decline” is due to the low birthrates 
among ethnic Germans. The “qualitative decline” is related to the “ongoing proliferation 
of the less stable, the less intelligent, and the less competent”ii (2010a, p. 11). This latter 
problem is related, first, to the failure of the social system to properly incentivize hard 
work and, second, to the “quality, structure, and cultural background of the migrants in 
Germany,”iii (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 17).  This, argues Sarrazin, has led to the overall decline 
in values and abilities, or “human capital” (Foucault, 2008), that a society needs to be 
successful.  
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This argument illustrates the link between life and death in biopolitical 
governmentality. Sarrazin posits that the excessive success in producing life, in the form 
of economic, political, and social rebirth after the World War II, has lead Germans to 
become complacent and to allow death to enter in the form of proliferating social 
undesirables. As Sarrazin’s arguments show, the focus of biopower on life does not mean 
that the function of sovereign power to wield death is eliminated. The flourishing of some 
forms of national life (economic) has led to a neglect of other forms (reproductive). In the 
introduction to his book, Sarrazin ventriloquizes an imagined “good German,” who 
protests that quantitative decline of a national population need not be fatal. A small 
nation can have advantages, this person might say. Sarrazin counters his imaginary “good 
German” interlocutor, arguing that reproductive decline would not be fatal per se if not 
for the simultaneous proliferation of the “wrong sort” of people—especially Muslim 
minorities and immigrants. By establishing the wrong types of incentives through the 
welfare system, the German state is held responsible for enabling these degenerate 
populations to thrive. 
Utilizing strategic aggregation and individuation of minority populations, 
Sarrazin’s rhetoric facilitates the construction and subsequent condemnation of 
congenitally degenerate demographics under the banner of individual responsibility. 
Sarrazin reasons that if racism or xenophobia impeded the socioeconomic stability and 
success of immigrants and minorities, then all people of color would be affected equally.  
Indians and Vietnamese seem at least as foreign as Turks and Arabs and yet 
demonstrate far greater success in our society. Causes for difficulties in school, 
the job market and in society generally must, thus, be sought out within the 
groups themselves; it must have something to do with their own behavior.iv 
(Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 60) 
295 
 
This false logic presumes that all difference from the norm is viewed equally by 
normative society, that Germans view all traces of foreignness in the same light. Here, 
the success and relatively positive preconceptions garnered by some minority groups 
contest the existence of racism rather than representing racism’s other face. Sarrazin 
develops this thread in another section of his book that praises European Jews for their 
outstanding intelligence and socio-economic success. Sarrazin outlines the Jewish 
involvement in the development of intelligence research, and the dismay of National 
Socialists in the face of the superior average results of Jews as compared to German 
gentiles. Sarrazin explains that he has “gone into detail on the Jewish-German origins of 
intelligence research because the discussion of the genetic components of intelligence 
often run into strong emotional resistance” (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 97). Raising the 
involvement of Jewish researchers in answer to this “emotional resistance” only makes 
sense if that resistance is a euphemism for anti-racist criticism. Sarrazin argues that the 
participation of Jews in this research, as well as Nazi frustration with it, disproves 
criticism of eugenics as racist. He bases this on the spurious assumption that minorities 
are incapable of supporting racism. Sarrazin allays the emotional discomfort of readers 
whose exposure to liberal ideals of tolerance may have sensitized them to react to claims 
such as his. By the same stroke, he characterizes any criticism of his work as racist as 
anti-rational.   
 By invoking positive assessments of Jews within Sarrazin's framework, he intends 
to prove that it cannot be racist because it favors Jews, based on their supposedly 
heightened intelligence. This evocation of Jews in Sarrazin’s book demonstrates the 
narrowness of his view of racism. In the German context, the antisemitic past is taboo to 
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the extent that even the word Jude often evokes discomfort (Mandel, 2008). Putting aside 
for the moment the fact that Sarrazin’s essentialist philosemitism is not the opposite of 
antisemitism but its twin, as Anne Norton (2013) argues, the history of the Jewish 
Question in Europe was never simply a matter of the superiority or inferiority of Jews per 
se. It was always a question of the nature and future of Europe and its nations. From 
Spinoza to Marx, the Jewish question was “the axis on which” modern struggles over 
politics, progress, secularism and faith turned (Norton, 2013, p. 2). Beginning with the 
Enlightenment, Jews became a means of defining Europe, either as a tolerant place where 
even non-Christians might flourish, or as a place under siege and threatened by outsiders 
within.  
Norton observes that the contemporary clash of civilizations narratives and their 
liberal democratic detractors have followed much the same course with the figure of the 
Muslim. Today, Norton writes, “Islam is marked as the preeminent danger to politics; to 
Christians, Jews, and secular humanists; to women, sex, and sexuality; to the values and 
institutions of the Enlightenment” (2013, pp. 2–3). For conservatives, they are a 
potentially disloyal and incompatible threat, and for liberals they are an object of 
tolerance—to be endured or saved—that reinforces the superiority of "Judeo-Christian" 
liberalism. Sarrazin’s book does not mince words in singling out Muslims as his primary 
target.  
When I speak here about migrants, I am referring exclusively to migrants from 
Muslim countries (Turkey, Africa, the Near and Middle East). They are the only 
ones who, in large part, have language problems; at the same time, they make up a 
considerable part of the lower classes and welfare population of Germany, and 
their children have the biggest problems in the German education system.v 
(2010a, p. 235) 
297 
 
Sarrazin equates Muslims with “migrants,” and migrants here are synonymous with 
social deficiency and the threat of the decline of Germany. Sarrazin’s use of Jews as a 
shield against anti-racist critique only underscores the parallel with the past. As the figure 
of the Jew defined the existential questions of Europe's past, so Muslims are mobilized 
today. The past shows, however, that this role has potentially lethal consequences.  
Sarrazin’s book draws on the legitimating force of scientific objectivity to present 
a picture of reality, which he claims is kept secret by the soft-hearted liberals of the 
political establishment in Germany. By focusing his analysis at the level of the 
population, Sarrazin defines aggregate threats to the nation, while maintaining that, since 
he is not speaking about the individual, his claims about the relative intelligence and 
productivity of different demographic groups do not constitute a racial project. The 
runaway success of Sarrazin’s book derives from its presentation of an “objectively 
verified” account of reality that resonates with the intuitive theories of a large part of the 
public, combined with a defensive scaffolding built on post-WWII color blindness and 
resentment toward the processes of Vergangenheitsbewältigung26, which became part of 
official politics in the Federal Republic during the late 1970s and 1980s.  
Although Sarrazin’s book is by no means the first to focus on the threat posed by 
the “failed integration” of Muslim immigrants and their children (see: Ates, 2008; Heisig, 
2010; Hug, 2010; Kelek, 2006; Ulfkotte, 2003, 2010), the relatively quiet reception of 
                                                          
 
 
 
26 Lit. “coming to terms with the past” 
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other such works fueled the perception of the book as groundbreaking. Even though other 
recent books from a similar perspective have achieved considerable success, none 
received the kind of advanced circulation afforded Sarrazin. The high-visibility pre-
circulation of book segments unleashed a heated debate in the media developed into a 
full-scale media-hype. The debate triggered by the publication of Sarrazin’s book took 
over the German media sphere in the last months of 2010. Years later, Sarrazin’s book 
and the subsequent debate continue to symbolize struggles in Germany over ideals of 
integration and the future of Germany as a multiethnic nation.  
The first section of this chapter outlines the role of contentious public debate in 
constructing and re-constructing social norms and regimes of knowledge. Using print 
sources, it examines the trajectory of the debate in the mediated public sphere. The 
second section analyzes the reader responses to the book and the debate on Amazon.de. 
Responses to the book demonstrate the appeal of Sarrazin’s claims of rationality and 
scientism in critiquing Muslims in Germany. They also reveal the strength of economic 
logics of social value that hold that government interventions must prioritize free market 
mechanisms for the regulation and optimization of the population. This reflects a 
biopolitical approach to politics and governance, which uses neoliberal logics and 
technologies to selectively cultivate the life of the population (Lemke, 2011, p. 60). The 
Sarrazin debate revealed biopolitical social logics that divide the population according to 
their supposed potential for integration, which is to say, their potential for productivity 
within German society. According to this discourse, productivity is a universal social 
good, and thus, apolitical. Meanwhile, anti-racist critiques of Sarrazin are characterized 
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as politically motivated, irrational attempts to subvert hard facts by exploiting German 
guilt about the past.  
The Scandal is a Scandal 
The Sarrazin debate does not fit neatly into the categories of media events or 
media scandal. While the Sarrazin debate is certainly about the adjudication of social 
norms and morality, it is not a scandal in the traditional sense which implies the making 
public of morally transgressive private acts (Lull & Hinerman, 1997, p. 8). These acts are 
often of a sexual or criminal nature and typically involve celebrities and politicians, 
although they may also involve corporations or public institutions. They are highly 
personalized and often focus a magnifying attention on the implicated public figures, 
turning them into characters. The Sarrazin debate is a scandal composed entirely of ideas 
in circulation, revolving around the hero-martyr character embodied by Sarrazin. The 
scope of the debate was centripetal, expanding from the figure of Sarrazin to encompass 
the German nation and even the “Western World.” What exactly constituted the 
fundamental transgression of the Sarrazin debate was contested. In the initial wave of 
public reaction, the transgression was the defamatory and racist nature of Sarrazin’s 
claims. The backlash against this initial scandal, however, held that the true transgression 
was the characterization of Sarrazin’s arguments as defamatory and racist. In short, in the 
backlash created by Sarrazin supporters, the scandal itself was the true scandal.  
Although the most commonly theorized media scandals are sparked by a material 
or embodied occurrence—whether an accident with an uncertain cause, or the revelation 
of an ethical transgression by a public figure or institution—the event of the scandal itself 
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is always fundamentally a phenomenon of communication.  Following Deleuze, Paul 
Patton writes that there are "two realms of being, a material realm of bodies and states of 
affairs and an incorporeal realm of events. Events are expressed by means of language, in 
statements, but they are attributes of bodies and physical states of affairs" (1997b, p. 3). 
The corporeal is implicated here, but it is in communication that the corporeal is made 
meaningful, and where the potential for change resides. Patton continues to explain that 
events are the secondary effect of “corporeal causal interactions: they do not affect bodies 
and states of affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses and actions of 
agents. Pure events are both the expressed of statements and the ‘sense’ of what happens” 
(1997b, p. 3). The material occurrences of mediated scandals are only made meaningful 
in description. Action as embodied occurrence only becomes social, and thus political, 
through communication.   
While this is true in a strict sense, it is important not to limit the conception of 
communication to the verbal. Gesture, the aural and the visual are no less potent forms of 
communication than the verbal, although their semantic openness may be more apparent. 
However, this chapter, as well as most of this dissertation, is limited to written forms of 
communication. Although this encompasses only a fraction of what contributed to the 
“sense” of what the Sarrazin debate meant, this fraction was intentionally constructed to 
communicate. In written communication, the strategic logics of the affair as it unfolded 
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are still available, often in their original form.27 This is particularly appropriate in the 
case of the Sarrazin debate, since, from the outset the scandal consisted of a struggle over 
the moral implications of social critiques depending on cultural and racial differentialism. 
This type of communication event is located in the social imaginary, but not in the sense 
of the imaginary that is opposed to the real. These “collective assemblages of enunciation 
might be regarded as a materialist concept of the social imaginary” (Patton, 1997a, p. 30). 
This study focuses on a portion of this assemblage of enunciation which remains 
accessible in an inscribed form. 
Peter Vasterman broadens the focus of literature on visibility and on 
concentrations of media attention to offer a theoretical framework for what he calls 
“media-hype” (2005). Vasterman centers his framework on the multiplying effects of the 
media to account for their impact on common knowledge and political opinion through a 
process of social amplification (2005, p. 513). “Media-hype can…be defined as a media-
generated, wall-to-wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and enlarged by the 
self-reinforcing processes within the news production of the media” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 
515). The chain reaction of media-hype begins with a “key event” that triggers more 
attention than usual for a variety of reasons. The broadness of this definition is 
intentional, since the trigger of increased attention is often unpredictable. In the case of 
                                                          
 
 
 
27 Amazon.de reviews may be edited by reviewers after they are posted. These changes cannot be 
tracked by other users. The earliest reviews will often acknowledge that they updated and 
expanded their original reviews after finishing to read the book. 
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the Sarrazin debate, the kinds of statements and claims about Muslim immigrants that 
triggered the hype were not uncommon in the public sphere.28 Yet, its supporters hailed 
Sarrazin’s book as fresh, brave and unprecedented. While, as some critics pointed out, the 
theses themselves were far from unprecedented (Al-Wazir, 2010), the wave of media 
hype unleashed by the pre-circulation of book excerpts in the media supported the 
impression that there was something particularly shocking or unexpected about Sarrazin’s 
claims.   
The key event in the Sarrazin affair was the pre-circulation of sections from the 
book in Germany’s most popular newspaper and magazine, the Bild and Der Spiegel, the 
week before its general publication. The ability of Sarrazin’s agents to arrange this high-
profile debut was likely predicated on Sarrazin’s demonstrated ability to generate media-
hype. An unapologetic polemicist, Sarrazin caused a smaller-scale scandal in 2009 that 
foreshadowed the arguments he would make in his book. In an interview with the 
magazine Lettre International, Sarrazin stated, “I do not have to recognize anyone who 
lives off the state, rejects this state, does not properly provide for the education of their 
children and constantly produces new little headscarf girls” (Berberich & Sarrazin, 2009, 
p. 197). This earlier scandal paved the way for Sarrazin’s 2010 debut, since, as 
Vasterman observes, even after the decline of a news wave, media-hype facilitates the 
generation of subsequent news waves because of the public’s heightened sensitivity 
                                                          
 
 
 
28 See, for example, the Ich denke an Deutschland conference inaugurated in 2009, which posed the 
question, “When will we have finally gone too far?” http://www.denkichandeutschland.net/24.htm.  
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regarding the topic (2005, p. 515). Bild is a tabloid that has a daily circulation of over 3.5 
million as of 2010, making it the highest circulating periodical not only in Germany, but 
also in all of Europe. From its establishment in 1952, Bild has taken a strong conservative 
and nationalist editorial stance. It has long been the target of criticism for its unmatched 
influence on politics and the German social imaginary. Bild takes unambiguous stands on 
issues and encourages readers to act. One of the paper’s slogans, “Bild dir deine 
Meinung” is a play on words meaning “form your own opinion.” In addition to boasting 
the highest readership, Bild received more reprimands than any other paper from the 
Deutscher Pressrat, Germany’s independent press watch group.29 Although publishing in 
Bild provided the maximum quantitative audience for Sarrazin’s work, the paper’s well-
known rightwing populist stance might have allowed the book to be dismissed as merely 
another populist provocation.  
In contrast to Bild, Der Spiegel distinguishes itself as a national standard of 
investigative journalism. Der Spiegel has employed fact checkers since its establishment 
in 1947 and currently maintains one of the world’s largest fact checking departments 
(Silverman, 2010). Although Der Spiegel has its own history of muckraking and political 
maneuvering, it remains one of Germany’s periodicals of reference. Der Spiegel is one of 
two sources that is most widely read by German journalists, making it is one of the most 
important “orientation media” nationwide (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006, p. 
                                                          
 
 
 
29 Since 2006, Bild has been reprimanded over 50 times (“Deutscher Presserat : 2006-2013,” n.d.)  
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359). In addition, Spiegel Online, which operates independently from the magazine 
counterpart and does not overlap in terms of content, is the second most visited news site 
in the German media sphere behind BILD.de (Stein, 2012, p. 36). Publishing in Der 
Spiegel lent legitimacy and seriousness to Sarrazin’s claims, making them difficult to 
dismiss out of hand. By pre-circulating excerpts in Bild and Der Spiegel, Sarrazin was 
guaranteed maximum visibility. Both publications debuted different excerpts on August 
23, 2010, and Bild continued to publish a new excerpt every day for a week.  
The published sections in Bild and Der Spiegel set the terms for the debate, and 
by hitting on a number of hot-button issues unleashed a critical reaction which was 
anticipated in the book, and thus strengthened the rhetorical position of the work rather 
than undermined it. The “news theme” (Vasterman, 2005) framing the discussion 
accepted Sarrazin’s claim—stated in the first section published in Bild and repeated 
elsewhere—that the facts and ideas he presented were taboo and that political correctness 
prevented their discussion in the public sphere. The rhetorical terms set by Sarrazin that 
became the news theme and ensured that any criticism could be construed as confirming 
his basic premise. Sarrazin’s leadership position and the hyper-visibility of the text with 
its transparent racial provocations demanded responses from public figures, which 
contributed to a “positive feedback loop” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 513) generating new 
events on which to base stories.  
The media sought and published responses from the institutions associated with 
Sarrazin, building “interactive media momentum” (Vasterman, 2005). As is typical in 
media-hype, the “huge news hunt generates all kinds of responses in society, varying 
from individuals reporting similar experiences to statements from official sources and 
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interest groups, using the opportunity to promote their views or to announce actions” 
(Vasterman, 2005, p. 515). The initial reaction from politicians and public figures was 
strongly critical. Indeed, chancellor Angela Merkel made a statement just two days after 
the first segments were published, calling them “highly offensive, defamatory, and 
polemical” (“Umstrittene Thesen zu Migration,” 2010). Criticism of Sarrazin grew 
stronger after an interview with Berliner Morgenpost in which he responded to a question 
about the existence of a “genetic identity” that,  “all Jews share a particular gene, 
Basques have particular genes, that distinguish them from others”vi (“Thilo Sarrazin—
‘Ich bin kein Rassist,’” 2010). The claim of the existence of a “Jewish gene” sparked 
immediate condemnation across the political spectrum (Friedrich, 2011, p. 11). It is 
important to note, however, that almost without exception even Sarrazin’s harshest critics 
affirmed the value of debating “problems of integration.” 
The comment asserting the existence of a Jewish gene, although relatively neutral 
compared to Sarrazin’s statements about the inherited intelligence deficits of Muslims, 
ignited a new controversy that ensured Sarrazin’s dominance in news coverage across the 
media sphere. Although the plausible deniability of the racist theories informing 
Sarrazin’s work was maintained by his supporters, Sarrazin’s remark about a “Jewish 
gene” crossed the line of deniability for a German public particularly sensitive to 
antisemitism after what one journalist euphemistically called, “those murderous twelve 
years” (Baum, 2010). While holding firm to the claims of his book, he expressed regret 
for broaching the topic of the Jewish gene and the comment was considered a mere gaffe 
by Sarrazin’s supporters (Broder, 2010). Reacting to the controversy, the Bundesbank 
board and Bundespresident Wullf asked for and received Sarrazin’s resignation from his 
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seat on the board of the Bundesbank. The progress of these public reactions and calls to 
action provided new opportunities for news outlets to publish on the story as breaking 
news.  
With the initial backlash keeping the story at the top of the news agenda, 
Sarrazin’s book sold faster than it could be printed for the first several weeks after its 
publication. Just as importantly, the public condemnation affirmed Sarrazin’s self-
positioning as a teller of “uncomfortable truths,” since, intuitively, if his arguments were 
already part of public discussions on the social issues they would not have raised such a 
strong backlash. In confirming this assertion, the counter-arguments of Sarrazin’s critics 
gained little purchase and the terms of the debate were set as those he had proposed. 
Furthermore, this feedback loop provided the counter-opinion necessary to create 
uncertainty as to the meaning of Sarrazin’s statements. This uncertainty is necessary for a 
story to sustain interest and instigate a public conversation. As Bird writes, “the scandal 
story… is not clear and closed, but ‘open’ allowing for many competing versions and 
interpretations. As people speculate, they tend to look for answers in their own 
experience” (1997, p. 109). Without the condemnation from public figures, Sarrazin’s 
statements probably would have faded from public attention.   
In the wake of the stark criticism followed a backlash and growing support for 
Sarrazin’s arguments and for “freedom of opinion.” This development began already in 
the early days of outrage, as media outlets repeatedly reported on the unprecedented 
responses from their audiences, mostly in support of Sarrazin (Friedrich, 2011, p. 12). As 
the reports of public support for Sarrazin’s work piled up and the book sold out even 
before it could hit the shelves, opinions among the elite shifted and discourse refocused 
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on the need to respect the feelings of “the people”—referring to the normative German 
public. Merkel significantly softened her position less than two weeks after the initial pre-
circulation, saying that although she still maintained that Sarrazin’s work was not helpful 
for the integration debate, acknowledgement of the statistically proven elevated tendency 
toward violence among devout Muslim youths should not be taboo: “It is a big problem, 
and we can talk openly about it without raising the suspicion of xenophobia” 
(“Integrationsdebatte ohne Tabus,” 2010). In this interview in Bild’s Sunday edition, 
Merkel confirmed the existence of a “taboo” against the discussion of the social 
deficiencies of a given group. She went on to warn against the association of violence 
with any specific religion, saying that,  
Violence by young people is often a sign that they don't see any prospects for 
themselves. Only education, education, education can help with that. Our 
government is making a lot of offerings in that regard, but the first responsibility 
lies with the parents, from which school and society can't relieve them.vii (Merkel, 
2010)  
Although Merkel attempted to soften and reframe the links that the Bild’s questions 
repeatedly proposed between criminality and unemployment and people with a Turkish 
and Arab or Muslim background, her reframing did not challenge Bild’s conclusions, 
including claims that minorities are threatening and intimidating the police. Her 
responses supported an interventionist approach by the government to regulate immigrant 
and minority compliance with integration demands, while denying the existence of social 
and structural inequality as causes of the poor prospects for minority youth. While 
affirming that the state needs to and does provide appropriate education, Merkel located 
ultimate responsibility in the private sphere of the family.  
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While continuing to deny the value of Sarrazin’s contribution, Merkel adopted the 
language and assumptions that framed Sarrazin’s text, implicitly sanctioning the 
fundamental validity of his claims about the dangers of failed integration and political 
correctness. Without explicitly singling out any group, Merkel mirrored the deficit 
narratives proposed in Bild’s questions. 
We can expect from those who come here that they integrate into our society, that 
they learn our language. That men make it possible for their wives to take part in 
societal life, that girls be allowed to go on class trips and take part in physical 
education classes. Violence in schools and other deplorable situations must be 
openly discussed. Concealment only strengthens prejudice. (Merkel, 2010) 
Merkel’s comments frame integration as a problem of minority values and behaviors 
clashing with German norms of gender equality, female empowerment, and adherence to 
the law. Merkel reproduces Orientalist tropes of the despotic and patriarchal Muslim 
(Said, 1979), strengthening the distinction between “our” peaceful and egalitarian 
Western norms and “their” Oriental culture. By condemning the most obviously 
egregious parts of Sarrazin’s discourse, the racialized assumptions underlying Merkel’s 
framing of the enforcement of integration are normalized. Although she resists naming 
any particular group, the centuries old familiarity of European publics with latent 
Orientalist tropes upholding the fundamental cultural distinction and incompatibility of 
East and West is such that no group need be explicitly named. Merkel went a step further 
in October, attracting international attention with her claim that “multiculturalism is a 
failure” (“Integration,” 2010, “Lob und Empörung,” 2010), a claim she and her fellow 
party leaders have made repeatedly over the years. The speed of this rhetorical shift, from 
outright condemnation to implicit validation, shows the power of the public backlash 
against the initial public condemnation of Sarrazin’s work. This rapid convergence also 
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suggests that the forms of knowledge held by Sarrazin’s supporters and his critics were 
not as distinct as a polarized understanding of the debate suggests.  
The one premise that neither critics nor supporters of Sarrazin disputed in the 
media coverage was the idea that “integration problems” were a serious concern in 
Germany that needed to be openly and aggressively addressed in policy. In the articles 
examined, only one person denied the fundamental premise of “integration” as a social 
issue. In an interview with Spiegel Online, white German actor Peter Lohmeyer was 
interviewed about the role of soccer in personal and national identity. When asked about 
the meaning of the German-Turkish Euro-Cup soccer qualifying match for “integration 
debate,” Lohmeyer responded, “Integration discussions really get on my nerves. You 
don’t have to talk about it, integration just happens. Period” (“EM-Qualifikation 
Deutschland,” 2010). With this exception, “integration” was broadly accepted as an issue 
demanding serious scrutiny and debate. In the corpus of articles, integration is never 
directly defined, but is outlined by certain associations and indicators: educational 
achievement, employment status, and language proficiency are chief among them. 
Integration is conceptualized as a personal choice to value education and take 
responsibility for economic productivity. In other words, integration is the choice to 
dedicate one’s scarce resources to the development of one’s human capital, to be an 
effective “entrepreneur of the self” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Like the notion of 
integration itself, the subject of integration is poorly defined but implicitly understood. 
The figure of the integrant is referenced by terms such as migrant, immigrant, Muslim, 
Turk, Arab, foreigner, and foreign co-citizen. Little or no distinction is made between the 
immigrant generations and their German-born descendants, or between foreign nationals 
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and German citizens. Supporters and detractors of Sarrazin proposed different sources of 
the presumed failure of Muslim populations to achieve integration. While all agreed that 
the state should invest in special educational measures for migrants, Sarrazin’s detractors 
focused almost entirely on education while supporters demanded that the government 
intervene and enforce integration.   
The difference between detractors and supporters can be interpreted in terms of 
two approaches to neoliberal social politics that Foucault identifies in his 1978 lectures 
entitled, The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Sarrazin’s critics emphasize the need for 
maintaining the social protections present in notions of Vitalpolitik (vital politics) that 
originated in the German and Austrian “ordoliberal” school of economics.30 Developed 
starting in the 1930s, ordoliberal economists developed a new theory of liberalism which 
was later implemented as the basis of the post-war political and economic system in West 
Germany. Like other forms of neoliberalism, Vitalpolitik accepts and promotes the 
extension of the economy to the entire social field, but in addition it maintains the need 
for compensating for what is cold, calculating, and mechanical in the economic field of 
competition. Philosopher and public intellectual, Richard David Precht (2010) most 
clearly encapsulates this approach in his commentary in Der Spiegel identifying a “social 
war”—not in terms of a Huntington-style “clash of civilizations,” but in terms of either a 
“social” or “dissocial” approach to the economy. Precht calls for a morally sensitive “new 
                                                          
 
 
 
30 The concept of neoliberalism was coined by the German Ordoliberal school (Foucault, 2008). 
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idea of growth” centered on measures of happiness. This view resonates with the German 
neoliberal version of enterprise society that is “a society for the market and a society 
against the market” in that it is oriented towards the market while compensating for the 
market’s effects on social values (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The approach of Sarrazin’s 
critics maintains ordoliberalism’s concern for the socially corrosive effects of market 
rationality without questioning the economic premises underlying Sarrazin’s work.  
In contrast, Sarrazin’s supporters did not accept the ambivalence towards market 
rationality inherent in German ordoliberal social politics. As I examine in more detail 
below, they saw the social protections it proposes as a hindrance to the proper function of 
economic rationality at all levels of the social body. Yet, the call among Sarrazin 
supporters was not merely against political intervention in migration and integration, but 
rather for interventions that support economic rationality in every aspect of social life, 
and most intimately and most urgently, in choices about reproduction. Across the 
spectrum of opinion in Der Spiegel and Bild, the question is not whether the state should 
intervene to compel the “integration” of transnational populations, but how it should do 
so.  
Scandal and Online Review Forums 
In addition to direct communication with traditional media in the form of letters to 
the editor, calls, and comments on online versions of stories, members of the public 
registered their reactions on the internet on book review forums. The book review forums 
of the internet provided a neutral ground for public response. The first reviews of the 
book were posted on Amazon.de within 24 hours of the publication of the first book 
312 
 
excerpts. Amazon provided a provided a public space for rejoinder moderated primarily 
by readers themselves. Unlike the comment sections of online news articles in which the 
content of the article guides comments, book review sites allow readers and members of 
the public more latitude in the topic and length of their responses. Amazon.de also 
includes mechanisms for the public to weigh in on whether the reviews are “helpful” and 
to respond directly to reviews.  
 Internet-based communication allows individual users to achieve a level of 
visibility that approaches and sometimes exceeds that of the traditional media.  Castells 
argues that politics is primarily media politics and that, although “the media are not the 
holders of power… they constitute by and large the space where power is decided” 
(2007, p. 242). As such, mediated communication plays a fundamental role in the 
formation of “the public mind.”  For this reason, Castells sees the establishment of 
internet-based communication, or what he calls “mass self-communication,” as the basis 
of a historical change in the terrain of politics and “counter-power” (2007). The 
overwhelming majority of the reviewers of Sarrazin’s book on Amazon.de position 
themselves, like the book itself, against what they portray as the German political 
establishment.   
The Sarrazin debate was so successful because, for supportive reviewers, it 
replayed a narrative of beleaguered truth-teller, risking condemnation to speak truth to 
power. Sarrazin prepared the ground for this narrative and his credibly was, thus, 
increased by his critics. Sarrazin’s critics undermined his theories and analysis, but failed 
to provide an equally compelling narrative. As Tomlinson (1997) observes, media 
scandals are “middle-order moral events” that function to regulate the unspoken moral 
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foundations of a community, providing  “contexts for ‘communal’ moral reflection and 
debate in modern secular societies” (1997, p. 68). Major moral issues, from starvation 
and genocide to climate change are difficult to personalize. They are not easily connected 
to or instantiated in the behavior of symbolic individuals. Instead, these high-order events 
are so unwieldy that they tend to produce a retreat from moral engagement. In contrast, 
scandal attracts and requires the active engagement of people to materialize as an event.  
The success of scandal as a middle-order moral event depends in part on the narratability 
of scandal, that is, the potential of scandal to be converted into a story with symbolically 
significant characters.  
In the case at hand, the most significant character was Sarrazin himself. Sarrazin 
strategically placed himself as a champion of truth beginning with the epigraph of his 
book, which was also opened the first excerpt published in Bild. The epigraph is a quote 
from one of the founders of the German Social Democratic Party, Ferdinand Lassalle, 
that states, “all political small-mindedness consists of the silencing and concealment of 
that which is.”31 This quote sets up the antagonism that Sarrazin expands in the following 
text between the champions of truth and reality and the well-intentioned but cowardly 
apologists for the true causes of social denigration. Sarrazin’s acquiescence to calls for 
his resignation from the Bundesbank completed his transformation into a “martyr” of 
political correctness (“Sarrazin-Rücktritt,” 2010).  
                                                          
 
 
 
31 “Alle politische Kleingeisterei besteht in dem Verschweigen und Bemänteln dessen, was ist.” 
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 If scandal’s particular enduring appeal as a narrative form lies in its ability to help 
“people structure their view of what the world is and how it should be” (Bird, 1997, p. 
102),  the next question is what view of the world a given scandal produces. One of the 
most salient features of the Sarrazin affair evident in the Amazon.de reviews is the 
personal investment of reviewers in defending the core arguments raised by Sarrazin’s 
work. As Tomlinson writes, “what claims priority in our selective attention… is those 
experiences that speak most directly to the way in which we continuously narrate our 
‘selves’ to ourselves” (1997, p. 73). The Sarrazin debate reveals a clash between political 
discourses of tolerance and multiculturalism and the self-narration of many Germans, 
which, as reader responses indicated, found its expression in Sarrazin’s portrayal of 
Germany’s problems. The magnitude and content of the response suggests that the 
backlash against Sarrazin’s perspective piqued the ire of Germans who were weary of the 
perceived taboos around cultural differentialism that are seen as a lingering punishment 
for the crimes of the Nazi period.  
Biopolitical Truth in Reader Responses 
Of the 840 reviews published on Amazon.de as of December 28, 2015, more than 
a quarter were written within the first two months of the initial pre-circulation of book 
excerpts. After five years, new reviews and discussions continue to be added regularly, 
although much less frequently than in the early months. This analysis focuses on reviews 
published during the critical first two months. Of the 227 reviews posted in the period 
August 23-October 18, 2010, the highest impact reviews (those with over 100 votes 
registered in response to the question, “Was this review helpful to you?”) were selected 
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for close textual analysis assisted by descriptive coding. The great majority of all reviews 
posted as of the end of 2015 gave the book the maximum possible score of 5 stars; 82% 
of reviews assigned the book four or five stars. Mirroring the opinions expressed in the 
review scores, positive reviews were much more likely to earn positive user feedback in 
terms of the votes for the review’s helpfulness. Most voters rated negative reviews as 
unhelpful. Because negative reviews were more likely to attract high numbers of 
(negative) votes, one-star reviews were heavily over-represented in the selected corpus 
(table 6). A representative sample of 45 reviews would have included 31 five-star 
reviews, 7 four-star reviews, 3 three-star reviews, 1.5 two-star reviews, and 3 one-star 
reviews. The overrepresentation of negative reviews in my sample amplified oppositional 
opinions that would have been lost in a representative sample. 
 
Table 6: Reviews on Amazon.de that Received Over 100 Votes, Aug. 23-Oct. 18, 2010 
 
Rating Number of 
Reviews 
Helpful Votes Unhelpful Votes Percentage 
Voted Helpful 
5 Stars 27 11,021 2,332 83 
4 Stars 2 472 96 83 
3 Stars 2 819 188 81 
2 Stars 1 84 295 28 
1 Star 13 1,368 2,766 33 
Total 45 
   
 
While a diversity of opinion is expressed across the body of texts, several themes 
predominate. These themes relate to the politics of truth, economics and the dysfunction 
of the state’s welfare policies, and the need to exercise and protect the democratic values 
of German society. Although the importance of Sarrazin’s most racially charged claims 
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was frequently minimized, reviews often defended the validity of such claims using 
economic and statistical facts. The reviews, as a corpus, represent an impassioned 
defense of society based on a purportedly dispassionate rationality of facts and figures. 
The threat to society, as it is constructed here, is not just integration-refusing immigrants, 
but more fundamentally, the welfare state that perpetuates this failure to integrate. The 
reviewers assert the democratic sovereignty of the people, as represented by the 
outpouring of public support for Sarrazin, to check the over-reach of the government.  
One of the most common themes repeated in reviews was the strength of the 
book’s truth-value, which was based on logic and statistical fact. Reviewers frequently 
stated that these statistics and facts are widely known and accepted, yet they also claimed 
that they are “swept under the rug” (CyberCynic, 2010) by the liberal elite.     
The data presented in the book shows a sad truth, that is well supported by 
statistics. Namely, the rejection by some immigrants of the simplest basic rules: 
the learning of a foreign language as well as the observance of the laws and rules 
of the host society.viii (Olli R., 2010) 
In his book, Sarrazin draws on broadly recognized investigations, studies, 
scientists and, without exception, on serious sources. He collects statistics, 
evaluates them and draws his conclusions in a dispassionate, objective way. As 
such, it has less to do with “opinions,” but rather with conclusions about things 
that are already known.ix (CyberCynic, 2010) 
People accuse Sarrazin that his numerical data are all wrong. As a board member 
of the Bundesbank, Sarrazin has access to the best available statistical material. 
He would hardly leave himself open, with false data on the birth rates of Turkish 
migrant women in relation to German academics.x (Chartleser, 2010) 
Sarrazin was described as a disinterested and rational professional, characteristics that 
lend legitimacy to his interpretation of the data. In fact, reviewers used the abundance of 
data to marginalize Sarrazin’s interpretive role. As one reviewer assessed, “the author has 
brought together many facts, that speak a clear language”xi (Naoko, 2010). The 
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mechanisms of knowledge invoked to validate Sarrazin’s thesis involve tools of 
quantification to analyze and diagnose society. In Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures on the 
birth of biopolitics, Foucault emphasizes the need to determine “under what conditions 
and with what effects a veridiction is exercised, that is to say... a type of formulation 
falling under particular rules of verification and falsification” (2008, p. 36). Foucault is 
not interested in empirical truth per se, but rather in the regimes of veridiction that enable 
truth claims to be made and widely accepted regardless of their empirical validity. While 
the debate often focused on proving or disproving Sarrazin’s data, the most important 
part of the debate was its function, not the validity of the science itself. The debate was 
and is important because of how it established biopolitics as the relevant mode of 
knowledge about society and its Others.  
In examining the rise of biopolitics, Foucault identifies the rise of a regime of 
truth based on political economy. In his lectures from 1975-1976, Foucault (2003) 
defines biopolitics as the massifying mode of power, aimed at the level of the population, 
as opposed to disciplinary forms that regulate at the level of the individual. The goal of 
biopower is to achieve equilibrium, regularity, and homeostasis across the social body. It 
involves a set of processes such as the ratio of birth to death, the rate of reproduction, the 
fertility of the population, and it introduces new mechanisms including forecasts, 
statistical estimates, and overall measures (Foucault, 2003, p. 246).  The goal of these 
mechanisms is to cultivate “the power to make live” to optimize the state of life 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 247). In seeking to trace the development of biopower in his later 
lectures, Foucault turns to the strategic logics of the market and political economy (see 
also Chapter 2). With the rise of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the market 
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moved from being the domain of jurisdiction (justice) to the site of the formation of truth. 
In this, the government shifted away from being the arbiter of justice in the market. 
Instead, the market took over the determination of what qualifies as good governance. 
“The market determines that a good government is no longer quite simply one that is 
just…The market must tell the truth (dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to 
governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 32). Foucault calls these two heterogeneous 
systems the revolutionary axiomatic, which operates according to public law and the 
rights of man, and the empirical and utilitarian, “which defines the sphere of 
independence of the governed on the basis of the necessary limitation of government” 
(2008, p. 43). Although these regimes of truth are heterogeneous, between them exists “a 
ceaseless connection and a whole series of bridges, transits, and joints” (Foucault, 2008, 
p. 43). As with universalist and particularist approaches to culture (see Introduction), 
while there are clear distinctions between the logic of each, they often work together to 
maintain hegemonic norms.  
Both systems of truth with their attendant moral schemata are present in the 
tensions of the Sarrazin debate. However, it is the empirical and utilitarian approach that 
supportive reviewers focus on most heavily. The axiomatic approach does emerge, 
however, in the form of the defense of German democratic values that are under threat 
from demographic changes favoring the Muslim population. In explaining why Sarrazin 
should not be compared to the extreme right, one reviewer wrote: 
The NPD [German National Party] is an undemocratic party; Sarrazin, however, 
speaks precisely to the point that with migrants from Turkish and Arab countries 
undemocratic and anti-human rights tides are infiltrating Germany. Sarrazin has 
absolutely nothing against a Turkish migrant who respects German laws, learns 
the German language, and feeds his own family.xii  (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010) 
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When the axiomatic paradigm appears in these reviews, it is often in the context of 
defending German moral and demographic values from “incompatible” cultures, which 
are epitomized by Turks, Arabs, and Muslims generally. This mode of governance and 
social distinction aligns with what Wallerstein (2006) calls “European universalism,” 
which, building on a clash of civilizations narrative, holds that Western civilizations are 
superior to their Others because they are the only ones based on universal values of 
equality and human rights. This comment also shows that the perceived anti-democratic 
ideology of Muslim immigrants can be construed as aligning them with the German far 
right. Finally, the reviewer upholds the fairness of critiquing the inferior values of Turks 
and Arabs by claiming that individuals may act independently and distance themselves 
from the statistically proven tendencies of their group. By adhering to the legal, cultural-
linguistic, and economic norms of German society a Turkish immigrant does not pose a 
threat.  
 Sarrazin supporters also frame anti-racist criticism an existential threat to German 
society.  
Leaving aside Thilo Sarrazin's sometimes rather coarse articulations, the book 
delivers above all verifiable facts that should serve as the basis for a discussion on 
necessary changes in our integration politics….in no way do I see his writing as 
an inflammatory smear that could serve to threaten the social peace in Germany. 
On the contrary: a man writes here, who talks not of assimilation but of 
integration, who is primary driven by worries about the future of our country, and 
who wants to dissolve the unspeakablility of the clash of cultures by clearly 
naming the existing conflicts.xiii (Ulrich Groh, 2010) 
Topics that are of true existential significance for our society—and not to forget—
for our children are covered with thought and speech bans. Transgressions are 
very effectively punished by the racism cudgel or by banishment to the dirty 
brown corner.”xiv (W. F. Schmidt, 2010) 
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There have been many attempts to reduce Sarrazin’s very thoroughly presented 
self-evident [arguments] to xenophobia. Whoever argues this has not read the 
book. Whoever gets drawn into such an argument is squandering our historical 
last chance to turn things around and prevent irreparable changes that mean an 
uncertain future for us and our children.xv (P. Schmitz, 2010) 
Anti-racist discourses here are construed as posing a threat to life and democracy by 
silencing the truth necessary to protect German society into the future. In complementary 
ways, these reviews deny the racial project of Sarrazin’s work. Here, it is not racism that 
threatens German democracy, but rather anti-racist discourses that prevent the 
acknowledgement of the real threats to democracy.  
 The tensions and contradictions inherent in these logics follow, in part, from the 
economic and political logics that developed in the Federal Republic after the World War 
II. As Foucault demonstrates, the “ordoliberal” (German neo-liberal) economic 
philosophy that formed the basis of West German post-war economic policies was based 
on the rejection of Nazi economic policy, which was conceived as the consolidation of 
four economic policies that had operated before the war: a protected economy, state 
socialism, economic planning, and Keynesian interventionism. “Faced with the Nazi 
system, the theoretical, speculative coup de force of the German neo-liberals was not to 
say, as most people did at the time, and especially the Keynesians: The economic system 
the Nazis are setting up is a monstrosity” (Foucault, 2008, p. 109). Instead, ordoliberals 
posited that Nazism demonstrated the culmination of the economic logics of these four 
economic approaches. The thread that links these approaches is the state’s control over 
economic processes. “Since Nazism shows that the defects and destructive effects 
traditionally attributed to the market economy should instead be attributed to the state and 
its intrinsic defects and specific rationality, then the analyses must be completely 
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overturned” (Foucault, 2008, p. 116). The resulting ideal is an inversion: a state 
supervised by the market as opposed to a market supervised by the state. Sarrazin aligns 
himself with these postwar ideals of a state that directs its interventions according to the 
market, and those postwar ideals are firmly associated with Germany’s post-fascist 
reconstruction as an exemplary democratic nation. 
 In Sarrazin’s book and in reviewers’ responses, the misdirected interventions of 
the state are the fundamental social and economic barrier preventing democracy—in the 
form of the sovereign will of the people—and market rationality from working to solve 
the nation’s problems. Reviewers do not denounce government intervention at large, but 
only intervention that limits liberty and inhibits the regulatory effects of the market. They 
call instead for more active interventions to enforce market rationality, which, in this 
view, necessitates integration. One reviewer praised Germany Does Away with Itself as 
A long-overdue, rousing book that underpins with numbers where our 
government’s laissez-faire [policies] and especially the one-sided media reporting 
with its multicultural glorification and prescribed bleeding heart idealism 
(Gutmenschentum) has gotten Germany.xvi (Franziska G., 2010) 
The unwillingness of government to make active interventions to ensure the future life of 
the German population is interpreted as resulting from German guilt over the Nazi past. 
Not only are comparisons of Sarrazin’s theories with the eugenics of the Nazi period 
dismissed as invalid, guilt about the Nazi period actually threatens the German 
population:  
We live here in an absolute suck-up society. We stand in the middle of absolute 
chaos and our dear politicians silence what is going on here to death. Why? 
Because they want to play the nice Germans, the perfect Germans for the whole 
world, but don’t have things under control in any way. And why should we and 
our children still held responsible for things that someone hatched decades ago.xvii 
(S. Staufen-Breisach “Halleluja,” 2010) 
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Here, the government’s excess is evident, on the one hand, in the anti-racist political 
correctness that seeks to limit the free speech of citizens who speak out against 
immigrants and minorities and, on the other, in the welfare state’s meddling with the 
proper functioning of the market system. In this view, “social policy cannot have equality 
as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function” (Foucault, 2008, p. 143). 
This vision of equality is that inequality is the same for all. In this regard, the United 
States is invoked as a more appropriate model. In the U.S., social benefits are more 
limited and unavailable to newly arrived immigrants.  “Therefore,” writes another 
reviewer, “integration there is enforced through the necessity of participation in the labor 
process”xviii (Falk Müller, 2010). By focusing on the role of the state in producing this 
social dysfunction, reviewers humanize Sarrazin’s critique:   
Contrary to what is claimed over and over, Sarrazin does not blame either Hartz-
IV (welfare) recipients or migrants across-the-board, neither does he attack them. 
On the contrary, he determines that they behave, like any entrepreneur or 
employee, and in fact any economic person, according to the rules of economics, 
in that they optimize the relationship between input and output. Whoever can get 
something for free would be stupid to pay for it, and whoever earns more without 
working in Germany than they would with hard work in their homeland, would be 
badly advised not to come here if he could.xix (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010) 
By inhibiting the salutary inequality of the market, this quote argues that the state 
incentivizes less industrious people to leave their homelands in search of the easy life 
provided by Germany’s welfare system. Here the reviewer argues that, not only does 
Sarrazin not condemn immigrants who take advantage of the system, he respects their 
rational decision to pursue a piece of the German dole. Thus, the only logical conclusion 
is to change the incentives driving that decision.  
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Along the same lines, reviewers condemn state interventions that support low-
income families with children for encouraging the “wrong sorts” of populations to 
proliferate. Incentives governing the rationality of reproduction are among of the most 
frequently mentioned concerns in reviews. As another reviewer writes, the welfare 
system  
Encourages families from the social stratum that cannot or will not survive 
through their own impetus to have large numbers of children. Thus, the taxpayer 
finances the intellectual thinning [of society], ever more welfare recipients are 
coming with ever fewer gainful workers. (P. Schmitz, 2010) 
This line of argumentation underscores the death that is always implicit in biopower. 
Here the life of the intellectually inferior represents the weakening and death of the 
population. The implication is that for the German population to live, power must be 
exercised to curb the growth of sub-populations that pose a threat to that life. This 
illustrates the connection that Mbembe observes between “the generalized 
instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and 
populations (2003, p. 14). In biopolitics, the destruction of human bodies and populations 
is ideally carried out through the optimization of policies aimed at controlling life and 
death at the aggregate level. The interventionist state—or, more precisely, the improperly 
intervening state—is singled out as the primary enabler of undesirable immigrants. 
Political intervention, here, needs to follow and support the logics of the market, creating 
the proper incentives to discourage the reproduction of undesirable populations. 
Reviewers support the extension of economic rationality into the most intimate private 
spheres of life. The market, properly supported by state institutions, would act as a guide 
and educator, rooting out the indolent and cultivating the entrepreneurial.  
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Although the immigrant underclasses are portrayed here as being all but helpless 
in the face of the poorly managed incentive system, the moral critique of Muslim 
immigrant indolence usually returns once the discussion turns to individual 
responsibility. As the above reviewer continues,  
58% of people with Turkish roots do not feel welcome in Germany. But what 
better way to achieve recognition in a country than through successful self-
integration of which one can be proud? And those who only want social support, 
without integration or without rendering any service at all in return—to them one 
has to say: you are really not welcome!xx (Falk Müller, 2010) 
In this remark, integration is framed as a tangible accomplishment in which one can take 
pride. What exactly this integration entails is not explicit, but it implies the achievement 
of social success. In the first case it connotes entrepreneurship, whether social or 
economic. Integration is also framed as a possible form of reciprocation for those 
receiving public benefits. Either way, integration serves as short hand for the 
achievement of social worth.  
 With the focus on fertility and the political economy of the welfare state, Sarrazin 
and his supporters advocate changes that would limit the intervention of the government 
in supporting the salutary function of the economy. In biopolitics, “the multiplicity of 
individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is” (Foucault, 2009, p. 42). The 
discourses and mechanisms of security in biopolitics function, “without prohibiting or 
prescribing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition, 
to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it 
responds--nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it” (Foucault, 2009, p. 47). By 
eliminating the welfare state, the market would be permitted to operate freely, and would 
correct the problems of undesirable immigration. At the same time, public resources 
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could be spent modifying conditions to encourage the procreation of “the more 
competent” (die Tüchtigeren) (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 174).  
Conclusion: Consolidating the People  
The book excerpt published in Der Spiegel opened with the sovereign claim that 
“it is the right of every society to determine for itself who it will admit. Every country has 
the right, thereby, to protect its culture and its traditions”xxi (Sarrazin, 2010b). The social, 
political, and economic are all brought together in the Sarrazin’s statistically legitimated 
portrayal of the decline of German society. The above statement invokes the sovereign 
right of the nation-state to define its borders and decide who within them has the right to 
have rights. As Agamben shows, modern biopolitics is characterized by the constant need 
to redefine the boundaries of life that define and separate the inside from the outside, 
which is to say, to perpetually distinguish between politically relevant and bare life 
(1998, p. 131). Given the central role of biopolitics in the eugenicist projects of the Nazi 
regime, it is surprising that Sarrazin largely overcame anti-racist critiques of his work. 
This may be related to the fact that Sarrazin’s underlying political-economic framework 
is taken directly from the post-war ordoliberal economic philosophy, which is associated 
with Germany’s return to democracy and economic prosperity. In fact, as was discussed 
above, the ordoliberals defined themselves precisely in contrast to their characterization 
of Nazi political economy.  
However, as Agamben (1998) points out, the ease of transformation of modern 
parliamentary democracies to totalitarian states and then back again is only made possible 
because of the extent to which politics has become biopolitics. The trajectories of Italy 
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and Germany show that their political transformations were primarily a matter of 
determining a new form of organization suited to the task of the “care, control, and use of 
bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 122). As the troubling binary between the capable and the 
incapable in the Sarrazin debate showed, the shadow of biopower’s imperative to “make 
live” represents a continuity between modern totalitarian and democratic states. In a 
system that operates under the impetus to make live, racism “is primarily a way of 
introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break 
between what must live and what must die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). These implications 
of the cultural binaries drawn in the debate were not lost on all reviewers. One critical 
reviewer summarized the central point of Sarrazin’s book as follows: “there is worthy 
and there is unworthy life”xxii (Steuber, 2010).  
Despite the initial outrage over the genetic elements of Sarrazin’s arguments, the 
framing of integration as a cultural, economic, and political problem was generally 
accepted on the terms set forth by Sarrazin. In particular, integration is conceived as an 
individual process undertaken by non-Germans acting according to economic rationalities 
that can be measured by the socio-economic performance of an individual or group. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that the Sarrazin debate progressively became an integration 
debate, which focused on why some groups were socially deficient. This debate 
developed into calls by the leading center-right Christian Democrats for policies to 
reform and restrict immigration. Following similar statements from the party’s leader, 
Horst Seehofer, chairman of the Christian Social Union argued that, “no additional 
immigration should be allowed in the future from cultural groups that reject our German 
Leitkultur (leading culture). Integration refusal and the rejection of our German Leitkultur 
327 
 
are two sides of the same coin”xxiii (Weiland, 2010). Commentators that argued against 
the characterization of certain groups as “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer) 
tended to rely on individual model immigrants (see El-Sharif, 2010). As the comments 
posted below these articles confirm, these sorts of individualized accounts were easily 
rejected as irrelevant to broader social trends that confirmed the existence of problem 
groups. This view holds that through their supposed rejection of German values, problem 
immigrants are condemned to—and deserving of—the social inequality that characterizes 
their situation. Thus, if they would only choose to integrate, the success that results from 
the superiority of the German canon of values (Wertekanon)32 could also be theirs.  
The Sarrazin debate also opened new space for rightwing politics in the German 
mainstream, sparking speculation about the foundation of a new rightwing political party 
lead by Sarrazin. Although Sarrazin had no interest in founding a party, or even in 
leaving his center-left Social Democratic Party, the call for a rightwing alternative was 
answered with the establishment of the Euro-skeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
party in 2013. The party platform closely follows many of the ideas promoted by 
Sarrazin, from a purist approach to economic liberalism to a desire to restrict Muslim 
immigration. While the party was founded with a primary focus on economic liberalism, 
the anti-immigration and ethnic nationalist elements of their platform have become 
increasingly prominent. The AfD has been making consistent gains in the polls since their 
                                                          
 
 
 
32 For a typical example of the formulation of the role of these canonic values, see (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 
19) 
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founding, and has overtaken in the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats to 
become the second party in several states. The Sarrazin debate set the objectives and 
galvanized the public for a new political movement on the right in Germany.  
The previous chapters have examined distinct occurrences of celebration and 
condemnation of immigrants and their descendants, while also drawing them into relation 
through their common foundation in biopolitical discourses that seek to manage 
difference in the government of life. The next chapter examines where these two modes 
of integration discourse overlap and collide in cases where minority celebrities serve as 
models of integration or its failure. It will also address the role of ideas about the German 
language that emerge repeatedly throughout integration discourse. The creation of prizes 
honoring “examples of successful integration” and campaigns that mobilize exceptional 
minority individuals celebrates an ideal of diversity that supports normative German 
values. Successful individuals prove the cosmopolitan and meritocratic character of 
German society and, at the same time, gloss over the myriad differences that distinguish 
the experiences of first generation immigrants from those of their children and 
grandchildren. Minority celebrities play several different roles in this form of integration 
narrative, from “migrant” strawman to minority hegemonic enforcer. The cases in the 
next chapter underscore the never-resolved status of the candidate for integration by 
tracing examples that cross back and forth between celebrating success and reifying 
failure.  
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i “Dieser Grundoptimismus und die Jahrzehnte des fas ungetrübten Erfolgs haben aber die Sehschärfe der 
Deutschen getrübt für die Gefährdungen und Fäulnisprozesse im Innern der Gesellschaft.” 
ii “Über die schiere Abnahme der Bevölkerung hinaus gefährdet vor allem die kontinuierliche Zunahme der 
weniger Stabilen, weniger Intelligenten und weniger Tüchtigen die Zukunft Deutschlands,” 
iii “…um die Qualität, die Struktur und den kulturellen Hintergrund der Migranten in Deutschland.” 
iv   Inder und Vietnamesen wirken in Deutschland mindestens so fremdartig wie Türken und Araber und 
haben doch viel größere Erfolge in unserer Gesellschaft vorzuweisen. Ursachen für die Schwierigkeiten 
in der Schule, am Arbeitsmarkt und generell in der Gesellschaft müssen daher wohl auch in den 
Gruppen selbst gesucht werden; sie dürften also durchaus etwas mit deren eigenem Verhalten zu tun 
haben. 
v Im Kern ist das deutsche Bildungsproblem vor allem auch ein Problem der muslimischen Migranten. 
Wenn hier von Migranten gesprochen wird, sind ausschließlich Migranten aus den muslimischen 
Ländern gemeint (Türkei, Afrika, Naher und Mittlerer Osten). Sie haben als Einzige zu großen Teilen 
Sprachprobleme, sie bilden zugleich einen wesentlichen Teil der Unterschicht und Transfer bevölkerung 
in Deutschland, und ihre Kinder haben die größten Schwierigkeiten im deutschen Bildungssystem 
vi “Alle Juden teilen ein bestimmtes Gen, Basken haben bestimmte Gene, die sie von anderen 
unterscheiden.” 
vii Das ist ein großes Problem, und wir können offen darüber sprechen, ohne dass der Verdacht der 
Fremdenfeindlichkeit aufkommt. Aber ich warne davor, Gewalt mit einer bestimmten Religion zu 
verbinden. Das führt in die Irre. Gewalt bei jungen Menschen ist oft ein Zeichen dafür, dass sie keine 
Perspektive für sich sehen. Und da hilft nur Bildung, Bildung, Bildung. Unser Staat macht da viele 
Angebote, aber die Hauptverantwortung liegt bei den Eltern, die ihnen Schule und Gesellschaft nicht 
abnehmen können. 
viii Die im Buch vorgestellte Datenlage zeigt eine traurige Wahrheit, die statistisch gut unterlegt wurde. 
Namentlich die Weigerungshaltung einiger Immigranten die einfachsten Grundregeln zu beachten: das 
Erlernen der fremden Sprache sowie die Beachtung der Gesetze und Regeln des Aufnahmelandes. 
ix Sarrazin bezieht sich in seinem Buch auf allgemein anerkannte Untersuchungen, Studien, Wissenschaftler 
und durchweg seriöse Quellen. Er erfasst Statistiken, wertet diese aus und zieht seine Schlüsse in einer 
unaufgeregten sachlichen Weise. Es handelt sich also weniger um "Meinungen", sondern um 
Konklusionen dessen, was bereits bekannt ist. 
x Man wirft Sarrazin vor das seine Zahlenangaben alle falsch sind. Sarrazin hat als Bundesbankvorstand 
Zugang zu dem besten verfügbaren statistischen Material. Er wird sich kaum die Blöße geben, dass seine 
Zahlenangaben zu den Geburtenraten türkischer Migrantinnen bzw. deutscher Akademikerinnen falsch 
sind. 
xi Der Autor hat viele Zahlen zusammengetragen, die eine deutliche Sprache sprechen. 
xii Die NPD ist eine undemokratische Partei; Sarrazin wendet sich aber gerade dagegen, dass mit Migranten 
aus türkischen und arabischen Ländern demokratie- und menschenrechtsfeindliche Strömungen nach 
Deutschland eindringen. Gegen einen türkischen Migranten, der die deutschen Gesetze achtet, die 
deutsche Sprache lernt und sich und seine Familie selbst ernährt, hat Sarrazin rein gar nichts. 
xiii Sieht man einmal von der zuweilen etwas deftigen Artikulation des Thilo Sarrazin ab, so liefert das Buch 
in erster Linie verifizierbare Fakten, die als Diskussionsgrundlage für notwendige Änderungen in unserer 
Integrationspolitik herhalten sollen und diesen Anspruch auch erfüllen. Keineswegs hingegen verstehe 
ich seine Schrift als aufwieglerische Hetze, die dazu geeignet sein könnte, den sozialen Frieden in 
Deutschland zu gefährden. Im Gegenteil: Hier schreibt ein Mann, der nicht der Assimilation, sondern der 
Integration das Wort redet, den primär die Sorge um die Zukunft dieses Landes umtreibt und der die 
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Sprachlosigkeit der aufeinanderprallenden Kulturen auflösen will, indem er die bestehenden Konflikte 
klar benennt. 
xiv Aber Themen, welche für unsere Gesellschaft und—nicht zu vergessen—für unsere Nachkommen von 
wahrlich existenzieller Bedeutung sind, werden mit Denk- und Redeverboten belegt. Verstöße werden 
sehr erfolgreich mit der Rassismuskeule bzw. dem Verweis in die braune Schmuddelecke geahndet. 
xv Es wird vielfach versucht, die von Sarrazin sehr ausführlich dargestellten Selbstverständlichkeiten auf 
angebliche Ausländerfeindlichkeit zu reduzieren. Wer so argumentiert, hat dieses Buch nicht gelesen. 
Wer sich auf so eine Argumentation einlässt, verspielt die historische letzte Chance, das Ruder noch 
herumzureißen und unumkehrbare Veränderungen zu verhindern, die eine ungewisse Zukunft für uns 
und unsere Kinder bedeuten. 
xvi Ein längst überfälliges, aufrüttelndes Buch, das mit Zahlen untermauert, wohin das Laissez-faire unserer 
Regierungen und besonders die einseitige Medienberichterstattung mit ihrer Multikultiglorifizierung und 
verordnetem Gutmenschentum Deutschland gebracht haben 
xvii Wir leben hier in einer absoluten Schleim-Gesellschaft. Wir stehen mitten im absoluten Chaos und 
unsere lieben Politiker schweigen es tot was hier abgeht. Warum? Weil sie der ganzen Welt die lieben 
Deutschen, die Perfekten Deutschen vorspielen wollen, es aber in keinsterweise im griff haben. Und, 
warum sollen wir und unsere Kinder immer noch für dinge zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, die 
irgend jemand vor Jahrzehnten angezettelt hat. 
xviii “Dort hat man erst nach mehreren Jahren Aufenthalt Anspruch auf Sozialhilfe, die relativ gering und 
zudem auf 5 Jahre begrenzt ist. Dadurch wird Integration dort schon durch die notwendige Teilnahme am 
Arbeitsprozess erzwungen.” 
xix Im Gegensatz zu dem, was immer wieder behauptet wird, beschuldigt Sarrazin weder Hartz-IV-
Empfänger noch Migranten pauschal, noch greift er sie an. Im Gegenteil, er stellt fest, dass sie sich, wie 
jeder Unternehmer oder Arbeitnehmer, überhaupt jeder wirtschaftende Mensch, nach den Grundsätzen 
der Ökonomie verhalten, indem sie das Verhältnis zwischen Input und Output optimieren. Wer etwas 
umsonst kriegen kann, wäre dumm, etwas dafür zu bezahlen, und wer in Deutschland ohne Arbeit mehr 
verdient als in seinem Heimatland mit harter Arbeit, wäre schlecht beraten, nicht hierher zu kommen, 
wenn er es könnt. 
xx 58% der Menschen türkischer Abstammung fühlen sich in Deutschland nicht willkommen. Aber wie 
kann man Anerkennung in einem Land besser erreichen, als durch eigene Integrationsleistung, auf die 
man selbst auch stolz sein kann? Und wer nur Sozialleistungen will, ohne Integration oder überhaupt 
Gegenleistung—dem muss man sagen: du bist wirklich nicht willkommen! 
xxi “Es ist das Recht einer jeden Gesellschaft, selbst zu entscheiden, wen sie aufnehmen will, und jedes 
Land hat das Recht, dabei auf die Wahrung seiner Kultur und seiner traditionen zu achten” 
xxii “Die Kernaussage dieses Buches ist: Es gibt wertes und es gibt unwertes Leben.” 
xxiii "Es darf in Deutschland künftig keine zusätzliche Zuwanderung aus Kulturkreisen geben, die unsere 
deutsche Leitkultur ablehnen. Integrationsverweigerung und Ablehnung unserer deutschen Leitkultur 
sind zwei Seiten einer Medaille." 
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CHAPTER 7 – MODELS AND MISCREANTS: INTEGRATION BY CELEBRITY 
EXAMPLE 
 
Over the course of the first decade of the new millennium, the oxymoronic 
category of “foreign co-citizens” (ausländiche Mitbürger) that arose in the 1980s began 
to give way to the cumbersome “people with a migration background” (Menschen mit 
Migrationshintergrund). This new term maintains an emphasis on the foreign, conflating 
the crucial differences in the experiences of immigrants and their German-born children 
and grandchildren. Those whose foreignness remains visible through somatic 
characteristics, or through names and dress, are categorized apart from the German 
national collective. More precisely, the category turns them into perpetual candidates for 
integration, who may be approved as a valuable member of the national population one 
day and classified as a threat the next. This chapter further examines the construction of 
qualifications for integration success and failure that surfaced in the 2010 Sarrazin affair 
using two celebrity-focused media projects broadcast during the same year. The first 
project is the creation of a new prize category honoring “integration” by one of 
Germany’s most important media award programs. The second is a print media campaign 
that displayed pictures of successful immigrants and people of color ostensibly to 
encourage German language learning.  
Unlike the Sarrazin affair, which began from a place of condemnation, these two 
media projects purport to celebrate and support integration success. However, closer 
analysis reveals the shared underlying assumptions about the positive value of normative 
Germanness and the social and intellectual deficits of immigrants and minority 
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Germans—groups that are conflated under the umbrella term “migrant.” The famous 
entertainers at the center of these projects used the platforms they provided to stake a 
claim to full citizenship as “new Germans” (see also Chapter 5). In doing so, however, 
they often supported the same discourses of integration that perpetuate the divide 
between normative citizens and those who must perpetually prove their value.  
The first example this chapter examines is the debut of the category of the 
“Integration Bambi,” created in 2010 for Herbert Burda Media’s annual Bambi Awards, 
one of Germany’s most important media awards. The inaugural Integration Bambi was 
presented to national soccer team member, Mesut Özil. The son of Turkish immigrants, 
Özil has been widely celebrated and heavily scrutinized in the German public since his 
successful debut on the national team in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The 
creation of the new award and the celebration of Özil as an “example of successful 
integration” were received with little comment by the media. Evidently, the award and its 
recipient fit with generally accepted narratives and, thus, remained soft news of only 
passing interest.  The 2011 recipient, on the other hand, attracted significant attention. 
The selection of then 33-year-old rapper Bushido, born Anis Mohamed Youssef 
Ferchichi, for an integration award was considered scandalous and sparked a series of 
protests by former Bambi recipients and activist groups representing LGBT and feminist 
interests. Although Bushido has received numerous awards for his music without raising 
controversy, his acknowledgement in the context of integration was treated differently. In 
rejecting Bushido as an example of successful integration, evidence was marshaled to 
show how he is in fact an example of failed integration. In criticizing Bushido’s selection, 
critics reified the value of the prize and consolidated a portrait of its inverse. The corpus 
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for this section is the website for the Bambi awards as well as a recording of the speeches 
presenting the award to Mesut Özil in 2010 and to Bushido in 2011. The news coverage 
of the inaugural award for Özil was sparse; it was mentioned in most of the news pieces 
summarizing the event, but it did not inspire significant commentary. In contrast, 
Bushido’s receipt of the award inspired heavy coverage and commentary. Since the 
corpus of press coverage of the Bushido award is too large for close textual analysis, I 
limited my search to articles written from the day of the ceremony and the following two 
days (November 10-12, 2011), which I determined was the period of most intensive 
coverage. In this period, 24 articles were returned from Google Custom Searches of the 
top German periodicals (see Introduction for source selection methodology) using the 
search terms Bambi AND Bushido AND integration (see table 7). My analysis asks how 
the contrast between these two award recipients defined and entrenched the discourse of 
integration.  
Table 7: Top Periodical Results for Bambi AND Bushido AND Integration,Nov. 10-12, 2011 
Source Articles 
Bild 6 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 
Focus 1 
Frankfurter Rundschau 5 
Handelsblatt 1 
Der Spiegel 3 
Stern 2 
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Süddeutsche Zeitung 2 
Die Tageszeitung (taz) 1 
Die Welt 3 
Total 24 
 
The second example I analyze is a self-described “integration campaign” that 
debuted in early 2010, which was created through the cooperation of the German Federal 
Government and the Association of German Periodical Publishers (Verband Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger). Analysis of this example reveals an important theme in integration 
discourse: the inadequacy of minority usage of the German language. The campaign, 
titled “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben”33(henceforth Out with It), featured 
photographs of prominent individuals “with immigration backgrounds” sticking out their 
black, red, and gold striped tongues to indicate their ability to speak German. The 
campaign, which claims to “to encourage immigrants to learn German,” argues that 
speaking the language is the key to a successful life in Germany. What is not clear is how 
someone without fluency in German and significant knowledge of German popular 
culture would understand the ads. This logical gap notwithstanding, the campaign was 
honored with the prestigious Cultural Prize for the German Language (Kulturpreis 
Deutsche Sprache). This section will analyze the assumptions about immigrant and 
                                                          
 
 
 
33 Lit. “Out with language, into life.” Raus mit der Sprache is an idiom, which loosely translates to “speak 
up” or “out with it.” In this chapter, I will refer to this as the Out with It campaign. 
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minority Germans that motivate the campaign as well as the kind of citizenship 
performed by exceptional bodies of color in the campaign. Furthermore, it will address 
the how ideas about the German language play into the construction of the category of 
“integrant.” 
After an outline of the institutional and logical scaffolding of the Out with It 
campaign, I analyze the song that was selected as the theme for the second iteration of the 
campaign in late 2010 in the wake of the Sarrazin debate. The song, Nur ein Augenblick34 
by rapper Harris, was used in a music video showing the making of the campaign. The 
original video for the song debuted on October 3, 2010, on German Unity Day. The video 
shows washed out images of the German flag waving masses on the Berlin “Fan Mile”, 
the stretch of road between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column that has been 
set up for public viewings of national soccer matches during the men’s FIFA World Cup 
(see Chapter 3). The song’s text calls out integration refusers (Integrationsverweigerer), 
condemning them for their criminal tendencies and their complaints about Germany 
while denying the significance of racism. The sources for this section are the 
advertisements featuring 27 minority and immigrant models and the two videos for the 
campaign theme song, Nur ein Augenblick. I also examine press coverage of the 
campaign and its theme song to understand how they were interpreted in the mainstream 
media. While this campaign attracted considerable praise from across the press sphere, it 
                                                          
 
 
 
34 Lit. “Just a Blink of an Eye” 
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was generally considered uncontroversial and, thus, did not spur a large volume of 
coverage. As such, I expanded my search to include results from the German press 
archive, WISO35 in addition to Google Custom Searches of the top German periodicals. 
The searches for the campaign slogan, “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben,” returned 
33 articles discussing the campaign. Searches for Harris AND Integration AND rapper 
returned 20 articles, 18 of which appeared in late 2010 when the campaign chose his song 
as its theme. Table 8 shows the combined results of both searches, which totaled 35 
unique articles.  
Table 8: Combined Results for “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben” plus Harris AND 
Integration AND Rapper 
Periodical Type Total Top Periodicals 
Local/Regional 11 0 
National 24 22 
Total 335 22 
 
As with the Du bist Deutschland campaigns from 2005 and 2007 (see Chapter 4), this 
campaign and the new Bambi award category tout the diversity of German society, while 
also reaffirming the normativity of whiteness. These projects, which are all primarily led 
by the German media industry, mobilize minority bodies to affirm the cosmopolitan, 
tolerant, and meritocratic character of contemporary Germany. However, as the projects 
                                                          
 
 
 
35 WISO-net.de is an academic archive that includes 188 local, regional, and national periodicals.   
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in this chapter show, defining integration success through celebrity example also 
constructs integration failure as a matter of individual choice.   
Prize Logic in the Public Sphere: The Bambi and German Social Cohesion  
In 2010, Germany’s oldest media prize, the Bambi, added a new category; the 
jury awarded the first Bambi prize for “Integration” to the national soccer team 
midfielder Mesut Özil. With the German team’s third place finish at the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup the previous summer, soccer played a prominent part in the Bambi ceremony, 
reflecting its impact in the media sphere for the year. The creation of the Integration 
Bambi is also a reflection of anxieties over a changing Germany, which erupted three 
months earlier with the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s anti-Islam polemic, Deutschland 
schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away with Itself) (see Chapter 6). What came to be known 
as the Sarrazin Debate stirred up national sentiments and surprised many public figures 
by revealing the popularity of Sarrazin’s stance against Muslim minorities (see Follath, 
2010). By selecting a prominent, widely popular figure to stand as an “outstanding 
example of successful integration,” the Bambi jury provided a counter-example to 
Sarrazin’s disparaging pseudo-scientific analysis of Muslims in Germany.  
However, while the Bambi for Integration ostensibly celebrates the presence of 
minority identities as part of Germany, it simultaneously circumscribes those identities, 
supporting notions of distinct cultural sources. Successful integration is defined as the 
acquisition of distinctly German cultural traits and traditions, while maintaining a pure 
connection to what is described as one’s “cultural roots.” The Integration Bambi is 
emblematic of attempts by the media to define an acceptable place in the nation for 
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minority identities, while still maintaining a normative core concept of a German culture 
independent of and distinct from that of minority cultures. Despite the problematics 
raised by the proscriptive qualifications for belonging inherent in a cultural prize for 
integration, the German press generally failed to question the category itself. In part, this 
failure can be traced to the logic and structure of the cultural prize itself. The critical and 
deliberative press essential for complex cultural dialogue in the mediated public sphere is 
short circuited by the cultural prize which, as James English (2008) shows, is not only 
resistant to critique, but requires critique to thrive.  
This section investigates the nature of the public sphere created by this prize. This 
case illuminates the German media’s investment in the definition of national identity as 
well as the role and definition of the concept of culture in this national project. 
Entertainment-focused cultural prizes mobilize the symbolic value of celebrity for 
political, social, and economic purposes. Although this is also true of cultural prizes in 
general, pop culture prizes such as the Bambi are built explicitly on the logic of celebrity, 
which consists of a virtuous circle in which media presence creates celebrity and 
celebrity, in turn, legitimates the media.  
 The Bambi has claimed the space of adjudicator in the German media sphere. 
Although it embraces the populism of the most commercial media offerings, the Bambi 
does not hesitate to arbitrate the weightiest public issues. It has positioned itself as a hub 
of circulation in the public sphere. The Bambi selects from and amplifies images, events, 
and discourses circulated in the media in each year. As Michael Warner put it, “a public 
is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (2002, p. 62). The 
Bambi presumes to create a space for the appraisal and appreciation of everything that 
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ostensibly matters in the mediated German public sphere, including well-known 
international figures like Jane Goodall (Our Earth Bambi 2010), international celebrities 
like Justin Bieber (Entertainment Bambi 2014), and national soccer players Miroslav 
Klose and Phillip Lahm (Jury Prize 2014). 
The 2010 Bambi awards were in conversation with a variety of issues of public 
interest at the time. This is particularly clear in the case of the creation of the new 
category: The Bambi for “Integration.” The introduction of this award category reflects 
the preoccupation with identity and the evolving ethnic makeup of Germany. As I 
suggested above, it responds to a recent flair-up of social tension national self-reflection 
surrounding the publishing of Sarrazin’s controversial but extremely popular anti-Islam 
book (see Chapter 6). It also mobilizes the relatively uncomplicated and presumably 
apolitical sentiments of national cohesion formed around the German national soccer 
team and the FIFA World Cup (see Chapters 3-5). These events, too, are part of a larger 
process of national reflection on the meaning of Germanness. As the 2010 Sarrazin 
debate from Chapter 6 shows, although citizenship law changes at the turn of the 
millennium were an essential step in opening conceptions of Germanness to include 
ethnic and religious minorities, the threat posed by minorities to national normativity 
continues to be a source of considerable societal anxiety among majority Germans. 
Although politicians were generally united in their immediate condemnation of Sarrazin’s 
book, the popularity of his ideas among the majority population caused almost immediate 
backsliding, culminating in Chancellor Merkel’s statement declaring that 
multiculturalism had “failed utterly” (Smee, 2010).  
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Since the international soccer spectacle was a major focus of media attention in 
2010, the Bambi organizers had planned to relive some of the World Cup enthusiasm 
with a performance by Shakira of the official World Cup song, “Waka Waka (This Time 
for Africa).” In a long tradition of Bambi awards for the national soccer establishment, 
the national team coach and training team received a jury’s choice Bambi. In creating the 
category of Bambi for “integration” and awarding it to Mesut Özil, the jury weighed in 
on the public debate, projecting onto the athlete their conception of “successful 
integration.” Composed of players from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds, 2010 
national team was celebrated in the press as a representation of, in Özil’s words, “a 
colorful new Germany” (Bambi 2010, 2010). Özil, whose talent and Turkish heritage has 
made him the subject of intense interest in the press, emerged in 2010 as one of the 
team’s strongest players.  
The Bambi awards mobilized Özil’s celebrity to conceptualize and celebrate a 
notion of social cohesion, in which minorities “hold onto their roots” without publically 
challenging or changing the norms of German society. As David Marshall argues, 
celebrity is a powerful and malleable sign at the media’s disposal with its “capacity to 
house conceptions of individuality and simultaneously to employ or help embody 
‘collective configurations of the social world’” (1997, p. xi). To understand what it means 
to be a celebrity, or Prominente, in Germany, we can look to the highest-ciruculating 
German periodical, the daily tabloid Bild. The Bild website includes a “theme page” 
dedicated to “Deutsche Promis” (German Celebs) that outlines a political economy of 
attention, in which individuals give up their privacy and submit to public scrutiny 
because “they live from regularly being in the media, since it increases their fame and 
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with it their market value”i (“Deutsche Promis - Stars aus Musik, Fernsehen, Kunst und 
Kultur,” n.d.). The examples of celebrities in the article include television moderators, 
actors, musicians, and athletes. In answer to the question of “why we need celebs,” Bild 
theorizes that “most people need role models. Not only to imitate them, but also to 
distance themselves, following the motto, ‘That is totally not okay!’”ii Mediations of 
celebrity lives, thus, create a symbolic space for drawing connections and boundaries in 
the public ajudication of norms governing the body politic.  
The Integration Bambi, like many of the other “social” Bambis that celebrate 
celebrity charity, separates the celebrity from the ostensible source of their fame—their 
work as professionals—and uses the social capital of their pure renown to make a 
statement about society. Particularly for socially-oriented prizes, that which is being 
honored is often as much about defining that which is unacceptable. As such, the 
definition of Mesut Özil as an “outstanding example of successful integration” creates a 
discursive framework by which minorities can be judged as successes or failures of 
integration.  
 The discourses of the award, particularly as exemplified by author and television 
moderator Nazan Eckes’s introductory speech, are constructed to soothe majority 
German anxieties around Muslim minorities. Eckes, through her dress as much as her 
words, presents herself as a model of non-threatening diversity. In her dress, which was 
the object of great interest in the press for having the lowest cut décolleté of the evening, 
she literally revealed herself to the German public. Her dress stands in opposition to the 
veiled femininity of the Muslim “parallel society,” assuring the audience that she does 
not represent the disturbing closure of Muslim modesty. In another conciliatory gesture to 
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the presumed values of her audience, Eckes opens with a story of transformation from her 
childhood: 
I was born in Cologne, or Kölön, as they say in Turkey. My parents are Turks. 
When I was six years old, I asked my mother about Saint Nicholas. She said to 
me, Nazan, kisim - my daughter—there is no Saint Nicholas. And I was the only 
one in my class who didn’t have sweets in their boots on the sixth of December. 
And today, almost thirty years later, Saint Nicholas comes to my house too. That 
is proof. I have arrived, arrived in my home, Germany.iii (Bambi 2010, 2010) 
Eckes’s inclusion of Turkish words establishes her cultural authority to speak as a 
Turkish-German minority. The story of her disappointment at being excluded from the 
Christian German tradition of Saint Nicolas Day ended with the redemptive claim of her 
choice as an adult to partake in German cultural—and religious—traditions. Her anecdote 
acknowledges and accepts the Christian core of German traditions, modeling a form of 
integration that leaves the majoritarian foundations of the nation unchanged. Like the 
statement Eckes makes with her dress, her story is a counter-example to prevailing 
discourses of Muslim fundamentalism. She communicates that her religious beliefs—
whatever they may be—are not a hindrance to her participation in Germany’s “Judeo-
Christian Leitkultur” (Wittrock, 2010). The presentation celebrates Özil’s universal 
popularity across distinct lines of cultural difference. Both Germans and Turks celebrate 
Özil, and, in Eckes’s words, “his relaxed association with his Turkish roots and the 
German national jersey is an example to us all” (Bambi 2010, 2010). The 2010 
integration award congratulates Germans for their meritocratic and cosmopolitan country, 
which, as Eckes claims, “opened opportunities that [she] would never have had 
elsewhere.” As one journalist swooned, the Eckes’s words on integration were powerful 
enough to make you forget the Sarrazin debate (Albers, 2010). With sweeping emotions 
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and glittering celebrities, the issue of the problematics inherent in creating a categorical 
award adjudicating the qualifications for “successful integration” was never seriously 
engaged in the press coverage of the award.  
Those problematics were thrown into sharp relief by the debate around the 2011 
Bambi for Integration recipient, Tunisian-German rapper Bushido. As Özil served to 
outline the qualities of the desirable minority—defined by his success and his agreeable, 
uncontroversial personality—Bushido functioned as a counter-example. With his lyrics 
composed for maximum shock value, in addition to being Germany’s most successful 
rapper he has long been a controversial figure on the German cultural scene. His selection 
for the integration Bambi was based, according to the jury, on his success despite his 
difficult upbringing and on his transformation into an interlocutor for politicians and the 
media on behalf of many Germans with a “migration background.”  They also honored 
him for his charity work in recent years supporting the integration of young people from 
“migration backgrounds.”  
Bushido’s Bambi had two main consequences of significance for this analysis: 
first, it caused a national scandal, drawing enormous attention to the award and, second, it 
evoked well-worn stereotypes of the criminal and intolerant Muslim Other. The press 
coverage of the Bushido Bambi scandal dominated the coverage of the awards, and 
generated far more original commentary than the years surrounding it. Whereas most of 
the other years’ coverage consisted largely of boilerplate wire service stories and press 
releases, Bushido’s Bambi inspired commentary and debate across the mediated and the 
public sphere. Following the intensified discourse around Bushido’s award, the Bambi’s 
ratings spiked in 2011 drawing six million viewers, or over 20% of the television 
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audience. The uncontroversial 2012 awards only managed to draw in 2.6 million viewers 
(“Zuschauerzahlen: Bambi im Rekordtief,” 2012). A handful of journalists remarked on 
this spike in attention, speculating that the controversial selection of Bushido might have 
been a calculated move to generate publicity and increase the perception of the Bambi’s 
cultural relevance (Buß, 2011; Frank, 2011). Most of the coverage, however, centered on 
the critiques of Bushido as an unworthy recipient of the award.  
Following the logic of cultural prizes (English, 2008), in offering a Bambi award 
for Integration, the recipient may be critiqued as undeserving, but that critique only 
further reifies the category. Critics ended up enumerating the ways that Bushido fails to 
be a good example for integration without questioning the basic premise of the award. 
Most critics made it clear that their outrage was not inspired by Bushido being honored 
per se but by the fact that that honor was being bestowed in a social category of which he 
was unworthy.  
Bushido can win all the prizes in the world—from Kreuzberg to Hollywood,  just 
NOT ONE for “integration.”iv (Gensing & Varro, 2011) 
Bushido calls for violence against gays and lesbians in his texts and statements. I 
understand “successful integration” to be something different.v (Green Party state 
representative Claudia Stamm quoted in Gottschild, 2011) 
Whoever propagates contempt for women and gay people has not earned a prize 
for successful integration.vi (Green Party politician Völker Beck quoted in 
Gottschild, 2011)  
In the opinion of [Green Party Leader Claudia Roth], he is certainly not an 
example for successful integration, but “rather an extremely successful cultural 
figure who makes big bucks off the backs of minorities.”vii (“Entscheidung stößt 
auf heftige Kritik,” 2011) 
Far from harming the institution of the Bambi, the critics generally accepted the category 
of integration proposed by the institution, but merely critiqued the jury’s judgment in this 
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particular choice. The debate brought Bambi coverage into more prominent spaces in the 
German media sphere, with prestige publications like Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Die 
Tageszeitung, and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung devoting attention to the award and the 
protest it unleashed among activist groups. This follows James English’s assertion that 
scandal is the lifeblood of the prize. He writes that prize scandals function to “clarify and 
disseminate, as well as at times to assist in modifying, the contemporary rules governing 
the behaviors and dispositions of ‘artists’ or other authorities in matters of art” (2008, p. 
196). In this case, however, the prize claims authority to characterize the behavior of 
immigrants and minorities as represented by celebrities. The criticism of prizes reinforces 
the value hierarchies critics seek to adjudicate. By criticizing Bushido as unworthy of the 
honor, even observers on the left—such as the Green party politicians quoted above—
who might in other cases be critical of integration discourse ended up supporting the 
legitimacy of the integration prize.  
The second consequence of the award was to provide fodder for the reification of 
the idea of the unassimilable Other. The discussion around the prize left little room for 
reflexivity around the notion of an integration prize. It focused almost exclusively on the 
question whether the winner was worthy of the prize, whether he lived up to the values it 
is designed to reward. The arguments in favor of the award—which in my investigation 
were primarily voiced by Bambi affiliates— were based on the idea of the prize 
symbolizing a “second chance.”  
It is clear to [Hessian Minister for Integration Jörg-Uwe] Hahn: “He now has the 
duty to distinguish himself as a bridge builder”viii (“Bambi-Gala,” 2011) 
Bushido was not honored with the Bambi for his earlier texts, said Peter Maffay. 
“On the contrary: Bushido has very clearly distanced himself from his statements 
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of ten years ago. He has long admitted his mistakes openly. My intention was, 
with all respect for those [Bushido] discriminated against, to build a bridge.ix 
(“Nach Wirbel um Bambi für Bushido,” 2011) 
The gift the prize conferred was the possibility of Bushido turning over a new leaf and 
leaving behind undesirable behavior of the past, behavior that—everyone agreed—was 
contrary to the ideals of the prize. It was framed as a pedagogical tool, an incentive for 
the winner to follow the “right path.” This was particularly clear in the speech by aging 
rock artist, Peter Maffay, who presented Bushido with the Bambi for Integration. 
Although Maffay was collaborating with Bushido on a project entitled “Growing Up,” his 
speech was half-hearted. He distanced himself, saying that he knew Bushido “too little,” 
but felt that what they had in common was their willingness to “row toward unknown 
shores.” He concluded by expressing his confidence that Bushido “would live up to” the 
ideals of the prize. When Maffay announced weeks later that he was dissolving his 
partnership with Bushido, it was interpreted as confirmation of what all the critics knew 
all along: Bushido was irredeemable—a veritable counter-example for “integration.”  
Most of the criticism of Bushido’s receipt of the award came from the political 
left and from activists for social justice. Bushido’s critics accused him of exploiting 
inflammatory texts for financial gain, as when Green Party leader Claudia Roth 
condemned Bushido for making “big bucks off the backs of minorities” (quoted above). 
This left-wing critique was met by a reaction from several conservative commentators 
who celebrated Bushido for his bold “political incorrectness” and for his material 
success.  
Bushido is a perfect example of successful integration. The scandal around his 
award shows the phoniness of the self-proposed heralds of migrants…. The 
friends and devotees of migrants are outraged that, of all people, a rapper who is 
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successful under capitalism and incorrect in his political discourse is awarded an 
Integration prize.x (Poschardt, 2011) 
To me, this whole do-gooder fuss stinks. What happened, after all? Bushido is a 
superstar. He’s no pantywaist, but rappers never are. Not everyone can sing about 
love and tra-la-la.xi (Gensing & Varro, 2011) 
The conservative distain for identity-based political activism emerges here as support for 
Bushido’s “taboo breaking rap style” (Miklis, 2011). Debate about Bushido’s award 
disrupts minoritarian identity politics by pitting gender- and sexuality-based minorities 
and their supporters against integrants, typically conceptualized as Muslim immigrants 
and minorities. For conservatives, this reveals the hypocrisy of all identity-based social 
justice projects. The conservative commentators quoted above double down on a 
definition of integration based on meritocratic economic success (see also Chapter 6). 
Bushido’s self-presentation as a hyper-masculine outlaw appealed to some conservative 
sensibilities. However, it simultaneously played into conservative discourses of 
immigrants and minorities as a potential security threat. Crucially, both conservative and 
liberal partisans in this debate tended to validate the categorization of minorities as either 
integration successes or failures.  
Even if Bushido had succeeded in making good on his “second chance,” his story 
is constructed as a quintessential example of the binaries dividing Muslim immigrant 
cultures from native Christian German culture. The Integration Bambi demonstrates how 
easily strong multiculturalist conceptions of culture can shift to nativist ones; when a 
strong conception of cultural difference remains, it is a simple matter to switch focus 
from celebrating the “color” and “diversity” of immigrant cultures to condemning those 
same cultures as reactionary and illiberal. Even if the Integration Bambi holds that 
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minorities can—and should—acquire traits of the majority society, the constituent parts 
of their identities are seen as distinct: one should be integrated in the majority culture 
without losing contact with their “roots.” The result of the Bushido scandal was both to 
boost the presence of the Bambi on the national stage and to rehash arguments about 
undesirable qualities of immigrants. Bushido became a “migrant” straw man.  
In the end, Bushido was turned into an anti-hero, a counter-example that further 
ingrained discourses of the intractable immigrant who stands against the enlightened 
values of liberal German society. Although most of the press coverage avoided explicitly 
labeling Bushido as a typical undesirable immigrant, one journalist in the liberal prestige 
newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung was more direct, writing that “Bushido embodies the 
young man with a migration background and thug-attitude, who acts out violently against 
minorities and won’t be confined by the rules of society” (Grill, 2011). This construction 
draws a distinction between the angry young (Muslim) men of the undesirable immigrant 
class and the minorities that must be protected from their violence.  
This construction of masculine Muslim violence was repeated with the selection 
of the 2012 Integration Bambi recipient. Rabbi Daniel Alter was awarded in the 
integration category after being assaulted by a group of young men who were “presumed 
to be Arab.” In addition, during the 2012 Bambis, the sister of a young Thai-German man 
who was murdered by young Turkish-Germans in Berlin’s Alexanderplatz was honored 
in the category “Courage.” The choice to honor victims in two cases that were framed as 
acts of Muslim intolerance against other minorities reinforces the idea of the threats 
posed by dangerous Arab and Turkish “migrants” to the purportedly liberal-cosmopolitan 
ideals of the new Germany. While the fight against race and identity-based violence is 
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valuable regardless of the identities of the perpetrator, the choice of which perpetrators 
and victims are represented and which are ignored demands scrutiny.  
The choice to highlight two cases of Muslim intolerance with Bambi awards in 
2012 is particularly notable given the revelation that year about a famous series of 
previously unsolved murders committed by a right-wing extremist group, the National 
Socialist Underground (NSU). After two of the group leaders were found dead in a 
burning trailer home in November 2011, the authorities discovered that the group had 
been responsible for the murders of 9 small business owners of Turkish and Greek 
descent from 2000 to 2006. This series of murders, committed across Germany with the 
same weapon, had been a long-standing subject of media speculation. Police 
investigations and media speculation focused in entirely the wrong direction: the victims 
were assumed to have been killed by Turkish perpetrators as part of a transnational 
organized crime ring. The victims’ families were accused of hindering the investigation 
by keeping a code of silence, following the “characteristic hierarchical Turkish family 
structure” (Denso, 2006). As late as August 2011, the case was described in Der Spiegel 
as evidence of the threat of Turkish organized crime:  
Since [the murder series from 2000 to 2006], dozens of police officers and state 
attorneys have hunted perpetrators and weapons; officers from the domestic 
security and intelligence service are attempting to penetrate the mafia-style 
organization of Turkish nationalists in Germany, responsible for the blood-letting. 
The murders, this much investigators know, are the reckoning for debts from 
criminal businesses or revenge on deserters.xii (Neumann & Ulrich, 2011) 
Investigators in the so-called “Bosporus” special commission ignored clues assembled by 
profilers in 2006 pointing to right-wing perpetrators, in part because the commission’s 
preference for a theory linking victims to Turkish organized crime (“Falsche Annahme 
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des Profilers bei den NSU-Morden,” 2013). After over a decade of criminalizing the 
victims of xenophobic hate and their families, the revelations in late 2011 and 2012 
revealed the deadly consequences of widely-held criminal stereotypes of Turkish and 
Arab immigrants and minority Germans. Throughout the investigation, the victims of the 
flippantly named “kebab murders” (Döner-Morde) were characterized in the media and 
by investigators as criminals, as deserving of their fate.  
In discourses reminiscent of American stereotypes of ethicized criminality, from 
the tropes of the Italian Mafia to discussions of “black-on-black” crime, the victims 
symbolized Others who introduce organized crime into Germany. Even in their deaths 
they represented a danger to the normative population. When it was discovered that the 
murders were hate crimes committed by German neo-Nazis, the case raised profound 
questions about the unwillingness of authorities and the media to see and take seriously 
the threat of racist violence by the German right. During 2012, one of the most important 
stories in the German media showed the influence of racism at both the margins and in 
the core institutions of German society, but this story was absent from consideration 
during the Bambi prizes that year. This absence would not necessarily be significant had 
the Bambi not chosen to highlight the victims of Muslim violence in two separate awards 
that year, including the Integration Bambi. 
The celebrity and prize logics that support cultural awards cannot avoid having 
putatively normative consequences when applied to a social category of identity and 
belonging. The prize inhibits the expression of individual subjectivities and instead 
imposes its evaluative criteria to define valuable examples of diversity. The celebrity in 
Burda’s Bambi awards is rendered significant according to the categories of the prize, 
351 
 
which is to say, as candidates for integration. The celebrity within the construction of the 
cultural prize is rendered a mobile sign whose significance is articulated through the 
values embodied in the prize. The prize forecloses the notion of the “subject-in-process” 
(S. Hall, 1996) since the award functions as a conclusion. By awarding a cultural prize 
for integration to individuals born and raised in Germany, the prize maintains a division 
between those who qualify categorically as Germans and those who must strive to be 
considered integrated in German society. It does so under the guise of liberal 
cosmopolitanism.  
Even with the problem posed by the subjectification between normative national 
and “migrant” candidates for integration inherent in the Integration Bambi, social critics 
in the media sphere failed to analyze the underlying problem with the award category. 
The logic of the prize undercuts the function of a critically reflexive public media sphere. 
Critics of the prize cannot help but participate in the discourses constructed by it; critique 
of cultural prizes, no matter how appropriate, tends to bolster their circulation in the 
public sphere. Since representation and circulation is tantamount to importance, heated 
debate and criticism only raise the profile of cultural prizes. After all, “the direction of 
our glance can constitute our social world” (Michael Warner, 2002, p. 62). The Bambi 
demonstrates the resilience of the cultural prize format, which, when wedded to the 
celebrity power of the popular entertainment media, forms a unique stage for the 
articulation of identities.  
“Out with It”: Language Politics and Celebrity Enforcers 
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The introduction of the Integration Bambi in 2010 coincided with the debut of 
another celebrity-oriented integration project. The Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben 
campaign was a pro-bono social marketing campaign created by the newly minted 
German Foundation for Integration (Deutschlandstiftung Integration), an organization 
founded by the Association of German Periodical Publishers (Verband Deutscher 
Zeitschriftenverleger) and supported by the German government. The foundation’s board 
of trustees is chaired by Hubert Burda, owner of Hubert Burda Media and the Bambi 
awards, and Maria Böhmer, the first German Commissioner for Integration. Chancellor 
Angela Merkel is the organization’s honorary patron. This organization reflects the 
private and public institutionalization that has accompanied the rise in integration 
discourse.  
According to its website, the Foundation for Integration aims to support the 
achievement of “equality of opportunity for people with a background of migration in 
Germany” (“Deutschlandstiftung Integration: Deutschlandstiftung,” n.d.). This framing 
of their mission suggests a focus on structural issues, on creating the conditions for equal 
opportunity. Although, the foundation’s activities, as listed on its website, include a 
scholarship fund for talented young people, they primarily focus on so-called 
“information campaigns” such as their inaugural Out with It campaign from 2010. Both 
the scholarship project and the media campaigns select highly successful individuals and, 
like the Bambi award, display them as examples of successful integration. In fact, the 
foundation recently inaugurated its own integration award, the Golden Victoria, which 
Angela Merkel personally awarded to Polish-born national soccer team member Miroslav 
Klose in 2014 (“Sie sind Sympathieträger und wunderbares Vorbild,” 2014). Instead of 
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acknowledging the conditions that contribute to “equality of opportunity” or its lack, the 
foundation’s actions focus on minority individuals who have already achieved success. 
These “information campaigns” single out successful individuals and then divine the 
characteristics or skills that contributed to their success.  
The Foundation for Integration’s projects raise several important issues in relation 
to discourses of integration. First, they offer a chance to investigate minority participation 
in hegemonic projects regulating minorities and immigrants. Second, they highlight the 
strength of discourses of language in defining valid citizenship and a life worth living. 
This section examines the first question through a textual analysis of the Out with It 
campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye” (Nur ein Augenblick) by the Black 
German rapper Harris. Then, it analyzes the politics of discourse around language using 
press coverage of the Out with It campaign and its theme song. Reflecting and 
elaborating issues raised in other chapters, analysis of this campaign reveals blind spots 
in critical thinking about racism, nationalism, and the perpetuation of second-class 
citizenship. 
The Foundation for Integration’s first project, the Out with It campaign, gathered 
elite athletes, politicians, and entertainers with transnational backgrounds to, as the Bild 
put it, “motivate migrants living in Germany to learn our language”  (“Kampagne für 
Integration,” 2010). This motivation took the form of print ads featuring celebrities 
sticking out their tongues, which were digitally altered to display the colors of the 
German flag. The ads included prominent politicians Aygül Özkan, Christian Democratic 
minister in Lower Saxony and Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu (see figure 11) 
displaying their painted tongues. While the outstretched tongue could be read as a defiant 
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gesture through which visible minorities break rules of decorum to claim the German 
language as their own, press descriptions show that it was interpreted primarily as an 
exhortation to other minorities to speak “good” German (for example “Kampagne für 
Integration,” 2010). 
  
Figure 11: Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu sticks out his tongue for the Out with It campaign. This is 
one of over two dozen campaign ads displaying the digitally altered tongues of minority German 
celebrities.   
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The most common term used to describe the gesture in the corpus analyzed here is 
frech, which translates to impudent, cheeky, or saucy. The infantile associations of this 
term and the depicted gesture problematize a straightforward interpretation of the gesture 
as empowering. It is difficult to imagine normative German politicians, such as the 
campaign’s official patron Angela Merkel, consenting to publically perform this intimate 
and childish gesture. In the only scholarly critique of the campaign I was able to locate, 
Mita Banerjee (2011) considers this question of agency and defiance. She uses the 
relatively recent German academic field of “xenology” (Fremdverstehen, which literally 
translates to “understanding the foreign”) to position the campaign within broader 
changes in German society beginning in the 1990s. When the third generation of Turkish-
Germans did not generally shed all vestiges of foreignness, Banerjee writes that German 
politicians and intellectuals shifted their focus to a well-meaning effort to understand 
foreigners and, through this understanding, to solve the “immigrant problem.” Turkish-
Germans were the “pivot point” of this effort; their supposed failure to assimilate served 
as the standard by which to compare other immigrant groups  (Banerjee, 2011, p. 197). 
The xenologist acts as an ethnographer with a crucial difference; although ethnographers 
long understood their work as a project of understanding the Other, even in its earliest 
forms the observer sought to participate and to learn the language and the ways of their 
subjects. The xenologist, on the other hand, asks their participants to explain themselves 
“in the fieldworker’s terms” (Banerjee, 2011, p. 198). Banerjee observes that while the 
depicted gesture is meant to be shocking and perhaps defiant, the politics of its framing is 
to domesticate the subjects’ foreignness, pushing them to justify themselves in state-
sanctioned language. Banerjee claims that the ad’s photographs “could only have been 
356 
 
taken by a xenologist” (2011, p. 199). This is only partially true, since, in a campaign 
such as this, there are many creators. The concept was developed by Patricia Scheder of 
the advertising agency DDB for the Integration Foundation and the photographer was 
Murat Aslan, a Berlin-based photographer of Turkish descent. The minority participants 
all joined voluntarily and expressed enthusiasm for the project in the occasional quote 
printed in the media. These minority celebrities are co-authors of the photographs 
alongside the normative German xenologists.  
The interest of minority and transnational Germans in participating in this project, 
and others like the Integration Bambi, suggests that participation may be a means of 
taking on, however temporarily, a position as normative citizen. It is important to ask, 
however, if the significance of their status as apparent minorities—which is the reason for 
their participation—will be changed by the campaign or action. More concretely, do 
projects like the Integration Bambi or the Out with It campaign challenge common 
narratives of cultural or intellectual deficiency? The following analysis argues that 
examples of minority celebrity success may serve more to support the idea of Germany as 
a just and meritocratic society than to undermine widespread negative stereotypes of 
transnational minority communities. The Out with It campaign also shows that 
essentialist notions of culture and race allow some minority celebrities to take staunchly 
xenophobic positions without provoking serious reproach. In its choice of an aggressive 
song condemning intransigent immigrants as its theme song, this government and media 
industry supported campaign shows examples of exceptional minority citizens as proof of 
the potential for minorities to succeed under the current hegemonic system while 
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simultaneously condemning those who fail for their lack of loyalty and commitment to 
the German nation.  
Ungrateful Immigrants in Good-Hearted Germany  
The title of the campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye,” by rapper 
Harris (see figure 12), refers to racism in Germany. The song opens with Harris’s claim 
to understand the experiences of minorities who have endured open prejudice and 
antagonism from white German society.  
You are young, black hair, brown eyes, dark skin. 
Believe me, I know that shitty look too 
That particular “You, fucking Kanacke36 look” 
But that’s not Germany, that is just a blink of the eye 
 
[Du bist jung, schwarze Haare, braune Augen, dunkle Haut 
Glaube mir, ich kenn diese scheiß Blicke auch 
Dieser bestimmte „Du scheiß Kanacke-Blick“ 
Aber das ist nicht Deutschland, das ist nur ein Augenblick] 
 
This opening strophe establishes Harris’s minority credentials, airing the fact that racism 
exists as a part of everyday life in Germany. At the same time, he invalidates the 
significance of these experiences of racism, arguing that they are an aberration that does 
not represent the German nation. Racism, here, is ephemeral and insignificant. It is not an 
inevitable byproduct of the global political system of nation-states that divides the 
                                                          
 
 
 
36 Kanake is a strongly pejorative term for foreigners that was originally used against immigrants from 
southern Europe but which has come to be associated with Turkish and Arab minorities. The term was 
“reclaimed” in the 1990s as part of the Kanak Attak movement (see Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007). 
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population into normative nationals and foreign strangers, nor is it a reason to criticize 
majority society.  
 
Figure 12: Rapper Harris displays his body, prominently tattooed in old German Fraktur script with 
the word, Deutschland.   
Having invalidated a minority position critiquing systematic racism, Harris opens 
an attack on intransigent, intolerant, and ungrateful immigrants: 
How is it that you’ve lived in this country for over 10 years?  
Maybe longer, and you still don’t speak the German language? 
You say Germans are shit, German women are trash. 
Please do Germany a favor and get out! 
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[Wieso wohnst du in diesem Land über 10 Jahre? 
Vielleicht länger und sprichst trotzdem nicht die deutsche Sprache? 
Du sagst Deutsche sind scheiße, Deutsche Frauen sind Dreck 
Tue Deutschland bitte einen Gefallen und zieh weg!] 
 
Harris’s imagined interlocutor is the stereotypical nightmare of failed integration. He is 
young and presumably male, based on the alleged intolerance of emancipated German 
women. The first sign of the immigrants’ failure is his lack of German language ability. It 
both symbolizes his rejection of German society and further invalidates any criticism he 
raises of conditions in Germany. After all, if he does not speak German, it is assumed that 
he cannot possibly understand German society. Such a person holds no value to the 
nation, and Harris exhorts them to “get out.” Harris even offers, “If you don’t know 
where the airport is, I’ll bring you. I’ll pay for your ticket and souvenirs,” claiming that 
they would soon miss Germany and that they “don’t know how good [they] have it here.” 
The text is primarily aimed at immigrants, but the critique also applies the whole 
population of visible minorities who act as though they “do not want to be here” and who 
do not properly perform their respect and appreciation for their place in Germany. Harris, 
foregrounding his status as a visible minority, condemns fellow minorities who do not 
share pride in their Germanness. 
In addition to their lack of appropriate appreciation for Germany, Harris 
condemns his interlocutor as infantile and self-segregating, suggesting that a poor attitude 
and work ethic are responsible for immigrants’ problems, not racism, economic 
inequality or systemic disadvantage. The projected interlocutor’s audacity to critique 
Germany without fulfilling the affective performance of loyal citizenship incites Harris, 
who places himself in the role of pedagogue.  
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But when I see and hear how they speak about Germany… 
If they can’t go back to a war, that I can understand 
 
But you’ve got to behave yourself, that’s just how it is! 
If you don’t look German, that’s just the way it is. 
Be proud of your roots, stick your chest out and walk tall 
But you can’t live here and talk shit about everything 
And think that everyone should be nice to you too 
Above all, if you don’t respect the Germans.  
 
[Aber ich sehe und höre doch wie sie über Deutschland reden 
Wenn man nicht in den Krieg zurück kann, kann ich das verstehen 
 
Aber man muss sich benehmen, es ist einfach so! 
Wenn du dich nicht als deutsch siehst, ist das einfach so 
Sei stolz auf deine Wurzeln, Brust raus und gerade gehen 
Du kannst hier aber nicht leben und alles schlecht reden 
Und denken, dass man dann auch noch nett ist zu dir 
Vor allen dingen, wenn du die Deutschen nicht respektierst] 
 
The immigrant’s demand for respect is invalidated by his criticisms of Germany, 
according to Harris. This passage starts with Harris’s frustration with negative talk about 
Germany, building on the familiar trope that if majority society is so bad, if it is “all 
Nazis,” then immigrants should simply leave. While conceding that some people do not 
have the choice to go back to their war-torn homelands, Harris claims that they have the 
responsibility to “behave themselves.” The stance advocated by Harris resonates closely 
with American “respectability politics.” In the words of Michelle Smith (2014), this 
approach proposes that “marginalized classes will receive their share of political 
influence and social standing not because democratic values and law require it, but 
because they demonstrate their compatibility” with mainstream society. Respectability 
politics are “the first resort of marginalized classes.” They circulate within marginalized 
communities and are reinforced by mainstream discourses that locate the source of social 
inequality in personal and cultural deficits, disavowing the legitimacy of anger stoked by 
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inequality. Harris acknowledges that carrying visible difference can have negative 
consequences, “but that’s just the way it is.” This passage, in a subtler way than the main 
chorus, delegitimizes critiques of social exclusion based on visible difference, claiming 
that a respectful attitude towards majority society and appropriate pride in one’s “roots” 
is the solution to exclusion.  
The demand for gratitude to Germany returns throughout the text. Harris’s text 
personifies Germany, giving the nation a body with organs and affect; “Germany is 
generous and has a big heart.”xiii Harris is offended by the interlocutor’s lack of 
appreciation for the safety, stability, and opportunity Germany provides, and his laziness 
and “ignorance.” Harris rebukes, chides, and infantilizes his interlocutor. “You’re lucky, 
you’re here now,” Harris proclaims. “So behave yourself, do your work, grow up, and 
don’t be childish…You should be ashamed to speak so badly of Germany!”xiv Although 
Harris appears to hear all of the negative things that his interlocutor says about Germany, 
he claims to be unable to understand his interlocutor’s explanation of his position. In the 
manner of xenologist, Harris demands explanation from the foreign Other, only to ignore 
it when it does not come in a normative form.  
What is this shit all about? How ignorant do you have to be? 
You don’t want to learn German, but you want to stay in Germany 
That is too much for me, I can’t understand that 
Can you please explain it to me? Oops, I don’t understand you 
And that’s why you stay among yourselves, you can’t speak any German! 
 
[Was soll der Scheiß? Wie Ignorant muss man sein? 
Du willst kein Deutsch lernen, aber in Deutschland bleiben 
Das ist mir zu viel, ich versteh das nicht 
Kannste mir das bitte erklären? Ups, ich versteh dich nicht 
Und darum bleibt ihr unter euch, ihr könnt kein Deutsch!] 
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The supposed inability to communicate in German invalidates the claim to full political 
personhood including the right to participate in social critique. Harris classifies language 
deficits as a result of intellectual deficits as well as a lack of will; he ties segregation to 
these deficits as opposed to broader questions of class or to decades of policy choices on 
guest worker housing, city planning decisions, and everyday racism in housing (see 
Mandel, 2008). Harris’s song is an unveiled attack defining and maligning socially 
undesirable immigrants and minorities. He gleefully acknowledges the potential 
interpretation of his text as racist, rapping, “If I were blond with blue eyes, you would say 
that I am a Nazi,”xv a sentiment he repeats in interviews (Harris, 2010b). For Harris—and 
apparently also for the government officials, and marketing and nonprofit agents who 
chose this song as the theme for the campaign—his status as a visible minority makes it 
impossible for him to promote racism. The selection of this song reveals a serious 
misapprehension of the nature and function of racism in the most influential echelons of 
the public. If racism is a materially significant discourse that uses demographic features 
to fracture the population into Life that must be protected and life that is a threat to the 
politically relevant population (see Introduction), it is the logic of the discourse itself that 
matters, not the demographic characteristics of its promoter. Harris uses his minority 
status to undermine anti-racist critiques of discourses like his, which claim that 
immigrants’ purported disdain for the majority population and their supposed lack of 
motivation or ability are harmful to the nation. From these firmly essentialist foundations, 
Harris uses his position to become the ideal enforcer of normative national hegemony. 
Language and Life 
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The Out with It campaign positions itself as a helping hand to “migrants” to 
encourage them to learn German and, thereby, become full citizens. Instead, its theme 
song and the campaign’s content suggest that it is an internal discussion among 
normative German society and its minority elite defining the requirements for national 
membership and the responsibility for social inequality. To understand the campaign, 
audiences must also be familiar enough with the German public sphere to recognize the 
campaign models as nationally known politicians, athletes, and entertainers. Furthermore, 
to understand the campaign’s theme song, audiences must have a strong command of the 
German language. The campaign requires cultural and linguistic knowledge that would 
not be available to the purportedly isolated population it claims to target. The relationship 
in Harris’s song between language and politically legitimate personhood is also expressed 
in the more benignly framed discussions around the Out with It campaign. This final 
section analyzes discussions of the campaign in the press to understand the role of ideas 
of language in integration discourse.  
The idea of language as both a means for and a measure of integration is one 
central themes in integration discourse that earlier chapters addressed only in passing. 
Arguments foregrounding the importance of speaking German appear frequently, whether 
in common experiences of German-born minorities who are regularly praised for their 
“good German” (see for example Bota et al., 2012) or in complaints about the purported 
refusal of immigrants in “parallel societies” to learn German. This issue also arose in 
discussions surrounding Bushido’s Bambi for Integration as a possible justification for 
the award: 
If he sees to it that his friends and fans maybe learn German better, then that is a 
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really a good approach.xvi (Actress Uschi Glas quoted in Gottschild, 2011) 
He makes use of nasty clichés, but he also uses his popularity to spread good 
messages, like: Foreigners who live here must learn the German language.xvii 
(Hessian Integration Minister Jörg-Uwe Hahn quoted in Gottschild, 2011) 
These quotes argue that Bushido’s utility in convincing “foreigners who live here”—a 
descriptor that presumably refers to his friends and fans—to speak (better) German is 
more valuable than the potential harms posed by his clichéd gangsta-rap texts. Using 
press discussion around the Out with It campaign, this section examines how discourse 
about language supports and validates processes dividing the population into normative 
nationals and integrants. Although German language acquisition by first generation 
immigrants differs greatly from language acquisition by children raised in the German 
school system, these distinctions are erased in integration discourse. All integrants may 
be scrutinized and praised or condemned for their use of the German language. Focusing 
on the purported unwillingness or inability of integrants to speak “proper German” places 
responsibility for social exclusion on integrants themselves, protecting the idea of a 
meritocratic German society in the face of persistent education and opportunity gaps for 
immigrants and their descendants.  
 The discussions of the Out with It campaign in the press were not generally 
contentious. With a few exceptions, press accounts described the campaign in positive 
terms, uncritically conveying the stated meanings and motivations of its creators and 
participants. What emerges in the articles describing the campaign is a concept of 
integration that uses a symbolic notion of the German language use as a metonym for full 
citizenship and, thus, full political personhood. This notion of language is portrayed as 
equally accessible to all who are willing to work for it, opening a putatively egalitarian 
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space of citizenship. However, by using examples of minority celebrities who were raised 
in Germany, the campaign sets minority German speakers apart from their ethnic German 
counterparts. Regardless of the fact the featured celebrities they have been exposed to 
German since childhood, their dominance of standardized German is portrayed as 
particularly relevant for German language learners, or candidates for integration. The 
following excerpts characterize the imagined targets and motivation for the campaign.  
With this campaign, the [Integration Foundation] seeks to make it clear how 
important it is for people with a migration background living in Germany to 
dominate the German language.xviii (Rausch, 2010) 
The campaign titled Out with It, should motivate migrants living in Germany to 
learn our language.xix (“Kampagne für Integration,” 2010) 
Celebrities want to be role models for migrant children.xx (Fröhlich, 2010) 
In order to get, in particular, children and young adults to increase their 
willingness to learn German, celebrities with foreign roots have made themselves 
available for the second series of the Integration Foundation campaign.xxi (Fietz, 
2010) 
A poster campaign aims to move migrants to learn German…. The campaign 
primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak German despite 
having been born in Germany.xxii (Lachmann, 2010) 
These five quotes target the broad range of individuals under the category of “people with 
a migration background,” explicitly including those born and raised in Germany. All, 
here, are equally candidates for integration. Successful examples, embodied here by 
celebrities, have been mobilized to “motivate” those whose failure to integrate is 
signified by their supposed inability or unwillingness to “speak German.” By focusing on 
children and young people, these quotes position unqualified, normative German 
language against youth vernacular forms. The existence of a correct, standard, and 
normal German language is taken for granted in these quotes. This is framed as “our” 
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language, the language that normative Germans speak. Non-standardized forms of 
German spoken by the children of immigrants are deemed invalid. The final section of 
this paper will contextualize this determination within a long tradition of language 
standardization as the basis for constructing the nation state. First, I will discuss examples 
from the press coverage that situate language-as-integration as the prerequisite for 
legitimate political and economic personhood.  
 Crucially, German and “language” in this corpus refers not to actual speech or 
communication practice, but to a symbolic ideal of “correct” standardized German. This 
point is driven home by the campaign’s mode of representation. Celebrities are mobilized 
as bodies; their language is not heard, but is symbolized through the display of their 
tongues, branded with the national colors. The campaign empties the representatives’ 
speech of all content, rendering their bodies as symbolic nodes for integration discourse. 
In a distortion of the deliberative democratic model (J. Habermas, 1974), the 
communication of ideas as the ideal basis for active citizenship is displaced by the tongue 
itself as an instrument for producing a standardized national form of language. Language 
is valuable as a symbolic performance rather than as a means of communication and 
contestation in an agonistic public sphere. As Harris’s song demonstrates, ideas 
communicated outside the proper register can be dismissed as incomprehensible and 
illegitimate. The final quote above comes from a scathing opinion piece from the 
nationally circulating Die Welt titled with the question, Are Germans ashamed of their 
language? The column takes the campaign as an opportunity to air grievances about poor 
appreciation for the national language among minorities and normative Germans alike. 
The extended quote reads,  
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The campaign primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak 
German despite having been born in Germany. [Integration Commissioner Maria] 
Böhmer says to them, “Language is more than communication—it is a tie that 
binds us.” It should be anyway.  
But since that is still not the case today, we have this good and important poster 
campaign. After all, after five decades of immigration, young people in social 
combustion points [soziale Brennpunkte] in big cities stammer out a so-called 
“Kanak-Sprak” and are not capable of formulating grammatically correct 
sentences in German.”xxiii (Lachmann, 2010) 
This piece not only stigmatizes and delegitimizes minority German spaces and 
vernaculars, it interprets the supposedly lax attitude among majority Germans towards 
policing and correcting minority language as a failure of national pride. The myth of 
German (or any standardized national language) as a discrete, transparent, and concrete 
linguistic entity invites all those hailed as the national “we” to judge if speech meets the 
standard of qualifying as “German.” Although Harris recognizes that he is not perceived 
as part of the normative national collective because of his appearance, he asserts his 
national legitimacy, in part, by passing judgement on the linguistic deficits of his fellow 
minorities.  
Although the campaign’s provocation is broadly presented and interpreted as a 
positive, cheerful, and lighthearted call to encourage “migrants” to follow the successful 
example of minority celebrities, the descriptions of a generalized migrants figure that 
appear in the corpus are most often negative. The campaign’s inclusion of minority 
hegemonic enforcers, like Harris, facilitates explicit discourses of blame and 
condemnation of “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer). Discussions of the 
campaign define the trope of the “enemy of integration,” typically described as a young 
urban male of Arab or Turkish descent. Harris condemns people that he describes as his 
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own friends, with whom he grew up in Berlin’s Kreuzberg neighborhood. He uses his 
own experience as a troubled young man who saw the error of his ways and achieved 
success to invalidate his friends who felt marginalized:  
The excuse was always: Germany doesn’t give us a chance. But that’s not true. I 
myself was at a school for the “difficult to educate” (Schwererziehbare). There 
were remedial classes, there were extra remedial classes and remedial classes for 
remedial classes. No one can say that Germany doesn’t do anything for these 
teens. They refuse!xxiv (Harris, 2010b) 
Of course: When Sarrazin says that young criminals are often “black-heads,” he is 
unfortunately right. At least in Berlin. Now all the black-heads say: Fucking 
Sarrazin. I say: What do you mean, fucking Sarrazin, man? These criminal Alis37 
screw up the reputation of well-integrated Arabs and Turks.xxv (Harris, 2010b) 
An article from the same author who exalted in Nazan Eckes’s speech for the integration 
Bambi, wrote an article praising Harris, claiming that “soccer and music have done more 
for integration than all the politicians combined” (Albers, 2010). In it, she quotes self-
identifying minority fans of Harris who support his critique of minorities who refuse to 
take responsibility for their problems: 
“You get straight to the point, man”; “Yes, we are also at fault that things are the 
way they are”; fans who write “I am young. I am a Turk. I passed my A-levels 
and I’m completely integrated. And I hate these Kanake, who can’t behave 
themselves here.”xxvi (Albers, 2010)  
The aggressively pejorative language in this quote is presented as acceptable, since it 
comes from self-identified minorities. Harris’s anger and disgust with enemies of 
integration overflows in another article in response to the topic of “honor killings.” 
                                                          
 
 
 
37 The common Arabic name Ali is used here as a racialized slur associating Arab men with criminality. 
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“Fucking parallel society!” Harris spits out his contempt with the words. “And we 
are supposed to handle these people with kid gloves? They should be 
deported.”xxvii (Pham, 2010) 
Harris’s impassioned denunciations of the “parallel society” and his casual use of 
designations like “black-head” and “criminal Ali” are accepted without challenge, since, 
as a self-designated in-group member, Harris claims to be incapable of supporting racist 
projects. He expresses irritation with anti-racist critique, claiming that essentially the only 
thing about the Sarrazin debate that concerns him is the accusation that Sarrazin is racist. 
In response, he posed the question, “why must the cudgels be brought out anytime 
anyone says anything about foreigners?”38 (Pham, 2010). This comment points to idea, 
common in integration “debates” (see Chapter 6), that anti-racist critique abuses and 
victimizes normative Germans.  
The national symbolic meaning of language in this corpus resonates with the 
political and economic discourses of integration and citizenship explored throughout this 
dissertation. The campaign creators saw their campaign as perfectly timed to meet 
intensified scrutiny of minorities and their integration status, as the second series debuted 
at the peak of the “integration debate” unleashed by Sarrazin (Fröhlich, 2010). The 
campaign supports the tautological associations in the Sarrazin debate that define 
integration as the achievement of social and economic success. Language-as-integration 
defines the difference between success and failure, and more fundamentally, between life 
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and existence. As one of the campaign’s models, DJ Chino, explained,  
The German language is the BEST! Only when you understand and are 
understood can you begin to live and not merely to exist.xxviii (“Integrations-
Kampagne,” n.d.) 
This quote situates language at the base of the distinction between the politically 
qualified, valuable version of life (zoe) and bare life (bios) (Agamben, 1998). There is a 
persistent tension in the corpus that emerges from the intentional ambiguity surrounding 
language and communication. In this quote, DJ Chino discusses the basic ability to 
communicate, to understand and be understood. However, the press coverage of this 
campaign explicitly denies language as a simply, or even primarily, a matter of 
communication. As the quote above from politician Maria Böhmer states, “language is 
about more than communication—it is the tie that binds us.” The ambiguity around 
language and communication only serves to consolidate a normative notion of proper 
German.   
Proper language is legitimated as a fundamental requirement for valid and active 
citizenship. It is frequently linked to the achievement of a “good” and politically 
meaningful life. 
Whoever wants to become someone in Germany, and doesn’t speak the language, 
has no chance…. The Integration Commissioner of the Federal Government, 
Maria Böhmer said, “Good language knowledge opens the doors for a successful 
life in our country.”xxix  (“Integrations-Kampagne startet,” 2010) 
[Maria Böhmer] said, in essence, whoever does not speak German can never 
become anything in Germany. In contrast, whoever speaks good German can 
make a contribution to society.xxx (Lachmann, 2010) 
 “Only those who speak the German language have a chance,” warns [CDU 
minister Aygül] Özkan, promising, “In this country anyone can become 
anything”xxxi (Fröhlich, 2010) 
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The message is clear: NO FUTURE WITHOUT A COMMON LANGUAGE!xxxii 
(Herrmann, 2010) 
Speaking the right form of German is required for the successful life of any individual 
person. Furthermore, the normalization of language is the prerequisite for the future of 
society itself, as the last quote emphasizes in capitalized text. Language-as-integration 
posits that the success associated with normative belonging is equally accessible to all, 
since language learning is flexible and technically available to all people. Those who 
refuse to learn German or speak properly cannot expect “to become anything” or even 
participate in society. In Maria Böhmer’s words, “whoever can’t speak German is only an 
onlooker in our country”xxxiii (Ehrenstein, 2010). Language-as-integration discourse 
erases discrimination and structural inequality, asserting that the solution to social and 
economic inequality among minority populations lies with the individual. At a more 
fundamental level, it affirms that those without proper speech cannot have active, 
politically relevant lives.  
Shifting Definition of Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Monolingualism 
On its face, enabling immigrants to learn the German language poses clear 
benefits to immigrants as well as society at large. However, discussions about language 
deficits among “migrants” are built on a fuzzy concept of language. These discussions 
ignore the diversity of immigrant and minority experiences as well as the contextual 
factors that contribute to different levels of fluency and speech style. Furthermore, while 
campaigns like Out with It publicize the idea of language deficiency among minorities 
and immigrants, they do not include concrete plans to address the chronically insufficient 
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resources dedicated to instruction of German as a foreign language offered as part of 
“integration classes” (“Haushaltsplan,” 2014; Kocaman, 2010).  
In one of the only critical articles written about the campaign, freelance writer 
Mely Kiyak (2010) investigated the language course offerings aggregated on the website 
ich-spreche-deutsche.de, the only concrete service offered by the initiative. She framed 
the article as an open letter to the politician Aygül Özkan, the first female Turkish-
German minister who also posed for the Out with It campaign. Kiyak attempted to find a 
language course that would serve her imaginary retired 55-year-old mother with limited 
German skills. She called 10 of the 36 programs listed on the site and found that their 
offerings all targeted foreign students and business people or new immigrants. She also 
called local and national government ministries dedicated to assisting immigrants. She 
could not find a single German course that was appropriate—either in terms of cost or 
content—for her hypothetical mother. Kiyak concludes that “the market has not reacted 
to the political demand on migrants to learn better German. Likewise, politicians have no 
solutions. And you, [Aygül Özkan]? You model for a PR campaign by an industry group 
and stick your tongue out at migrants”xxxiv (Kiyak, 2010). While four other articles in the 
corpus included skepticism about the campaign’s purpose and effectiveness, Kiyak’s 
column was the only example that seriously addressed the lack of resources available for 
immigrants to meet language standards demanded in the German public sphere.  
This focus on German language acquisition coalesced around the turn of the 
millennium at the same time as the introduction of jus soli citizenship. Like the concept 
of integration, the multilingualism introduced by foreign labor had been a topic of 
political debate since the mid-1970s (Gramling, 2009). However, they only became a 
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major political and public focus after citizenship laws were changed to acknowledge the 
reality of Germany’s status as an immigrant country. Previously, the priority of linguistic 
policy for labor migrants and their children had been to foster the “readiness-to-return” 
(Rückkehrbereitschaft) by funding instruction in heritage languages. German language 
instruction for first generation immigrants was neglected by the government. Only after 
pluralism was legally acknowledged as a German reality did linguistic pluralism become 
a target of state control. David Gramling (2009, 2016) identifies this “linguistic turn” as a 
new model of civic belonging based on the idea of jus linguarum (right of languages), or 
“cosmopolitan monolingualism.” Gramling argues that, unlike the previous models based 
on “blood” or “soil,” jus linguarum does not seek to establish a uniform “civic essence,” 
but rather reacts to the existence of linguistic plurality by introducing “segregative 
strategies” to reduce its impact on public life (2009, p. 131). Cosmopolitan 
monolingualism upholds the idea of “cultural diversity while discouraging the public use 
of multiple heritage languages.” In the early to mid-2000s, the “salutary neglect” of the 
Kohl government in the 1980s and 1990s gave way to a rapid proliferation of new laws 
and policies tying social assistance and visa renewal to the demonstration of progress in 
German language courses. Lest they be considered coercive, these policies were justified 
in terms of civil rights, arguing the immigrants had the “right” to learn German as a 
means of achieving autonomy and equality in Germany. In a remarkably fast turnaround, 
the center-right political coalition effectively resignified the German language “not as an 
inherited ethnic possession but as a pan-ethnic lingua franca” that represented the 
solution to the specter of cultural relativism and parallel societies ascribed to 
multiculturalism.  
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In the politics of integration of the early to mid-2000s, cosmopolitan 
monolingualism emerged as a panacea for problems of social cohesion and became the 
key symbolic performance of civic unification. However, as German language 
competency became an increasingly important symbolic tool, public debates about civic 
belonging only served to obscure the complexity of language practices among 
multilingual people, including the fact that for those raised in the German school system 
German may not be their “mother tongue” but it is certainly one of their native languages. 
The norm of monolingualism is so strong in Germany, as in most other European 
countries and their settler-colonialist offshoots (Auer & Wei, 2007), that multilingualism 
is seen as a problem that interferes with the proper acquisition of the majority language. 
In a proposal that inspired national ridicule, the Christian Social Union (CSU) party of 
Bavaria went so far as to propose that immigrants and asylum seekers speak German not 
only in public but also in the home, arguing at their party convention in 2014 that 
“whoever wants to live here permanently should be urged to speak German in the public 
sphere and at home”xxxv (“Sprachregeln für Zuwanderer,” 2014). This proposal inspired 
near universal opposition, as the incursion into the private sphere was deemed invasive 
and impractical.  
However, many critical responses to the CSU’s German-everywhere proposal 
actually revealed the strength of underlying monolingual language ideologies. Robert 
Moore (2015) recently compared EU policy documents on language pluralism in the 
European Union with early language standardization projects at the dawn of the modern 
European nation-state. In Moore’s analysis, the ideal multilingual Europe consists of a 
collection of monolingual states, each with its own mother tongue. Each of these 
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monolingual Europeans should then be encouraged to learn one language of choice and 
one language for international and practical use. Moore relates this policy to fears, on the 
one hand, of the dominance and threat of contamination posed by the lingua franca 
English and, on the other, fears of social disintegration through linguistic diversity of 
non-EU immigrants. In contemporary Europe, diversity is hailed as a “benefit,” a cultural 
advantage in a global age. At the same time, persistent anxieties circulate about the 
potential for chaos and miscommunication resulting from “poorly managed” diversity. 
Like the integration discourses examined throughout this dissertation (see, in particular, 
Chapter 2), linguistic difference is understood through a political economy of life that 
sees it as both a means of future growth through innovation and a potential threat in the 
form of those who “opt out” (Wiese, 2015), refusing to participate in the national project. 
With little to no interest in actual linguistic practices, symbolic language politics are a 
means of consolidating European norms in the face of changes brought by the new 
mobility within the European Union and by global political and economic projects.  
There has been substantial research on new youth vernaculars in Western 
European countries showing similar constructions of these vernaculars as inferior and 
threatening to national language and majority culture (see Wiese, 2014). In research from 
across Europe, vernaculars associated with minority youth are associated with negative 
behavior such as violence and sexism even while they are sometimes seen as fashionable 
or “cool.” This simultaneous devaluation and appropriation of minority sociolects will 
sound familiar to those acquainted with debates around “Ebonics” (African American 
Vernacular English) in the United States. Despite scholarly research to the contrary, 
public reactions frequently equate deviations from standard German in minority 
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vernaculars with mistakes made by learners of German as a foreign language (Wiese, 
2015). Furthermore, this use of “flawed” German is perceived as a willful attack on 
German norms, as “opting out” of majority society and, thus, as an act of aggression and 
a threat to social cohesion (Wiese, 2015, p. 356). This minoritized form of speech is also 
associated with laziness, with the unwillingness to expend the effort to speak “properly.” 
High German, in contrast, is a skill to be cultivated with care and, thus, is worthy of its 
elevated cultural capital. Whereas regional dialects are considered part of national history 
and local folk culture and are seen as compatible with learning High German, minority 
German vernaculars are commonly seen as an outside imposition (Wiese, 2014, 2015).  
The CSU’s German-only proposal mentioned above comes into conflict with 
cosmopolitan monolingualism because it threatens the integrity of pure language 
transmission. In their zeal to eliminate all language diversity, the CSU proposal 
introduced the possibility of parents transmitting “faulty” or “broken” language to their 
children. The CSU violates the modern ideals of plural monolingualism by encouraging 
the possibility of corrupting a pure language. This commitment to language purity is 
illustrated by the leader of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, who responded to the CSU 
proposal, arguing,  
One reason why I can speak reasonably good High German, and not only Swabian 
chatter or broken German is because my parents didn’t speak German with me. If 
my parents had tried to speak mangled German with me, I certainly would not 
have become the chair of Alliance ‘90/The Greens, or a member of the German 
parliament, instead I would have ended up a car mechanic or some such thing. 
Which is to say, thank God my parents didn’t listen to the CSU, because when 
parents teach their children a language badly, the best teacher in the world can’t 
counteract it.xxxvi (D. Müller & Özdemir, 2014) 
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Özdemir, who is one of the most consistent and outspoken advocates for immigrants, 
asylum seekers, and minorities in the German government, bases his condemnation of the 
CSU proposal on the value of language purity. In this view, learning anything but the 
standard dialect of a language makes it impossible to acquire the standard dialect, even 
with “the best teachers in the world.” High German, which was originally a geographic 
distinction, is now a qualitative distinction. The only road to upward mobility and the top 
echelons of society, here, is through the standard dialect. Although Wiese’s research 
shows that regional dialects are considered authentically German and, thus, valuable, 
speaking only regional dialect is a sign of poor education. Özdemir’s comment reflects 
well-established European monolingual narratives, which hold that regional dialects and 
“mangled” forms of standard language spoken by foreigners threaten standard language 
learning (Moore, 2015). Ignoring the realities of linguistic flexibility and the prevalence 
of code-switching, this “language decay” narrative (Moore, 2015) is a foundational topos 
of monolingual ideology that persists from the early days of the European nation-state 
(Gramling, 2009; Wiese, 2015). Özdemir’s statement promotes an orderly and managed 
multilingualism, that minimizes linguistic decay through provincial and “flawed” speech. 
And while Özdemir’s leftist politics would typically align him with those who would be 
critical of classist structures that denigrate local knowledge, this statement uncritically 
accepts that competence in High German is a reasonable prerequisite for socio-economic 
success.  
The CSU proposal was almost universally rejected not because its 
monolingualism was too extreme, but instead because it violated the kind of 
cosmopolitan monolingualism and managed multilingualism that have emerged as ideals 
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in German and the European Union. In contrast, language bans that impose monolingual 
speech in official and public spaces, such as the schoolyard, have been widely celebrated. 
One school in Berlin, where 90 percent of students grew up multilingual, was even 
awarded the prestigious “German National Prize” in 2006 for their implementation of a 
German-only policy (Gramling, 2009). Although the policy evoked a heated national 
debate—including condemnation from Özdemir’s Green Party colleague, Özcan Mutlu, 
who appeared in the Out with It campaign (see figure 2) (Ohlert, 2014, p. 550)—the 
students affected by the policy did not find it problematic (Gramling, 2009). In interviews 
about the policy, students, as competent code-switchers, were not overly concerned with 
the policy, nor did they see it as particularly burdensome. Instead, students used the 
opportunity to raise other concrete issues of concern to them, such as reducing class size 
and improving opportunities after graduation. These concerns were largely ignored in the 
press.  
What these discourses overlook is that speaking German is already a normal part 
of everyday life for multilingual students. Although they may have grown up speaking 
another language at home, the overwhelming monolingualism of the media sphere and 
public life makes it almost impossible for young people to avoid significant exposure to 
German even before they begin formal education. Still, young multilingual citizens, for 
whom code-switching is the norm, are subjected to scrutiny for their German language 
skills under the same rubric as those who learn German as a foreign language. They are 
congratulated when they speak with ease in formal registers or criticized for their “bad 
German” when they use informal youth sociolects. The Out with It campaign is an 
excellent example of the congratulatory mode, since the minority celebrities featured all 
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grew up multilingual with German as one of their native languages. They are held up as 
examples not for their fluency in multiple languages, but solely for their ability to speak 
“proper” German.  
However, the everyday minority Germans—actual or hypothetical—who appear 
in the articles do not emerge from scrutiny as well as the celebrity role models. In the Out 
with It corpus, the characterizations of non-celebrity integrants was overwhelmingly 
negative. The positive descriptions of immigrants and minorities generally revolve 
around the role model celebrities as examples of the achievements possible through 
successful integration. One typical example paraphrases a statement by one of the 
advertising executives responsible for the campaign, explaining that “the prominent 
ambassadors are living proof that in Germany everything is possible when you integrate 
yourself. And when you are good”xxxvii (Fröhlich, 2010). Although “being good” is often 
implied within integration, this example shows that, in this campaign, language takes 
center stage in defining integration.  
The negative assessments of everyday minorities are concentrated in seven of the 
39 articles examined, most of which speak about “migrants” in the abstract or through 
anecdotes told by Harris. One article from Stern, titled “The Sad Reality of Integration: 
The Germans, They Are the Others”xxxviii (Albers, 2010) claims to break this pattern of 
“speaking about integration” without speaking with “migrant children.” It follows Harris 
as he visits a majority minority school in Berlin’s Wedding neighborhood at the 
invitation of their German teacher. Harris faces off with a boy who wants to know about 
Harris’s origins. Harris insists that he is German, despite the student’s continued 
questioning. The journalist describes the scene: “A boy and a man. Both born and raised 
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in Germany. Both marked as foreign by their dark hair, eyes, and skin. But only the boy 
feels foreign”xxxix (Albers, 2010). This assessment casts social exclusion as a matter of 
individual choice, erasing the power differential between the celebrity man and the 
unknown boy. The students are said to identify with Harris, because of his status as a 
visible minority.  
They tell him stories from their lives as migrant children, of everyday racism, 
prescribed social roles, hateful Germans, of life in their own world and of the fear 
of life in the other world. Harris tries to destroy the clichés that a generation grew 
up with, that also serve a defensive function. However, he had to ask for 
clarification, since even though these children grew up in Germany, none of them 
speaks the national language perfectly”xl 
The author does not specify which clichés Harris was attempting to clear up, but the 
context suggests that Harris answered their accounts of discrimination and social 
exclusion by telling students that their impressions of Germans are stereotypical and that 
they are using racism as an excuse for their problems. By characterizing students’ speech 
as incomprehensible, the author underscores the idea of students’ isolation from 
normative society and plays into common deficit narratives associated with the 
descendants of immigrants.    
The author goes on to say that students are aware of the problem of inadequate 
speech in their community, paraphrasing their comments: 
It is “ungood” that the soccer star Mesut Özil was awarded the Bambi for 
Integration, since he couldn’t speak correct German, says one boy. “My dad 
thinks that he can speak super good German, but when I hear him on the 
telephone, I think, what kind of talk is that,” admits another. Encouraged, a pair of 
girls finally told of parents who can’t speak German. “I am ashamed sometimes,” 
said one quietly.xli  
The author reminds us again of students’ language deficits, transcribing the error in the 
boy’s unfavorable assessment of Mesut Özil’s speech capacity, a deficit that he deems 
significant enough to disqualify Özil from consideration for an Integration award. The 
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students’ internalization of the national language ideology is so deep that it elicits shame 
for themselves, their families, and even the most celebrated members of their community. 
The article concludes with a quote from a boy who resigns himself to the reasonable 
expectation of social and economic failure if he cannot perform properly in the 
hegemonic linguistic register, saying “if I can’t hack it—with the language and 
everything—then I won’t make it here in Germany.”xlii This recognition is presented as 
the desired conclusion of Harris’s visit, as a positive step towards pushing young 
minority students to put aside complaints of social exclusion and accept the narrative of 
personal responsibility and language normativity as the road to success.   
Conclusion 
The celebrities and successful individuals celebrated in the Out with It campaign 
act as minority enforcers of the hegemonic norms of cosmopolitan monolingualism. Their 
success is attributed to their competence in standardized German, implying—and in the 
case of Harris’s song explicitly stating—that individuals not fluent in standard German 
are responsible for any social and economic problems they face in Germany. In Harris’s 
terms, racism “is just the blink of an eye,” insignificant in comparison to the individual’s 
rejection of German society evidenced by their inability to communicate in the 
sanctioned standard vernacular. The celebration of minority role models in the Bambi for 
Integration and the Out with It campaign were accompanied in equal or greater measure 
by condemnations of minority straw men and tropes of young Muslim males’ antagonism 
towards Germans and their liberal democratic national project.  
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Celebrities are presented as examples of successful integration, proof that, as 
campaign model and women’s national soccer team player Celia Okoyino da Mbabi put 
it, “there is equality of opportunity in Germany for children with a migration background 
too”xliii (Fietz, 2010). Celebrities are portrayed as successful because they are integrated, 
and their success proves their integration. Forms of diversity that fit neatly into an 
imagined ideal of German and “Western” values—summarized in one article as “respect 
for civil society, democratic rules, the defense of human rights, the freedom to think 
differently”xliv (Malzahn, 2010)—are positioned as a threat to the nation and to the “good 
immigrant.” Only with a “German foreground” can candidates for integration hope to 
live. “If we are not successful in defending this [German] foreground, we will lose entire 
city sections forever—and with them the people”xlv (Malzahn, 2010). In other words, 
threatening forms of difference embodied by enemies of integration must be eliminated to 
enable the life of successful candidates for integration as well as normative nationals.  
In popular public narratives, diversity is valuable when it is well-managed and 
contributes to national political and economic projects. Diversity is proof that “Western 
values” are tolerant and permit “the freedom to think differently.” Difference is valuable 
when it adds “color” and inspires innovation, spurring growth. However, diversity that 
overflows or challenges hegemonic projects, that puts spaces and populations beyond the 
reach of the state, threatens the power of the nation-state to make live. In the conclusion, 
I will consider how these narratives of celebration and of the threat of uncontrolled 
diversity are playing out in the German reaction to the global refugee crisis.   
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i Deutsche Promis…leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit und 
damit ihren Marktwert leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit 
und damit ihren Marktwert. 
ii Die meisten Menschen brauchen Vorbilder. Nicht nur zum Nachmachen, sondern auch, um sich 
abzugrenzen, nach dem Motto: „Das geht ja gar nicht!“ 
iii Ich bin in Köln geboren, oder Kölön, wie man in der Türkei sagen würde. Meine Eltern sind Türken. Als 
ich sechs Jahre alt war, habe ich meiner Mutter nach dem Nikolous gefragt. Sie sagte zu mir, Nazan, 
kisim, (meine Tochter) der Nikolaus gibt es nicht. Und ich war die einzige an der Klasse, die am sechsten 
Dezember keine Süssigkeiten im Stiefel hatte. Und heute, fast dreizig Jahre spatter, kommt der Nikolaus 
auch zu mir. Das ist der Beweis, ich bin angekommen, angekommen in meine Heimat Deutschland. 
iv Bushido kann alle Preise dieser Welt bekommen—von Berlin-Kreuzberg bis nach Hollywood. Aber 
KEINEN für „Integration“. 
v „Bushido ruft in seinen Texten und Statements zu Gewalt gegen Schwule und Lesben auf. Unter 
„gelungener Integration“ verstehe ich etwas anderes.“ 
vi „Wer Frauen- und Schwulenverachtung propagiert, hat keinen Preis für gelungene Integration verdient“ 
vii Er sei ihrer Meinung nach sicher kein Beispiel für gelungene Integration, „sondern eine äußerst 
erfolgreiche Kunstfigur, die auf dem Rücken von Minderheiten große Kasse macht“ 
viii Für Hahn ist klar: „Er hat jetzt den Auftrag, sich als Brückenbauer zu profilieren.“ 
ix Bushido sei nicht für seine frühen Texte mit dem Bambi ausgezeichnet worden, sagte Peter Maffay. „Im 
Gegenteil: Bushido hat sich ganz klar von seinen Aussagen von vor zehn Jahren distanziert. Er hat sich 
schon lange öffentlich zu seinen Fehlern bekannt. Meine Absicht war, bei allem Respekt gegenüber den 
Diskriminierten, eine Brücke zu bauen.” 
x Bushido ist ein Musterbeispiel gelungener Integration. Der Skandal um seine Auszeichnung zeigt auch die 
Verlogenheit der selbsternannten Herolde der Migranten… Die Freunde und Verehrer der Migration sind 
nun empört, dass ausgerechnet ein im Kapitalismus erfolgreicher und im Diskurs politisch unkorrekter 
Rapper einen Integrations-Preis bekommt  
xi Mir stinkt dieses ganze Gutmenschen-Getue. Was ist denn schon passiert? Bushido ist ein Superstar. Kein 
Warmduscher, aber das sind Rapper nie. Können halt nicht alle von Liebe und Schwuppiduppi singen. 
xii Seither jagen Dutzende Polizisten und Staatsanwälte Täter und Waffe, Verfassungsschützer versuchen, 
die mafiöse Organisation türkischer Nationalisten in Deutschland zu durchdringen, die für das 
Blutvergießen verantwortlich sein soll. Die Morde, so viel wissen die Ermittler, sind die Rechnung für 
Schulden aus kriminellen Geschäften oder die Rache an Abtrünnigen. 
xiii Deutschland ist großzügig und hat ‘n großes Herz 
xiv Du hast Glück, bist jetzt hier, also benimm dich. Mach deine Arbeit, werd erwachsen, sein nicht 
kindisch! [...] Schäm dich über Deutschland so schlecht zu reden! 
xv Wär ich blond mit blauen Augen, würdest du sagen, dass ich ein Nazi bin. 
xvi Wenn er sich jetzt darum kümmert, dass seine Freunde und Fans vielleicht besser Deutsch lernen, ist das 
schone in guter Ansatz. 
xvii Er bedient üble Klischees, aber er nutzt auch seine Popularität, um gute Botschaften zu verbreiten, etwa: 
Ausländer, die hier leben, müssen die deutsche Sprache lernen. 
xviii Die 2008 vom Verband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (VDZ) gegründete Stiftung will mit der 
Werbekampagne deutlich machen, wie wichtig es für in Deutschland lebende Menschen mit 
Migrationshintergrund ist, die deutsche Sprache zu beherrschen. 
xix „Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben“, heißt die Kampagne mit der in Deutschland lebende Migranten 
animiert werden sollen, unsere Sprache zu lernen. 
xx Promis wollen Migrantenkindern Vorbilder sein. 
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xxi Um gerade bei Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bereitschaft zu erhöhen, Deutsch zu lernen, 
haben sich nun Prominente mit ausländischen Wurzeln für eine zweite Staffel der Kampagne der 
„Deutschlandstiftung Integration“ zur Verfügung gestellt. 
xxii Eine Plakataktion soll Migranten zum Deutschlernen bewegen.... Die Aktion richtet sich vornehmlich an 
Migranten und deren Kinder, die kaum Deutsch sprechen, obwohl sie in Deutschland geboren wurden. 
xxiii Die Aktion richtet sich vornehmlich an Migranten und deren Kinder, die kaum Deutsch sprechen, 
obwohl sie in Deutschland geboren wurden. Ihnen sagt Böhmer: "Sprache ist mehr als bloße 
Kommunikation - sie ist das Band, das uns verbindet." So sollte es zumindest sein. Weil das aber bis 
heute leider nicht so ist, gibt es diese gute und wichtige Plakataktion. Denn nach fünf Jahrzehnten 
Zuwanderung stammeln die Jugendlichen in den sozialen Brennpunkten der Großstädte eine sogenannte 
"Kanak-Sprak" und sind nicht in der Lage, grammatikalisch korrekte Sätze auf Deutsch zu formulieren. 
xxiv Die Rechtfertigung lautete immer: Deutschland gibt uns keine Chance. Aber das stimmt nicht. Ich 
selber war auf einer Schule für Schwererziehbare. Da gibt es Förderkurse, da gibt es Extra-Förderkurse 
und Förderkurse für Förderkurse. Da kann keiner sagen, dass Deutschland nichts für diese Jugendlichen 
macht. Die wollen nicht! 
xxv Klar: Wenn Sarrazin sagt, dass junge Kriminelle oft Schwarzköpfe sind, hat er damit leider recht. 
Zumindest in Berlin. Jetzt sagen all die Schwarzköpfe: Scheiß-Sarrazin. Ich sage: Wieso Scheiß-
Sarrazin, Alter? Diese kriminellen Alis versauen den Ruf aller gutintegrierten Araber und Türken. 
xxvi ("Du bringst es auf den Punkt, Alter", "Ja, wir sind auch Schuld daran, dass es so ist, wie es ist"), Fans, 
die schreiben ("Ich bin jung, ich bin Türke, ich hab mein Abi gemacht, ich bin komplett integriert. Und 
ich hasse diese Kanaken, die sich hier nicht benehmen können"), zig SMS voll des Lobes. 
xxvii »Scheiß-Parallelgesellschaft!« Harris spuckt die Verachtung mit dem Wort aus. »Und solche Leute soll 
man mit Samthandschuhen anfassen? Abschieben sollte man den.«  
xxviii Die deutsche Sprache ist HAMMER! Erst wenn man versteht und verstanden wird, kann man anfangen 
zu leben und nicht bloß zu existieren. 
xxix Wer in Deutschland was werden will und die Sprache nicht spricht, hat keine Chance…. Die 
Integrationsbeauftragte der Bundesregierung Maria Böhmer, sagte: „Gute Sprachkenntnisse öffnen die 
Türen für ein erfolgreiches Leben in unserem Land.“ 
xxx Dabei sagte [Maria Böhmer (CDU)] sinngemäß, wer nicht Deutsch spreche, könne in Deutschland 
nichts werden. Wer hingegen gut Deutsch spreche, könne sich in die Gesellschaft einbringen. 
xxxi "Nur, wer die deutsche Sprache spricht, hat eine Chance", mahnt Özkan und verspricht: "In diesem 
Land kann jeder alles werden." 
xxxii Die Botschaft ist klar: KEINE ZUKUNFT OHNE EINE GEMEINSAME SPRACHE! 
xxxiii "Wer kein Deutsch kann, ist nur Zaungast in unserem Land" 
xxxiv Der Markt reagiert nicht auf die politischen Forderungen an Migranten, besseres Deutsch zu lernen. 
Die Politik findet ebenfalls keine Lösungen. Und Sie? Modeln für die Imagekampagne einer 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung und strecken den Migranten die Zunge heraus! 
xxxv Wer dauerhaft hier leben will, soll dazu angehalten werden, im öffentlichen Raum und in der Familie 
deutsch zu sprechen. 
xxxvi Einer der Gründe, warum ich halbwegs Hochdeutsch kann und nicht nur Schwäbisch schwätze oder 
gebrochenes Deutsch, liegt daran, dass meine Eltern mit mir nicht Deutsch gesprochen haben. Denn 
hätten meine Eltern versucht, mit mir radebrechend Deutsch zu reden, wäre das Ergebnis gewesen, dass 
ich ganz sicher nicht Parteivorsitzender von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen geworden wäre, oder 
Bundestagsabgeordneter, sondern dann wäre ich irgendwie Kfz-Mechaniker oder sonst was geworden. 
Das heißt, Gott sei Dank haben meine Eltern nicht auf die CSU gehört, denn wenn Eltern mit ihren 
Kindern eine Sprache schlecht lernen, kann der beste Lehrer der Welt dagegen kaum noch ankommen.  
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xxxvii Die prominenten Botschafter seien der lebende Beweis dafür, dass in Deutschland alles möglich sei, 
wenn man sich integriert. Und wenn man gut ist, ergänzt Schoeffler. 
xxxviii Die traurige Realität der Integration: Die Deutschen, das sind die anderen 
xxxix Ein Junge und ein Mann. Beide in Deutschland geboren und aufgewachsen. Beide wegen ihrer dunklen 
Haare, Augen und Haut als Ausländer abgestempelt. Doch nur der Junge fühlt sich auch so. 
xl Sie erzählen ihm Szenen und Geschichten aus ihrem Leben als Migrantenkinder. Von alltäglichen 
Rassismen, festgelegten Rollen, hässlichen Deutschen, dem Leben in der eigenen Welt und der Angst vor 
der Zukunft in der anderen. Harris versucht, die Klischees zu zerschlagen, mit denen eine ganze 
Generation groß geworden ist, die auch Schutzfunktion haben. Allerdings muss er immer wieder 
nachfragen, denn auch wenn diese Kinder in Deutschland groß geworden sind, spricht keines von ihnen 
einwandfrei die Landessprache. 
xli Es sei "ungut", dass Fussballstar Mesut Özil mit dem Bambi für Integration ausgezeichnet worden sei, 
schließlich könne er selbst nicht richtig Deutsch, sagt ein Junge. "Mein Vater meint, er kann voll gut 
Deutsch, aber wenn ich ihn am Telefon höre, denke ich, was redet der da", verrät ein anderer. Ermutigt 
erzählen schließlich auch ein paar Mädchen von Eltern, die kein Deutsch können. "Ich schäme mich 
manchmal", sagt eines ziemlich leise. 
xlii Wenn ich es nicht packe - mit der Sprache und so -, dann schaffe ich es nicht hier in Deutschland. 
xliii Ich habe durch den Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland 
Chancengleichheit gibt. 
xliv Dieser deutsche Vordergrund besteht in der Achtung zivilgesellschaftlicher, demokratischer Regeln, der 
Verteidigung von Menschenrechten, der Freiheit von Andersdenkenden. 
xlv Wenn es uns nicht gelingt, diesen Vordergrund zu verteidigen, werden wir auf Dauer ganze Stadtteile 
verlieren - und mit ihnen die Menschen. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation assembles case studies from the past decade to investigate how 
discourses of integration have emerged as a tool for managing Germany’s internal 
Others, modifying and strengthening the category of the normative national in the 
process. The cases in this dissertation show how nativist logics form the foundation of 
integration, helping to explain the ease with which the xenophobic extreme right is 
entering mainstream politics in Germany and across the continent. Conceptions of 
integration are not monolithic; in fact, they are most often decidedly vague and 
malleable. However, this dissertation demonstrates how discourses of integration 
facilitate the racialized division of society from a platform justified by the promise of 
improving the life of the German population, including willing candidates for integration. 
The perception of the propensity of some groups to integrate has come to distinguish the 
deserving from the undeserving, the beneficial from the threatening; these processes have 
become increasingly important and fraught as the global refugee crises began to impact 
Europe in recent years.  
This dissertation asked how mediated discourses of integration reproduce norms 
of national culture and identity that operate to manage minority and immigrant 
populations in the German context. The discourse of integration has become a norm 
across Europe, and in Germany it has guided the first attempts by the government to 
implement policy dealing with the long-term inclusion of transnational populations in the 
German body politic. To understand integration discourse it is necessary to situate it in 
relation to broader discourses of culture and the meaning of national belonging. The first 
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two chapters in this dissertation outlined the contemporary development of two major 
foundations of German national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of 
Heimat (homeland) and the rational, European universalist Germany founded on 
constitutional patriotism and pride through productivity. The two chapters in this section 
examined the theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity as well as the place 
of “new Germans” within them. The second section examined the construction of “the 
new Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the development of 
“soccer patriotism” and the celebration of immigrant patriots. The three chapters in this 
section analyzed three cases that illuminate the relationship between patriotism and 
productivity and the role of diversity in this new national formation. The third section 
investigated the idea of integration failures and the threat they pose to the future of the 
German population. The cases examined in these final two chapters each entail a process 
of dividing the valuable from the unproductive and threatening integrants, showing the 
relation between processes of celebration and condemnation. Integrants are both a 
valuable resource for the renewal of the German population and a potentially mortal 
threat to the fabric of German society. The cases in this section trace the process of 
evaluation that separates the productive from the harmful, and seeks to manage the 
threats posed by harmful difference to re-establish the stability of the population.  
In Germany, sports have emerged as a key mechanism and narrative tool in 
integration policy and media discourse, wherein elite national sports and amateur youth 
sports play different but complementary goals. At the amateur level, sports integration 
supports the practical goals of providing regulated spaces of contact, as well as symbolic 
goals of reinforcing the superiority of normative German values. As was discussed in 
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Chapter 2, the embodied practice of sport is conceived as a means of instilling discipline 
among multiethnic youth to render them as docile bodies. It is an attractive form of 
governmentality that paves the way for other lessons on becoming an entrepreneurial and 
productive subject. In teams that include a mix of normative nationals and immigrants, 
youth sports can also provide opportunities for contact and solidarity across categories of 
difference. Literature produced by youth sports institutions invested in sporting 
integration praise this potential for contact, while providing normative guidelines to 
manage difference by prioritizing universal rules and German monolingualism.  
At the elite national level, minority athletes become symbols of the German 
nation. As the cases in this dissertation show, as the bodies of visible minorities have 
come to symbolize the nation, they allow the nation to celebrate its own conversion into a 
cosmopolitan space. Permitting minorities to symbolize the nation is evidence that the 
national category is capacious and tolerant. However, the structure of broadcast sports 
also functions as a panopticon (Foucault, 1977), in which the audience and announcers 
frame, zoom in, scrutinize and interpret the meaning of players’ gestures as artifacts of 
integration. While players know that they are being viewed, they cannot know or control 
the lens's movement, focus, or length. Others have the power to interpret and 
semantically fix their bodily expression. Of course, this power to affix meaning is not 
complete, and players may recover some of this power by breaking the script, by 
speaking out of place or refusing to follow the norms and expectations of the field. 
Nevertheless, the athlete is there first and foremost as a physical performer. In the context 
of integration discourse, athletes provide a performance waiting to be captured by 
cameras and interpreted by the media.  
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Two key media events inspired this dissertation: the men’s FIFA World Cup of 
2006, which was hosted in Germany, and the 2010 debate unleashed by the publication 
and popular success of a eugenicist book by politician and Bundesbank board member, 
Thilo Sarrazin. The extensive national self-reflection catalyzed by these seemingly 
unrelated events contributed to intertwining discourses defining the characteristics and 
practices of a healthy German population as well as the threats to that population. In the 
first case, pride in Germany through sporting spectacle is defined as a salutary practice 
that is open to the whole population. It is a means for Others to show their commitment to 
national well-being. At the same time, the participation of Others is highlighted to 
demonstrate the constructive nature of “soccer patriotism,” distinguishing it from 
harmful, exclusionary forms of nationalism.  
The case of the Sarrazin debate exemplifies the flip side of integration discourse. 
While sporting integration is about national renewal, the Sarrazin debate outlines the fear 
of the imminent collapse of the normative German nation under pressure from Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants who ostensibly refuse to integrate. The Sarrazin debate 
makes the hierarchy within the category of the integrant explicit. Integration discourse 
may attach itself to any identifiable traces of the transnational or the foreign, but the 
Sarrazin debate reveals the racialized category of the Muslim as paradigmatic figure of 
problematic difference at the center of integration discourse. At the same time, Sarrazin 
praises East and South Asians, Jews, and other minorities to obscure the fundamentally 
racializing aims of his project. The etic category of the Muslim organizes the large 
population of Arab and Turkish immigrants and their descendents into an essentialized 
religio-cultural group, in much the same way as historical Antisemitism (Mandel, 2008; 
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Norton, 2013). This “negative essentialism” converts Islam into an explanatory 
framework for all manner of social ills, without the need or even the possibility of 
empirical evidence connecting it to an actual group of people (Semati, 2011). In reality, 
the religious practices and cultural norms of Muslims in Germany reflect the diversity of 
practices of the many national and sub-national populations that make up Germany’s 
transnational population. Contemporary representations of Muslim peril implicit and 
sometimes explicit in integration debates, recall the tradition of Orientalist discourses 
(Said, 1979) situating the East and, more precisely, Islam as the “constitutive outside,” 
thus stabilizing the self-definition of Europe.  
The Sarrazin debate shows how biopolitical logics divide the population into 
categories of the worthy and the unworthy, those who must live and those who pose a 
threat to life. Still, a strong distinction between the constructive and destructive modes of 
integration discourse is not tenable. As the cases in this dissertation show, integration 
discourse moves easily between celebration and condemnation, supported by the 
neoliberal strategic logics at the core of biopolitics. Biopolitics refers to a historical 
process by which “life” emerged as the center of political strategies (Lemke, 2011, p. 33). 
As it was developed by Foucault, biopolitics refers to an assemblage of strategies of 
governance, forms of political legitimacy, and technologies of security and population 
management. Binding Sarrazin’s anti-Muslim arguments and the promotion of sporting 
patriotism and integration are underlying values of social well-being through 
productivity. In tandem with common sense thinking about migration and difference at 
the level of the population, integration discourse operates at the individual level through 
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initiatives oriented towards cultivating disciplined, docile bodies, for example, through 
the kinds of sports integration programs analyzed in Chapter 2.  
Whereas most of the contemporary research on migration and cultural difference 
in Germany and Europe focus on immigrants themselves, examining their levels of 
educational or economic attainment or investigating their experiences of exclusion and 
accommodation, this dissertation focuses attention on the function of integration 
discourse for the construction of the normative population. This conclusion extends the 
findings of this dissertation to the reactions to the ongoing refugee crisis. The cases in 
this dissertation elucidate the continuities between the outpouring of enthusiastic public 
support for refugees in the summer of 2015 and the simultaneous implementation of new 
policies that further restrict asylum laws. The development of integration discourse in the 
mediated public sets up a logical framework for the selective and always provisional 
inclusion of immigrant and minority populations as part of the new “colorful” Germany.  
Asylum and the Future of Integration 
The mediated public discourse in Germany around new peaks in demand for 
asylum during 2015 dramatically exemplifies how integration discourse strengthens 
national norms. As I will briefly outline below, the responses to the refugee crisis in 2015 
followed many of the patterns established in other cases examined in this dissertation. 
Representations reflected Germany’s recent rise as one of the most admired countries in 
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the world, as reflected in the Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index39 surveys measuring the 
“soft power” of nation branding, as discussed in Chapter 4. As during the World Cups in 
2006 and 2010, Germans were praised for their welcoming and open culture, showing 
that they had learned from the lessons of the past to become a global moral leader. 
Domestically, journalists and commentators marveled at “how deeply our country has 
changed since those macro-crimes, that one could only slowly begin to speak of decades 
after the war” (Liebsch, 2015). Unfortunately, the celebratory discourse and action in this 
case was accompanied from the beginning by the other tools of securitization and 
responsibilization that characterize integration discourse. Finally, I turn to critical voices 
outside the mainstream public sphere, who critique the triumphalism of the response to 
the refugee crisis. They relate these responses to Germany’s recent history of self-
congratulatory national spectacle, which denies structural and institutional racism in 
mainstream Germany. Against dualistic conception of Germany (as voluntary-helpers or 
the racist fringe) and of immigrants and minorities (as productive and colorful or 
threatening and strange) these writers advocate an agonistic and critical transcultural 
approach to politics and representation in Germany.  
Good Germany, Bad Germany   
                                                          
 
 
 
39 See: http://nation-brands.gfk.com/ 
393 
 
During a visit to Berlin in June 2014, I was waiting for the S-Bahn when I noticed 
a sticker on the sign indicating the name of the stop (figure 13). The sticker showed a 
colorful cartoon of a panicked eagle in a boat, scrambling to pull a life preserver labeled 
“right to asylum” out of a sea of grasping discolored hands. At the bow of the boat, 
behind the eagle, the German flag waves. The boat's rudder is painted with the German 
national colors and topped with the European Union flag. The top of the sticker proclaims 
that “the boat is full.”  The bottom portion of the sticker was partially ripped up, 
obscuring the letters in the bottom right corner. The complete image, shown in the right 
panel of figure 20, displays the initials of the far-right National Democratic Party that 
produced it. The sticker showed some weathering, suggesting it had been there for some 
time.  
 
Figure 13: Left and center: Photos of NPD sticker from a train platform (by author); Right: Full image 
found with Google Image search 
 
This sticker and its partial removal symbolize several the key discourses and 
political tensions explored in this dissertation around nationalism and the control of 
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difference in Germany. The slogan at the top of the sticker is a well-established nativist 
metaphor, which proposes that immigration threatens to swamp the nation that is at 
capacity. This resembles the “wave” metaphor for migration, which is common across 
languages and national contexts. This depiction takes the metaphor to its logical extreme, 
making explicit the biopolitical logics suggested by the boat. In this image, refugees are 
completely stripped of their humanity. They are rendered as the living dead. The shred of 
life they possess, in the form of the reanimated hands grasping towards the safety in the 
Europe-boat, is only relevant insofar as it poses a threat to the national population, 
represented by the petrified eagle. Because of its limited capacity, the small asylum life 
preserver cannot possibly serve as an aid. Instead, it functions as a lure that pulls undead 
hands towards the boat.  
The sticker clearly demonstrates the position of its neo-Nazi authors. In short, the 
valuable life of the national population is under threat from refugees, whose lives 
represent the death of the national population. As this dissertation demonstrates, this 
discourse also operates in the center of the popular mediated public sphere, most 
obviously in the Sarrazin debate but also in positively framed discussions about the value 
of properly managed and curated diversity. The choice of passersby to remove the letters 
indicating the sticker's authorship while leaving the message fully intact represents the 
acceptability of the discourses of the right, while denying their connections to racism in 
German society.  
Reactions to the refugee crisis in Germany involved both the kinds of euphoric 
celebration that characterized the 2006 World Cup and new regulations restricting asylum 
rights based on biopolitical criteria of value under the imperative of integration. These 
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criteria amplify the threat posed by failed candidates for integration from “incompatible” 
cultures. These associations are supported by well-meaning programs, such as the sports 
integration programs explored in Chapter 2, as well by the anti-Muslim polemics of Thilo 
Sarrazin (Chapter 6) and the denials of racism by rapper Harris (Chapter 7). Although 
these discourses circulate freely in the mainstream public sphere, their mobilization and 
intensification as part of a growing xenophobic populist politics has raised alarm among 
many politicians and prominent Germans. Like the alteration of the NPD sticker, public 
responses to rising anti-refugee violence sought to exile open racism without attacking 
the roots of racist discourse in the mainstream. As the critics at the end of this conclusion 
argue, the refugee crisis became another spectacle, offering the opportunity to show the 
world the welcoming and tolerant new Germany while characterizing racism as a 
marginal phenomenon outside the boundaries of the normative nation. 
Introducing the World to Willkommenskultur 
As the international press observed with great approval (Kämper, 2015), Germany 
sent a message of support for refugees at a time when many other European countries 
were building fences. However, even as Germany gave the world the neologism 
Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) (Akrap, 2015), the domestic reality was much 
more complicated: In 2015 lawmakers aggressively passed laws restricting asylum law 
and the movement of “concerned citizens” (besorgte Bürger) coalesced behind the new 
rightwing party, Alternatives for Germany (AfD). Indeed, a similar electoral shift to the 
right has been building across Europe, gaining strength from the political and economic 
instability in the Euro Zone and anxieties induced by record numbers of people forcibly 
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displaced by war and economic desolation, primarily from Syria, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016) 
determined that the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced people are living in 
low- and middle-income countries, in the late summer of 2015 stories of a “European 
migrant crisis” dominated international news cycles. Images of crowds moving along 
train tracks and overloaded boats on the Mediterranean flooded the media. Still, of the 
65.3 million people forcibly displaced in 2015, only 6% of them were hosted in Europe 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). Both in terms of pure numbers 
and as a percentage of the total population in European countries, European and other 
high-income countries have provided refuge for relatively few forcibly displaced people.  
Whereas only months before Germany had played role of cold hardliners by 
proposing harsh austerity measures for Greece as its economy collapsed, in the late 
summer of 2015, Germans enjoyed international admiration for publicly welcoming 
refugees on train platforms and for Merkel’s statement that, “We can do it” (wir schaffen 
das) in regards to accommodating refugees. International news outlets praised Germany, 
while explaining that Germans’ welcoming response to refugees was due to their rational 
recognition that, with their rapidly aging population, Germany needed to welcome 
foreigners.40 The Washington Post published an article proclaiming that a demographic 
                                                          
 
 
 
40 Unfortunately, these narratives did not play out as expected; a survey of Germany’s top firms revealed 
that by September 2016, the 30 companies in Germany’s DAX stock exchange had only hired 63 refugees, 
50 of whom were employed by the Deutsche Post (DHL) (Prodhan, 2016). 
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map of fertility rates shows “why some European countries reject refugees and others 
love them” (Noack, 2015), confirming that Germany’s embrace was solidly based in the 
statistically supported recognition of national interests in a time of population decline. A 
Globe and Mail headline from earlier that year dubbed Germany as “the place where the 
refugee flood is a solution, not a problem” (Saunders, 2015). In addition to the narrative 
of pragmatic self-interest, an article in The Washington Post also draws on the popular 
narrative of the “good-hearted German,” doing penance for the crimes of the Nazi period: 
Empathy and the country's Nazi-past — which turned Europe into a battlefield 
and later forced many Germans themselves to flee the war — might explain the 
country's enthusiasm for helping today's refugees. But there is another factor that 
few would openly acknowledge right away: Germany really needs them. (Noack, 
2015) 
This combination of rational self-interest and moral fortitude established a narrative in 
which Germans were the European heroes of the refugee crisis. Although this narrative 
functioned well internationally as a counterpoint to the outright hostility against refugees 
by many European leaders, it does not hold up under closer scrutiny of domestic politics. 
Without diminishing the substantial work of activists and concerned citizens in Germany, 
it is misleading to characterize the German response to the increased demand for asylum 
as enthusiastic in a durable sense or as responding to a rational desire to counteract the 
demographic decline of the German population 
The narratives of good Germans amongst duty-shirking European neighbors was 
partly based on valid foundations, but it is an oversimplification of Germany’s 
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complicated and ambivalent stance towards asylum seekers (see figure 1441). On the one 
hand, Germany made the exceptional move to temporarily suspend the Dublin rules 
requiring refugees to apply for asylum in the EU country of first arrival in August 2015 
(Holehouse, 2015). Furthermore, despite pressure from within her party, Merkel 
expressed her commitment to upholding the German constitution and the obligations of 
the Geneva Convention by refusing to put a limit on the number of asylum cases 
Germany would hear (“Merkel’s Conservative Allies,” 2015). On the other hand, by the 
end of September the German federal government had drafted and approved new 
restrictions reducing benefits and making asylum in Germany less accessible (“Neues 
Asylrecht,” 2015). Still, in the second half of 2015, images of refugees holding up 
pictures of Angela Merkel or handmade signs expressing their love and appreciation of 
Germany contrasted sharply with images of crowds of people caged or fleeing armed 
guards in Hungary. Although Germany’s exceptionally welcoming position was short-
lived, it made a strong international impression. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
41 Timeline sources: Abé et al. (2015), Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2016), Bundesregierung 
(2016), Connor (2016), Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD (2015), Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD 
(2016), Deutsche Welle (“Germany reinstates Dublin rules,” 2015), United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (2016) 
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 Figure 14: Timeline of Responses to Refugee Crisis 
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While international stories focused on the felicitous confluence of German 
pragmatism and moral commitments to human rights, domestically Germany struggled 
with a surge in arson attacks on refugee hostels in 2015. As concerns about “waves” of 
migrants “flooding” into Europe intensified, so did the violence against refugees and the 
hostels that housed them. An investigation by Die Zeit (Paul Blickle et al., 2015) 
determined that 222 serious violent attacks against refugees hostels had taken place in the 
first 11 months of 2015. In 169 of those cases no suspects were identified and only four 
cases resulted in convictions. In August, a multiday riot rocked the small town of 
Heidenau near Dresden. Groups of people, mostly men, greeted newly arrived refugees 
with flying bottles, rocks and racist slurs. A video posted on YouTube by one of the 
rioters shows smoke filled streets as people aim fireworks at police in riot gear (Hannes 
Kling, 2015). Dozens of people stand in and along the sides of the streets, pulling down 
police barriers, smashing concrete blocks, and throwing the resulting rubble at the police. 
At several points, they chant “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people). None of the rioters 
were arrested. Although Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière promised that the 
rioters would come to feel “the full severity of the state” (Zeit wieder rechte 
ausschreitungen in Heidenau), it took three months for investigations of suspects to begin 
and, as of the time of this writing, there have been no convictions (“Heidenau,” 2016). 
As shocking as the events in Heidenau were, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
the most interesting part about them is not the actions of these extremist youth but the 
way their actions and statements were taken up in public discourse. The violent riots of 
Heidenau provided an undeniable and unambiguous incidence of racist hate against 
which mainstream society could unite in condemnation. Against the acts of Heidenau, 
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President Joachim Gauck made a statement praising the actions of ad hoc volunteer 
networks that had gathered to support the incoming asylum seekers. Gauck framed these 
actions, in Manichean terms, as the helper-citizens against the malicious extremist 
minority, claiming that volunteers “show that there is a light German, that is represented 
here shining against the dark Germany that we sense when we hear about attacks against 
asylum seeker housing or any xenophobic actions against people”i 
(“Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015). Gauck goes on to say, 
These lovely examples, that is the Germany we are building and that we depend 
on. And that this is a crystal-clear answer to the malicious agitators and arsonists, 
who spoil the image of our country. We will tell them, “You don’t represent us.” 
And we will absolutely not tolerate that lawbreakers—either abroad or 
domestically—stand for this Germany, which has shown itself to be open and 
willing to help.ii (“Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015) 
Gauck’s statement came as part of a wave of enthusiasm for volunteering and 
demonstrating the welcoming character of Germany. The day after Gauck’s speech, 
Germany’s most popular periodical, Bild, rolled out a new public campaign under the 
slogan “We Help #refugeeswelcome” (Wir Helfen #refugeeswelcome). The campaign 
was introduced by Bild with the statement,  
“With the campaign, WE HELP, BILD wants to set an example of 
humanitarianism. We want to show that the noisy troublemakers and foreigner-
haters do NOT bellow in our name! That Germany has a heart for people who 
need help!”iii (“Große Hilfs-Aktion von BILD für Flüchtlinge,” 2015)  
The Bild campaign gathered stories of companies, celebrities, and professional soccer 
teams who signed on to wear and proclaim the slogan “We help,” soliciting stories from 
their readers of their actions to help refugees. Gauck’s statement and the framing of the 
Bild campaign share a preoccupation with demonstrating to Germans themselves and to 
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the international community that Germany is a good and ethical nation. The asylum 
seekers provide the opportunity to showcase this goodness, framed as a national trait.  
 At the same time, as with soccer patriotism, the celebration of the helper nation is 
portrayed as incompatible with—and even antithetical to—nationalism. Professor of 
philosophy, Burkhard Liebsch made this argument three weeks after Gauck’s speech in 
an article in Die Zeit titled, Our Country Surprises Itself iv (2015). Liebsch points to the 
growth of volunteer movements in Germany to help refugees and argues that “hospitality 
does not lend itself to national pride and narcissism.”v Liebsch points out that the 
domestic and international press “surprised us with the discovery that we are a hospitable 
people. Apparently, no one had predicted this. And yet, the truly lovely pictures from 
train stations in Munich, Frankfurt, and Dortmund appear to unambiguously confirm this 
image.”vi According to Liebsch, these images of people holding signs welcoming the 
refugees who had been subjected to such brutal treatment on their way to Germany are a 
sign of the establishment of a post-ethnic conception of collective identity.  
Liebsch’s text makes the enthusiastic reaction to refugees the center of a new 
national identity, while denying the political utility of this move. First, he sketches a new 
German historiography of an original Germanic hospitality that was lost during the rise of 
nationalism, culminating in the ultimate transgression of hospitality: The Holocaust. In its 
zeal for eliminating difference, Liebsch proposes that the National Socialist mission 
would have eventually reached all people including, presumably, normative Germans. 
After all, “don’t we all arrive as foreigners in this world?” Having learned from the Nazi 
era that the community of ethnicity (Volksgemeinschaft) “can only be a totalitarian 
fiction,” Liebsch claims that only the extremist fringe wants “to belong unconditionally, 
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to lose oneself in a political community” anymore. Second, Liebsch proposes that the 
refugee crisis offers the opportunity to recover the soul of the country, which since the 
end of the war, has been on the road to “freedom, not to pursue shameless and antisocial 
wealth covered over with a positive self-image, but in the sense of the freedom to answer 
others worldwide who need a place to dwell.”vii Here Liebsch critiques the economic 
rationality that provided a primary foundation of the Federal Republic (see Chapter 2).  
Liebsch sees the crisis as a “historically singular opportunity” to freely choose 
hospitality in the Derridian sense (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000) —unbound from the 
unitary norms, customs, and religious dictates requiring hospitality in “supposedly 
backward countries and cultures” (2015). This ideal form of hospitality belongs to no 
one, “least of all those who would write it on their flag” in order “to show who they are 
or what they would like to be.” In this, Liebsch contrasts true “hospitality” with the 
“welcome culture” that “was propagated during that special sporting mega event,” 
referring to the 2006 men’s soccer World Cup. The latter was predicated on the limited 
stay of the foreign guests “after leaving their money here.” Self-interest, calculation, and 
conditionality is the antithesis of Liebsch’s ideal of hospitality.  
While Liebsch’s laudable ideal may well describe the disposition of the ranks of 
volunteers dedicating their time and resources to answer the call for shelter, Liebsch’s 
claim that the public statements and images of hospitality run contrary to strengthening 
symbolic nationalism is spurious. So long as national borders and citizenship regimes 
determine “the right to have rights,” the kind of hospitality desired by Liebsch is bound to 
the rule of law. Citizens may mobilize to offer shelter and care, but the law determines 
who may enjoy the sanction and protection of legal residency. The progression of 
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increasing restrictions on the right to asylum during 2015 and 2016 contradicts the claim 
that Germany’s response to refugees represents a new era of disinterested hospitality. 
Without a legal commitment to relinquish sovereignty as part of the pledge to asylum 
(Bosswick, 2000), the heavily mediatized welcome provided by citizens and volunteers 
risks becoming little more than a part of a symbolic narrative of national virtue. 
Liebsch was not alone in making the connection to the enthusiasm for playing 
host to the world during 2006 World Cup. For Liebsch, the economic motivations of the 
2006 World Cup make it a counterexample to the welcoming images from train stations 
in 2015. However, as the discussions of soccer patriotism and the World Cup throughout 
this dissertation show, whatever economic benefits there may be to the country hosting a 
sports mega event, the symbolic and affective significance of hosting is paramount. The 
symbolic political value of these events is such that, despite increasing research showing 
the likelihood of public debt and economic harm to host countries and cities, countries 
still compete heavily for the opportunity to host. The media coverage of these events also 
belies the claim that the desire to lose oneself in a national community has disappeared 
except among the extremist fringe. In Liebsch’s account, the asylum seekers themselves 
disappear except as a call that “our country” might answer, making itself whole again as a 
community of individuals constituted through moral action rather than ethnicity. By 
denying the significance and even the utility of national self-celebration of Germany’s 
welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur) for symbolic politics, Liebsch reinforces the 
binary dividing self-interested and chauvinistic nationalism from good forms of collective 
solidarity. As with the discourses of patriotism and integration examined throughout this 
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dissertation, this discourse denies nationalism while taking for granted the nation as the 
primary definition of that community.  
Beyond the Binary: Voices for a Critical Transnational Public 
The delight of rediscovering Germany’s hospitable national character was 
observed with skepticism by a handful of commentators writing outside the mainstream 
press, most of them self-identified as the children of guest workers, refugees, or 
immigrants. This dissertation analyzes the mediated public discourse of mainstream 
publications, the government, and private sector foundations. These cases demonstrate 
the frequently limited and curated participation of minority voices: athletes and 
celebrities invited to speak as role models of integration or immigrant patriots whose 
choice to promote a more inclusive civic nationalism matches journalistic interest in 
surprising stories that validate national values and create distance from shameful pasts. In 
this conclusion, I would like to turn to some of the critical voices that have been too rare 
in the archives examined in this dissertation. In their criticism of reactions to the refugee 
crisis, they raise concerns of the individualization of the problem of racism, the 
depoliticization of inequality, and the ephemerality of solidarity built on self-
congratulatory national spectacles—issues that reverberate throughout cases assembled 
here.  
This dissertation argues that, in a political, economic, and social system governed 
by biopolitical norms and logics, integration discourse performs the function of racism in 
Foucault’s sense (2003). It divides the population into normative nationals and candidates 
for integration. The cases in this dissertation have dealt primarily with the valuation of 
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the national category, in part through the process of assessing the achievement of 
integration by immigrants and minorities. The reactions to the refugee crisis include 
politics and discourses of integration, but they also protect the category of the national on 
another front, by assigning blame for racism to the antisocial (asoziale) fringe.  
As critical commentators point out, the public enthusiasm for volunteering and the 
reaction to rightwing violence create a “simplified binary dividing society into ‘good 
white Germans’ and ‘bad white Germans’” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). This is 
exemplified by Gauck’s division of society into “light” and “dark,” fragmenting and 
isolating undesirable elements by categorizing them as social pathology. The problematic 
association of light with good and dark with bad in a discussion of white nationalist 
violence went largely unnoticed in the mainstream public sphere. The kinds of 
pathologies typically associated with “integration refusers” are associated here with “dark 
Germany.” Bloggers Ellen Kollender and Janne Grote write critical commentary from the 
self-conscious position as Germans “without an apparent migration background.” In an 
article for the alternative online periodical Migazin, Kollender and Grote assemble many 
examples of prominent citizens that have attempted to marginalize racism through 
ridicule by characterizing those who express rightwing views as useless and intellectually 
407 
 
deficient people.42 As a key example, they point to a celebrated quote by the popular 
musician Farin Urlaub, stating that 
As long as there are people who can't do anything, who don't know anything, and 
have never achieved anything, there will also be racism. Since these people want 
to feel good about themselves and to be proud of something. So, they look for 
someone who is different from them and they consider themselves superior. Or 
they are crazily proud to be “German,” something for which no effort was 
necessary on their side.viii (Kollender & Grote, 2015) 
Kollender and Grote observe that this formulation projects racism onto the “losers” of 
society, those who have failed because of their “self-imposed lack of work and prospects” 
(2015). Likewise, in an article posted on the platform Medium, graduate students and 
former asylum seekers Elif Kücük and Sinthujan Varatharajah see in this binarism a 
familiar discriminatory schema in which “low secondary school qualifications, lacking 
intelligence, poor spelling or welfare (Hartz IV) are shortsightedly and arrogantly 
declared as reasons for racism” (2015). The useless human described in the Farin Urlaub 
quote above bears a striking resemblance to descriptions of “problem migrants.” Theirs is 
characterized as a worthless form of life, a form that is harmful to the growth of a healthy 
population.  
As part of this process of drawing divisions, the “helper nation” joined in public 
displays of generosity and kindness towards refugees. Critical commentators expressed 
discomfort and skepticism about this sudden outpouring of enthusiasm, even as they 
                                                          
 
 
 
42 See, for example, the satirical version of a popular Sarah Conner’s song by comedian Carolin Kebekus 
“How Stupid You Are” (Wie Blöd Du Bist).  
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admitted feeling a spark of hope that this time the support would be more durable than 
the anti-racism concerts and demonstrations of “upstanding citizens” following the anti-
refugee violence of the 1990s. In the 1990s, these symbolic public acts against racism did 
nothing to stop the laws undoing the strong protections for refugee rights in the 
constitution. Liebsch and critical commentators draw a common parallel between the 
representations of the response to refugees and the spectacle of heroism and hospitality 
celebrated during the men’s World Cup—a tradition that firmly took hold in 2006. As 
Doris Akrap writes in the Guardian, “it’s as if a year after the World Cup triumph in Rio, 
Germans desperately want to be world champions again—this time as the globe’s most 
welcoming country for refugees” (Akrap, 2015). Bahareh Sharifi echoes this sentiment in 
an article written for Migazin, writing that it is not the political protests of refugee 
activists over the past several years at have brought people onto the streets, but instead—
referring to the 2006 World Cup, known as the Summer Fairytale—the “spreading drive 
to have been part of the Germany Summer Fairytale Part 2” in which everyone seeks to 
outdo each other in the “mediated presentation as world champions of welcoming culture 
(Willkommenskultur)”ix (Sharifi, 2015). Sharifi’s use of the past perfect progressive here 
emphasizes the self-consciousness of the actions by participants imagining their future 
selves looking back on the historical narrative they are creating. Writing in late 
September 2015, Kücük and Varatharajah elaborate this idea, imagining how “the past 
several months will remain in memory as the ‘summer of refugees and great solidarity.’ 
A supposedly well-earned nostalgia”x (2015). Following the script of the World Cup 
mobilizations and victories, these commentators observe in the mediated outpouring of 
support for refugees the preparation of narratives in the present as the basis of future 
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collective memory. The pattern is so well known, that nostalgia is already present while 
events are in process.  
Writing in mid-August, blogger Nadia Shehadeh observed the formation of this 
narrative. 
About a week and a half ago the German Summer Fairytale took off, a wonderful 
story of solidarity, harmony, and Occidental diligence that unfolded through 
volunteer action and the generosity on the part of all kinds of ascetics. Selfies in 
front of masses of donations were shot and uploaded onto the networks, because 
do good and talk about it! The talk was of the victory of civil society and of evil 
and of “goosebump moments.”xi (2015) 
In this description, the refugee crisis provided a moment of collective self-affirmation 
that picked up and even exceeded the breadth and power of the World Cup due to the 
seriousness of the task of saving lives and the “evil” antagonist of rightwing violence. 
Shehadeh goes on to vent her frustration as she watches her Facebook feed fill up with 
stories and images that could serve as architypes of the white savior complex. Shehadeh 
wryly notes that “this is the summer of the heroes, this summer 2015, above all the 
German heroes, and it didn't even require a soccer team”xii (2015). Shehadeh also focuses 
attention on the ways that social media has created an echo chamber amplifying the 
spectacle of the good. In an even more pointed commentary in the weekly business news 
magazine, Wirtschaftswoche, famous Turkish-German comedian and cabaret artist, 
Serdar Somuncu, expressed his frustration with the mediatized helper-ism in 
unambiguous terms: “The sympathy with refugees is degenerating into a spectacle of 
self-representation.... the common sense of welcoming culture is starting to make me 
sick…. last year it was the Ice Bucket Challenge, now it is refugees”xiii  (Somuncu, 
2015). Somuncu sees in the social media virality of refugee boosterism a competitive 
spectacle and predicts that the cause célèbre—in this case the mortal plight of refugees—
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will evaporate from public concern once the rash of excitement has passed. What will be 
left is the self-satisfaction and the security of the conviction that your community is on 
the side of the good.  
Beyond the simple frustration with the self-congratulation of majority Germans, 
commentators argue that the spectacle of the good poses several problems for addressing 
the needs and rights of refugees—problems that are intertwined with broader struggles to 
validate the political claims of minority Germans. As in integration discourse aimed at 
immigrants and minority Germans, the process of division separating the bad nationals 
from the good personalizes and, thus, depoliticizes issues of racism, inequity, and the 
place of diversity in German society. Both the condemnation of the bad and the 
celebration of the good draw attention away from cultural, structural, and institutional 
politics that materially impact the lives of refugees and minorities. Volunteerism risks 
setting up a paternalistic relationship between majority society and refugee supplicants 
(Kollender & Grote, 2015), rather than a relationship based on political commitments to 
human rights in which refugees themselves are recognized as legitimate political actors 
(Sharifi, 2015). 
Volunteerism also sets up a relationship based on the “symbolic violence”  
(Bourdieu, 1994) of the gift that must be met with appreciation and comes with the 
expectation of reciprocation. This prepares the way for the kinds of economic 
rationalities that have come to govern integration discourse since the beginning of the 
millennium, as the cases in this dissertation have shown. Kücük and Varatharajah see in 
Angela Merkel's asylum policy a desire to bind asylum policy and economic utility. This 
can be seen in the approving discussions of Germany's pragmatic approach to admitting 
411 
 
refugees as a solution for German labor shortages mentioned above. They write that, 
“refugees are welcome then, so long as they are useful, not least of all as apprentices, 
skilled workers and tax payers. But what about the illiterate, the aged and the 
psychologically and physically ill? Are the then less ‘worthy of saving,’ less welcome?” 
(Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). Here, through the question of economic utility, the 
biopolitical line dividing worthy from unworthy life emerges again. As Agamben argues, 
the refugee, who has lost all other claims but that of humanity, should be the ultimate 
embodiment of human rights, but “signals instead the concept’s radical crisis” (1998, p. 
126). Kücük and Varatharajah observe, even in the heady days of “welcome fever” 
(Kollender & Grote, 2015), the continuity of economic utilitarian discourse mobilized to 
assess those with nothing left but the claim to human rights. The poverty of those claims 
concerns Doris Akrap, who in listening to “good Germans” often asks herself,  
What is going to happen, when the new refugees demand more than a tent, a 
bottle of water and a slice of bread? How will German society deal with this next 
turning point? What if it turns out that not every refugee has the skills to equip 
them for the “made in Germany” brand?  
When the asylum comes in the form of a personal gift, the political demands a refugee 
might make appear as an affront to the host-guest relationship. The limits of this 
arrangement materialize the moment refugee political claims condemn the inhumane 
conditions of detention, the “camp as a form of violence” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). 
The limits have also emerged in the year since the “summer of heroes,” as two new 
revisions of asylum law have further restricted mobility and the forms of resources 
available to asylum seekers.  
In a development that in retrospect appears almost inevitable, the state has also 
responded to the crisis by implementing the first federal “Integration Law” 
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(Integrationsgesetz) in July 2016, which makes access to benefits dependent on 
attendance of “integration courses” and allows authorities to place restrictions on place of 
residence. The law also ties the continued permission to stay in Germany to successful 
participation in occupational training and employment. Picking up on the now well-
developed theme of integration discourse, the motivation for the law is summarized as 
“demand and support” (fördern und fordern). The law facilitates access to the job market 
for those with a strong likelihood of being granted asylum (guter Bleibeperspektive) and 
sanctions those who are unable or unwilling to participate. While the law commits to 
increasing resources for critical programs, including language classes, the emphasis on 
requirements and sanctions suggests that the problem with “integration” lies with the 
refusal on the part of asylum seekers to participate. As Pro Asyl’s (2016) position paper 
on a draft of the new law points out, in reality the problem is that the demand for 
language courses far outpaces the supply. The emphasis on penalties supports the 
prejudicial and counterfactual position that problems with “integration” lie solely in the 
refusal of refugees and immigrants to participate. 
 In the actions of public volunteerism and legal restriction over the past year, the 
critical commentators introduced above point to a crucial missing piece: the voices of 
those impacted—both contemporary and former refugees as well as guest workers, their 
descendants, and all those whose “migration background” is apparent, making them 
perpetual candidates for integration. Sharifi argues that “legal protection and political 
participation” are necessary, but must also be accompanied by the possibility of “active 
co-determination of societal and cultural self-conception” (2015). Reactions to the 
refugee situation underscore the importance of this kind of interpretational 
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enfranchisement. As the electoral success of the new rightwing political party, 
Alternatives for Germany (AfD), shows, a clear division between “dark” and “light” 
Germany—between the good normative national and the bad racist failed national—is a 
myth. Reactions to the increased demand for asylum in Germany demonstrate how 
biopolitical fragmentation operates as part of the acceptance of a new “colorful” 
Germany. In Serdar Somuncu’s words, “The most important task that we in this 
thankfully ever more diverse nation have is not to unthinkingly allocate affection and 
rejection, but rather to learn to weigh things and to allow argumentation in”xiv (2015). To 
achieve this, minority narratives must be part of mediated public discourse even when 
they contest majority norms and point to the uncomfortable issues of the structural and 
racialized components of poverty and inequality.  
The apparent polarization and division of the society into  
 the “helper nation” (Helfer-nation) and “dark Germany” (dunkeles Deutschland) 
obscures the intertwining of the celebration and condemnation of integration discourse. 
Narratives of integration facilitate the easy swing from one stance to the other, 
maintaining the positive self-conception of the normative national as tolerant and 
pragmatic while cordoning off the non-normative into the ambiguous category of the 
integrant. The conception of Germany as a paragon of Willkommenskultur was cemented 
by images of Germans celebrating refugees. The narrative that German support emerged 
from individual moral and empathetic commitments (based on having learned from the 
Nazi past) and out of pragmatic and thus durable economic self-interest established this 
welcoming reputation domestically and abroad. As the same time, the policy changes 
implemented in 2015 and 2016 represent a continuation of the restrictions of the 1990s, 
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when the “asylum compromise” abolished the sacrifice of sovereignty contained in the 
constitution's original commitment to asylum rights. The voices of refugees, along with 
their political organizing and their contestation of disappearing rights and inhumane 
conditions, remain marginal. 
Integration and the Citizen 
Less than two decades after the introduction of jus solis citizenship, integration 
discourse has become a cultural and a juridical norm, deepening political and cultural 
commitments to biopolitical rationalities for the cultivation of valued forms of life. The 
two major revisions of asylum law since 2015 were followed by the implementation of 
Germany’s first Integration Law in 2016, building on and significantly expanding the 
integration mandates of the Germany's first Immigration Law from a decade before.  This 
dissertation argues that the positive and apolitical nature of concepts and mandates 
associated with integration should not be taken for granted. Instead, we need to carefully 
consider what function the idea of integration plays wherever it is mobilized to define the 
rules for belonging and citizenship. Integration discourse depends on an evaluative 
framework that classifies the population first by their status as national or integrant, and 
second according to the threats and benefits they represent for the population at large. 
The category of the integrant must constantly be evaluated and managed to determine, 
both at the individual level and at the level of the group, whether integrants fall into the 
subcategory of successes or failures of integration. This evaluation determines whether 
non-nationals are beneficial or deleterious to the national population. Crucially, it is a 
perpetual evaluation that can never be definitively settled. As several of the cases studied 
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in this dissertation show, an integrant who is celebrated as a “successful example” in one 
situation may later be judged a failure or traitor to the cause of integration based on 
another situation.  
The topic of integration emerges where difference is seen as most insurmountable, 
and the paradigmatic Other is now the figure of the Muslim. While new generations of 
European-born Muslims are increasingly visible as national sports heroes, pop artists, and 
politicians, their success is too often mobilized to support the conviction that through 
integration success is equally accessible to all. This meritocratic myth perpetuates 
cultural deficiency models for explaining achievement and economic gaps, and erases the 
history of structural and interpersonal discrimination faced by immigrants and, especially, 
Turkish labor immigrants and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. The cases 
in this dissertation focus on high-profile mobilizations of integration since it arose as a 
major national concern at the turn of the millennium. These cases also all involve the 
definition of Germanness, the proper performance of national affiliation, and the 
projection of Germany’s future. Putting these cases in conversation with each other 
reveals the development of more inclusive social imaginaries as well as the entrenchment 
of racial narratives in an economic guise. Across Europe, the rejection of 
multiculturalism and its associated deliberative approaches in favor of integration has 
shifted the focus of public discussions on difference from a paradigm of action based on 
negotiation, contestation, and self-narration to a paradigm based on the management of 
life itself. 
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i Die zeigen es gibt ein helles Deutschland, das hier sich leuchtend darstellt gegenüber dem 
Dünkeldeutschland, das wir empfinden, wenn wir von Attacken auf Asylbewerber Unterkünfte oder gar 
Fremdenfeindliche Aktionen gegen Menschen hören. 
ii Das ist dies schöne Beispiele, das ist das Deutschland, das wir bauen und auf das wir uns stützen. Und das 
ist diese überdeutliche Antwort an Hetzer und Brandstifter, die das Angesicht unseres Landes 
verunzieren…. wir werden den sagen, Ihr repräsentiert uns nicht, und wir werden schon gar nicht dulden, 
dass Rechtsbrecher, im Grunde im Ausland und im Inland für dieses Deutschland stehen, das sich heute 
als offenes und hilfsbereites darstellt. 
iii Mit der Aktion WIR HELFEN will BILD ein Zeichen der Menschlichkeit setzen. Wir wollen zeigen, dass 
Schreihälse und Fremdenhasser NICHT in unserem Namen grölen! Dass Deutschland ein Herz hat für 
Menschen, die Hilfe brauchen! 
iv Unser Land überrascht sich selbst  
v Gastfreundschaft eignet sich nicht für nationalen Stolz und Narzissmus. 
vi In- und ausländische Presse überrascht uns mit dem Befund, dass wir ein gastfreundliches Volk sein 
sollen. Das hat offenbar niemand vorausgesehen. Und doch scheinen die in der ganzen Welt verbreiteten, 
wirklich sehenswerten Aufnahmen von den Münchener, Frankfurter und Dortmunder Bahnhöfen dieses 
Bild eindeutig zu bestätigen.  
vii Aber nicht im Sinne der Befreiung zu schamlosem und asozialem Reichtum, den man durch ein positives 
Selbstbild bemäntelt, sondern im Sinne der Freiheit, weltweit anderen, die auf eine Bleibe angewiesen 
sind, zu antworten.  
viii Solange es Leute gibt, die nichts können, nichts wissen und nichts geleistet haben, wird es auch 
Rassismus geben. Denn auch diese Leute wollen sich gut fühlen und auf irgendetwas stolz sein. Also 
suchen sie sich jemanden aus, der anders ist als sie und halten sich für besser. Oder sie 
sind bekloppterweise stolz darauf, ‚Deutsch‘ zu sein, wozu keinerlei Leistung ihrerseits nötig war. 
ix So waren es auch nicht die politischen Kämpfe der Geflüchteten-Aktivist*innen am Rindermarkt 2013, 
die die Menschen in München auf die Straße brachten, sondern der derzeit um sich greifende Drang 
beim deutschen Sommermärchen Teil 2 dabei gewesen zu sein. Es scheint, als wollen sich alle bei ihrem 
Einsatz überbieten, gefolgt von dem sich gegenseitig auf die Schulter klopfen und der medialen 
Inszenierung als Weltmeister der Willkommenskultur. 
x Die vergangenen Monate werden wohl in Zukunft als “Sommer der Flüchtlinge und der großen 
Solidarität” in Erinnerung bleiben. Eine vermeintlich wohlverdiente Nostalgie. 
xi Vor ungefähr anderthalb Wochen ging das doitsche Sommermärchen los, eine wundersame Fabel aus 
Zusammenhalt, Harmonie, abendländischem Fleiß der sich in ehrenamtlichem Engagement entfaltete und 
Großzügigkeit jenseits jeglicher Askese. Selfies vor Spendenmassen wurden geschossen und in 
Netzwerken hochgeladen, denn tue Gutes und spreche darüber! Vom Sieg der Zivilgesellschaft über das 
Böse und von Gänsehautmomenten war die Rede.  
xii Es ist ein Sommer der Held_innen, dieser Sommer 2015, vor allem der deutschen Held_innen, und es 
brauchte nicht mal eine Fußballmannschaft dafür. 
xiii Die Anteilnahme mit Flüchtlingen artet in ein Selbstdarstellungsspektakel aus. Was kotzt mich 
mittlerweile dieser Common Sense von Willkommenskultur an…. Letztes Jahr war’s noch 
die Icebucketchallenge, jetzt sind es die Flüchtlinge….   so unglaubwürdig ist die Anteilnahme, wenn sie 
Teil eines Spektakels wird, bei dem es vielmehr um das Image des engagiertesten Wohltäters zu gehen 
scheint, als um die Frage, wie man aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit lernen kann.  
xiv Die wichtigste Aufgabe, die wir in den nächsten Jahren in dieser Gott sei Dank immer vielfältiger 
werdenden Nation haben, ist es, nicht blind Zuneigung und Ablehnung zu verteilen, sondern das 
Abwägen zu lernen und Argumentationen zuzulassen. 
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